Top-level reports on any project should cover:

Periodic appraisal is recommended, by peer and/or external groups, of the complexity and value of information flows including reports to ensure that the minimum effort is expended to produce only the necessary information. It is relevant that under the UK Corporate Governance Code, companies should monitor their risk management and internal control systems and, at least annually, carry out a review of their effectiveness, and report on that review in the annual report.

The culture of the organization should encourage honest and open reports. It should not deter whistle blowers. The insights of Hirschman’s exit, voice and loyalty model should be applied to work for continual improvement.

The practice of openness and disclosure together with a basic trait of honesty will ensure that potential or actual corrupt practices are exposed and rejected. There are, however, contexts where such standards do not exist. Indeed, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out business operations in certain countries unless ‘on-costs’, often called euphemistically mobilization costs, introduction fees or facilitation payments, are added to the contract sum. Such allowances are often added to the fees paid to the agent representing the organization in that country and that is the end of the matter as far as the company is concerned. Care must be taken in all cases to comply with the requirements of the UK Bribery Act 2010 or where applicable the US Foreign Corruption Practices Act 1977.

Another difficulty to ethical application and monitoring of principles is where corporate control is confused due to complex arrangements made through tax havens where sources of finance, ruling regulations, effective ownership, interest and dividend payments are obscured. Such cases are increasingly common. Professionals should take care that they are operating within their codes of conduct, particularly with regard to the public interest. It is not sufficient to rely on the stewardship performance of institutional investors or on regulators.

On a more personal level, there is always the dilemma of how far one can go when giving or receiving seasonal gifts, entertaining clients or being entertained by suppliers. Perhaps the clearest answer to this question was given by a senior manager of a construction company to a project manager who asked for clarification as to what gifts are acceptable or permissible. The advice given was: ‘You can accept anything, provided you can carry it home in your stomach’. The National Audit Office’s Code of Conduct gives three pages of excellent guidance on this topic.

Governance arrangements for an organization should be tailored to its own needs. As found in the 2015 research sponsored by the UK Institute of Directors, it is unlikely that any standard scheme of measurement will usefully apply across organizations at different stages of development or in differing sectors and cultures. Difficulties arising in applying standard governance models especially where one organization does not have sole control of one or more projects.

Particular governance issues arise in the public sector, such as political direction, confidentiality constraints and the difficulty in applying professional codes of conduct. These require different treatment compared to that in the private sector as successfully demonstrated by the National Audit Office which commends an approach to gifts and hospitality based on three principles: purpose, proportionality and avoidance of conflict of interest.

The evidence is mixed as to whether organizations that score higher on objective governance schemes perform better for stakeholders. Some sectoral studies, such as in the oil and gas sector, show a positive relationship, but some wider studies do not. Nevertheless, the 2014 qualitative research by APM found that effective governance was one of the top three factors in project success. However, there is anecdotal evidence from highly successful technology companies such as Apple and Google that the best judges of appropriate governance are their own leaders rather than third party standard setters.

The quality of applied governance is also difficult to measure. The reality is that dynamic governance decisions can be made under stress and subject to group dynamics that are not recorded. Assurance schemes too often rely entirely on verifiable documented evidence. These capture only a part of the significant reality, such as in the case of Royal Bank of Scotland in UK in 2007 where excellence in reported governance compliance preceded a major crisis which was subsequently attributed to ‘a real failure in corporate governance’ including inappropriate behaviour.