Criticism and self-criticism lie at the heart of learning. We learn from our ability to reflect critically and assess the consequences of our actions, taking on board the criticisms of others and of ourselves. But criticism, as every child learns early in life, is painful and hurtful: and it is undoubtedly part of a technology of power. At its most extreme, criticism becomes bullying—incessant nit-picking and fault-finding which undermines a person’s self-confidence and serves to perpetuate their subordinate dependent standing. In less extreme forms, criticism can still act to maintain hierarchical distinctions, to paralyze the willingness to experiment and innovate and to dread the prospect of failure, humiliation, and ridicule. Criticism can easily become internalized as self-criticism which is every bit as destabilizing as criticism by an external authority. As psychoanalysis teaches us, the voice of the super-ego can be harsher, more vigilant, more unreasonable, and harder to answer back than the voice of external authority. Yet, criticism is vital for learning. How can it be balanced and prevented from unleashing the kinds of dynamics that we identified earlier?
It is for this reason that we shall conclude this contribution by arguing that criticism and critical reflection are effective prompts for learning when balanced by an ethic of care which treats people in their different roles, as students, as subordinates and employees, as patients, and even as consumers, as ends in themselves rather than as means to specific ends. Since it was first articulated by Carol Gilligan (1982) in connection with the moral development of young girls, the discourse on the ethics of care has generated many insights in diverse fields ranging from international relations to psychology and moral philosophy (see, for example, Held, 2006). In the field of organizational studies and especially in management learning, however, it has been substantially ignored (for an exception, see Gabriel, 2009). The ethics of care sees caring as a vital dimension of most human interactions and as the foundation of a particular type of morality. In contrast to the ‘ethics of justice,’ the ethics of care does not rely on claims of universality, absolute judgments of right and wrong, and perfect virtues. Instead, it is a morality that grows out of the recognition that all people are embedded in different webs of social relations, being dependent on others for their survival and well-being and capable of supporting others in their moments of need and helplessness.
A large part of the debate on care concerns its gendered nature, whether in other words, women are more disposed by nature, culture, or other factors for caring than men and how this affects power relations between the genders (Held, 2006; Kittay, 1999; Kittay and Feder, 2002; Noddings, 1986; Tronto, 1993). What seems likely is that while both women and men can act in caring ways, at least in Western cultures, caring is associated with the feminine principle as against the ethic of impersonal objectivity, criticism, and judgment which represent a masculine or even patriarchal order. Being cared for is what every newborn child requires, and caring is attending to the needs of others with whom we feel close and for whom we are prepared to take personal responsibility. Caring is not a scripted emotional performance and cannot be reduced to emotional labor. Caring involves some of the qualities that are currently and fashionably grouped under the title of emotional intelligence, yet, unlike emotional intelligence, it entails no suggestion of emotional manipulation or deception. Instead, caring involves sensitivity to the emotional needs of the other person and an ability to guide and influence these emotions through a wide range of actions, utterances, and expressions. It requires an ability to ‘notice what you are noticing’ (James and Ladkin, 2008); and to anticipate the needs and vulnerabilities of the cared for. And, in spite of all this, it is a profound mistake to view an ethic of care as some kind of charitable principle of universal love or as a ‘touchy-feely’ ethic of intimacy. An ethic of care may sometimes dictate taking difficult, hard, and unpleasant actions in support of a person, an institution, or even a thing one cares for.
The ethic of care does not resolve the anxieties we signaled earlier, nor does it dissolve the political realities within which learning takes place; it can, however, contribute to learning in a number of different ways. First, it offers a counter-balance to the ethic of criticism, sustaining learning, especially in its early, tentative stages. Without compromising the commitment to rational discourse and rigorous knowledge, the ethic of care ensures that criticism is exercised in a responsible manner, a manner which tolerates disagreement and encourages learning. Within an ethic of care, criticism never degenerates to nit-picking, the compulsive pointing out of even trivial flaws with the aim of establishing hierarchies of authority and privilege. On the contrary, the caring critic acknowledges his or her own fallibility and the possibility that his or her judgment may be made in error.
An ethic of care offers a partial containment of anxieties unleashed by both the learning process and organizational politics. It allows for mistakes to be recognized and corrected, it supports experimentation and responsible improvisation, and it promotes respect for human fallibility and insecurity. Akio Morita, co-founder of Sony and a leader known both for his toughness and his caring qualities makes the point explicitly in his autobiography:
Mistakes or miscalculations are human and normal, and viewed in the long run they have not damaged the company. I do not mind taking responsibility for every managerial decision I have made. But if a person who makes a mistake is branded and kicked off the seniority promotion escalator, he could lose his motivation for the rest of his business life and deprive the company of whatever good things he may have to offer later. . . . I tell our people, ‘Go ahead and do what you think is right. If you make a mistake, you will learn from it. Just don’t make the same mistake twice.’
(Morita, 1987: 150)
The ethic of care does not function as a universal warm blanket of unconditional positive regard. Far from it—it can involve hard decisions, disappointing news and the management of disillusionment and pain without recourse to comforting untruths and false hopes. It can also dictate sharp political action in pursuit, defense, and support of individuals, groups, and organizations for which one cares. In this way, the ethic of care may extend to the process of learning itself and to the political realities with which it is intertwined. It may even extend to the organization itself as a valued entity, one that is cherished by those who work for it, support it, and nurture it. In a memorable piece inspired by the children’s story of the velveteen rabbit, David Sims (2004) has argued that it is love that turns organizations into valued spaces in which people’s actions ‘come alive.’ The velveteen rabbit is a children’s toy that, in the story, comes to life or becomes ‘real’ only when the child who owns it develops a caring relation with it. The story’s theme that love ‘animates’ what it touches is one that has been rehearsed endlessly by poets and storytellers, but Sims argues that it may also apply to organizations, some of which generate extraordinary amounts of loyalty and affection among their members whereas others remain objects of instrumental usefulness and emotional indifference. An ethic of care can in this way neutralize the widely commented cynicism that can so easily afflict our organizations and their attempt to foster a learning culture.
In this chapter, we indicated a number of different ways in which emotions in organizations enter into the learning processes of individuals and groups. We suggested that emotions neither enhance nor inhibit learning in a direct and straightforward manner; and emotions themselves are neither the direct products of learning nor its raw materials. Instead, we proposed that emotional configurations in organizations are themselves tied up with organizational politics and power and argued that to consider knowledge and learning outside organizational politics and power leads to blinkered accounts. Fear of failure or criticism, a key emotion in regard of organizational learning, is also the result of a political set-up focused on punishment and making scapegoats. We proposed, by contrast, an ethic of care that provides a secure environment in which people may learn, individually and collectively, from their mistakes and miscalculations, and engage in constructive criticism and self-criticism.
References
Antonacopoulou, E. P. and Gabriel, Y. (2001) Emotion, learning and organizational change: Towards an integration of psychoanalytic and other perspectives. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 14(5): 435–451.
Armstrong, D. (2000) Emotions in organizations: Disturbance or intelligence? International Society for the Psychoanalytic Study of Organizations Annual Symposium, London, June.
Ashkanasy, N. M. and Daus, C. S. (2002) Emotions in the workplace: The new challenge for managers. Academy of Management Executive, 16(1): 76–86.
Campbell, C. (1989) The romantic ethic and the spirit of modern consumerism. Oxford: Macmillan.
Carr, A. (2001) Understanding emotion and emotionality in a process of change. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 14(5): 421–434.
Cooper, R. (1989) Modernism, postmodernism and organizational analysis 3: The contribution of Jacques Derrida. Organization Studies, 10(4): 479–502.
Craib, I. (1998) Experiencing identity. London: Sage.
Cunliffe, A. and Easterby-Smith, M. (2004) From Reflection to Practical Reflexivity: Experiential learning as lived experience. In M. Reynolds and R. Vince (eds.) Organizing Reflection. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Damasio, A.R. (1994) Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Putnam.
Damasio, A.R. (1999) The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Fineman, S. (1993) Emotion in Organizations. London: Sage.
Fineman, S. (1996) Emotion and organizing. In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, and W. R. Nord (eds.), Handbook of Organization Studies. London: Sage: 543–564.
Fineman, S. (2001) Managing emotions at work: some political reflections. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference, Washington, DC.
Fineman, S. (2003) Emotionalizing organizational learning. In M. Easterby-Smith and M. A. Lyles (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management. Oxford: Blackwell: 557–574.
Fineman, S. and Sturdy, A. (1999) The emotions of control: a qualitative exploration of environmental regulation. Human Relations, 52(5): 631–663.
Flam, H. (1990a) The emotional ‘Man’ and the problem of collective action. International Sociology, 5(1): 39–56.
Flam, H. (1990b) Emotional ‘Man’ II. Corporate actors as emotion-motivated emotion managers. International Sociology, 5(2): 225–234.
Foucault, M. (1978) The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Brighton: Harvester Books.
Freire, P. (1970/1996) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
French, R (1997) The teacher as container of anxiety: Psychoanalysis and the role of the teacher. Journal of Management Education, 21(4): 483–495.
French, R. and Vince, R. (1999) Group Relations, Management and Organisation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Freud, S. (1914/1984) On narcissism: An introduction, On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis. Harmondsworth: Pelican Freud Library, 11: 59–97.
Freud, S. (1923/1984) The ego and the id, On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis. Harmondsworth: Pelican Freud Library, 11: 341–406.
Freud, S. (1940/1986) An outline of psychoanalysis. Historical and Expository works on PsychoAnalysis. Harmondsworth: Pelican Freud Library, 15: 371–443.
Gabriel, Y. (1998) Psychoanalytic contributions to the study of the emotional life of organizations. Administration and Society, 30(3): 291–314.
Gabriel, Y. (1999) Organizations in Depth. London: Sage.
Gabriel, Y. (2009) Reconciling an ethic of care with critical management pedagogy. Management Learning, 40(4): 379–385.
Gherardi, S. (1999) Learning as problem-driven or learning in the face of mystery? Organizational Studies, 20(1): 101–123.
Gherardi, S. (2004) Knowing as desire: Dante’ Ulysses at the end of the known world. In Y. Gabriel (ed.), Myths, Stories and Organizations: Premodern Narratives for Our Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 32–48.
Gilligan, C. (1982) In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor.
Habermas, J. (1972) Knowledge and Human Interests. London: Heinemann.
Held, V. (2006) The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heller, A. (1979) A Theory of Feelings. Amsterdam: Van Gorkum Assen.
Hochschild, A.R. (1979) Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. American Journal of Sociology, 85(3): 551–575.
Hochschild, A.R. (1983) The Managed Heart. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Höpfl, H. and Linstead, S. (1997) Learning to feel and feeling to learn: Emotion and learning in organizations. Management Learning, 28(1): 5–12.
James, K.T. and Ladkin, D. (2008) Meeting the challenge of leading in the 21st century: Beyond the ‘deficit model’ of leadership development. In K.T. James and J. Collins (eds.), Leadership Learning: Knowledge into Action. London: Palgrave McMillian: 13–34.
Jaques, E. (1955) Social systems as a defense against persecutory and depressive anxiety. In M. Klein, P. Heimann, and R. E. Money-Kryle (eds.) New Directions in Psychoanalysis London: Tavistock Publications.
Kersten, A. (2001) Organizing for powerlessness: A critical perspective on psychodynamics and dysfunctionality. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 14(5): 452–467.
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. (2004) Organizations on the couch: A clinical perspective on organizational dynamics. European Management Journal, 22(2): 183–200.
Kittay, E. (1999) Love’s labor: Essays on women, equality, and dependency. New York: Routledge.
Kittay, E. and Feder, E. (2002) The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Landen, M. (2002) Emotion management: Dabbling in mystery—white witchcraft or black art? Human Resource Development International, 5(4): 507–524.
Mangham, I. (1998) Emotional discourse in organizations. In D. Grant, T. Keenoy, and C. Oswick (eds.), Discourse and Organization. London: Sage: 51–64.
Mayer, J. and Salovey, P. (1997) What is emotional intelligence? In P. Salovey and D. Sluyten (eds.) Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence: Implications for Educators. New York: Basic Books.
Menzies, I. E. (1960) A case study of the functioning of social systems as a defense against anxiety: A report on a study of the nursing system in a general hospital. Human Relations, 13: 95–121.
Morita, A. (1987) Made in Japan. London: Fontana.
Noddings, N. (1986) Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Odih, P. and Knights, D. (2007) Political organizations and decision making, In D. Knights and H. Willmott (eds.) Introducing Organizational Behaviour and Management. London: Thomson.
Palmer, B. (2002) The Tavistock Paradigm: Inside, Outside and Beyond. In R. D. Hinshelwood and M. Chiesa (eds.) Organizations, Anxieties and Defenses: Towards a Psychoanalytic Social Psychology. London: Whurr Publishers Ltd.
Pedler, M. (2002) Accessing local knowledge: Action learning and organizational learning in Walsall. Human Resource Development International, 5: 523–540.
Sacks, O. (1995) An Anthropologist on Mars. Oxford: Blackwell.
Salecl, R. (2004) On Anxiety. London: Routledge.
Salzberger-Wittenberg, I, Henry, G., and Osborne, E. (1983) The Emotional Experience of Learning and Teaching. London: Routledge.
Sims, D. (2004) The velveteen rabbit and passionate feelings for organizations. In Y. Gabriel (ed.), Myths, Stories and Organizations: Premodern Narratives for Our Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 209–222.
Spivak, G. (1988) Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson, and L. Grosberg (Eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Urbana: University of Illinois Press: 271–313.
Ten Bos, R. and Willmott, H. (2001) Towards a post-dualistic business ethics: Interweaving reason and emotion in working life. Journal of Management Studies, 38(6): 769–793.
Tronto, J. C. (1993) Moral boundaries: A political argument for an ethic of care. New York: Routledge.
Vince, R. (1998) Behind and beyond Kolb’s learning cycle. Journal of Management Education, 22(3): 304–319.
Vince, R. (1999) ‘Uncomfortable Knowledge’ management: The impact of emotions on organizational learning. The 3rd International Conference on Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management, Lancaster University, UK, June 6–8.
Vince, R (2001) Power and emotion in organizational learning. Human Relations, 54(10): 1325–1351.
Vince, R. (2002) The politics of imagined stability: A psychodynamic understanding of change at Hyder plc. Human Relations, 55(10): 1189–1208.
Vince, R. (2006) Being taken over: Managers’ emotions and rationalisations during a company takeover. Journal of Management Studies, 43(2): 343–365.
Vince, R. (2008) ‘Learning-in-Action’ and ‘Learning Inaction’: Advancing the theory and practice of critical action learning. Action Learning: Research and Practice, 5(2): 93–104.
Vince, R. (2010) Anxiety, politics and critical management education. British Journal of Management, 21(1): 26–29.
Vince, R. and Martin, L. (1993) Inside action learning: The psychology and the politics of the action learning model. Management Learning, 24(3): 205–215.
Vince, R. and Saleem, T. (2004) The impact of caution and blame on organizational learning. Management Learning, 35(2): 131–152.
Williams, S. (2001). Emotion and Social Theory. London: Sage.
Winnicott, D. (1962). The Maturational Processes and Facilitating Environment. London: Hogarth Press.
Winnicott, D. (1964) The Child, the Family and the Outside World. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Winnicott, D. (1980) Playing and Reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin.