cross-good pricing effects, 114
degree of product variety, 114
endogenous variables and cost shifters, 109
entry models with differentiation, 116 –118
first-order conditions, 108
implicit function technique, 111
inverse advertising demand function, 110
Jeziorski model, 111
linear monopoly demand, 109
marginal cost-marginal benefit analysis, 107–108
method of moments techniques, 110
monopoly newspaper markets, 108
“multi-product” firm pricing first-order
conditions, 112
Nash equilibrium, 112, 115
newspaper markets, 114
newspaper profit, 110
operating costs, 114
per-firm revenue function, 115
price-setting game, 110
pricing decisions, 109
single-product logit demand, 108
time-shifting technologies, 118
two-sided multi-product demand equations, 111
vector of demographics, 108
welfare maximizing equilibrium, 116
Media market outcomes, 217–218
Media multitasking
competition for attention, 220–221
media complementarities, 218–220
Median voter behavior, 421
Media platforms
ad-financed business model, 461–462
advertising effect, 239
advertising-financed business model, 47
advertising revenue, 460
blogging content, 462
dual source of financing, 239–240
duplication of genres, 237–239
empirical evidence, 242–243
imperfect competition in product market, 240–241
limits on ownership concentration and media
bias, 242
matching advertising to content, 494–511
matching advertising to users, 511–524
maximum vs. minimum differentiation, 237
multi-homing consumers, 241–242
non-participating bloggers, 462
second preferences, 239
simple formal exposition, 460
Merger policy and regulation
ad-financed platforms incentives, 228
antitrust authorities, 227, 244–250
consequences, 226
diversity and differentiation incentives, 227
Hotelling model, 227
platforms’ choice of genres, 236–243
possible non-price effect, 257–258
possible price effect, 250–257
price and quantity effects, 228–236
two-sided market, 226–227
Mergers, newspapers and magazines, 428–430
“Minor” broadcast networks, 271
Minority Telecommunications Development
Program, 368
Misleading advertising
cheap talk, 162–163
imperfect enforcement of laws, 163 –164
Mixed-finance model, 17
Mobile advertising, 457, 458f
Monopoly, 16–17
Multi-homing consumers
competition for advertisers, 241–242
two-sided markets, 231–235
Multi-homing consumers, Internet
aggregate demand, 472–473
business-sharing effect, 478–479
consumer demand structure, 476, 477 f
content duplication, 480
demand configuration, 475, 475f
duopoly, 475–476
duplication effect, 478–479
equilibrium prices and profits, 476– 477
incremental pricing, 478
monopoly, 475–476
one-sided market, 472
overlapping consumers, 475
positive consumer preference correlation, 479
profits, 473
transportation parameter, 476
two-sided ad-financed media model, 473–474
welfare-optimal locations, 473
Multi-homing readers
Anderson–Coate duopoly analysis, 67
behavior of advertisers, 66
competitive bottleneck, 66
535
Index