In an analysis of more than 700 practicing attorneys, adversarial behavior was regarded by peers to be distinctly ineffective. In fact, more than 50% of the negotiators viewed as adversarial were regarded as ineffective.⁹ As negotiators become more irritating, stubborn, and unethical, their effectiveness ratings drop.

When both negotiators have a cooperative orientation, they can be more effective in terms of maximizing the pie.¹⁰ For example, cooperative groups outperform individualists in terms of pie-expansion.¹¹ Highly cooperative negotiators use more integrative strategies (such as information exchange), make more proposals for mutual coordination, and use fewer distributive tactics.¹² Moreover, the more cooperatively motivated people present in a negotiation, the more integrative (pie-expanding) information is exchanged.¹³ When individualistically motivated negotiators are at the table, distributive strategies increase (e.g., positional statements and substantiation). Cooperators and individualists take different roads to reach win-win outcomes.¹⁴ Individualists use the multiple-offer strategy and indirect information exchange; in contrast, cooperators share information about interests and priorities directly.

Negotiators should not turn into “cream puffs.”¹⁵ In any negotiation situation, it is important not to lose sight of your own interests. Individualists do not need to worry about this possibility, but cooperators and competitors do. Often, two cooperators end up with a lose-lose agreement because they fail to make their interests known to the other party.¹⁶ When a pro-social cooperator negotiates with a competitor, they are more likely to accept an unfair offer (such as an “$8 for me/$2 for you” split), as compared to individualists and competitors.¹⁷ Even in populations of successful business executives, negotiators can experience relational anxiety and fear that they need to make concessions to avoid straining relationships.¹⁸ Negotiators who show “unmitigated communion” make large concessions to accommodate the other and reap less profit; when both parties are high in unmitigated communion, joint gains are lower.¹⁹ (See Exhibit 5-4 for an example of the implications of being too “agreeable” in negotiation.)

In negotiations between United Airlines and its pilots in 1999, the union doubled its pay raise demand from 14.5% to 28% immediately upon learning that pilots at Delta had gotten a 20% jump above industry-leading rates.²⁰ The United Auto Workers knew they needed to help Detroit’s automakers cut labor costs to reduce the gap in production expenses with nonunion, Asian rivals. However, negotiations were stymied because union negotiators questioned the salaries and bonuses awarded to top executives. As a result of pressure, the CEO of Ford paid himself a $1 salary.²¹ In one investigation, people were given several choices concerning the division of a pie between themselves and another person (e.g., $300 you/$300 other vs. $500 you/$800 other).²² They were asked to indicate how satisfactory each division of the pie was. If people were purely individualistic, satisfaction would only be driven by the amount of money for oneself. In fact, people were highly concerned with how much the “other person” received, so much so that people often preferred to earn less money, if it meant that this would equate outcomes between themselves and another person. For example, many people preferred $300 self/$300 other over $500 self/$800 other. When faced with a choice between $300 self/$300 other versus $800 self/$500 other, people still preferred equality but not as strongly as when the self was disadvantaged.

The relationship we have with the other party can affect our own motivational orientation. Consider the following choices:²³

• Choice A: $4,000 for yourself

• Choice B: 50% chance at $3,000; 50% chance at $5,000

Which do you choose? We asked 111 MBA students, and most of them (73%) chose the sure thing: choice A. This example confirms the risk-aversion principle we discussed in Chapter 2. We then asked a separate, but comparable, group of MBA students to choose between the following:

• Choice C: $4,000 for yourself

• $6,000 for another person

• Choice D: Self: 50% chance at $3,000, 50% chance at $5,000

• Other: 50% chance at $7,000, 50% chance at $5,000

A close look at all four choices (A, B, C, and D) reveals that choice C is identical to choice A (except for the payoff to the other person), and choice D is identical to choice B (except for the payoff to the other person). Thus, if people were perfectly rational and consistent, they would choose C over D (given that most choose A over B). However, that’s not what happens. People’s choices are driven in large part, by their relationship with the other party. Negotiators who have a positive relationship with the other person prefer the sure thing of choice C (56%) over the gamble of choice D; in contrast, those who had a negative relationship with the other person preferred to gamble on D (67%) over C. Distinct differences are evident between the pie-expanding and pie-slicing strategies used by cooperators versus those used by competitors. Cooperators not only increase the size of the pie, they also prefer an equitable division of the pie in comparison to individualists and competitors. Furthermore, cooperation is strongly related to reciprocity: Relative to individualists and competitors, cooperators are more likely to engage in the same level of cooperation as their opponent.²⁴

Negotiators can use reinforcement (and punishment) to shape the behavior of their opponents. For example, in one study a lecturer stood in front of a class. Half of the class was instructed to look interested, nod their heads, and smile approvingly (positive reinforcement); the other half of the class was told to look bored and disinterested (punishment). After a short time, the instructor moved to the side of the class that was reinforcing his behavior. It is important to reinforce the behavior immediately after it occurs. Similarly, one of the fastest ways to extinguish a behavior is simply not to respond.

Integrative (pie-expanding) and distributive (pie-slicing) behaviors tend to be reciprocated.²⁵ If you want to discourage a competitive motivational orientation in the counterparty, then don’t reciprocate.

What happens when a person with a cooperative orientation negotiates with a competitive person? The cooperator begins the negotiation in a cooperative fashion, but when she realizes that she is facing a competitor, she changes her own style. People with a cooperative orientation behave competitively when paired with a competitive opponent, whereas competitive players do not change.²⁶ When different types of players faced a pro-social (cooperative) opponent, pro-social and individualistic players were more likely to cooperate than were competitive players. Pro-socials and individualists competed when the other party competed, but competitive players competed regardless of the behavior of the other party.²⁷ However, when a cooperative person negotiates with an individualistic negotiator, both experience significantly more positive negotiation processes and outcomes than do purely individualistic dyads.²⁸

During negotiation, people’s strategies often change in response to how they view the other party and the situation. In particular, when a cooperator meets a competitor, the cooperator is the one to change. Thus, a strong tendency toward convergence of styles is likely to occur at the bargaining table.²⁹ Convergence of outcomes, as well as bargaining styles, occurs in later stages of negotiation.³⁰ As deadlines approach, people exchange specific proposals and make concessions.³¹

Epistemic motivation refers to a person’s need to understand his or her world.³² To reach integrative agreements, negotiators should have not only a cooperative (social) orientation but also a deep understanding of the task (epistemic motivation). Negotiators who are high in both epistemic and cooperative motivation develop greater trust and reach more integrative agreements than those low in cooperation or low in epistemic motivation.³³

Interests are a person’s needs, desires, concerns, fears—in general, the things a person cares about or wants. Interests underlie people’s positions in negotiation (the things they say they want). Reconciling interests in negotiation is not easy. It involves understanding interests, devising creative solutions, and looking for trade-offs. We discussed some negotiation strategies in Chapters 3 and 4, such as fashioning trade-offs or logrolls among issues, searching for compatible issues, devising bridging solutions, and structuring contingency contracts. It is difficult to immediately address interests in a negotiation because people adopt positions and emotions can often conceal interests. Negotiators who use an interests-based approach frequently ask other parties about their needs and concerns and in turn, disclose their own needs and concerns.³⁸

Consider the following rights-based negotiations:

• Los Angeles Dodgers owner Frank McCourt found himself sharing ownership of the team with his ex-wife, Jamie, when a judge invalidated a disputed marital agreement that would have made him sole owner of the franchise. The rights of ownership controversy stemmed from a marital property agreement signed by both parties years earlier.³⁹

• The United Steel Workers (USW) union is known for invoking successorship clauses to get what it wants. In most cases, these clauses simply require that the potential buyer of a plant adhere to a collective-bargaining agreement. But the USW altered its clauses to state that before a plant can be sold, a successor company must agree on a new labor contract, thereby giving the union the ability to “approve” the sale of a steel plant. When Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel struck a partnership deal with Brazil’s largest steelmaker, CSN, the union did not like the idea. Union leaders believed CSN would benefit significantly while the American workers would receive very little. They used the rights clause to invoke the rights of the workers and effectively rejected the possibility of a merger between the two companies.⁴⁰

These examples illustrate that a common negotiation style is to rely on some independent standard with perceived legitimacy or fairness to determine who is right in a situation. Some rights are formalized by law or contract. Others are socially accepted standards of behavior, such as reciprocity, precedent, equality, and seniority (e.g., “I want a higher salary because it would be consistent with the incentive structure in this organization.”). Negotiators who use a rights-based approach frequently say things like “I deserve this” or “this is fair” (see the cartoon in Exhibit 5-6 for a humorous example of a rights-based move).

Rights differ across situations. For example, a productive employee may want a salary increase based upon extreme productivity, yet the organization may focus on seniority. Negotiators may involve a third party to determine who is right. In adjudication, disputants present evidence and arguments to a neutral third party with the power to hand down a binding decision.

Power is the ability to coerce someone to do something he or she would not otherwise do. Exercising power typically means imposing costs on the other side or threatening to do so. Exercising power may manifest itself in acts of aggression, such as sabotage, physical attack, or withholding benefits derived from a relationship. When Chicago teachers went on strike at the start of the 2012–2013 school year, public sentiment turned against the Chicago School Board and Mayor Rahm Emmanuel. The teachers used the publicity to leverage higher average annual pay raises and other benefits. In return, the board extended the length of the school day and established a new merit system based on student standardized tests.⁴¹

Within a relationship of mutual dependence (e.g., labor and management; employee and employer), the question of who is more powerful rests on who is more dependent. In turn, one’s degree of dependency on the other party rests on how satisfactory the alternatives are for satisfying one’s interests. The better the alternative, the less dependent one is. Power moves include behaviors that range from insults and ridicule to strikes, beatings, and warfare.

Power tactics have the intent to coerce the other side to settle on terms more satisfactory to the wielder of power. For example, when former U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich negotiated the balanced-budget agreement with former President Bill Clinton in 1996, the use of power led to a government shutdown two times. Clinton and Gingrich negotiated face-to-face for 35 days and learned how to do a dance that involved using a lot of power (“hitting the other party pretty hard”) and then backing off and finding a way to work together.⁴² Two types of power-based approaches are threats (in which one or both parties makes a threat) and contests (in which parties take action to determine who will prevail).⁴³ Determining who is more powerful without a decisive and potentially destructive power contest may be difficult because power is ultimately a matter of perception. People may fail to take into account the possibility that the other will invest greater resources in the contest than expected, out of fear that a change in the perceived distribution of power will affect the outcomes of future disputes. Many power contests involve threatening avoidance (e.g., divorce), actually engaging in it temporarily to impose costs on the other side (e.g., striking or breaking off diplomatic relations), or ending the relationship altogether.

The style you use in negotiation will often be reciprocated by the other party. In one investigation, interests were reciprocated the most (42%), followed by power (27%) and rights (22%).⁴⁴

Focusing on interests can usually resolve the problem underlying the dispute more effectively than focusing on rights or power. A focus on interests can help uncover “hidden” problems and help identify which issues are of the greatest concern to each party. Put the focus on interests early in the negotiations. This suggestion raises an obvious question: If interests are effective, why doesn’t everyone use them? Ury, Brett, and Goldberg identify several reasons, including lack of skill, the tendency to reciprocate rights and power, and strong cultural or organizational norms.⁴⁵

Suppose you enter a negotiation with an interests-based approach, but your opponent uses rights or power. This makes you angry, and you reciprocate power and rights out of sheer self-defense. Yet, you realize this behavior is creating a lose-lose situation. How do you break out of the spiral? Consider two strategies: personal strategies (that you can use in a face-to-face situation) and structural strategies (steps that an organization can take to create norms that engender an interests-based culture).⁴⁶

Focusing on who is right or who is more powerful usually leaves at least one person feeling like a loser. Losers often do not give up but instead appeal to higher courts or plot revenge. Rights are less costly than power. Generally, power costs more in resources consumed and opportunities lost. For example, strikes cost more than arbitration, and violence costs more than litigation. Costs are incurred not only in efforts invested but also from the destruction of each side’s resources. Power contests often create new injuries and a desire for revenge. Interests are less costly than rights. In summary, focusing on interests, compared to rights and power, produces higher satisfaction with outcomes, better working relationships, and less recurrence; it may also mean lower transaction costs.

Resolving all disputes by reconciling interests is neither possible nor desirable.⁶⁷ Rights and power procedures are often used when they are not necessary; a procedure that should be the last resort too often becomes the first move. Rights and power may be appropriate to use in the following situations:⁶⁸

• The other party refuses to come to the table. In this case, no negotiation is taking place, and rights and power are necessary for engagement.

• Negotiations have broken down and parties are at an impasse. A credible threat, especially if combined with an interests-based proposal, may restart negotiations. A potential strike by union pressmen and other production employees at New Jersey’s largest newspaper, The Star-Ledger, was averted after the newspaper’s management indicated that without concessions the paper would be shut down at the end of the year. The threat led to talks that ultimately led to concessions on both sides.⁶⁹

• The other party needs to know you have power. Sometimes, people need to wield power simply to demonstrate they have it.⁷⁰ However, threats must be backed up with actions to be credible. Furthermore, the weaker party may fail to fully comply with a resolution based on power, thus requiring the more powerful party to engage in expensive policing.

• Someone violates a rule or breaks the law. In this situation, it is appropriate to use rights or power.

• Interests are so opposed that agreement is not possible. Sometimes, parties’ interests are so disparate that agreement is not possible. For example, when fundamental values are at odds (e.g., abortion beliefs), resolution can occur only through a rights contest (a trial) or power contest (a demonstration or legislative battle).

• Social change is necessary. To create social impact, a rights battle may be necessary. For example, consider the case of Brown v. Board of Education, which laid important groundwork for the elimination of racial segregation.

• Negotiators are moving toward agreement and parties are “positioning” themselves. In other words, parties are committed to reaching a deal, and now they are dancing in the bargaining zone.

Consider the following when making a threat:⁷¹

Negotiators who use negative emotion feign temper tantrums as a way of threatening the counterparty to make a concession. It makes a difference whether the anger is “real” or “strategic.” Negotiators who are really angry and feel little compassion for the counterparty are less effective in terms of expanding the pie than are happy negotiators.⁸¹ Moreover, they are not as effective in terms of slicing the pie.⁸² In contrast, negotiators who are “strategically angry” are more likely to gain concessions from their opponent because the counterparty will assume the angry person is close to their reservation point.⁸³ Angry negotiators induce fear in their opponent, and their opponents are more likely to succumb when they are motivated.⁸⁴ For example, before the annexation of Austria, Hitler met to negotiate with the Austrian chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg. At some point in this dark historical meeting, Hitler’s emotional style became very angry:

The effect of negative emotions on negotiator behavior is also influenced by the alternatives available to negotiators. Recipients who have particularly poor alternatives are most affected by angry displays and therefore make more concessions.⁸⁶ The motivations and goals of the negotiator also influence the degree to which they react to the counterparty’s display of negative emotion. For example, whereas negotiators tend to make more concessions to an angry opponent than to a happy one, this tends to be more true when negotiators are motivated to understand the other party, such as when they are not under time pressure (and, therefore, have resources to engage in thought processing).⁸⁷ When expressing anger, negotiators should direct it to a specific behavior rather than another person, thereby separating the people from the problem.⁸⁸ Moreover, when negotiators do concede to an angry opponent, they will also tend to concede to that person in the future because they perceive the other as tough.⁸⁹

Communicating anger can sometimes backfire, such as when their opponent has the possibility to deceive them during the negotiation and when the consequences of rejecting the angry negotiator’s offer are low.⁹⁰ The use of strategic negative emotion is not limited to displays of anger and temper tantrums. Displays of helplessness, pouting, and hurt feelings also can be used to manipulate others. For example, Effa Manley, a female baseball executive and owner of the Newark Eagles baseball franchise in the Negro League in the 1930s and 1940s, was not above shedding tears to get what she wanted at the negotiation table. Pittsburgh sports writer Wendell Smith recalls, “If she did not get what she wanted, Mrs. Manley would wrinkle up her pretty face and turn on the sprinkling system.”⁹¹ Acting somewhat insane can achieve similar effects, such as when AOL’s Myer Berlow announced to his opponents during the middle of negotiations that his favorite movie was The Godfather and quoted his philosopher-hero, Machiavelli, saying, “it is safer to be feared than loved.”⁹²

Part of the strategic use of emotion involves the question of whether to be consistent in displaying an emotion. In fact, it is when negotiators exhibit emotional inconsistency and unpredictability, that they achieve greater outcomes for themselves. In a series of experiments, the counterparty made greater concessions when the negotiator alternated between anger and happiness (inconsistent display) compared to expressing consistent anger.⁹³ This was because the counterparty felt less in control of the negotiation.

The type of negative emotion expressed may elicit very different reactions from counterparties. For example, one investigation examined how negotiators responded to an opponent who was disappointed or worried (supplication) with a guilty or regretful opponent (appeasement) versus an unemotional opponent. Negotiators conceded more when the opponent showed supplication (disappointment and worry) and conceded the least when the opponent showed guilt.⁹⁴ People who are self-interested (pro-self) are more likely to concede to a disappointed opponent as compared to pro-socials, because they see disappointment as a threat to getting what they want.⁹⁵

Anger, power, and threats often go together in negotiation. The expression of anger acts somewhat like a threat. Negotiators are more likely to be effective in extracting concessions from the counterparty if they make a threat as compared to acting angry.⁹⁶ When negotiators use anger, the effectiveness of anger depends on how powerful the negotiator is. In general, displays of anger are helpful for powerful negotiators, but not for low-power negotiators. Why? Powerful negotiators feel more focused and assertive and claim more value when they are angry.⁹⁷ Conversely, low-power negotiators lose focus and yield value when they are angry. Displays of anger evoke a complementary emotion (fear) when coming from a high-power negotiator, but evoke a reciprocal emotion (anger) when coming from a low-power negotiator.⁹⁸ However, displays of disappointment evoke a complementary emotion (guilt) and lead to better outcomes regardless of the perceived power of the disappointed negotiator.

There is a cost to expressing anger in negotiation. When a negotiator expresses anger, the counterparty may attempt to sabotage the negotiation. In a series of studies, when negotiators were subjected to an “angry” opponent, they made concessions, but also sabotaged their opponents covertly.⁹⁹ Thus, the value-claiming advantages of expressing anger need to be weighed against the costs of eliciting covert retaliation.

The ability to accurately read emotions in others, particularly the counterparty, is important for successful outcomes. Indeed, a consistent positive correlation exists between emotion recognition accuracy (ERA) and goal-oriented performance.¹¹⁸ Greater recognition of facial expressions predicted how well negotiators did in a buyer–seller negotiation in terms of both distributive and integrative outcomes.¹¹⁹

Part of emotional intelligence is a certain degree of self-efficacy and confidence. Whereas no one likes an overly confident, arrogant person, we admire people who have a quiet, steady belief in themselves and a “can do” attitude. Just as there are many types of negotiation skills, it stands to reason that there are many areas of skill about which negotiators may or may not be self-confident. Distributive self-efficacy refers to a negotiator’s belief in his or her ability to claim resources effectively (e.g., “gain the upper hand”; “persuade others to make the most concessions”); in contrast, integrative self-efficacy refers to a negotiator’s belief in her or his ability to create resources (e.g., “establish rapport”; “find tradeoffs”).¹²⁰

Negotiators should resist the urge to gloat or show signs of smugness following negotiation.¹²¹ In one investigation, some negotiators gloated following their negotiation (“I really feel good about the negotiation—I got everything I wanted!”). Other negotiators made self-effacing remarks (such as “I really didn’t do that well”). Later, negotiators who overheard the other party gloat or make self-effacing remarks were given an opportunity to provide valuable stock options to these same parties. Those parties who gloated received significantly fewer stock options than those who made the self-effacing remark.¹²²

People often make concessions to another person just to shut them up. What they may not realize is that this effectively reinforces the very behavior they are trying to extinguish. Negative reinforcement, or escape behavior, explains the increased likelihood of behavior that eliminates or removes an aversive stimulus.¹²³ For example, if obnoxious music is emanating from a radio, you will turn off the radio, thus eliminating the unpleasant sounds. In a similar vein, because most people find it unpleasant to be around someone who is openly hostile, negative, and unpredictable, they may be willing to capitulate to the other party just to remove themselves from this aversive situation. Unfortunately, this behavior acts as positive reinforcement for the counterparty. If someone acts irrationally and you acquiesce, you increase the likelihood of that person engaging in negative behavior in the future.

People often try to suppress emotions. However, suppression may backfire. For example, when people tell themselves not to conjure up certain thoughts, they find it virtually impossible to refrain from thinking those exact thoughts. Indeed, people who spend more time trying to repair their negative moods are the most likely to suffer from persistent emotional problems, such as depression and anxiety.¹²⁴ Reevaluation involves acknowledging emotion, but thinking about a different way to view it.

If one negotiator conveys positive emotion, the other negotiator is likely to “catch” this positive emotional state and convey positive emotion as well.¹²⁵ However, the same is true for negative emotion. Other people’s emotions are a significant predictor of our own emotions, even after controlling for our perceptions of other’s emotions. Stated another way, we don’t need to be consciously aware of somebody else’s emotion for it to affect our own emotion and our decision making.¹²⁶

Certain words, when used in negotiation, are loaded and evoke emotion. In one investigation, the emotional impact of six different types of words were measured (see Exhibit 5-10).¹²⁷ Of all the different types of words, those that labeled the other person negatively or told the other person what he or she ought to do triggered the greatest anger and frustration.