Since the international community recognized the serious threat climate change poses to the world, various efforts have been made at different levels by diverse actors. Among them, the UN process mainly focusing on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been the center of discussions. In 1992, states adopted the UNFCCC on the occasion of the Rio Conference. As the first global mechanism to address climate change, the UNFCCC has tried to mobilize various resources to tackle climate change. Based on the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 as an implementation tool to further the efforts of international community.
The Kyoto Protocol contains more detailed rules and procedures on how to curb the amount of greenhouse gas emissions. Utilizing the top-down approach, which emphasizes the implementation of legally-binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs), the Kyoto Protocol introduced legally binding emission targets to developed Parties, the so-called Annex I countries, based on their historical responsibility. The Kyoto Protocol also introduced innovative market mechanisms as a complementary means to help Annex I countries meet their obligations as well as to aid developing countries achieve sustainable development. These Kyoto Mechanisms (often referred to as Flexibility Mechanisms) became an integral part of the implementation mechanisms within the UNFCCC regime.
As the first commitment period for Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol was set to expire by the end of 2012, states agreed on the Bali Road Map in 2007 to engage in another set of negotiations to design a post-2012 climate change regime with the aim of completing by 2009. This was not only to deal with the issues of the second commitment period for Annex I countries, but also to encourage mitigation actions by developing countries. As some advanced developing countries such as China and India have become large emitters of GHGs, it has become critical to engage them constructively during the course of mitigating GHG emissions. However, for various reasons such as the two-track approach of the UNFCCC, states failed to agree on a new regime by 2009, rather they took note of a political agreement—the Copenhagen Accord. As a result, another series of negotiations have been undertaken without much progress. In 2011, however, Parties made an important progress by agreeing to initiate a new set of negotiations in Durban, South Africa. In other words, states decided to launch a new negotiation process based on the so-called Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP), wherein they need to finish the negotiations and agree on the post-2020 climate change regime by 2015.
With the future of the climate change regime hanging in the balance, it could not be more timely to explore prospective options that could bring about a more effective global architecture to respond to the climate challenge; effective in terms of raising the level of ambition to close the mitigation gap and in terms of mobilizing reluctant countries in making pledges.
In designing a new international framework, this volume recognizes the need to reassess the current climate regime. The limitations of the existing regime create the pretext to seek ways or viable policy frameworks that could augment the capacity of the regime to effectively respond to the challenges posed by climate change. Since climate change is a global problem that warrants an eclectic set of solutions, this volume highlights an interdisciplinary approach to understanding important factors key to the realization of an effective climate change regime for post-2020.
By bridging lessons learned from past negotiations and by analyzing viable policy architectures, this book can serve to shed light on the many issues facing the international policy community in the hopes of achieving real progress for the post-2020 climate change regime.
Two decades of negotiations: what have we learned?
Need for enhancing effectiveness
The past climate change regime has predominantly utilized a top-down approach or a command-control approach being complemented by a bottom-up approach based on Kyoto mechanisms. This effort, however, has failed to tackle climate change and its adverse effects effectively. Considering the fragmented nature of the international community, a top-down approach may not be able to bring adequate results in achieving the objectives of the climate change regime. Without effective enforcement mechanisms at the international level, any attempt to implement climate change policy by imposing obligations of reducing GHGs on the states would fail. States that need to implement the given obligations may face serious challenges domestically if additional costs are incurred to implement the obligations. This would lead states to opt out of implementing their obligations. Therefore, a more effective climate change regime entails a much more efficient approach that ensures opportunities for the states, thereby reducing GHG emissions. In this sense, as demonstrated in this volume, a market-based bottom-up approach may better appeal to designing post-2020 climate change regime.
Furthermore, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the climate change regime, wider participation of states in mitigating GHG emissions is important. Currently, the Kyoto Protocol targets only about one-quarter of the global emissions (Bodansky 2009). Together, the top 25 GHG emitters account for approximately 83 percent of global emissions, with 13 Annex-I countries, 11 non-Annex I countries, and the EU (Baumert et al. 2005).
In particular, the rapidly growing economy of advanced developing countries is matched by an increase in aggregate GHG emissions (Cosbey 2009). As of the time of writing the introduction, China has already become the largest emitter, while India is expected to take over the China’s position in 2030. Indeed, it is really critical for the future climate change regime to find a way of encouraging developing countries to be more active in the global efforts to combat climate change in order to broaden the scope of participation in mitigating GHG emissions. In this sense, a market-based, bottom-up approach would be more attractive. If the emerging climate change regime can provide benefits to states that implement a low-carbon development strategy, it would certainly encourage not only developed countries but also developing countries to actively participate in implementing relevant low-carbon policies.
More flexibility
The Kyoto Protocol was a high-water mark for the UN-led climate change regime as it signaled the regime’s first serious step to address climate change, but more importantly, the Protocol was praised for its Flexibility Mechanisms designed to aid Parties, particularly Annex-I countries, to meet their commitments. As opposed to imposing particular policies and measures, Article 2 of the Protocol provides states the freedom (to some extent) to choose how to meet their national emission targets. However, the Protocol remains to prescribe internationally defined emissions targets. As states, particularly developing countries, are concerned about the possible repercussions of legally binding emissions targets on their economies, it is imperative to accord countries the flexibility to define their commitments in their own terms. In other words, providing states the ability to determine commitments that reflect what they are willing and are able to do.
Furthermore, since varying national circumstances and strategic interests necessarily call for different types of policies, it is also crucial to provide Parties with greater flexibility to chart their own national mitigation strategies that run parallel not only with their national interests but also with the broader international interests in responding to climate change. In this context, a plethora of approaches or policies have been considered. This volume for example, highlights the concept of low-carbon development strategy as a bottom-up approach that advances both development interests and climate action. A number of advanced developing countries such as China, Korea, Indonesia, and Brazil have resorted to this strategy as it allows them to contribute to mitigation efforts while promoting economic growth.
Issues in designing the post-2020 regime
At the Durban climate change meeting in 2011, the international community laid out the path to negotiate a new global architecture for the post-2020 period. The success of the negotiations for the post-2020 climate change regime will depend on how to prepare for a policy platform where countries with different interests may find a middle ground where they can participate more actively in efforts to reduce GHG emissions. In this sense, two issues of legal formality and approaches will be important in crafting the post-2020 climate change regime.
Legal formality
The challenge of reaching an agreement over the legal form of the eventual climate change agreement was first officially addressed when the UN climate negotiations in 2007 adopted the Bali Road Map which launched a process to reach an “agreed outcome” on long term cooperative action on climate change. The question over the legal nature of the “agreed outcome” of the climate negotiations under the UNFCCC has been a polarizing issue. Some argue that a legally binding instrument, be it a protocol or another treaty, will provide a sense of predictability and accountability, but others suggest that the difficulty of deciding which counties should be bound by what specific commitments, and by when, creates a pretext for unilateral, non-binding pledges from Parties.
This lack of agreement on legal form culminated at Durban when Parties agreed to build upon the process set by the Bali Road Map by establishing the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) to work on crafting a “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all parties” (Decision 1/CP.17 Par 2) which will oversee and manage future climate actions. However, the phrases that comprise the sentence remain ambiguous, and beg for scrutiny. The terms “Protocol” and “another legal instrument” run parallel to the 1995 Berlin Mandate which initiated the process that led to the Kyoto Protocol. However, others argue that in the context of the Durban Platform decision, “legal instrument” does not automatically signify a “legally binding instrument” and could refer to any of the legal instruments the COP could adopt—amendments, amendment to Annexes and Protocols (Rajamani 2012). As the terms “Protocol” and “another legal instrument” conjure up images of a legally binding agreement, a more ambiguous term “agreed outcome with legal force” was added to accommodate some Parties, such as China and India. Considering the increasing popularity of soft law instruments in the international law-making process, several options such as decisions of the Conference of Parties could be favored by these states. No matter what type of legal formality will be used for post-2020 climate change regime, ultimately, the level of effectiveness of a new regime will depend more on what type of approaches will adequately utilized in promoting the implementation of climate change policies by the states.
Approaches
Building upon the realization that the top-down approach has yielded little results in terms of reducing emissions and of reaching an agreement, this volume offers compelling arguments for the need for shifting the emphasis from a top-down approach to a bottom-up approach such as the low-carbon development strategy (LCDS) for the emerging international architecture for post-2020.
Although LCDS has only recently gained prominence, it is not something new. The current climate change regime has long recognized the potential of low-carbon development strategies in promoting mitigation actions that are consistent with sustainable development.1 Sometimes referred to as low-carbon green growth policy, LCDS generally refers to national strategies that envision a low-emission, climate-resilient economic growth (Clapp et al. 2010). This concept transcends both development and climate change policies. Since LCDS does not presume quantified emissions targets and is domestically defined, it could potentially bring about more participation from big emitters that are wary about taking legally binding emissions targets. This volume emphasizes low-carbon development strategy as an approach that could enhance existing climate change policies and measures or serve as the basis for new policies to address climate change. In this context, the main challenge for the emerging climate change architecture therefore is to create an international institutional framework that enables low-carbon growth.
Among the many issues to be addressed to create such a framework is how to generate enough incentives for individual countries to pursue ambitious low-carbon strategies. One of the options considered will be to develop a registry or a system of recognition, which will be important in quantifying the results of respective LCDS. This way, credits could be generated to incentivize countries for their respective efforts. Since a registry will make information available to the public, it quells doubts and fear that some states may free ride on the efforts of others by not putting forward their fullest efforts. The transparency that a registry engenders encourages reciprocity and coordination of national efforts. Another key issue is financing. Some developing countries do not have the necessary resources to implement or develop national low-carbon development strategies on their own. Funding or support can come in different forms and from different channels including development aid from developed countries or international institutions or from private funds through public–private partnerships.
At the crux of introducing LCDS as a vital approach within the UNFCCC regime is the overriding challenge of gaining political support from both developed and developing countries, as well as addressing the possible implications of LCDS for existing climate policies.
Structure of the book
Our research essentially seeks to provide interdisciplinary perspective for the budding climate change architecture for post-2020. The main focus is placed on finding new strategies that prove to be more effective.
This volume begins with an analysis of the existing climate change regime in order to identify the main factors behind its failure to adequately respond to climate change. In Chapter 1, “Why the world has failed to slow global warming,” David G. Victor of the University of California, San Diego argues that the UN-led negotiations on climate is stuck in gridlock as governments try to raise the level of ambition for emission reductions. He attributes this lack of progress to the complexity of the problem and the failure to adopt a workable policy strategy. He argues that the diplomatic toolbox used over the last two decades to manage earlier global environmental problems is not suitable for climate change. This toolbox contains canonical elements including legally binding treaties which are based on emission targets and timetables. However, Victor believes that, to improve the effectiveness of global efforts to address climate change an international agreement should offer governments the “flexibility” to adopt highly diverse policy strategies. Furthermore, Victor suggests that cooperation should start in smaller groups, commonly referred to by the international relations experts as clubs. As opposed to larger negotiations, smaller forums make it easier to agree on contingent deals and to incentivize members, which make it highly likely for the deals to hold. These smaller groups provide an avenue for governments who care most about mitigating climate change to make progress by creating benefits that will entice other governments to do more.
In Chapter 2 “Is an international climate treaty worth fighting for?” the former Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC Yvo de Boer echoes Victor’s analysis on the limitations of the UNFCCC. He argues that despite the complexity and the perceived lack of progress, an international legally binding treaty on climate change is worth the fight. He makes his case by arguing that an international agreement will be beneficial for business as it provides predictability and stability; for civil society as it facilitates participation and balances the climate change agenda; for governments as it allows for a coordinated action. Rather than focusing on legal formality, de Boer argues that successfully responding to the climate challenge lies in making the case for green growth. In this chapter he proposes three related courses of action to enable green growth.
In Chapter 3, “Post-2020 climate change regime building: an advanced developing country’s perspective,” Suh-Yong Chung of Korea University builds upon the previous chapters’ assessment of the existing climate change regime and explores the key issues to be addressed in the post-2020 regime formation from an advanced developing country’s point of view. This chapter begins by assessing the current top-down approach that has guided international actions to tackle climate change. His assessment reveals that the current approach has yielded little in curbing emissions. In order to achieve progress, Chung argues the regime is in need of alternative options that will ensure greater participation. In this chapter, the concept of LCDS is highlighted as a viable option to move the climate talks forward. As opposed to explicit reduction targets set at the international level, this approach helps Parties, particularly developing countries, to advance mitigation actions and development goals in a much more coordinated fashion. However, Chung recognizes the absence of an institutional framework for LCDS, hence this chapter explores key issues that need to be addressed for this international framework to materialize in the post-2020 climate change regime.
Moreover, due to the prevalent notion that there is an inherent trade-off between economic growth and addressing climate change, developing countries have incessantly expressed their worries about the risk mitigation actions might pose to their economic growth. In Chapter 4, “Post-Durban prospects for low-carbon green growth,” Paul Ekins of University College London presents evidence this is no longer the case and that emission reduction is compatible with continued economic growth and development. In his chapter, Ekins, from an economist point of view, explores the potential for low-carbon green growth as an integral part of the post-2020 international framework. He maintains that the hope of affordable economic cost rests on three hypotheses: first, emission reductions can be achieved by changing human behavior that have essentially zero cost; second, improved energy efficiency in households, companies, and transport that are available at low or nil cost can produce substantial emission reductions; lastly, renewable and low-carbon energy sources are already available at low cost as a percentage of GDP. To further support the notion that there is no necessary trade-off between economic growth and the environment, this chapter argues that it is imperative for committed industrial countries such as the UK and South Korea to demonstrate that deep emissions control can be consistent with continued economic growth and development.
In Chapter 5, “Climate negotiations: how to break the impasse and deliver” Juan Zak of the UNEP Risoe Centre for Energy, Climate, and Sustainable Development and Myung-Kyoon Lee of the Global Green Growth Institute maintain that sharing the burden of emissions reduction has turned into a permanent impasse between developed and developing Parties to the Climate Convention, which is crippling its effectiveness. As opposed to putting emphasis on states and holding them accountable for their GHG emissions, they argue that emissions are largely driven by richer individuals globally and not by developed countries per se. Hence, for the post-2020 period, they suggest a system of per-capita emissions allowances to be the basis for the new international framework to break the impasse in climate negotiations and achieve substantial results.
The last two chapters of this volume provide a real-life account of how the theories and concepts discussed in the preceding chapters translate into practice. Through Chapters 6 and 7, the volume seeks highlight the experience of developing countries that will inform policy makers on how to engage developing countries in taking on more ambitious pledges.
In Chapter 6, “China’s transition toward a low-carbon economy: a review of the 11th Five Year Plan,” Ye Qi and Hui-min Li of Tsinghua University reflect upon China’s experience in moving toward a low-carbon development path during the period of the 11th Five Year Plan (2006–2010). According to Qi and Li, the country’s low-carbon development can be characterized by two things. First, despite a dramatic decrease in carbon dioxide emissions intensity, the total CO2 emissions continues to rapidly increase. The “x-shaped” curve, which demonstrates a decreasing intensity and increasing total emissions, has been the primary feature of China’s low-carbon development. If the current export-oriented growth and rate of industrialization continues, the “X-shaped” curve will remain the key feature of China’s low-carbon development in the future. This chapter maintains that transitioning to a low-carbon economy in the midst of rapid industrialization and urbanization is probably the biggest challenge the country faces. Second, the transition was spurred mainly by the central government through its policies. On the one hand, it employed its administrative powers through a performance evaluating system ensuring that lower governments and state-controlled enterprises improve their structures and implement innovative policies. On the other hand, the government mobilized resources through “financial transfer and subsidy, incentives, interest discount and favorable loans.”
In Chapter 7, “Moving forward in the climate change policies and practices,” Wan Portia Hamzah, a Senior Fellow with the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia explores the implications of moving toward a low-carbon development path for one of Southeast Asia’s rapidly growing economies, Malaysia. The overriding challenge for Malaysia is how to strike a balance between its efforts to contribute in the global battle against climate change and achieving sustainable development. Hamzah recognizes that ASEAN countries are highly diverse in terms of their adaptive capacity, vulnerability to climate change and levels of development. Therefore, for countries in the region, flexibility to make the transition to a low-carbon economy at a rate consistent with their capacity is paramount and should be allowed. In order to ground the theoretical discussion, this chapter highlights Malaysia’s experience in setting the country toward a low-carbon development pathway. Hamzah examines the various initiatives the Malaysian government enacted for a low-carbon future and its implications for Malaysia’s economy. Moreover, to fully overcome the challenges of climate change, she recognizes the country’s need to search for new forms of regional cooperation within ASEAN.
Note
1 For example, the Cancun Agreement Para 65 states, “[it] Encourages developing countries to develop low-carbon development strategies or plans in the context of sustainable development.”
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