information). Results on product information disclosure suggest, however, that when
firms choose to provide limited information it is because it enhances their ability to cap-
ture consumer surplus, and hence forced disclosure rules are desirable for consumer
protection.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank Simon Anderson, Levent Celik, David Ettinger, Justin Johnson, Fre
´
de
´
ric Koessler, Marion
Oury, Andrew Rhodes, and Chris Wilson for helpful discussions and comments.
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