Index

“3 × 3”

“3 × 3” cyber security model, 118–121
back-office systems, 120
generation, transmission, distribution and metering systems, 120–121
generation, transmission, and metering embedded devices, 121

A

Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), 12, 47–50
compromise of, 49–50
smart meter, 48
Advanced network monitoring, 133–134
data loss prevention (DLP), 134
network behavior and anomaly detection (NBAD) tools, 133–134
network forensics tool, 134
Anti-virus, 129
Application whitelisting, 126–127, 129
Article 29 Working Party opinion, 92

B

Back-office systems, 120
BP Energy Outlook, 2
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), 149
Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS (BEAST), 36

C

Canadian Electricity Association, 3
Chain, in Smart Grid supply chain, 156–158
Change control, 129
CO2 emission reduction
electric vehicles, support for, 8
greater efficiency, 5–6
integration of renewable technologies, 6–7
reduction in need of new power plant, 7–8
smarter appliances, 8–9
Compensating network security controls, 132–133
application content inspection, 132
industrial protocol filters, 132
intrusion detection systems, 132
intrusion prevention systems, 132
transport layer security, 132–133
Consumer appliances, 89
Control zone protection, 129–130
application whitelisting, 129
anti-virus, 129
controlling configurations and system changes, 129
change control, 129
host data loss prevention (DLP), 129–130
host intrusion detection systems/host intrusion prevention systems (HIDS/HIPS), 129
event logging, 130
Cyber attack methods
attacking generation facilities, 82–83
blended attacks, 77–81
human-machine interface (HMI) popping, 77
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, 75–76
replay attacks, 76–77
secure protocols, 83–84
setting phasors to kill, 81–82
Cyber security
future considerations, 166–168
future countermeasures, 168–171
point security versus secure framework, 170–171
tools to develop, 169–170
Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, 147

D

Database Activity Monitoring or “DAM”, 136
Denial-of-service attack, 59–60
Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE), 170

E

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 5
Electric Reliability Council of Texas, 3–4
Electrical generation
burner and steam generation processes, 29–30
“clean” or “green” energy systems, 22
exploiting the controllers, 27–30
fuel delivery processes, 29
generation system architecture, 23–26
manipulation, 28–29
nuclear generation system, 23
security concerns and recommendations, 26–32
types of, 19–23
wind turbines, 22
build new plants for power, 7
raw materials, 8
renewable energy source, 6
source of, 6
Energy Retailers Association of Australia, 9
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 6
Event logging, 130

F

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 5–6
Field zone protection, 126–129
application whitelisting, 126–127
exceptions to rules, 128
real-time operating systems (RTOS), 128–129
Firewalls, 132–133

G

Grid resilience, 3–5
baseload generating units, 4
intermediate units, 4
peak demands, 3–4
peaking units, 4
power outage, 4–5
significant risks, 4

H

Hacking Smart Grid
denial of service, 59–60
devices-specific vulnerabilities, 68–69
identifying target, 62–67
inherent vulnerabilities, in industrial protocols, 70–72
interconnectedness, 64
leveraging automation systems for enumeration, 67
leveraging know vulnerabilities, 69–70
manipulation of service, 60–62
motive, 58–62
Scanning transmission and distribution infrastructure, 65–67
targeting major cyber security, 64–65
theft of information, 58–59
vulnerability, 67–73
Heritage Foundation, 4–5
Host data loss prevention (DLP), 129–130
Host intrusion detection systems/host intrusion prevention systems (HIDS/HIPS), 129
House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, 3

I

ICS-CERT, 167
Strategy for Securing Control Systems, 167–168
objectives, 168
IEC 60870-6, 155
IEC 61850, 54, 155
IEC 61968, 154
IEC 61970, 154
IEC 62351, 54, 155
IEEE 2030-2011 Smart Grid power system, 108–109
IEEE C37.118, 53–54
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), 9
In-home systems, 50
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2
IPsec Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP), 117
ISA-62443, 101–102, 109–114
for multi-plant zone separation, 110
and Smart Grids, 109
Windows-based devices, 109–111
“zone and conduit”, 109, 110
ISA-SP99, 109–114

M

Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, 75–76
McAfee Critical Infrastructure, 114
business networks (Enterprise), 114
unique environments, 114
Metering, 47
Microgrids, 50–51

N

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 89
Netwitness Investigator or Solera Networks’ DeepSee, 134
Network DLP, 136
NISTIR 7628, 101
Nitol botnet, 149
Nonintrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NALM), 89

O

“Operation b70”, 149

P

Phasor measurement units, 11–12
Privacy concerns with Smart Grid
avoiding loss of trust and reputation, 95–96
avoiding unnecessary costs, 95
consumer appliances, 89
consumer benefits, 88
customer’s energy records from power companies, 89–90
identifying and managing risks, 95–97
inadequate solutions, 95
informing organization’s communications strategy, 96
meeting and exceeding legal requirements, 96
personal data, 87–98
privacy impact assessment, 95–98
privacy risk, 88–98
smart meters, 88
thermal imaging, 90
Protocols, 52–54

S

SCADA network, 115
Ethernet and TCP/IP, 115
Scanning transmission, 65–67
Secure protocols, 83–84
Securing supply chain
risks in, 148
Security control
advanced network monitoring, 133–134
common technology-based methods, 126
compensating network security controls, 132–133
control zone protection, 129–130
establishing boundaries and zone separation, 130–134
field zone protection, 126–129
implementation of, 125
monitoring, 139–141
protecting data and applications, 134–138
service zone protection and back office systems, 130
Shamoon (W32.DistTrack), 141–142
“situational awareness,” 138–141
type of data to be protected, 137
Security information and event management systems (SIEM), 136
Service zone protection, 130
Shamoon (W32.DistTrack), 141–142
Simplified Smart Grid reference model, 121–122
Smart Grid
accessing without safeguards, 87
adoption of electric vehicles, 8
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), 12
alternative world, 162–163
challenge of making predictions, 161–163
charging stations for electric vehicles, 97
consumer benefits, 9
Data Protection Authority, 96
definitions, 2
energy demands, 2–3
environmental performance, 5–9
grid resilience, 3–5
managing peak demand, 10
operational efficiencies, 9–11
phasor measurement units, 11–12
potential exclusion, of communities, 12
privacy concerns, 87
processing personal data, 96
proportionality, 166
renting, 13
smarter appliances, 8–9
substation automation, 11
transformation, 2
transparency, 164–166
understandings, 1
values of personal data, 163–166
Smart Grid Australia, 3–4, 13
Smart Grid Coordination Group (SGCG), 104–107
Smart Grids architecture model (SGAM) framework, 104–107
Smart Grid cyber security models, 101, 103–104
“3 × 3” cyber security model, 118–121
anomaly detection products, 117
challenges in diversity and interconnectedness, 111
communication, 111–113
gateway systems, 111
mapping security requirements, 114–121
multiple segment systems, 113
process control network, 116
Smart Grid Coordination Group (SGCG), 104–107
Standardization Mandate M/490, 104–107
Smart Grid network architecture, 17
bulk and distributed generation architectures, 19–32
data manipulation, 31–32
distribution architecture, 43–47
generation system architecture, 23–26
IEC 61850, 54
IEC 62351, 54
IEEE C37.118, 53–54
network attacks, 30–31
protocols, 52–54
transmission and distribution architecture, 32–47
ZigBee, 54
Smart Grid supply chain, 149–158
the chain, 156–158
in communications providers, 151–152
contractually explicit, 155
in end customer, 151
guidance, 155
high transparency, 150–151
in grid operator, 150–151
ICT provider, 152–153
in installation companies, 152
mandatory standards, 155
medium transparency, 151–153
in retail, 152
standardization bodies, 153–156
@2legislation authorities, 155
Smart meter, 48, 88
compromise of, 49
Socket, 1–2
Standardization Mandate M/490, 104–107
System interdependencies, 51–52

T

Thermal imaging, 90
Transmission architecture, 32–47
functions, 34
SCADA systems and substation automation, 34–39
Transmission SCADA systems (T-SCADA), 34
direct attack vectors, 40–41
distribution field devices, 46–47
distribution SCADA/DMS, 44–46
field controllers and automated field devices, 46–47
line monitoring systems, 41–42
line protection systems, 41
phasor data concentrator, 40
phasor measurement, 39–41
possible exploitation of, 36
redefining inputs and outputs, 38
reliability and safety, 38
synchrophasors, 40
transformers, 42–43
wide–area communication infrastructure, compromise of, 36–38

U

United Nations, 2
US Cyberspace Policy Review, 147
US Generation III+ (GEN III+) nuclear power plan, 7–8

Z

ZigBee, 54
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