Before taking the self-test, refer back to the learning objectives at the beginning of the module and the glossary at the end of the module.
Use the key at the back of the book to correct your answers.
Restudy pages that correspond to any questions that you answered incorrectly or material you feel uncertain about.
In a two-person, zero-sum game,
each person has two strategies.
whatever is gained by one person is lost by the other.
all payoffs are zero.
a saddle point always exists.
A saddle point exists if
the largest payoff in a column is also the smallest payoff in its row.
the smallest payoff in a column is also the largest payoff in its row.
there are only two strategies for each player.
there is a dominant strategy in the game.
If the upper and lower values of the game are the same,
there is no solution to the game.
there is a mixed solution to the game.
a saddle point exists.
there is a dominated strategy in the game.
In a mixed strategy game,
each player will always play just one strategy.
there is no saddle point.
each player will try to maximize the maximum of all possible payoffs.
a player will play each of two strategies exactly 50% of the time.
In a two-person, zero-sum game, it is determined that strategy
strategy
the payoffs for strategy
a saddle point exists in the game.
a mixed strategy must be used.
In a pure strategy game,
each player will randomly choose the strategy to be used.
each player will always select the same strategy, regardless of what the other person does.
there will never be a saddle point.
the value of the game must be computed using probabilities.
The solution to a mixed strategy game is based on the assumption that
each player wishes to maximize the long-run average payoff.
both players can be winners with no one experiencing any loss.
players act irrationally.
there is sometimes a better solution than a saddle point solution.