Learning, Knowledge, and Emotion

‘Why do people in organizations seek knowledge?’ (Gherardi, 2004: 32) This may seem a question that leads to a certain dead end—people obviously look for knowledge in order to solve their problems and to gain advantage of some sort or other. So what happens if they fail to acquire knowledge or if the knowledge they acquire neither solves their problems nor gains them any advantage? What happens if the knowledge they crave turns out to redefine the nature of the problems they face or the nature of the competitive advantage they seek? And what if, as Gherardi (1999; 2004) reminds us, the pursuit of knowledge becomes an end in its own right, linked to desire, to curiosity, and to fascination with the unknown? Far from leading to a dead end, the ‘why’ question at the start of the paragraph inevitably leads to a view of learning and knowledge inextricably linked to emotion and passion—emotions, such as insecurity, fear, and anxiety may drive the quest for knowledge while passions of curiosity, exploration, and discovery may propel the quest for learning. Put this way, what seems surprising is that knowledge and learning are ever thought about without consideration to the emotions that drive them or the emotions they prompt along the way.

Why then are knowledge and learning so frequently considered independently of emotion and passion? As Fineman argued in 2003, learning and knowledge have long been approached in the rationalist tradition as cognitive domains, objective and pure, into which emotion can only introduce impurity and subjectivity. Yet, the parallel critical tradition has also existed, one that insists that knowledge and learning are inextricably linked to human interests (for classic statements, see Freire, 1970, 1996; Habermas, 1972) and, of course, to structures of domination and subordination (for the currently popular account of this view, see Foucault, 1978, 1980), not least those linked to masculine (Cooper, 1989) and colonial (Spivak, 1988) hegemony. But this critical tradition itself, in both its humanist and post-structuralist versions, has hesitated to engage with emotion as part of the discourses of knowledge and power.

More recently, emotions have started to attract the attention of different groups of scholars. This is related to wider social and cultural patterns that have brought emotion to the forefront of social life. Campbell (1989), for example, has argued that the suppression and denial of emotion were cardinal virtues of Puritanism, the Protestant ethic and even the Enlightenment project that saw everything as subordinate to the Commonwealth of Reason, Progress, and Science. Today, by contrast, argues Campbell, under the influence of consumerism, Puritanism has given way to a Romantic ethic. This castigates the choking of emotions, raising their free expression near the summit of values. All emotions, including fear, anger, and jealousy, argues Campbell can be vehicles for pleasure provided that we know how to express and contain them. ‘Emoting’ becomes a highly popular activity, whether it takes place in theatres and television shows, mass public festivals or intimate encounters. Thus, the ‘stiff upper lip’ ethic has given way to the mass demonstration of near-hysterical feeling, exemplified by the outpouring of emotion following the death of Princess Diana.