Chapter 25
Service concession arrangements

List of examples

Chapter 25
Service concession arrangements

1 INTRODUCTION

Service concession arrangements (SCAs) have been developed as a mechanism for governments to procure public services using private capital and management expertise. The rights and obligations of the public sector body procuring the services and the private sector entity providing the services are set out in a contract, the terms of which can be complex depending upon the nature of the SCA. The most common forms of arrangement are as follows:

  • ‘Build-operate-transfer’ SCA – where a private sector entity takes responsibility for building and operating infrastructure assets such as roads, bridges, railways, hospitals, prisons, power stations and schools, in consideration for a long-term contract from the public sector body giving the entity the right to charge for services to the public using that infrastructure;
  • ‘Rehabilitate-operate-transfer’ SCA – where the private sector entity restores or improves an existing facility or public service up to an agreed standard and continues to maintain and operate the related infrastructure for a contracted period. This type of arrangement includes a range of projects from the refurbishment of social housing and street lighting to major civil engineering projects to restore a city's underground rail system; and
  • ‘Operate-only’ SCA – where a private sector entity becomes responsible for the operational management and maintenance of an existing infrastructure asset that is used to provide services to the public. This last variant, together with the development of similar arrangements between private sector bodies, has at times obscured the boundary between service concessions and outsourcing arrangements (see 2.2.1 below).

The accounting challenge is to reflect the substance of these arrangements fairly in the financial statements of both of the contracting parties, because the various transactions between the parties to a SCA range across a number of accounting standards and interpretations, including:

  • accounting for the rights of the parties over the infrastructure assets (IAS 16 – Property, Plant and Equipment, and IFRS 16 – Leases);
  • construction or refurbishment of the infrastructure assets (IFRS 15 – Revenue from Contracts with Customers);
  • accounting for the various performance obligations under the contract during the operations period of the concession (IFRS 15 and IAS 37 – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets); and
  • recognition and measurement of the amounts payable or receivable under the arrangement (IAS 20 – Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance, IAS 23 – Borrowing Costs, IAS 32 – Financial Instruments: Presentation, IAS 37, IAS 38 – Intangible Assets – and IFRS 9 – Financial Instruments).

This makes it difficult to develop a coherent accounting model that deals with all the features of service concessions simultaneously, and from the position of both the private sector (i.e. the ‘operator’) and public sector (i.e. the ‘grantor’). Moreover, prior to the issue of IFRIC 12 – Service Concession Arrangements, entrenched national positions had developed and differing accounting treatments had been widely adopted in various jurisdictions, with or without a basis in specific local accounting standards. Also, some jurisdictions accepted more than one accounting treatment for broadly similar arrangements, some of which are influenced by a taxation basis that has been agreed with the jurisdictional taxation authorities. All this resulted in considerable diversity in the accounting by IFRS reporters of seemingly similar arrangements.

In 2001, SIC‑29 – Service Concession Arrangements: Disclosures – was issued. This did not attempt to address the accounting issues but considered the information that should be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements of an ‘operator’ and ‘grantor’ under a service concession arrangement. [SIC‑29.4]. Its requirements are described further at 7 below.

IFRIC 12 addresses the accounting issues from the perspective of the operator and was approved by the IASB in November 2006. The fact that the Interpretation took more than three years to develop indicates the complexity of the issues and the difficulty that the Committee encountered in fitting a solution into the existing accounting framework.

1.1 The Interpretations Committee's approach to accounting for service concessions

The Interpretations Committee views the primary accounting determination for the operator as being whether control over the infrastructure assets rests with to the operator or whether any new or existing assets under the concession arrangement are controlled by the grantor.

The Interpretations Committee suggests that arrangements where control does not rest with the grantor, and the asset is either derecognised by the grantor or is an asset constructed for the concession that the grantor never controls, can be dealt with adequately by other accounting standards or interpretations. [IFRIC 12.BC11‑BC13]. The interrelationship with other accounting standards is discussed further at 2.2 below.

Infrastructure assets controlled by the grantor are the subject of IFRIC 12. This applies whether the assets are constructed or acquired by the operator for the concession, that become those of the grantor because it controls them, or existing assets that remain under the grantor's control and to which the operator is granted access. [IFRIC 12.7].

‘Control’ is therefore a central concept in IFRIC 12. Control is not determined by attributing risks and benefits to identify the ‘owner’ of the infrastructure. Instead, IFRIC 12 regards control in terms of the operator's ability (or lack thereof) to decide how to use the asset during the concession term and how it will be deployed thereafter. Its definition and consequences are discussed further at 3 below.

Thus, any infrastructure that is under the control of the grantor will be accounted for using IFRIC 12. In doing so, the Interpretations Committee establishes the following principles for accounting by the operator of a concession falling within its scope:

  • the infrastructure is not recognised as property, plant and equipment by the operator; [IFRIC 12.11]
  • the operator recognises revenue from construction services when assets are built or upgraded during the concession term; [IFRIC 12.14]
  • a financial asset or an intangible asset is recognised as consideration for these construction services, depending upon the way in which the operator is paid for services under the contract; [IFRIC 12.15]
  • however, both types of consideration are classified as a contract asset during the construction or upgrade period in accordance with IFRS 15; [IFRIC 12.19] and
  • revenues and costs for the provision of operating services are recognised over the term of the concession arrangement. [IFRIC 12.20].

The requirement to recognise an asset as consideration for construction services gives rise to three service concession models – the ‘financial asset’ model, the ‘intangible asset’ model and a hybrid model. These are considered further at 4 below. However, under all models the operator is required to recognise a contract asset during the construction or upgrade period in accordance with IFRS 15. The recognition of revenue and costs in the operations phase is discussed at 5 below.

1.2 Terms used in this chapter

The following terms are used in this chapter with the meanings specified:

Term Definition
Grantor A public sector body (including a governmental body, or a private sector entity to which responsibility for a public service has been devolved) that grants the service arrangement. [IFRIC 12.3].
Operator A private sector entity that is contractually obliged to construct and/or upgrade, operate and maintain infrastructure used to provide services to the public on behalf of the public sector entity. The operator is responsible for at least some of the management of the infrastructure and related services and does not merely act as an agent on behalf of the grantor. [IFRIC 12.2, 3].
Service concession arrangement A contract that obliges the operator to construct and/or upgrade, operate and maintain infrastructure used to provide the services to the public on behalf of the grantor. The contract sets the initial prices to be levied by the operator and regulates price revisions over the period of the service arrangement. [IFRIC 12.3].
Infrastructure Assets used in the provision of services to the public. Examples include roads, bridges, tunnels, prisons, hospitals, airports, water distribution facilities, energy supply and telecommunications networks. [IFRIC 12.1]. Infrastructure can be constructed or acquired by the operator for the purpose of the service arrangement; or can be existing assets to which the grantor gives the operator access for the purpose of the service arrangement. [IFRIC 12.7].
Control criteria
  1. the grantor controls or regulates what services the operator must provide with the infrastructure, to whom it must provide them, and at what price; and
  2. the grantor controls any significant residual interest in the infrastructure at the end of the term of the arrangement, through ownership, beneficial entitlement or otherwise. [IFRIC 12.5].
Government Refers to government, government agencies and similar bodies whether local, national or international. [IAS 20.3].

2 SCOPE OF IFRIC 12

The scope of IFRIC 12 is specific and relatively narrow. The Interpretations Committee decided to address only public-to-private service concession arrangements in which:

  1. the grantor controls or regulates the services that the operator must provide using the infrastructure, to whom it must provide them, and at what price; and
  2. the grantor controls any significant residual interest in the property at the end of the concession term through ownership, beneficial entitlement or otherwise. (Infrastructure used in a service concession for its entire useful life is deemed to meet this second condition because there is no significant residual interest). [IFRIC 12.5, 6].

The Committee also decided to restrict its guidance to the accounting by operators in public-to-private service concession arrangements. [IFRIC 12.4]. Accordingly, the Interpretation does not specify the accounting by grantors. [IFRIC 12.9].

The Committee acknowledged that these restrictions would exclude many arrangements that are found in practice for private sector participation in the provision of public services. However, it concluded that the above conditions were likely to be met in most of the public-to-private service concession arrangements for which guidance had been sought and that other standards apply when these conditions are not a feature of the arrangement. [IFRIC 12.BC11‑13]. The standards that might apply for arrangements outside the scope of IFRIC 12 are set out at 2.2 below.

2.1 Public service nature of the obligation

Initially, as described in the exposure draft D12, the interpretation was intended to apply only to arrangements that involved a ‘public service obligation’, i.e. a contractual obligation for the operator to ‘keep available to the public the services related to the infrastructure’.

Having agreed that ‘the concept of a public service obligation was not in itself robust enough to form the basis for the scope’,1 the IFRIC did not retain this condition. This is understandable, since different governments will have a range of political or ideological views of what activities should be provided by the state and the definition of a ‘public service obligation’ may vary across jurisdictions and, sometimes, over time within the same jurisdiction.

As a result, the reference to ‘the public service nature of the obligation undertaken by the operator’ now only appears as a common feature of a service concession in the background section of the interpretation, without defining what is meant by the term. Instead, the Committee refers to examples of service concession arrangements. IFRIC 12 identifies roads, bridges, tunnels, prisons, hospitals, airports, water distribution facilities, energy supply and telecommunications networks as examples of infrastructure used for public services. [IFRIC 12.1]. SIC‑29 refers to water treatment and supply facilities, motorways, car parks, tunnels, bridges, airports and telecommunications networks. [SIC‑29.1]. It also states that a service concession arrangement generally involves the grantor conveying to the concession operator the right to provide services that give the public access to major economic and social facilities for the period of the concession. [SIC‑29.2(a)].

It is at least clear that it is not necessary for the operator to have direct involvement with the public as evidenced by the example in the Application Guidance of the interpretation of a ‘hospital [which] is used by the grantor to treat public patients’. [IFRIC 12.AG7].

2.2 Arrangements that are not in the scope of IFRIC 12

The Committee acknowledged that in practice there are arrangements for private sector participation in the provision of public services that will not fall in the scope of IFRIC 12. However, it was satisfied that the Interpretation would apply to most of the public-to-private service concession arrangements for which guidance had been sought. Nevertheless, the Committee did consider a range of typical arrangements and decided that it could provide references to the standards that apply to those that fall outside the scope of IFRIC 12 without giving any guidance as to their application. [IFRIC 12.BC13].

These references are presented in Information Note 2 to IFRIC 12 (on which the following table is based) and which shows a range of arrangements between the public and private sectors. The Interpretations Committee's view is that IFRIC 12 is interpreting IFRSs for the transactions in the middle of this range, where the application of standards was previously unclear. These are described in the table below as ‘Rehabilitate-operate-transfer’ and ‘Build-operate-transfer’ arrangements. The table also demonstrates how other standards, namely IFRS 16, IFRS 15 and IAS 16, apply to arrangements that do not contain the features of a public-to-private service concession as defined in the Interpretation.

Category Lessee Service Provider Owner
Typical arrangement types Lease, e.g. Operator leases asset from grantor Service and/or maintenance contract (specific tasks e.g. debt collection) Rehabilitate- operate- transfer Build- operate- transfer Build-
own-
operate
100% Divestment Privatisation, Corporation
Asset Ownership Grantor Operator
Capital Investment Grantor Operator
Demand Risk Shared Grantor Operator and/or Grantor Operator
Typical Duration 8‑20 years 1‑5 years 25‑30 years Indefinite (or may be limited by licence)
Residual Interest Grantor Operator
Relevant IFRSs IFRS 16 IFRS 15 IFRIC 12 IAS 16

2.2.1 Outsourcing arrangements

Service concessions are not the only contractual arrangements between public sector bodies and private sector providers of services. Public sector bodies lease buildings or other property, plant and equipment from private sector entities for their own use. The private sector entity might also be engaged to construct the buildings or other property before it is occupied by the public sector body. The public sector also engages independent subcontractors to perform procurement services or to outsource the operation of its internal activities and functions.

It is, important to consider whether the infrastructure is being used by the operator to provide services for the benefit of the public (such as in the case of a water treatment facility, for example), rather than to the grantor for its own benefit.

SIC‑29 identifies examples of activities that are not service concession arrangements, citing an entity outsourcing the operation of its internal services, such as employee cafeteria, building maintenance, and accounting or information technology functions. [SIC‑29.1].

The Interpretations Committee noted in September 2005 that it would not expect an information technology outsourcing arrangement for a government department to be dealt with under IFRIC 12.2

The assessment of whether an arrangement is a service concession within scope of IFRIC 12 or an outsourcing arrangement could give rise to differences in accounting for the private sector entity. Treating an arrangement as an outsourcing arrangement could result in the private sector entity recognising PP&E in its financial statements in respect of the assets subject to the arrangement. This would be the case if the arrangement were accounted for as the provision of goods and services under IFRS 15. When the private sector entity is considered to be the lessor, given the length of typical service concession arrangements, it is likely that a finance lease receivable would be recognised under IFRS 16. [IFRS 16.67]. Although for an arrangement accounted for under IFRIC 12, the private sector entity (operator) would in this case normally recognise a financial asset, an important distinction is that in an IFRIC 12 service concession, the private sector entity would recognise revenue in the period during which any infrastructure asset was being constructed. [IFRIC 12.14]. A lessor would record an IAS 16 asset under construction and only recognise revenue if the terms of the lease required that asset to be derecognised.

2.3 Interaction of IFRS 16 and IFRIC 12

IFRS 16 was issued by the IASB in January 2016 and became effective for annual reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2019. The scope of IFRS 16 excludes service concession arrangements falling within scope of IFRIC 12. [IFRS 16.3(c)]. Any arrangement that meets the control criteria in paragraph 5 of IFRIC 12 does not meet the definition of a lease. [IFRS 16.BC69]. IFRS 16 defines an arrangement as containing a lease if the contract conveys the right to control the use of an identified asset for a period of time in exchange for consideration. [IFRS 16.9]. A right to control the use of an identified asset is then described in terms of the right to direct the use of the asset. [IFRS 16.B9]. In this way, both IFRS 16 and IFRIC 12 apply a control model. Therefore, a conclusion that the grantor controls or regulates what services the operator must provide with the infrastructure, to whom, and at what price, [IFRIC 12.5], is not compatible with the assertion that the private sector entity has a leasehold interest in the same assets under IFRS 16. The control criteria in IFRIC 12 are discussed at 3 below.

In light of this, the IASB had considered whether it was necessary to explicitly exclude from the scope of IFRS 16 service concession arrangements within the scope of IFRIC 12. However, stakeholders informed the IASB that including a scope exclusion for service concession arrangements in IFRS 16 would provide clarity in this respect. [IFRS 16.BC69].

We believe that there is no requirement for entities to reassess whether arrangements entered into before the date of initial application of IFRS 16 that were previously determined to be leases under IFRIC 4 – Determining whether an Arrangement contains a Lease, fall in scope of IFRIC 12 or IFRS 16. This is because the transitional provisions of IFRS 16 allow a practical expedient whereby entities are not required to reassess whether a contract is, or contains, a lease at the date of initial application of the Standard if they had previously determined whether the contract contained a lease under IFRIC 4. As a result, entities only have to reassess service concession contracts entered into after the date of initial application of IFRS 16. [IFRS 16.C4]. The transitional provisions of IFRS 16 are discussed in Chapter 23 at 10.

2.4 Private-to-private arrangements

While the Interpretations Committee expects IFRIC 12 to be applied primarily to public-to-private arrangements, its application to private-to-private arrangements is neither required nor prohibited. The Basis for Conclusions notes that application by analogy could be appropriate under the hierarchy in IAS 8 – Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors – if the arrangement met the control criteria quoted at 2 above. [IFRIC 12.BC14]. Accordingly, the application of IFRIC 12 to other arrangements would be regarded as an accounting policy choice, rather than a treatment that could be determined on a case by case basis. However, this choice would not be possible if it was determined that the arrangement falls within the scope of other standards, such as IFRS 15 and IFRS 16.

2.5 Accounting by grantors

The Interpretation applies only to accounting by the operator, not the grantor. [IFRIC 12.4, 9]. Grantor accounting was determined not to be a priority for the Committee, who noted that grantors are government bodies that do not necessarily apply IFRS. [IFRIC 12.BC15]. In 2011, the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) approved a new standard, IPSAS 32 – Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor – that addresses the grantor's accounting in such arrangements. Its approach is consistent with that used for the operator's accounting in IFRIC 12, in that an infrastructure asset is recognised by the grantor, together with an obligation comprising either a financial liability to the operator or, where an unconditional to pay cash to the operator is not a feature of the arrangement, a deferred revenue balance.3 This chapter does not address accounting by grantors.

3 THE CONTROL MODEL

A contractual arrangement that is within the scope of IFRIC 12 includes the following features, commonly referred to as the ‘control criteria’:

  1. the grantor controls or regulates the services that the operator must provide using the infrastructure, to whom it must provide them, and at what price; and
  2. the grantor controls any significant residual interest in the infrastructure at the end of the concession term through ownership, beneficial entitlement or otherwise. [IFRIC 12.5].

The Interpretations Committee considers that, taken together, these conditions identify when the infrastructure is controlled by the grantor for the whole of its economic life, [IFRIC 12.AG6], in which case an operator is only managing the infrastructure on the grantor's behalf. Crucially, it has concluded from this that an infrastructure asset controlled by the grantor cannot be the property, plant and equipment of the operator. [IFRIC 12.11, BC21, BC22]. Control should be distinguished from management. If the grantor retains both the degree of control described in (a) above and any significant residual interest in the infrastructure, the operator is only managing the infrastructure on the grantor's behalf – even though, in many cases, it may have wide managerial discretion. [IFRIC 12.AG5].

3.1 Regulation of services

The control or regulation of services does not have to be governed by contract as it could include control via an industry regulator. Control also extends to circumstances in which the grantor buys all the output as well as those in which it is bought by other users.

The grantor and relevant related parties must be considered together. If the grantor is a public sector entity, the public sector as a whole, together with any independent regulators acting in the public interest, are to be regarded as related to the grantor. [IFRIC 12.AG2]. ‘Price’ can mean the amount at which the grantor buys the service or the amount that the operator charges members of the public or a combination of both.

This means that many regulated public utilities (water, sewage, electricity supply etc.) will fall within (a) at 3 above. Other arrangements that fall within (a) include public health facilities that are free to users and subsidised transport facilities (rail, some toll roads and bridges) that are partly paid by public sector grant and partly by passenger fares. Of course, all of these will only be within scope of IFRIC 12 if there is also a contract between grantor and operator for the arrangement and any significant residual interest is also ‘controlled’ by the grantor under (b).

The Interpretations Committee stresses that the grantor does not need to have complete control of the price. It is sufficient for the price to be regulated, which could be by way of a capping mechanism (regulated utilities are usually free to charge lower prices). Other ‘caps’ may not be so apparent. A contract may give the operator freedom to set its prices but any excess is clawed back by the grantor, e.g. through setting a maximum return on an agreed investment in the infrastructure. In such a case, the operator's return is capped and the price element of the control test is substantively met. [IFRIC 12.AG3].

Care should be taken to look to the substance of the agreements, so a cap that only applies in remote circumstances will be ignored.

Some arrangements only allow the grantor to control prices for part of the life of the infrastructure. For example, an operator may construct clinical facilities that are used by a government health care provider (the grantor) for a five-year contract term. At the end of the term, the health care provider may extend the contract by renegotiation. If it does not do so, the operator can run the facilities for private health care. Although the prices are controlled for the first five years, this arrangement is unlikely to meet the control condition in (a) at 3 above.

Alternatively, the contract might allow regulation of the prices of some but not all the services provided with the infrastructure. Judgement is required in determining whether arrangements involving partially regulated assets fall within the scope of IFRIC 12 (see 3.4 below).

3.2 Control of the residual interest

In order for an arrangement to be within scope of IFRIC 12, the grantor must control not only the services provided with the infrastructure but also any significant residual interest in the property at the end of the concession term through ownership, beneficial entitlement or otherwise. [IFRIC 12.5(b)]. The grantor's control over any significant residual interest should restrict the operator's ability to sell or pledge the infrastructure. As discussed below, control over the residual interest does not require the infrastructure to be returned to the grantor. It is sufficient that the grantor controls how access to the infrastructure is awarded after the concession term.

The control approach requires consideration of the infrastructure as a whole (what the IFRIC refers to as a ‘holistic’ approach), thereby avoiding the piecemeal accounting for the different components of the infrastructure as required by IAS 16. If the operator has to replace part of an item of infrastructure during the life of the concession, e.g. the top layer of a road or the roof of a building, the item of infrastructure is to be considered as a whole, so that condition (b) will be met for the whole of the infrastructure, including the part that is replaced, if the grantor has the residual interest in the final replacement of that part. [IFRIC 12.AG6].

The Interpretation does not expand on what is regarded as ‘significant’. Some infrastructure assets such as toll roads and bridges generate cash flows directly and it may be possible to use estimated future cash flows to calculate the significance of the residual value, whether or not the grantor will charge tolls after reversion of the asset. It may not be possible to base the assessment of ‘significance’ on the cash flows received by the operator on handing back the asset to the grantor as these may be nominal amounts; indeed, the grantor may pay nothing. The remaining useful life of the asset when it reverts may give a good indication, e.g. if a hospital is handed back to the public sector with a remaining useful life of twenty years, this residual interest is likely to be significant.

There are a number of features that indicate whether the grantor controls the residual interest. There are usually several contractual alternatives: the operator is granted a second concession term, a new operator is allowed to acquire the assets or the grantor acquires the assets and brings the arrangement ‘in house’. The grantor still controls the residual as it will determine which of these alternatives applies and the option exercise price (if it or a new operator acquires the infrastructure) is irrelevant.

In some arrangements the grantor only has an option to reacquire the asset at the end of the concession term. The operator cannot control the infrastructure until the grantor decides what to do with the option. An option at fair value at the date of exercise may by itself be enough to give the grantor control over the residual under IFRIC 12 if it is sufficient to restrict the operator's ability to sell or pledge the infrastructure. This is a clear difference between a ‘risks and rewards’ and a ‘control’ model as under the former, the operator would be seen as keeping the risks and rewards of ownership if another party had the right to acquire the asset at fair value.

What if the arrangement is for the whole life of the infrastructure? Assets in service concession arrangements may revert to the grantor at the end of the concession term but they may not have much, if any, remaining useful life. Many modern buildings, for example, only have a useful life of thirty years or so and this is a common concession term. Consequently, infrastructure used in a service concession arrangement for its entire useful life (‘whole of life infrastructure’) is included within the scope of IFRIC 12 if the grantor controls or regulates the services that the operator must provide using the infrastructure, to whom it must provide them, and at what price. [IFRIC 12.6].

The Interpretations Committee noted that one reason for including the ‘significant residual interest’ requirement was to differentiate between privatised, but still regulated, industries and service concession arrangements, thereby seeming to confirm that it had not intended regulated industries to be in scope.4 The Interpretations Committee considers that privatised regulated industries should generally be out of scope, because they are divestitures or privatisations where it is more appropriate to treat the infrastructure as the property, plant and equipment of the operator. This is indicated in the table included as Information Note 2 to IFRIC 12 (reproduced at 2.2 above). It is usually the case in a privatisation that the infrastructure only reverts to the grantor in the event of a major breach of the conditions of the regulatory framework as otherwise the right of the operator to provide the regulated services may roll over indefinitely into a new term. In other cases, it may require legislative change to bring the assets back into the control of the public sector. This means that the grantor does not control the residual interest in the property as required by IFRIC 12.

ENGIE discloses that some of its concessions are not considered to be within scope of IFRIC 12 as the grantor has no rights over the infrastructure at the end of the contract. These assets (for gas distribution) are likely to have an economic life significantly in excess of the contract term.

3.3 Assets within scope

There are two groups of assets within scope of IFRIC 12:

  1. the infrastructure that the operator constructs or acquires from a third party for the purpose of the concession; and
  2. existing infrastructure to which the grantor gives the operator access for the purpose of the concession. [IFRIC 12.7].

Generally, ‘infrastructure’ is interpreted broadly and it is accepted that ‘the infrastructure’ used to provide services can include moveable assets. Although IFRIC 12 uses the word ‘infrastructure’ and includes examples traditionally regarded as such, including roads, bridges, hospitals and airports, [IFRIC 12.1], the Interpretation is based on the definition of an asset under IFRS. An asset is ‘a present economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events’, [CF 4.3], and is therefore considered to apply to all assets, including items such as buses or rolling stock that are made available by the grantor to the operator of the public service.

It is usually relatively straightforward to apply (a) above to infrastructure that the operator constructs or acquires from a third party for the purpose of the concession. The accounting for service concession arrangements in which infrastructure is leased from a party other than the grantor is discussed at 3.3.1 below.

However, there are some issues of interpretation relating to infrastructure to which the grantor has given access to the operator for the purpose of the SCA. Infrastructure under (b) above could include other arrangements in the form of leases from the grantor over assets. As part of a SCA, in addition to receiving payments for the construction and/or operation of the infrastructure, an operator may make lease payments to a grantor, e.g. it may lease the land on which a facility is to be built. These issues are discussed at 3.3.2 below.

A third group of assets comprises property, plant and equipment previously held by the operator and then used in connection with the provision of services under the SCA. The Interpretations Committee's view is that accounting for these types of assets is already covered by existing accounting standards, principally IAS 16, and therefore it does not specify how the operator should account for its previously existing assets that now form part of the infrastructure. [IFRIC 12.8]. The treatment of existing assets is discussed further at 3.3.3 below.

3.3.1 Accounting for service concession arrangements for which the infrastructure is leased from a party other than the grantor

As noted at 3.3 above, assets within the scope of IFRIC 12 include infrastructure that the operator constructs or acquires from a third party for the purpose of the service arrangement and existing infrastructure to which the grantor gives the operator access for the purpose of the service arrangement. [IFRIC 12.7]. In some cases, an operator may enter into an arrangement with the grantor to provide a public service using infrastructure that is leased. For example, an operator may lease trains in order to provide rail transportation services to the public. The accounting for arrangements in which infrastructure is leased from the grantor are addressed at 3.3.2 below. Where the lessor and grantor are controlled by the same governmental body and are related parties, lease payments made by the operator to the lessor are, in substance, payments made to a grantor in a service concession arrangement5 which are covered at 3.3.2 below. For arrangements in which infrastructure is leased from a third party, the first question that arises is whether such arrangements are in scope of IFRIC 12. If so, how should the operator account for any assets and liabilities arising from the arrangement with the lessor?

The Interpretations Committee has discussed these questions in respect of an arrangement where infrastructure is leased from a third party lessor, unrelated to the grantor, and the operator is not required to provide any construction or upgrade services with respect to the infrastructure. In the fact pattern discussed, the operator is contractually required to pay the lessor for the lease of the infrastructure, and has an unconditional contractual right to receive cash from the grantor to reimburse those payments. In September 2016, the Interpretations Committee observed that:

  1. Assessing whether an arrangement is in scope of IFRIC 12 requires consideration of all facts and circumstances, in particular whether the control conditions in paragraph 5 of IFRIC 12 are met (see 3 above), and whether the infrastructure falls within one of the groups of assets set out in paragraph 7 of IFRIC 12 as in scope of IFRIC 12 (see 3.3 above). However, an operator is not required to provide construction or upgrade services with respect to the infrastructure for the arrangement to be in scope of IFRIC 12.
  2. If the arrangement is in scope of IFRIC 12, then it is the grantor, not the operator, that controls the right to use the infrastructure. Accordingly, the operator should assess whether it has the obligation to make payments to the lessor for the lease, or whether the grantor has this obligation.
    1. If the grantor has the obligation to make payments to the lessor, the operator is collecting cash from the grantor that it remits to the lessor on behalf of the grantor.
    2. If the operator has the obligation to make payments to the lessor as part of the service concession arrangement, the operator should recognise a liability for this obligation when it is committed to the service concession arrangement and the infrastructure is made available by the lessor. At the time the operator recognises the liability, it should also recognise a financial asset because the operator has a contractual right to receive cash from the grantor to reimburse those payments. The operator should offset the liability to make payments to the lessor against the corresponding receivable from the grantor only when the criteria for offsetting a financial asset and financial liability in IAS 32 are met.6 The offsetting criteria in IAS 32 are discussed at Chapter 54 at 7.4.

In contrast to the fact pattern discussed by the Committee, if the operator is contractually required to pay the lessor for the lease of the infrastructure, but does not have an unconditional contractual right to receive cash from the grantor to reimburse those payments, then in effect it is paying the lease payments on behalf of the grantor. Therefore, the operator should recognise a liability for this obligation and treat this obligation either as an additional cost of the concession right asset under the intangible asset model or as a reduction to the overall consideration the financial asset model applies (see section 3.3.2 below.).

3.3.2 Periodic payments to the grantor for the right to use assets

Assets within the scope of IFRIC 12 include infrastructure that the operator constructs or acquires from a third party for the purpose of the service arrangement and existing infrastructure to which the grantor gives the operator access for the purpose of the service arrangement. [IFRIC 12.7]. IFRIC 12 contains no explicit guidance regarding periodic payments made to the grantor in connection with the right to use assets. The issue is whether these costs should be treated as lease costs in accordance with IFRS 16, treated as executory in nature with costs expensed as incurred or otherwise recognised as a liability. If they are considered to be within scope of IFRIC 12, what are the accounting consequences? Are they part of the overall consideration paid by the grantor or recognised as an asset and, if an asset, did they form part of the ‘concession asset’ at the start of the concession, with an obligation to make the related payments?

This has been discussed by the Interpretations Committee. The Committee decided in March 2016 that the treatment of variable payments for asset purchases, including payments that vary in relation to future activity by the purchaser, was too broad an issue for it to address, and consequently decided not to add the issue to its agenda.7

For fixed payments made by the operator to the grantor, the Committee observed in July 2016 that IFRIC 12 would apply, unless:

  1. they are payments for the right to a good or service that is separate from the service concession arrangement, which should be accounted for under other applicable IFRSs; or
  2. they are payments for the right to use an asset that is separate from the infrastructure within the scope of IFRIC 12, in which case the operator should assess whether the arrangement contains a lease. If the arrangement contains a lease, the operator should account for those payments by applying IFRS 16.8

This approach is consistent with the requirements in IFRS 15 to determine whether consideration payable to a customer gives rise to goods or services distinct from the customer contract (see Chapter 29 at 2.7). [IFRS 15.70‑72]. Payments that are part of the overall concession agreement but do not fall within these two exceptions will be accounted for as part of the SCA. In this case the accounting treatment will depend on whether the SCA falls within the financial asset model, the intangible asset model or is a hybrid. If the financial asset model applies, payments would be treated as reductions to the overall consideration received and therefore be offset against the financial asset receivable under the SCA. In contrast, under the intangible asset model the payments to the grantor should be recognised as a liability that increases the cost of the concession right asset. This is discussed further at 4.7 below.

3.3.3 Previously held assets used for the concession

IFRIC 12 does not apply to infrastructure held and recognised as property, plant and equipment by the operator before entering into the SCA. If such assets of the operator become part of the infrastructure in the SCA, the operator must apply the derecognition requirements of IAS 16 to determine whether it should derecognise those previously held assets. [IFRIC 12.8]. The Interpretations Committee's view is that accounting for assets is already covered by existing accounting standards, principally IAS 16, and therefore it is not necessary to specify how the operator should account for its previously existing assets that now form part of the infrastructure. [IFRIC 12.BC16].

The implication is that losing control of a previously held asset by contractually giving control of its use to the grantor may be a disposal of the asset under IAS 16. The existing asset would be derecognised and any consideration on the disposal established in accordance with the requirements for determining the transaction price in IFRS 15. [IAS 16.72]. This means that the total consideration received under the contract would be allocated between an amount receivable for construction and upgrade services and an amount to reflect the transfer of the asset to the control of the grantor. What was previously recorded by the operator as property, plant and equipment would be replaced by an element of either an intangible asset or a financial asset, depending on the accounting model determined to be appropriate to the particular SCA (see 4.1.2 below). Gains and losses must be calculated as the difference between any net disposal proceeds and the carrying value of the item of property, plant and equipment, [IAS 16.71], and recognised in profit or loss. Derecognition of assets within scope of IAS 16 in general is discussed in Chapter 18 at 7.

The operator may use some of its existing assets for the purpose of the concession without transferring control to the grantor. Unless the contract transfers the residual interest in these pre-existing assets to the grantor (and thereby both of the control criteria laid out at 3 above are met), these assets are out of scope of IFRIC 12. If an infrastructure asset is itself out of scope, the SCA might include, for example, extensions to that asset, upgrades to it and a contractual period of using the infrastructure asset to provide services. In this case, the total consideration payable under the concession will be allocated between the extension, upgrade and operating services within scope of IFRIC 12. Accordingly, construction revenue would be recognised at the time of the extension or upgrade work, with an additional financial asset or intangible asset recognised as appropriate.

3.4 Partially regulated assets

IFRIC 12 notes that it is not uncommon for the use of infrastructure to be partly regulated and partly unregulated and gives examples while noting that these activities take a variety of forms:

  1. ‘any infrastructure that is physically separable and capable of being operated independently and meets the definition of a cash generating unit as defined in IAS 36 –Impairment of Assets – shall be analysed separately if it is used wholly for unregulated purposes. For example, this might apply to a private wing of a hospital, where the remainder of the hospital is used by the grantor to treat public patients.
  2. where purely ancillary activities (such as a hospital shop) are unregulated, the control tests shall be applied as if those services did not exist, because in cases in which the grantor controls the services described in paragraph 5, the existence of ancillary activities does not detract from the grantor's control of the relevant infrastructure.' [IFRIC 12.AG7].

In both cases, the grantor may have given to the operator a right to use the unregulated asset in question. This right may be in substance a lease from the grantor to the operator; if so, this is to be accounted for in accordance with IFRS 16. [IFRIC 12.AG8]. Determining whether the right is, in substance, a lease would involve using the principles in IFRS 16 (see Chapter 23 at 3.1). The interaction of IFRIC 12 and IFRS 16 is discussed at 2.3 above.

The Interpretation gives no further guidance on how an entity might interpret the term ‘purely ancillary’ in evaluating whether an unregulated activity is ignored for the purposes of determining if the control criteria are met or considered to detract from the grantor's control of the asset. The hospital shop is clearly insignificant by virtue of its size relative to the whole hospital, the proportion of cash flows attributable to it and the fact that the existence of a shop has no direct impact on the function of the infrastructure in the provision of regulated services. However, it is not clear at what point a secondary activity would become or cease to be ‘purely ancillary’ which will be a matter of judgement.

In addition, there are many concession agreements that include unregulated services that are neither purely ancillary nor delivered by using a physically separable portion of the total infrastructure, a situation not addressed by AG 7. For example, a grantor may control prices charged to children, pensioners and the unemployed who use a sports facility but the amounts charged to other adults are not controlled. The same facility is being used by all, regardless of the amount that they pay. Alternatively, price regulation could apply only to services provided at certain times of the day rather than to different classes of user. In such cases it will be a matter of judgement whether enough of the service is unregulated in order to demonstrate that the grantor is not considered to control the asset, which would lead to the arrangement as a whole falling out of the scope of IFRIC 12. This assessment will be made at the beginning of the contract and will not be revisited unless errors were made in the original assessment. In practice, partial price regulation is often a reason for an arrangement to fall outside the scope of IFRIC 12.

However, if it transpires that there are significantly fewer unregulated users than anticipated then it is likely that the contract will be renegotiated. This is because of the public service obligation, which means that the grantor will want the service to continue to be provided to the public albeit under new terms. The new contract may be within scope of IFRIC 12. If a toll bridge has had fewer users than anticipated, the grantor might subsidise the tolls under a new arrangement.

4 ACCOUNTING BY THE CONCESSION OPERATOR: THE FINANCIAL ASSET AND INTANGIBLE ASSET MODELS

The Interpretations Committee's accounting framework for public-to-private arrangements is summarised in the following diagram from Information Note 1 in IFRIC 12. The diagram starts with the presumption that the arrangement has already been determined to be a service concession (see 2 above):

image

The two accounting models in IFRIC 12 apply several decisions of principle:

  • the control model applies as described at 3 above, which means that the operator will not recognise infrastructure assets as its property, plant and equipment; [IFRIC 12.11] and
  • the operator is providing ‘construction services’ and not, for example, constructing an item of property, plant and equipment for sale. Construction services are to be accounted for separately from ‘operation services’ in the operations phase of the contract. [IFRIC 12.14, BC31].

There is a third important point of principle: although the nature of the consideration determines the subsequent accounting (as discussed at 4.1.2 below), both types of consideration give rise to a contract asset during the construction or upgrade period. [IFRIC 12.19]. The point at which the consideration is subsequently classified as a receivable or intangible asset is discussed at 4.2 and 4.3 below, respectively.

4.1 Consideration for services provided and the determination of the appropriate model

Most service concession agreements are for both construction (or upgrade) services and operations services. Operators almost always negotiate a single contract with the grantor and, although the Interpretation does not refer to this, this will usually include a single payment mechanism throughout the concession term, sometimes called a ‘unitary payment’. The operator is unlikely to be remunerated separately for its different activities. The payment mechanism often falls into one or other of the following models:

  • P = (F × I) – (D + E)
  • P = unitary payment per day
  • F = price per day for overall accommodation requirement
  • I = Indexation increase based on the retail prices index
  • D = deductions for unavailability
  • E = performance deductions

The payments for both schemes are not immediately separable between amounts attributable to the construction or other services.

  1. a prison where payment is made based on the number of occupied places

The unitary payment is based on the number of occupied places. Occupied means not only that a prisoner is allocated a physical space but the associated core services and minimum requirements must be met in relation to services such as heating, mail delivery and food. No payment is made for unoccupied places. There are no separate payment streams for any of the non-core services (i.e. not associated with the definition of an occupied place) but deductions from the unitary payment can be made for substandard performance of these services.

The unitary payment is based on the following formula:

  • P = (F × I) – Z
  • P = unitary payment per place
  • F = Fixed amount per occupied place per day
  • I = Indexation increase based on the retail prices index
  • Z = Performance deductions

The operator acts as a service provider. It constructs or upgrades infrastructure used to provide a public service and operates and maintains that infrastructure for a specified period of time. [IFRIC 12.12]. IFRIC 12 clarifies that the operator should recognise and measure revenue in accordance with IFRS 15 for the services it performs. [IFRIC 12.13]. This requires the operator to allocate the consideration receivable to each performance obligation in proportion to their relative stand-alone selling prices. The exercise to separate the consideration receivable for the distinct services (i.e. construction, upgrade or operating services) provided by the operator is expanded at 4.1.1 below. The nature of the consideration determines the accounting model, [IFRIC 12.13], as described at 4.1.2 below.

Payments often start only when the infrastructure asset has been completed and accepted as suitable for purpose by the grantor. Operators usually seek payment during the construction phase but whether or not they receive any is inevitably a result of negotiation between the parties. Payments that are received are normally for services provided and not directly to meet construction costs; any amounts received will be allocated to the relevant service activity as described below.

4.1.1 Allocating the consideration

The Interpretation argues that the separate services within a service concession arrangement, i.e. ‘construction services’, ‘upgrade services’ or ‘operations services’, should be disaggregated ‘because each separate phase or element has its own distinct skills, requirements and risks’. [IFRIC 12.BC31].

The allocation of revenue for the provision of these separate services is determined in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.14, 20]. This involves identifying who is the customer(s) of the service concession arrangement (see 4.1.1.A below), identifying the performance obligations under the contract with the customer (see 4.1.1.B below), determining the transaction price under the contract(s) (see 4.1.1.C below), and allocating that transaction price to the performance obligations in the contract (see 4.1.1.D below).

4.1.1.A Identifying the contract(s) with a customer

The first step in allocating consideration in accordance with IFRS 15 is to identify the contract with the customer. Under IFRS 15, a contract is defined as an agreement between two parties that creates enforceable rights and obligations. [IFRS 15 Appendix A]. Whether the customer in a service concession arrangement is the grantor and/or the user of the infrastructure will depend on the terms and conditions of the service concession arrangement. Because the grantor of the concession retains control over the infrastructure asset, [IFRIC 12.5], it is likely that the grantor will be identified as the customer for any construction or upgrade services.

Because of the public service nature of the obligation undertaken by the operator, the operating services are provided to the public. This suggests that the public may be the customer for the operating services. A customer is defined in IFRS 15 as a party that has contracted with an entity to obtain goods or services that are an output of an entity's ordinary activities in exchange for consideration. [IFRS 15 Appendix A]. IFRS 15 does not require the existence of a written contract; a contract may be oral or implied, although it must be legally enforceable. [IFRS 15.10]. Therefore, where a written or implied contract exist between the operator and users of the infrastructure, the operator receives consideration from those users of the infrastructure, and is collecting that consideration as principal (rather than as agent for the grantor), we believe that the users of the infrastructure may be identified as the customers for the operation services.

Identification of the contract with the customer under IFRS 15 is discussed in Chapter 28.

4.1.1.B Identifying the performance obligations in the contract

Most service concession agreements are for both construction (or upgrade) services and operations services. Many service concessions also require the operator to perform some level of maintenance of the infrastructure asset over the term of the service concession arrangement. IFRS 15 provides guidance on the types of items that may be goods or services promised in the contract. Examples given by the standard include performing a contractually agreed-upon task (or tasks) for a customer, and providing a service of standing ready to provide goods or services. [IFRS 15.26].

A promised good or service is a performance obligation if it is either:

  1. a good or service that is distinct; or
  2. a series of distinct goods or services that are substantially the same and have the same pattern of transfer to the customer. [IFRS 15.22].

In order to be distinct, a promised good or service must be:

  1. capable of being distinct – i.e. provide a benefit to the customer either on its own or together with other resources that are readily available to the customer; and
  2. distinct within the context of the contract – i.e. the entity's promise to transfer the good or service to the customer is separately identifiable from other promises in the contract. [IFRS 15.27].

If a promised good or service is not distinct, IFRS 15 requires that the entity should combine those goods or services with other promised goods or services until it identifies a bundle of goods or services that is distinct. [IFRS 15.30].

Where an operator has identified only one contract with the grantor, the operator would typically identify, at least, construction services, upgrade services and operation services as separate performance obligations. Whether the operator has identified a contract with the users of the infrastructure as the customer for the operating services will impact the identification of performance obligations within the contract(s) with customers.

It could be argued that because major maintenance enhances an asset that the grantor owns, then it is providing a benefit to the grantor. In addition, contractual terms often require an operator to repay an element advanced by the grantor for maintenance services if the operator does not incur contracted levels of maintenance spend. This may also support the argument that maintenance is a separate performance obligation. In practice, there is likely to be some judgement involved in determining whether maintenance is a separate performance obligation, based on how it is defined in the contractual arrangement. To the extent that the contract requires the operator to provide major maintenance, similar in nature to an upgrade, that enhances the infrastructure asset, maintenance could be a separate performance obligation. However, minor maintenance necessary to preserve the infrastructure in a condition required for the operator to operate the infrastructure safely and to return it to the grantor in a certain condition at the end of the arrangement could be argued as not transferring a distinct good or service to the grantor. In other cases, it may be less clear whether a contractual obligation represents a performance obligation under IFRS 15 or an obligation that should be accounted for under IAS 37. For example, a water supply operator may be contractually required to replace all lead pipes for environmental and health reasons; similarly, a gas supply operator may be required to replace all cast-iron pipes for safety reasons. If an entity exercises significant judgement in determining whether major maintenance is a separate performance obligation, consideration should be given to the disclosure requirements in paragraph 122 of IAS 1 – Presentation of Financial Statements. See Chapter 3 at 5.1.1.B.

In practice, operators may often sub-contract some or all the construction activities under a service concession arrangement. In such cases, the operator should apply the guidance in IFRS 15 to determine whether it is acting as principal or agent for the provision of construction services. This determination will impact whether the operator's performance obligation under the contract is to provide construction services, or to arrange for another party to provide construction services. Principal versus agent considerations under IFRS 15 are discussed in Chapter 28 at 3.4.

4.1.1.C Determining the transaction price under the contract

Transaction price is defined in IFRS 15 as the amount of consideration to which an entity expects to be entitled in exchange for transferring promised goods or services to a customer, excluding amounts collected on behalf of third parties. [IFRS 15.47].

The determination of transaction price must take into account any elements of variable consideration. It is often the case within service concession arrangements that the operator will be required to pay penalties if their performance under the contract does not meet specified standards. The element of revenue that is subject to such penalties would be considered a form of variable consideration under IFRS 15. [IFRS 15.51]. IFRS 15 requires that, if the consideration promised in a contract includes a variable amount, an entity should estimate the amount of consideration to which they will be entitled. [IFRS 15.50]. IFRS 15 requires that variable consideration should be estimated using either an expected value or most likely amount basis, depending on which method the entity expects to better predict the amount of consideration to which it will be entitled. [IFRS 15.63]. The assessment of which approach is most appropriate will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the service concession arrangement and the penalty regime. In practice, it may be that the expected value approach better predicts the amount of consideration to which the operator expects to be entitled in many service concession arrangements. Estimates of variable consideration are then included in the transaction price only to the extent that it is highly probable that a significant reversal of revenue will not occur when the uncertainty associated with the variable consideration is subsequently resolved. [IFRS 15.56].

Payments often start under a service concession arrangement only when the infrastructure asset has been completed and accepted as suitable for purpose by the grantor. In these cases, the delay between the timing of payments from the grantor compared to the provision of construction services by the operator, may require a significant financing component to be taken into account in determining the transaction price. However, where the reason for the difference between the cash selling price of the construction services and the promised consideration arises for reasons other than the provision of finance, and the difference between those amounts is proportional to the reason given for the difference, the contract does not contain a significant financing component. [IFRS 15.62]. This may be the case where the form of the consideration for the construction services necessitates a delay between the provision of the services and the receipt of the consideration, such as where the operator receives an intangible asset in return for construction services.

The amount of promised consideration should be discounted at a rate that the operator would use if it were to enter into a separate financing transaction with the grantor at contract inception. The discount rate should reflect the credit characteristics of the grantor, as well as any collateral or security provided, including assets transferred in the contract, [IFRS 15.64], i.e. the discount rate is a rate specific to the contract. IFRS 15 also notes that the discount rate could be derived by discounting the contractual cash flows to a cash selling price for the promised good or service. [IFRS 15.64]. In Illustrative Example 1 to IFRIC 12, the implied interest rate in the contract is assumed to be the rate that would be reflected in a financing transaction between the operator and the grantor, although this may not always be the case in a service concession arrangement. Some may argue that the rate implicit in the contract more appropriately reflects the economic substance. However, in our view, primacy should be given to the rate that the operator would use if it were to enter into a separate financing transaction with the grantor at contract inception. Whilst the rate implicit in the contract may be used in determining that rate, we believe that that the use of the rate implicit in the contract may not always be consistent with the objective of paragraph 64 of IFRS 15, being to use a discount rate that would be reflected in a separate financing transaction between the entity and the customer.

The effect of financing is excluded from the transaction price prior to the allocation of transaction price to performance obligations.

Determination of the transaction price under IFRS 15 is discussed in Chapter 29.

An operator may also be contractually required to make payments to the grantor. These may take the form of payments for the right of access to infrastructure or other assets, for the construction of assets or additional fees for the right to operate the concession. If the SCA falls within the financial asset model, the payments made may reduce the consideration received from the grantor. This is considered further at 4.7 below.

4.1.1.D Allocating the transaction price to the performance obligations in the contract

IFRS 15 generally requires the transaction price to be allocated to each performance obligation in proportion to their relative stand-alone selling prices. [IFRS 15.74].

If stand-alone selling prices are not readily observable, they must be estimated, considering all information that is reasonably available to the entity. The operator may choose to estimate stand-alone selling prices using an expected cost-plus margin approach, [IFRS 15.79], although other approaches are permitted.

Although most service concessions apply a single payment mechanism, it is often straightforward in practice to identify the underlying cash flows that relate to different activities within the arrangement. This may be based on the original contract negotiations or because the contract contains terms allowing for subsequent price adjustments by ‘market testing’ or benchmarking. However, the cash flows may not reflect the stand-alone prices of the underlying services so care will have to be taken. There may be practical problems when it comes to apportioning the total contract consideration between the elements of the contract and the allocation will be a matter of judgement.

Allocation of the transaction price to performance obligations under IFRS 15 is discussed in Chapter 29.

4.1.2 Determining the accounting model after the construction phase

IFRIC 12 states that the operator may receive a financial asset or an intangible asset as consideration for its construction services and the asset that it receives determines the subsequent treatment. [IFRIC 12.15, 19]. The nature of the consideration given by the grantor to the operator shall be determined by reference to the contract terms and, when it exists, relevant contract law. However, the Interpretation is clear that both types of consideration give rise to a contract asset during the construction or upgrade period. [IFRIC 12.19].

The Interpretations Committee decided that the boundary between the financial and the intangible asset models should be based on the operator's unconditional contractual right to receive cash from, or at the direction of, the grantor. [IFRIC 12.16]. The grantor does not need to pay the cash to the operator directly. Fees or tolls received from users are viewed as essentially no more than collections on behalf of the grantor if they are part of an overall arrangement under which the grantor bears ultimate responsibility. If the grantor pays but the amounts are wholly based on usage of the infrastructure and there is no minimum guaranteed payment, the entity has no unconditional contractual right to receive cash, as the amounts receivable are contingent on the extent to which the public uses the service. In this case the intangible asset model will apply.

The operator will recognise a financial asset to the extent that it has a contractual right to receive cash or other financial assets from the grantor for the construction services, where the grantor has little, if any, discretion to avoid payment. This is usually because the agreement is legally enforceable. [IFRIC 12.16]. The recognition of a financial asset is not affected by the fact that the operator's contractual right to receive cash may be contingent on performance standards, as in the example of a unitary charge for a hospital in Example 25.2 above. The Interpretations Committee points out that this is no different from other circumstances and other financial assets where the payment for goods and services depends on the subsequent performance of the asset. [IFRIC 12.BC44].

The operator will recognise an intangible asset to the extent that it receives a licence to charge users of the public service. [IFRIC 12.17].

Sometimes it is necessary to ‘bifurcate’ the operator's right to cash flows for construction services into a financial asset and an intangible asset and account separately for each component of the operator's consideration. This, the Interpretations Committee argues, is because the operator is paid for its services partly by a financial asset and partly by an intangible asset. [IFRIC 12.18].

The analysis between the different models can be seen in the following table:

Arrangement Applicable model
1 Grantor pays – fixed payments Financial asset
2 Grantor pays – payments vary with demand Intangible asset
3 Grantor retains demand risk – users pay but grantor guarantees amounts Financial asset or bifurcated (part financial, part intangible)
4 Grantor retains demand risk – operator collects revenues from users until it achieves specified return Intangible asset
5 Users pay – no grantor guarantees Intangible asset

Of the two arrangements in Example 25.2 above, the hospital is an example of (1) above: the payments are contractually fixed if all obligations and services are provided. The prison, as described in Example 25.2 above, would fall within (2) and be accounted for as an intangible asset. However, the prison operator might be paid on a different basis, e.g. it might be paid for 1,000 ‘available places’ and receive this as long as heating and food were capable of being provided. In this case it would be no different to the hospital and be a financial asset. There are, of course, many potential variations and a combination of fixed and variable demand could lead to bifurcation.

Common examples of arrangements that fall within (3) above are transport concessions where the operator collects revenue from users but is entitled to an agreed return on capital invested in the infrastructure. The fees or tolls up to this amount are considered to be collections on behalf of the grantor. There will be a financial asset to the extent of the guaranteed return. There may be an intangible asset as well if the value of the financial asset is less than the fair value of the construction services.

However, arrangements of the type in (4) above remain to be treated as intangible assets even if the overall risk to the operator of not obtaining a specified result is very low. An arrangement that effectively caps revenue collected from users once an agreed level of return is reached, it is argued, is not a contractual right to cash but a right to collect revenues from users and it is not relevant that the risk is low or that the operator will, in effect, get a fixed return. [IFRIC 12.BC52].

The following are examples of arrangements that will be accounted for using the intangible asset model:

  1. A municipality grants the operator a contract to treat all its waste collections for which it will be paid per unit processed. The arrangement does not provide for any guaranteed volume of waste to be treated by the operator (so it does not contain a take-or-pay arrangement) or any form of guarantee by the grantor. Historically, however, the annual volume of waste has never been less than 40,000 tons and the average annual volume over the last 20 years has been 75,000 tons.
  2. An operator enters into a toll bridge concession. The operator is permitted to collect revenues from users or the grantor until it achieves a 6% return on its agreed infrastructure spend, at which point the arrangement comes to an end.

In commercial terms, the toll bridge concession may be virtually identical to a transaction that falls within (3) above, e.g. where the users pay tolls but the grantor guarantees a minimum 6% return. The crucial difference is the grantor's guarantee. The arrangement with the guarantee, which will contain a financial asset, is likely to leave more of the rewards of ownership with the operator than the intangible arrangement in (b) as the operator will be entitled to benefits in excess of the 6% return. This demonstrates that the distinction between the financial asset and intangible asset models is linked less to the transfer of commercial risk, but more by the existence (or not) of an unconditional contractual right to cash flows.

There are jurisdictions where public-to-private contract laws or the concession arrangements themselves allow an operator to ask the grantor for a revision of the tariffs for the public service when the operator's actual return is below initial expectations. Although this feature in the concession arrangement is included to reduce the operator's risk, it only gives the operator a right to re-negotiate and the outcome of that is not certain. As a result, the operator does not have an unconditional right to receive cash and, therefore, the existence of these features would not allow the operator to apply the financial asset model.

Many payment mechanisms include deductions for substandard performance of services. These do not affect the analysis of the contract as a financial asset or intangible asset and are discussed further below.

4.2 The financial asset model

Under the financial asset model, which applies if the entity has an unconditional contractual right to receive cash or another financial asset, [IFRIC 12.16], the service element that relates to the construction of the infrastructure asset (‘construction services’) is accounted for in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.14]. For the avoidance of doubt, an asset is not recognised for the discounted present value of all amounts payable by the grantor under the service concession arrangement. The entity recognises an asset for construction services performed up to the reporting date; subsequently it may recognise an asset on the same basis for upgrade services; the carrying value of the asset does not include future services yet to be performed or maintenance services that are accounted for as expenses. The consideration received by the operator for other services is addressed at 5 below.

IFRIC 12 requires the consideration due to the operator to be classified as a contract asset rather than a receivable during the construction activity. [IFRIC 12.19]. IFRS 15 requires that a receivable is recognised only when the operator has an unconditional right to receive consideration. This is the case only if nothing other than the passage of time is required before payment of the consideration is due. [IFRS 15.108]. The right to consideration would not be unconditional if the operator must first satisfy another performance obligation in the contract before it is entitled to payment from the customer. Therefore, we believe that the operator should recognise a receivable in scope of IFRS 9 only when, and to the extent that, payment is not conditional on future delivery of operation services. Due to the nature of contractual penalties imposed in service concession arrangements, we believe that, in practice, the amount due to the operator in exchange for construction services will often unwind from a contract asset to a receivable over the period in which the other performance obligations in the contract are satisfied by the operator, rather than at the point when construction activity is completed.

On initial recognition, IFRS 9 requires a financial asset to be measured at its fair value (plus or minus transaction costs). [IFRS 9.5.1.1]. As a result, the receivable is initially recognised at fair value. In our view, the discount rate used to determine the initial measurement of the receivable under IFRS 9 should be determined considering the passage of time before payment is due and counterparty credit risk. The discount rate should not be risk adjusted to reflect the risk that payments to be received over the operating period may be subject to penalties. This is consistent with the requirement in IFRS 15 that a receivable is recognised only when there is an unconditional right to consideration, i.e. when only the passage of time is required before payment is due. [IFRS 15.108]. To the extent that the right to payment does depend upon the operator's future performance, the operator does not have an unconditional right to consideration and therefore should continue to recognise a contract asset, rather than a receivable. The fair value of the financial asset is impacted by changes in market interest rates. Where construction or upgrade activity takes a significant time (as is common in many infrastructure projects), it is possible that market interest rates will have moved between the date of commencement of construction services and the point at which the receivable is initially recognised, such that there is a difference between the initial measurement of the receivable in accordance with IFRS 9 and the amount of construction revenue and accrued interest recognised as a contract asset in accordance with IFRS 15 up to that point. In addition, whilst fair value under IFRS 9 is based on market interest rates, accrued interest recognised as part of the contract asset under IFRS 15 is determined using the rate ‘that would be reflected in a separate financing transaction between the entity and its customer at contract inception’, [IFRS 15.64], i.e. a rate specific to the contract. This may also lead to differences between the amount recognised as a contract asset under IFRS 15 and the initial measurement of the receivable under IFRS 9. IFRS 15 requires any difference between the initial measurement of the financial asset in accordance with IFRS 9 and the corresponding amount of revenue recognised under IFRS 15 to be presented as an expense. [IFRS 15.108].

As required by IFRS 9, the receivable would subsequently be recognised at amortised cost, at fair value through other comprehensive income, or at fair value through profit or loss, depending upon how it is classified under IFRS 9. [IFRIC 12.24]. Measurement at amortised cost requires the receivable to be held in a business model whose objective is to hold financial assets in order to collect contractual cash flows, and requires that those contractual cash flows represent solely payments of principal and interest. Any features that introduce more than de minimis exposure to risks or volatility in the contractual cash flows that are inconsistent with a basic lending arrangement would mean that the receivable would not be measured at amortised cost. [IFRS 9.B4.1.7A, B4.1.18]. If the amount due from the grantor is measured at amortised cost or fair value through other comprehensive income, interest income will be recognised, calculated using the effective interest method. [IFRIC 12.25]. Classification of financial assets under IFRS 9 is discussed in Chapter 48 at 2.

The financial asset recognised by the operator will be subject to the impairment requirements of IFRS 9. IFRS 15 also requires that contract assets are assessed for impairment in accordance with IFRS 9. [IFRS 15.107]. The impairment requirements of IFRS 9 are discussed in Chapter 51.

Borrowing costs incurred by the operator during the construction phase cannot be capitalised under the financial asset model. [IFRIC 12.22].

Example 25.3 below is based on Illustrative Example 1 in IFRIC 12 and illustrates how the financial asset model may be applied. It should, however, be noted that this example deals with only one of many possible types of arrangements seen in practice. It is important that entities understand and assess the facts and circumstances of their own service concession arrangements in order to determine the appropriate accounting.

In the example below, the operator recognises a receivable once construction services are complete. As discussed above, IFRS 15 requires that a receivable is recognised only when the operator has an unconditional right to receive consideration, which will be the case only when nothing other than the passage of time is required before payment of the consideration is due. [IFRS 15.108]. The example below contains an unstated assumption that this is the case at completion of construction services. However, this may not always be the case in practice.

4.3 The intangible asset model

If the financial asset model does not apply (i.e. there is no unconditional contractual right to cash or other financial assets), the operator's consideration for its construction services will be an intangible asset. [IFRIC 12.15]. As with the financial asset model, the operator cannot have an item of property, plant and equipment because the physical infrastructure is controlled by the grantor (see 3 above). [IFRIC 12.11]. Therefore, the Interpretations Committee has concluded that the right of an operator to charge users of the public service, for example the right to collect tolls from a road or a bridge, meets the definition of an intangible asset, that should be accounted for in accordance with IAS 38. It is, in effect, a licence ‘bought’ in exchange for construction services. [IFRIC 12.17].

Consideration is classified as a contract asset during the construction or upgrade period. [IFRIC 12.19]. and revenue for construction or upgrade services will be recorded in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.14].

Under the intangible assets model, borrowing costs must be capitalised during the period of construction. [IFRIC 12.22]. However, as noted above, IFRIC 12 requires consideration to be classified as a contract asset, rather than an intangible asset, during the construction period. [IFRIC 12.19]. In March 2019, the Interpretations Committee issued an agenda decision relating to the capitalisation of borrowing costs on a constructed good for which revenue was recognised over time. In that agenda decision, the Interpretations Committee noted that, in the particular fact pattern considered, a contract asset is not a qualifying asset as the intended use of the contract asset is not a use for which it necessarily takes a substantial period of time to get ready. IAS 23 requires capitalisation of borrowing costs that are directly attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of an asset that necessarily takes a substantial period of time to get ready for is intended use or sale. Some may argue that there is a tension between the requirement in IFRIC 12 to capitalise interest during the construction phase under the intangible asset model and this agenda decision. However, we believe that the agenda decision does not override the requirements of IFRIC 12 paragraph 22.

Whilst IFRIC 12 requires consideration to be classified as a contract asset during the construction or upgrade period, Illustrative Example 2 to IFRIC 12 shows that the contract asset is presented as an intangible asset during the construction phase. [IFRIC 12.IE15].

It is argued that an inevitable consequence of applying the intangible asset model is that there must be an exchange transaction in which the operator receives the intangible right in exchange for its construction services. As this is an exchange of dissimilar assets, revenue must be recognised in accordance with IFRS 15, which requires the recognition of revenue based on the fair value of the assets received, unless the fair value of the assets received cannot be reasonably estimated. [IFRIC 12.BC32, IFRS 15.66, 67]. This means that the operator must establish the fair value of either the intangible asset it receives or the stand-alone selling price of the construction services. [IFRS 15.67].

Under IAS 38, amortisation of an intangible asset should begin when the asset is available for use, i.e. when it is in the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management. [IAS 38.97]. We believe that this would likely be the case once construction is complete and the operator can begin using the license received in exchange for construction services in order to generate revenues.

In the following example, based on Illustrative Example 2 in IFRIC 12, the operator determines the fair value of the intangible asset indirectly by reference to the stand-alone selling price of the construction services delivered. As with Example 25.3 above, it should be noted that this example deals with only one of many possible types of arrangements seen in practice and it is important that entities understand and assess the facts and circumstances of their own service concession arrangements in order to determine the appropriate accounting.

4.3.1 Amortisation of the intangible asset

The intangible asset will subsequently be accounted for in accordance with IAS 38, [IFRIC 12.26], and the amount at which it is measured initially, i.e. after the exchange transaction, is its cost. [IAS 38.45]. It will be amortised on a systematic basis over its useful life, using a method that reflects ‘the pattern in which the asset's future economic benefits are expected to be consumed by the entity'. [IAS 38.97]. This means that the methods permitted by IAS 38 are available (straight line, diminishing balance or unit-of-production). [IAS 38.98]. The requirements of IAS 38 are discussed in detail in Chapter 17. Interest methods of amortisation are forbidden. [IFRIC 12.BC65].

The Interpretations Committee expressly considered unit-of-production methods to be appropriate in some circumstances; in March 2006, it was noted in the IFRIC Update that the Basis of Conclusions had been redrafted to avoid the impression that these methods were not allowed.9 There were still concerns that a unit-of-production method could result in lower amortisation in the early years of the asset's operation so IAS 38 itself was amended to remove a statement discouraging methods that might have such a result.10 This clarifies that there is no prohibition when the method is the most appropriate, whatever the resulting profile of amortisation.

Unit-of-production methods are typically considered in the context of toll roads and bridges. Obviously, the method might apply if there is a right to charge a specified number of users. It might also be used using the estimated number of users, e.g. the number of vehicles that might use a particular road during the concession term, as a basis.

The remaining issue regarding amortisation methods has been whether they could be based on revenue generated by the asset; this depends on the meaning of ‘consumption of economic benefits’ in the context of intangible assets with finite lives. In May 2014, the IASB issued amendments to IAS 38 to introduce a rebuttable presumption that a method of amortisation based on the revenue expected to be generated from an activity that includes the use of an intangible asset is not appropriate. This is because this method typically reflects factors that are not directly linked to the consumption of the economic benefits embodied in the asset. [IAS 38.98A]. See Chapter 17 at 9.2.2. The amendment became effective in 2016.

Example 25.5 below demonstrates the potentially distorting effects for a SCA of basing amortisation on revenue.

However, the Board did acknowledge certain ‘limited circumstances’ that would give rise to an exception to this presumption. Revenue generated can be used to amortise an intangible asset when: [IAS 38.98A]

  • the rights embodied in that intangible asset are expressed as a measure of revenue; or
  • when it can be demonstrated that revenue and the consumption of economic benefits are ‘highly correlated’.

The Board did not define what is meant by ‘highly correlated’, but it describes situations where the asset is ‘expressed as a measure of revenue’. A ‘highly correlated’ outcome would only be achieved where a revenue-based method of amortisation is expected to give the same answer as one of the other methods permitted by IAS 38. For example, if revenue is earned evenly over the expected life of the asset, the pattern of amortisation would be similar to a straight-line basis. In situations where unit prices are fixed and all production is sold, the pattern of amortisation would replicate the use of the units-of-production method. However, when unit prices are not fixed, revenue would not provide the same answer and its use would therefore be inappropriate. The following example illustrates how a revenue-based method of amortisation diverges from the units-of-production method when the price per unit is not fixed.

Despite an expected constant level of consumption of the asset in the example above, the revenue-based method results in amortisation being delayed until the later periods of the asset's use. This distortion is caused by the increase in price rather than any factor related to the use of the intangible asset.

The Board permits revenue-based amortisation to be used when revenue is ‘the predominant limiting factor that is inherent in the intangible asset’. [IAS 38.98B]. In other words, revenue determines the useful life of the asset, rather than, for example, a number of years or the number of units produced.

The IASB provided two examples of this circumstance in which revenue earned can be regarded as a measure of consumption of an intangible asset: [IAS 38.98C]

  1. a contract may allow the extraction of gold from a mine until total cumulative revenue from the sale of gold reaches $2 billion; or
  2. the right to operate a toll road could be based on a fixed total amount of revenue generated, based on cumulative tolls that have been charged.

An example of (b) is a SCA, described at 4.1.2 above, in which an operator enters into a toll bridge concession under which it is permitted to collect revenues from users or the grantor until it achieves a 6% return on its agreed infrastructure spend, at which point the arrangement comes to an end. As explained at 4.1.2, this will be accounted for as an intangible asset because the operator bears demand risk and may never achieve the revenue target. In this case the operator could calculate amortisation based on cumulative revenue as a percentage of total revenue.

The choice of amortisation method is a matter of judgement. In the following extract from its accounting policies, ENGIE indicates that it amortises its intangible assets mainly on a straight-line basis.

4.3.2 Impairment during the construction phase

As noted at 4.3 above IFRS 15 requires the operator to classify the consideration given by the grantor as a contract asset during the construction phase. [IFRIC 12.19]. Contract assets are subject to the impairment requirements of IFRS 9. [IFRS 15.107]. Operators may need to apply judgement in determining how to test the contract asset for impairment, given that the contract asset is expected to be realised in the form of an intangible asset, rather than as a receivable or cash. Operators may need to consider whether and how they can use the value of the underlying asset to which they are entitled as a proxy for cash flows in order to determine expected credit losses on the contract asset. The impairment requirements of IFRS 9 are discussed in Chapter 51, and impairment of non-cash consideration contract assets is discussed in Chapter 32 at 2.1.3.

4.4 Revenue recognition implications of the two models

There are major differences in the way in which revenue is measured under the two models. Under the financial asset model, total revenue over the concession term will be the same as the total cash inflows under the contract. By contrast, the fair value of the intangible asset is recognised as revenue under the intangible asset model, so total revenue measured using this model will be higher by this amount. The consequences of the two models can be demonstrated by the following simple example:

It is fair to say that this proved highly controversial. In fact, the September 2004 IFRIC Update stated that ‘the majority of the Interpretations Committee strongly disliked this outcome’.11 However, the Interpretations Committee maintained that this is the appropriate application of accounting standards to the arrangements and is consistent with the treatment generally accorded to barter transactions, [IFRIC 12.BC35], although, of course, there are no other sectors where barter transactions are fundamental to the arrangement.

4.5 ‘Bifurcation’ – single arrangements that contain both financial and intangible assets

The Interpretations Committee concluded that it may be necessary in certain circumstances to divide the operator's right to cash flows into a financial asset and an intangible asset. [IFRIC 12.18]. The IFRIC Update (March 2006) reported that ‘With this change, the proposed amendment would better reflect the economic reality of concession arrangements: to the extent that the operator is remunerated for its construction services by obtaining a contractual right to receive cash from, or at the direction of, the grantor, the operator would recognise a financial asset and, to the extent that the operator receives only a licence to charge users, it would recognise an intangible asset.’

The Basis for Conclusions to IFRIC 12 explains more of the reasoning and potential impact. In some arrangements both parties to the contract share the risk (demand risk) that the cash flows generated by the project will not be sufficient to recover the operator's capital investment. A common mechanism for achieving this is where the grantor pays partly by a financial asset (i.e. the grantor will pay cash for the services provided) but gives the operator the right to charge for services (i.e. the operator has an intangible asset). The operator's infrastructure asset is to be split into a financial asset component for any guaranteed amount of cash and an intangible asset for the remainder. [IFRIC 12.18, BC53].

These are common in transport concessions, e.g. a rail system paid for partly by grantor subsidy and partly by the payment of fares. This gives rise to difficult matters of judgement. It may not be clear how much of the arrangement is a financial asset and, therefore, where to draw the boundary between the two assets.

The following example, based on Illustrative Example 3 in IFRIC 12, illustrates how an entity may account for a service concession arrangement under the bifurcated model. As with Examples 25.3 and 25.4 above, it should be noted that this example deals with only one of many possible types of arrangements seen in practice and it is important that entities understand and assess the facts and circumstances of their own service concession arrangements in order to determine the appropriate accounting. In the example below, the operator recognises a receivable and an intangible asset once construction services are complete. As discussed at 4.2 above, IFRS 15 requires that a receivable is recognised only when the operator has an unconditional right to receive consideration, which will be the case only when nothing other than the passage of time is required before payment of the consideration is due. [IFRS 15.108]. We therefore assume that the example below contains an unstated assumption that this is the case at completion of construction services. However, this may not always be the situation in practice.

The example above shows the operator's contractual obligation to resurface the road being recognised and measured in accordance with IAS 37. The accounting for maintenance costs during the operations phase is discussed at 5.2 below.

4.6 Accounting for residual interests

Unless the infrastructure is used in a service concession arrangement for the whole of its useful life (within scope of IFRIC 12 – see 3.2 above), there will be a residual interest at the end of the contract that will be controlled by the grantor. The way in which the grantor controls the residual interest will affect the way in which the operator accounts for it. If the operator has an unconditional contractual right to cash (or another financial asset) for the residual interest in the infrastructure, this right will be a financial asset. It will be recognised as part of the consideration for the construction services. [IFRIC 12.16]. This is unaffected by the basis on which the consideration is calculated.

There are many different arrangements over residual interests in the infrastructure at the end of the concession term but broadly they depend on whether the grantor has a right or an option to acquire the residual interest and on the rights or options of the operator:

  1. The grantor may control the residual via an obligation to purchase the infrastructure from the operator but this could be at fair value, net book value, a notional amount or zero.
  2. It may only have an option to acquire the assets, on similar bases to (a), but it also has a right to put in place other arrangements, e.g. granting the operator a new term or selecting a new party to take on the assets. Payment might be made by the grantor or by the new operator but always at the direction of the grantor.
  3. The grantor has an option to acquire the assets but if this is not exercised then the operator may retain them.

The implications of grantor options and control of the residual interest have been discussed at 3.2 above.

If the terminal arrangements fall within (a) above the operator will have an unconditional contractual right to cash. It will recognise a financial asset, initially at fair value, which will then be accounted for according to the relevant classification under IFRS 9 (see 4.2 above). If the financial asset measured at amortised cost or fair value through other comprehensive income under IFRS 9, then interest will be calculated using the effective interest method. At the end of the contract the financial asset in respect of the residual interest will be stated at the operator's best estimate of the amount receivable.

Where the grantor has a right to put in place other arrangements, as in (b) above, the operator would only have an unconditional right to cash (i.e. a financial asset) after the grantor terminates the operator's involvement in the concession (by letting the contract lapse or by selecting a new party to take on the assets) if such termination will result in a payment to the operator. To the extent that the grantor can avoid any obligation to pay cash by allowing the concession term to continue, the operator has an intangible asset. The existence of such extension rights would have to be considered when determining the term of the concession arrangement.

If the arrangement is of the type described in (c), then the operator's residual interest is not a financial asset. Nor does it have a residual interest in the underlying property, plant and equipment because this is an arrangement within scope of IFRIC 12 and the entity cannot recognise the underlying assets, in whole or in part. [IFRIC 12.11]. The only option is to recognise an intangible right to receive cash or the residual interest in the assets. By contrast to the residual financial asset, it is most unlikely that the operator would be able to restate the value of this right over the term to its best estimate of the amount receivable at the end of the contract. IAS 38 only allows intangible assets to be revalued in very restricted circumstances; see Chapter 17 at 8.2.

The operator will have to account for its residual interests as described above based on the contractual rights, whatever model is being applied to its construction services. This is similar to the explicit requirements for upgrade services described at 5.1 below: IFRIC 12 recognises that upgrade services should be recognised as revenue on the basis of their individual contract terms regardless of the model applied. [IFRIC 12.14]. The result is that an entity that has recognised an intangible asset for the major part of its construction services might have to recognise a financial asset for the residual interests – or vice versa if its construction services have been accounted for as a financial asset. This treatment is a variation of the bifurcation described at 4.5 above except that the financial asset relates only to the residual interest in the infrastructure rather than to a portion of the consideration receivable for the infrastructure as a whole. The residual rights will be taken into account in calculating the revenue receivable under the contract, which are described at 4.2 and 4.3 above.

As the termination arrangements can be complex, care will have to be taken to ensure that the effects are fully analysed.

In this arrangement, the operator has a contractual right to cash that should be recognised as a financial asset. It has a right to receive the lower of (a) and (b). It may choose to use its right to cash to settle part or all of the price of a new concession agreement but this does not affect the fact that it has a right to cash. This example also illustrates that calculating the fair value of the contractual right to cash may be complex as it must take account of a number of different estimates, including the net book value of the infrastructure at the end of the contract, as well as the options available to the parties to the contract.

4.7 Accounting for contractual payments to be made by an operator to a grantor

Many arrangements require an entity to make payments to the grantor during the course of the SCA. These payments take two main forms:

  1. payments related to the use of tangible assets, including:
    1. payments to the grantor or third parties for making assets available (such as trains and buses) in order to provide the services required by the concession contract;
    2. payments to a third party for the construction and making available of assets (such as rolling stock) that pass to the grantor at the end of the concession term; and
    3. payments to the grantor for making available land on which the infrastructure assets are constructed or situated; or
  2. fees payable to the grantor for the right to operate the concession, which can be described as concession fees, development fees or access charges.

It is possible that some of these payments could be for the right to use assets controlled by the operator itself or the concession payment could relate to a distinct good or service that is separate from the concession arrangement. In July 2016, the Interpretations Committee observed:

  1. if payments made by an operator to a grantor are for a right to a good or service that is separate from the service concession arrangement, the operator should account for those payments by applying the applicable IFRS Standards; and
  2. if payments are for the right to use an asset that is separate from the infrastructure within the scope of IFRIC 12, the operator should assess whether the arrangement contains a lease. If the arrangement contains a lease, the operator should account for those payments by applying IFRS 16.12

The application guidance in AG7 and AG8 of IFRIC 12 may be relevant to an operator in assessing whether an asset is separate from the infrastructure within scope of IFRIC 12. This application guidance is considered at 3.4 above, in the context of partially regulated assets.

The Interpretations Committee observed that if payments made by an operator to a grantor are not for the right to a separate good or service or a right to use an asset that is a lease, the accounting for those payments should depend on whether the SCA falls within the financial asset model, the intangible asset model or is a hybrid. This means that the payments will be reflected in the carrying value of the appropriate concession asset:

  • if the SCA is accounted for under the financial asset model, then the concession payment is an adjustment to the transaction price, applying the requirements in paragraphs 70‑72 of IFRS 15, illustrated at 4.7.2 below;
  • if the intangible asset model applies, then the concession payment is part of the cost of acquiring the intangible asset recognised for the right to charge users of the service, illustrated at 4.7.3 below; and
  • if the operator has both a right to charge users of the public service and a contractual right to receive cash from the grantor, then the entity should assess the extent to which the concession payment represents an adjustment to the overall consideration receivable or whether it is consideration for the intangible asset element.13 This is determined by comparing the amount of the contractual right to receive cash from the grantor with the fair value of the operator's services.

The recommended treatment under the financial asset model is predicated on the fact that the operator has a contractual right to receive cash from the grantor and that payments between the parties are all part of this single relationship, however described. In this regard, payments to the grantor will include amounts paid to a related private sector entity to which responsibility for the service has been devolved. [IFRIC 12.3].

Under the Interpretations Committee's approach for the intangible asset model, payments to the grantor that are not for a right to a good or service that is separate from the SCA, and are not an embedded lease, represent consideration for the concession, i.e. part of the cost of the intangible asset recognised. It is clearly a requirement of IAS 38 that an intangible asset be recognised when it meets the definition and other recognition criteria (see Chapter 17 at 2 and 3) and it must be recognised at its present value if payment is deferred. [IAS 38.32].

Therefore, fixed fees payable over the life of a concession generate an intangible asset and give rise to a financial liability on inception, as the fixed fee will only be avoided by the operator if it withdraws from the concession, which in most circumstances is contractually and economically unfeasible.

4.7.1 Accounting for variable payments in a service concession

Some contracted payments, particularly concession fees, vary with a measure of usage of the concession asset or with another feature of the arrangement. Whilst the Interpretations Committee was able to reach a consensus on the treatment of concession fees that do not depend on future activity, as noted at 4.7 above, it has found the issue of variable payments more challenging.

In July 2013, the Committee tentatively agreed that, in cases where the variable payments do not depend on the purchaser's future activity, the fair value of those variable payments should be recognised as a liability and included as appropriate in the measurement of the related asset. The Committee was unable to reach a consensus on the treatment of payments that vary in relation to future activity and on the question of whether subsequent changes to the estimate of contingent consideration should be capitalised or expensed.14 In March 2016, the Committee determined that the issue of variable payments for asset purchases is too broad for it to address within the confines of existing IFRS standards, and consequently decided not to add the issue to its agenda.15 The Committee's deliberations on the treatment of variable payments for the separate acquisition of PP&E and intangible assets are also discussed in Chapter 17 at 4.5 and Chapter 18 at 4.1.9. At present, the usual treatment for an operator in a service concession is to treat contingent payments that vary in relation to future activity as executory and expense them as incurred.

4.7.2 Accounting for contractual payments under the financial asset model

If the financial asset model applies then the Interpretations Committee agreed that unless the contractual payments relate to the right to use assets controlled by the operator itself or relate to a distinct good or service that is distinct from the service concession arrangement, the contractual payment is accounted for as a reduction in the overall consideration received, i.e. it is an adjustment to the fair value of the consideration given by the grantor16 (see 4.7 above). Another way of expressing this is that payments from the grantor reduce the financial asset while payments to the grantor increase that asset; both will also affect the amount of interest accrued on the outstanding balance. This applies whether the payment is for the right of access to an asset or described as a concession fee.

4.7.3 Accounting for contractual payments under the intangible asset model

Under the intangible asset model, concession payments would be treated in accordance with IAS 38 as part of the consideration for the intangible asset.

While lease-type costs and land use charges can be part of any concession arrangement, concession fees (however called) are much more commonly a feature of arrangements which follow the intangible asset model. This is unsurprising as they are in substance payments made by the operator for the right to charge users of the concession infrastructure.

The Interpretations Committee have noted that unless the contractual payments relate to the right to use assets controlled by the operator itself or relate to a distinct good or service that is distinct from the service concession arrangement, the concession payment represents consideration for the concession right (i.e. part of the cost of the intangible asset recognised)17 (see 4.7 above). However, the effects on reported revenues were not addressed directly. In the following illustration, the concession fee is regarded as a distinct cost in addition to the fair value of the construction services. Alternatively, the concession fee could be regarded as a cost of the construction services, for example if the concession payments were for access to the land on which the infrastructure was to be constructed or for an asset used in the delivery of the construction services. In that case, the estimate of the stand-alone selling price of the construction services would include an appropriate margin on top of the concession fee (see 4.3 above).

5 REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE DURING THE OPERATIONS PHASE OF THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT

So far, we have described the recognition and measurement of the infrastructure asset in the accounts of the operator under the two models. A significant issue in practice is that service concession arrangements are composite transactions. They usually have a long duration (twenty-five to thirty years is not uncommon) during which time the operator has a variety of obligations. These may be in connection with the infrastructure asset itself and include:

  • enhancement of the infrastructure or construction of new infrastructure;
  • infrastructure components that must be replaced in their entirety;
  • infrastructure subject to major cyclical repairs; and
  • regular repairs and maintenance.

In addition, many service concession arrangements involve the provision of services. In the case of a hospital, for example, this could include utilities (such as water and electricity) and a wide range of ‘soft’ services such as cleaning, laundry, meals, portering, security and grounds maintenance, amongst others. All of these might be paid for as a single unitary charge that would probably be adjusted according to performance as in Example 25.2 above. The accounting models for service concessions must be able to deal with all of these issues.

IFRIC 12 identifies two principle revenue-generating activities in a service concession arrangement, construction or upgrade services and operation services, requiring that both are accounted for in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.14, 20]. The Interpretation also states that, during the construction phase, both accounting models (intangible asset and financial asset) give rise to a contract asset in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.19]. The point at which the consideration is subsequently classified as a receivable, or an intangible asset, is discussed at 4.2 and 4.3 above, respectively. Whilst the Interpretation includes examples to illustrate how these requirements might be applied to a relatively simple set of facts and circumstances, it does set out any special treatments in relation to how IFRS 15 is applied for an SCA. Any questions about how IFRS 15 should be applied in accounting for revenue from construction, upgrade or operation services or for the contract assets and liabilities arising during the construction phase of an SCA will be answered by reference to that Standard (see Chapters 27 to 32), rather than to IFRIC 12.

5.1 Additional construction and upgrade services

The concession may include obligations to construct new infrastructure (construction services) or to enhance either new or existing infrastructure to a condition better than at the start of the concession (upgrade services). IFRIC 12 does not deal in detail with the treatment to be adopted other than to say that revenue and costs relating to construction or upgrade services are recognised in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.14]. This means that all construction or upgrade services are accounted for in accordance with the appropriate model, regardless of when they take place. Contractual obligations to maintain or restore infrastructure may also include an upgrade element. [IFRIC 12.21].

Upgrade or construction services are separate performance obligations. This means that the contract has to require the particular service to be carried out at a specified time. This is not the same as a general requirement to maintain the asset in a specified condition.

It would be unusual for a toll road concession, for example, to require resurfacing to take place according to a predetermined schedule as road surfaces degrade with usage (based on both the number of vehicles and weight per axle) as well as weather conditions. However, the contract might require a new bridge or access road after a specified period of time and either of these would be separate upgrade services.

Upgrade services must be recognised in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.14]. IFRS 15 is discussed in Chapters 27 to 32.

The entity must determine the consideration receivable for the upgrade services. This may be part of the allocation at inception of the contract, as shown in Example 25.3 above where part of the contract revenue is attributed to road resurfacing, or the contract may specify a separate payment when the upgrade is performed. In either case, the entity would allocate the transaction price for the arrangement as a whole to each of the performance obligations in proportion to their stand-alone selling prices in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.14]. The entity would recognise revenue for the upgrade service only as the obligation to provide those services is fulfilled.

5.1.1 Subsequent construction or upgrade services that are part of the initial infrastructure asset

In some circumstances, the ‘enhancement’ spend is a component of the original intangible asset and should be recognised as part of the exchange transaction to secure the right to charge users described at 4.3 above. An example of this is the construction of an additional water treatment facility for an existing water distribution network to which the operator is given immediate access to charges users for water supply.

Assuming that the intangible asset model is the relevant one, the intangible asset received in exchange for such construction or upgrade services should be recognised in accordance with the general principles applicable to contracts for the exchange of goods or services. Therefore, service concession contracts should not be recognised to the extent that they remain executory, which is generally the case when they are signed. [IFRIC 12.BC66, BC68]. The contract is no longer executory if:

  • the operator has started to fulfil its contractual obligations by constructing the infrastructure concerned or enhancing an existing infrastructure before being entitled to derive benefits from its right to charge for the public service; or
  • the operator starts deriving benefits from its right to charge for the public service before fulfilling its obligations (e.g. when the contract provides for a new item to be constructed some time ahead in the concession period).

Therefore, if the operator starts charging users before the upgrade services are performed, the present value of these expenditures should be included in the measure of the consideration given for the intangible asset and therefore recognised as part of its carrying value on initial recognition. This would require the recognition of a liability for the present value of the best estimate of the amount required to construct the additional water treatment facility for the existing water distribution network.

The Interpretations Committee did not address the accounting treatment of subsequent variations in the amount of the liability for the operator's unfulfilled obligations that is recognised as part of the cost of the intangible asset (the licence) e.g. when the estimated amount of the expenditures to be incurred is revised. The situation may be regarded as analogous to the situation addressed by IFRIC Interpretation 1 – Changes in Existing Decommissioning, Restoration and Similar Liabilities – where the obligation is recognised as a liability in accordance with IAS 37 and as part of the cost of an asset. [IFRIC 1.1]. Therefore, the principles set out in IFRIC 1 – Changes in Existing Decommissioning, Restoration and Similar Liabilities – should be applied, i.e. a change in the measurement of the liability should be added to, or deducted from the cost of the intangible asset, subject to impairment testing and to the extent that the amount deducted from the cost of the asset does not exceed the carrying amount of the intangible asset. [IFRIC 1.5]. The periodic unwinding of the discount must be recognised in profit or loss. [IFRIC 1.8]. IFRIC 1 is discussed in Chapter 26 at 6.3.1.

5.1.2 Subsequent construction services that comprise additions to the initial infrastructure

An operator may be contractually required to add to the infrastructure and from this generate additional revenues. For example, it is common in developing countries that the operator of a water distribution network incurs an obligation to extend the distribution network. The operator will obtain revenues from newly connected users under its right to charge for the services. There is an example of such a right in Extract 25.3 below, in which Telenor ASA discloses that it has a right ‘to arrange, expand, operate and provide the cellular telephone services in various areas in Thailand’.

Revenues generated by the new infrastructure will be determined under the terms of the original licence granted to the operator. In this case, the extension work will add to the initial infrastructure asset, meaning that it will only be recognised when the expenditure is made. Accordingly, that new cost is not an additional component of the cost of the original intangible asset but will be a new intangible asset in its own right, giving rise to new construction revenues and recognised using the same principles as the original as described at 4.3 above.

5.2 Accounting for the operations phase

Both the financial and intangible asset models apply the same accounting in the operations phase of the SCA. According to the September 2006 IFRIC Update, ‘the nature of the asset recognised by the operator as consideration for providing construction services (a financial asset or an intangible asset) does not determine the accounting for the operation phase of the arrangement’.18

Revenue and costs for the operation services will be recognised in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.20]. This means that most operating costs are likely to be executory and will be accounted for as incurred. Contractual obligations, including obligations to maintain, replace or restore infrastructure to a specified level of serviceability during its operation or to a specified condition at the end of the concession, are to be recognised and measured in accordance with IAS 37, [IFRIC 12.21], as shown in Example 25.11 below, when such obligations do not include any upgrade element (which is treated as an additional construction service, see 5.1 above).

Distinguishing between executory maintenance expenditure and contractual obligations is not always straightforward. A concession arrangement may provide for a specified total amount of expenditure to be incurred by the operator throughout the contract. Sometimes, the contract provides for mechanisms whereby at the end of the contract, any shortfall in the agreed amount is paid in cash to the grantor by the operator. Particularly in the case of older contracts, it is common for the maintenance and repair obligation to be expressed in very general terms such as keeping the infrastructure in ‘good working condition’ or ‘state of the art’ working condition. The obligation may include the requirement that the asset be handed over with a certain number of years' useful life remaining.

Local regulations or laws also change over time. Some operators are obliged to report annually to the grantor on the level of maintenance and renewal expenditure incurred during the year and on a cumulative basis from inception of the contract. Sometimes, the operator must report on expected expenditures over some future period of time (e.g. over the next 12 months or two years) as well. In these situations, more often than not the grantor compares the cumulative expenditure at any point in time with either the operator's prior estimates of expenditures or with the level of expenditure that had been anticipated at the outset of the arrangement and was factored into the level of usage charges. In such circumstances, judgement is required in deciding whether expenditure on renewals is an obligation requiring recognition or an executory contract.

The Interpretations Committee has also provided an example in Illustrative Example 2, the intangible asset model, of how operational expenditure might be accounted for in accordance with IAS 37. Although this illustration is in the context of an intangible asset, IAS 37 can apply to maintenance and other obligations whichever model applies. Major maintenance, in this case the requirement to resurface the road, will be recognised as the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the reporting date and it is suggested that this might ‘arise as a consequence of use of the road’, therefore increasing in measurable annual increments. [IFRIC 12.IE19, IE20]. The basis for accounting for such obligations is discussed further in Chapter 26.

5.3 Items provided to the operator by the grantor

Following the basic principles underlying the accounting treatment under both models, infrastructure items to which the operator is given access by the grantor for the purpose of the service concession are not recognised as its property, plant and equipment. [IFRIC 12.27]. This is because they remain under the control of the grantor.

There is a different treatment for assets that are given to the operator as part of the consideration for the concession that can be kept or dealt with as the operator wishes. These assets are not to be treated as government grants as defined in IAS 20. Instead, an operator should account for these assets as part of the transaction price and in accordance with IFRS 15. [IFRIC 12.27]. (See Chapter 29 at 2).

What this means is that an operator that has been given a licence or similar arrangement over a piece of land on which a hospital is to be built does not recognise the land as an asset. If, on the other hand, the operator has been given a piece of surplus land on which it can build private housing for sale, it will recognise an asset. The consideration, which is the fair value of that land, will be aggregated with the remainder of the consideration for the transaction and accounted for according to the model being used.

6 FURTHER EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATING THE APPLICATION OF IFRIC 12 AND INTERACTIONS WITH IFRS 15 AND IFRS 9

IFRIC 12 was not significantly amended upon issue of IFRS 15 and IFRS 9 and the illustrative examples to IFRIC 12 were largely unchanged. However, it should be noted that the illustrative examples in IFRIC 12 are intended simply to demonstrate the principal features of the financial asset and intangible asset models. In doing so, they reflect some aspects of service concession arrangements that are commonly seen in practice, but the examples are not intended to be exhaustive. It is important that entities understand and assess the facts and circumstances of their own arrangements in order to determine whether their existing service concession accounting is supported under the 5-step model within IFRS 15 and the requirements of IFRS 9 as appropriate.

In the examples below, we have considered the fact patterns set out in Illustrative Examples 1 and 2 from IFRIC 12 (which are reproduced in Examples 25.3 at 4.2 above, 25.4 at 4.3 above and 25.12 at 5.2 above), in the context of the 5-step model in IFRS 15, and suggested how the accounting for the same basic fact pattern may be impacted by certain changes to the terms within the concession arrangement, the operator's assessment of those terms, and the introduction of other facts and circumstances.

7 DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: SIC‑29

IFRIC 12 has no specific disclosure requirements, although the disclosure requirements of the various applicable standards (such as IFRS 9, IFRS 7 – Financial Instruments: Disclosures, [IFRIC 12.23], and IAS 38) will have to be applied as appropriate. SIC‑29, which pre-dates IFRIC 12 by several years, includes additional disclosure requirements. [IFRIC 12.10]. It is important to note that the scope of SIC‑29 is not defined in terms of IFRIC 12 and is potentially broader in scope than IFRIC 12. It applies to a type of transaction that is described although not really defined and which does not depend on the control criteria described at 3 above. It also applies to both sides of the transaction, whereas IFRIC 12 applies only to the operator under the concession agreement.

SIC‑29 describes service concessions as arrangements in which an entity (the operator) provides services on behalf of another entity (the grantor, which may be a public or private sector entity, including a governmental body) that give the public access to major economic and social facilities. The examples of service concession arrangements given by SIC‑29 include water treatment and supply facilities, motorways, car parks, tunnels, bridges, airports and telecommunication networks. [SIC‑29.1].

SIC‑29 states that the common characteristic of all service concession arrangements is that the operator both receives a right and incurs an obligation to provide public services. [SIC‑29.3]. It excludes from its scope an entity outsourcing the operation of its internal services (e.g. employee cafeteria, building maintenance, and accounting or information technology functions). [SIC‑29.1]. This means that some of the arrangements that do not include the construction of a major capital asset, as discussed above, may not be caught by the requirements of the SIC, although there is no hard-and-fast dividing line between service concessions and outsourcing arrangements. For example, a contract between a government department and an operator to maintain the existing computer system, including replacement of hardware and software as appropriate, may be outside the scope of SIC‑29.

SIC‑29 summarises the rights and obligations as follows:

For the period of the concession, the operator has received from the grantor:

  1. the right to provide services that give the public access to major economic and social facilities; and
  2. in some cases, the right to use specified tangible assets, intangible assets, and/or financial assets;

in exchange for the operator:

  1. committing to provide the services according to certain terms and conditions during the concession period; and
  2. when applicable, committing to return at the end of the concession period the rights received at the beginning of the concession period and/or acquired during the concession period. [SIC‑29.2].

The disclosure requirements in respect of such projects are set out below:

SIC‑29 requires disclosure in addition to that required by other standards that may cover part of the transaction, such as IAS 16 (see Chapter 18), IFRS 16 (see Chapter 23) and IAS 38 (see Chapter 17). [SIC‑29.5]. All aspects of a service concession arrangement should be considered in determining the appropriate disclosures in the notes to the financial statements. [SIC‑29.6].

An operator and a grantor should disclose the following in each period:

  1. a description of the arrangement;
  2. significant terms of the arrangement that may affect the amount, timing and certainty of future cash flows (e.g. the period of the concession, re-pricing dates and the basis upon which re-pricing or re-negotiation is determined);
  3. the nature and extent (e.g. quantity, time period or amount as appropriate) of:
    1. rights to use specified assets;
    2. obligations to provide or rights to expect provision of services;
    3. obligations to acquire or build items of property, plant and equipment;
    4. obligations to deliver or rights to receive specified assets at the end of the concession period;
    5. renewal and termination options; and
    6. other rights and obligations (e.g. major overhauls);
  4. changes in the arrangement occurring during the period; and
  5. how the service arrangement has been classified. [SIC‑29.6].

These disclosures should be provided individually for each service concession arrangement or in aggregate for each class of service concession arrangements. A class is a grouping of service concession arrangements involving services of a similar nature (e.g. toll collections, telecommunications and water treatment services). [SIC‑29.7].

IFRIC 12 added a requirement to disclose ‘the amount of revenue and profits or losses recognised in the period on exchanging construction services for a financial asset and an intangible asset’. [SIC‑29.6A].

Vinci has made aggregate disclosures for the principal terms of its arrangements. The following extract is part only of the extensive disclosures that separately address concession arrangements under the intangible asset model, financial asset model and bifurcated model.

References

  1.   1 IFRIC Update, September 2005
  2.   2 IFRIC Update, September 2005.
  3.   3 IPSAS 32, Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor, International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board, October 2011.
  4.   4 IFRIC Update, September 2005.
  5.   5 IFRIC Staff paper, March 2016, IFRIC 12 – Service Concession Arrangements – Service concession arrangements with leased infrastructure, p.11.
  6.   6 IFRIC Update, September 2016, Interpretations Committee's agenda decision.
  7.   7 IFRIC Update, March 2016.
  8.   8 IFRIC Update, July 2016.
  9.   9 IFRIC Update, March 2006.
  10. 10 IAS 38 (2007), Intangible Assets, IASB, 2007 Bound Volume, para. 98 stated that ‘there is rarely, if ever, persuasive evidence to support an amortisation method for intangible assets with finite useful lives that results in a lower amount of accumulated amortisation than under the straight-line method.’ This was removed by Improvements to IFRSs, May 2008.
  11. 11 IFRIC Update, September 2004.
  12. 12 IFRIC Update, July 2016.
  13. 13 IFRIC Update, July 2016.
  14. 14 IASB Update, July 2013.
  15. 15 IFRIC Update, March 2016.
  16. 16 IFRIC Update, July 2016.
  17. 17 IFRIC Update, July 2016.
  18. 18 IFRIC Update, September 2006.
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