CHAPTER 9

Communication Ethics in Action

British Petroleum and Conflict Thoughtlessness

Conflict escalation occurs when organizations thoughtlessly disregard and ignore stakeholder issues and arguments that surface in the public sphere. Communication ethics in action requires a reflective communicative stance, ever attentive to multiple perspectives and viewpoints—particularly those that diverge from one’s own perspective. Conflict leads organizations to a fork in the road, with one possible response leading to productivity and creativity; the other leading to polarization and destruction. Heath (2000, p. 76) argues that “to be an effective communicator, each organization needs first to be good.” Such action does not assure a healthy engagement with conflict; however, intentional problematic behavior does assure organizations a caustic engagement with conflict. Constructive conflict requires a professional approach to corporate life that enacts communication ethics in action, protecting and promoting values in response to conflict between and among stakeholders. Conflict is a catalyst for growth and change; it refocuses attention, moving participants from confusion and frustration to clarity of direction.

This chapter provides a continuing examination of British Petroleum’s thoughtless contempt for communication ethics in action, examined in the following three sections:

Conflict escalation can initiate the final stage of crisis, involving a labyrinth of stakeholders and publics in opposition to an isolated organization. Ulmer and Sellnow (1995, p. 215) contend “organizational crises are complex events which have the ability to affect both an organization and its constituents.” Crises are a direct result of “escalating [conflict] intensity,” in which organizations are unable to pass “scrutiny” from various demographics, groups, and media (p. 215). The 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy exemplifies the reality of conflict consequences as BP ignored numerous opportunities to put communication ethics into action. Throughout the oil spill disaster, the company thoughtlessly ignored stakeholder perceptions of clashing viewpoints and perspectives; they refused the possible insights that are the benefits of constructive conflict. Opportunities for growth and trust building among stakeholders might have de-intensified the conflict and lessened the probability of escalation into the final stage of crisis.

Ignorance: Conflict and BP

Conflict redefines stakeholder identities, perspectives, and relationships. Inattention to conflict ignores possibilities for reinterpretation, renegotiation, and de-escalation of an impending crisis. Heath (2013) contends that organizational relationships are performative; they require monitoring, attention, and responsiveness if conflict is to be constructively met. He explains that organization-to-public relationships are “conceptualized as multidimensional and multilayered, but not reducible to something between an organization and its public(s);” the conflict embraces multiple constituencies (p. 427). The 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy displayed how a multitude of identities and stakeholder constituencies could and did influence the situation. Relationships between BP and their internal and external stakeholders necessitated ongoing and constant attention and repair; unfortunately, their communication ethics in action remained dormant.

This section illustrates a form of conflict illiteracy, with BP unable to read three basic signs: (1) interpersonal, (2) intra-industry, and (3) government. BP demonstrated conflict ignorance and unresponsiveness, ignoring leaders within not only their own organization but also ones in other oil companies, the U.S. government, and the local public spheres. Their actions ensured the inevitability of a crisis.

BP and Conflict Ignorance: Interpersonal

Obliviousness to the escalation of conflict defined the internal and external ethos of BP. At the time of the Deepwater Horizon accident, CEO Tony Hayward was the publicly recognized BP leader. His lesser-known chairman of the board, Carl-Henric Svanberg, remained hidden from the public eye, attempting not to undermine Hayward’s role. Svanberg served as a “non-executive” chairman, someone who is not an employee but is an external adviser to the organization, and he acted as a liaison between stakeholders and management, with the power to hire and fire the CEO. Typically, the task of a nonexecutive chairman during periods of crisis is to maintain public visibility through direct action. During Deepwater Horizon, however, Svanberg chose to remain in the public shadow.

From a communication ethics in action perspective, we can witness, here, the confusion of roles and public perceptions, mistaken efforts at face-saving, and strategic distancing. Alan Parker, founder of Brunswick, one of the world’s most successful public relations companies, assumed the task of guiding BP through this escalating crisis (Bush 2010, June 7). Parker met with Svanberg and underscored a basic BP message. However, there was confusion about who was to speak what part of the message to which constituencies. Hayward wanted Svanberg to handle interviews in the United Kingdom because Svanberg had influential relationships with multiple external constituencies—relationships that would assist in managing the conflict. Svanberg, a former engineer, recognized that he could not defend the design and drilling of Macondo, and therefore refused the request (Bergin 2012). His silence resulted in UK news agencies continually questioning his actions, labeling Svanberg the “invisible man … missing in action” (Bergin 2012, p. 231). With Svanberg’s refusal to play his public role, Parker attempted to rouse sympathy for Hayward, which became increasingly difficult as Hayward sought to downplay the environmental impact and shift blame to Transocean and BP continued to fail in its attempts to clean up the Gulf. Soon, discussions emerged about the necessity of replacing Hayward.

According to Bergin’s (2012) account of the event, in this context, Svanberg suggested that Hayward appoint Bob Dudley¹ to BP’s board. Svanberg and Hayward argued over the appointments needed for the BP board. “Distance” defined their relationship as conflict increased between and among external and now internal stakeholders. As the U.S. government continued its involvement, President Obama intimated that BP needed to replace Hayward, with Svanberg publicly agreeing. The U.S. media sought to crucify Hayward in news accounts, and the British press increasingly blamed Svanberg. Critical publicity in the UK and in the United States required increasing expenditure from BP and worry about future U.S. investments. Without consulting Hayward, Svanberg proclaimed publicly that Dudley would act as the day-to-day spokesperson for BP, highlighting the increase in internal division between Hayward and the organization. BP sought temporal reputation repair, but its actions signaled disorganization, lack of direction, and corporate confusion.

At the end of this conflict, Hayward hired his own public relations agency in hopes of assisting his own reputation.² The agency stated that Hayward’s reputation was irreparable, making his leadership of BP no longer possible. Bergin goes on to note that Hayward left office just days after the oil well was capped, having received this blunt assessment from his own public relations agency. Hayward and Svanberg’s interpersonal conflict led to repeated miscalculations that resulted in operational setbacks and that eviscerated public support for BP. Escalating conflict took on increased internal complexity that manifested in ever more problematic external consequences. The internal conflict between Hayward and Svanberg threatened BP’s financial health and necessitated third-party advice. The conflict eroded leadership and corporate reputation, leading to even more mistrust because of perceived lack of transparency, acts of strategic distancing, and behavior best described as passive-aggressive between Hayward and Svanberg. BP offered the public a paradigm exemplar of fragmentation and leadership without direction.

BP and Conflict Ignorance: Intra-Industry

The distance between Hayward and Svanberg mirrored the gap spawned between BP and other oil companies. Immediately after the explosion, Hayward asked for assistance from Exxon, Chevron, and Shell (Bergin 2012). They initially agreed. However, after learning of BP’s substandard drilling practices, the companies distanced themselves from BP. These competitors knew that BP’s carelessness would affect public perception of the entire industry. BP’s assertion that “this could have happened to anyone” infuriated CEOs of Exxon, Shell, Chevron, and Conoco. For the first time, “solidarity” in the industry collapsed. BP’s intra-industry conflict proved particularly devastating for their competitors.

The testimony from corporate oil leaders at the June 2010 House Energy Commerce Committee hearing devolved into public denouncements of BP’s practices. Each company demonstrated the flaws of BP’s well design, differentiating themselves from such practices. The committee, however, shifted public focus collectively to the oil industry, asking questions about their specific oil spill response plans. Collectively, their plans were clearly ineffective and misleading—no better than BP’s (Bergin 2012). In fact, “no company had invested any significant dollars into cleanup, research, or preparedness” (Juhasz 2011, p. 212). The media highlighted these absurdities, which demonstrated how intra-industry conflict escalates rapidly into environmental crisis. Clearly, “all-out hostilities had begun between BP and its rivals”; the industry distanced itself from BP (Bergin 2012, p. 246). A lack of communication ethics in action, demonstrated by BP, divided and fragmented the industry, calling forth governmental response and increased conflict about environmental preparedness.

BP and Conflict Ignorance: Government

From the beginning of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP and U.S. government representatives formed a “Unified Command,” a sharing of authority and responsibility for incident response. The group worked toward consensus in the management and coordination of action. The Unified Command held joint briefings informing the public of incident status, plans, and progress. Coast Guard Rear Admiral Mary Landry and BP’s Chief Operating Officer of Exploration and Production, Doug Suttles, handled these news briefings. With BP and the government aligned in response, as BP failed, so did the government.

“Top Kill” (see Chapter 6), the relief effort implemented by BP to stop the oil spillage, was yet another failure that pressured the collective work of BP and the government. After “Top Kill,” even the general public became increasingly impatient and irate at the collective incompetence of the two entities. With public perception pushing an escalation into crisis, the government attempted to distance itself strategically from BP. This strategic distancing began with an interview on Meet the Press with the Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar, stating in frustration: “If we find that they’re not doing what they’re supposed to be doing, we’ll push them out of the way” (Achenbach 2011, p. 150). Agreement on this strategic distancing action did not gather the support of all government constituencies. For instance, the next day, the Coast Guard Admiral and National Incident Commander of the Unified Command, Thad Allen, questioned Salazar’s statement: “To push BP out of the way would raise the question, to replace them with what? … They just need to do their job” (p. 150). Conflicting public statements by the U.S. government and its various constituencies set the stage for a strange union that involved strategic distancing and, simultaneously, public admission that relief efforts depended upon BP’s expertise.

On the heels of this conflict, and on orders from President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder, the daily news briefings from the Unified Command immediately stopped. As Achenbach noted (p. 153), this move was meant to “obliterate the image of the government and BP working together as equals. This could no longer look like a partnership or collaboration.” The White House announced that Thad Allen would deliver the daily news briefings without BP assistance, and government agencies simultaneously tightened their supervision of BP action. The U.S. government, in the form of the Coast Guard, the Minerals Management Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey, were “working with BP every day at multiple command centers … and remained embedded at BP’s headquarters in Houston” (p. 153). Allen later reflected, “What you had was a simultaneous political response and an operational response to this thing. They’re not always going to be congruent, but you handle both of them” (Achenbach 2011, p. 153). Operationally, BP was still central to the effort, but it cut out any public communication role as a political response. Allen’s response uncovers an important dynamic between operational truth and public perception: BP needed increasing transparency in order to build trust and to engage communication ethics in action.

Conflict, and the public perception of conflict, can escalate and/or de-escalate volatile public problems/opportunities through the embrace of communication ethics in action. This section demonstrated the devastating consequences of ignorance of conflict through three key considerations:

Ignorance of communication ethics in action results in problematic decisions and communicative behaviors that impact the reputations of both internal and external stakeholders. Conflict can be productive and creative when public perception recognizes good choices, a situation that ultimately enhances organizational reputation. However, when conflict goes ignored, crisis is the inevitable consequence emerging from thoughtlessness toward responsibility, whether intentional or otherwise.

Thoughtlessness: Unintended Consequences

When conflict remains unresolved, potential harmful consequences threaten internal and external stakeholders. Often, internal constituencies contend with ethical dilemmas in the midst of emerging problems and thoughtless inattention to communication ethics in action. Corporate ignorance of communication ethics in action internally and externally magnifies emerging risk. Palenchar and Heath (2007, p. 122) contend that risk communication within public relations research includes “private sector and public sector organizations” that “failed to understand and exhibit appropriate levels of corporate responsibility.” Such disregard for corporate accountability escalates conflict into full-blown crisis, prompting internal stakeholders to challenge leadership, which further precipitates unintended consequences.

The pragmatic consequences of conflict ignorance unfold into full-blown crisis, as illustrated by BP’s inattentiveness to communication ethics in action. This section underscores the necessity of communication ethics in action when meeting conflict, discussed through three significant considerations: (1) whistleblowing, (2) assessment, and (3) retaliation. This section emphasizes Bok’s³ (1980) work on whistleblowing, which demonstrates the pragmatic consequences of disregard for thoughtful communication ethics in action and is confirmed by the example of BP’s history.

Thoughtlessness: Whistleblowing

Thoughtless disregard of communication ethics in action forces internal constituencies to contend with competing goods, dilemmas that create unintended organizational health consequences. Whistleblowing is a communicative behavior enacted in moments of severe ethical dilemma within an organization. In “Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibilities,” Bok (1980) describes the communicative act of whistleblowing as enactment of an ethical conflict with the hope of restoring the public good. Whistleblowers illuminate neglect and abuse due to corporate misdeeds that have the potential to do public harm. Bok (pp. 277–278) argues that whistleblowing is a product of ethical conflict; “sounding an alarm” places the greater weight of concern on the side of public safety. Whistleblowing is a serious act, not only for the public but also for individual careers, and it necessitates weighing facts and responsibilities related to the severity and significance of potential harm if the concerns are not voiced.

According to Bok, one must also assess one’s own responsibility in the act of whistleblowing. Issues of public responsibility, loyalty to an organization and peers, and personal consequences constitute the decision-making matrix for a potential whistleblower. One must understand that whistleblowing can invite retaliation. Whistleblowing generally involves internal constituencies attempting to rectify organization actions and directions that breach its responsibility to external stakeholders and users.

Thoughtlessness: Assessment

Organizations must actively consider stakeholder accusations. Thoughtful assessment must counter the impulse to disregard negative voices. The United States Code of Ethics for governmental employees states that an individual should “expose corruption wherever uncovered” and should “put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party, or government” (1958, B12). If, after weighing all of the potential conflicts and likely consequences, the stakeholder judges the benefits to the public to outweigh the costs to the self, that stakeholder must find an outlet and sound an alarm.

BP has a notorious history related to whistleblowers. The company has disregarded and, at times, retaliated against persons engaged in ethical communicative behavior that questions corporate practices. The most well-known BP instance involved an oil speculator named Chuck Hamel. During the 1980s, Hamel invested millions of dollars in transporting oil to refineries in the Gulf of Mexico. His business created competition for Alyeska (Trans-Alaskan Pipeline) companies such as BP, ConocoPhillips, and Exxon. The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company is a consortium of large oil companies that operate the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, or TAPS. BP is the largest shareholder in Alyeska.⁴ Although never proven in court, Hamel asserted that these companies purposefully contaminated his oil—thus putting him out of business. Hamel “made retribution against the industry a personal mission.” While gathering information for his case, he received a constant flow of information from “clandestine visitors” who secretly divulged confidential information about both Alyeska and BP violating environmental and safety concerns. Some reports indicated illegal dumping of toxic sludge into Valdez; others indicated unreported pipeline leaks and numerous complaints centered on cancer-causing emissions. Employees even provided evidence about falsified water quality tests that the company sent to the EPA.

Eventually, Hamel lost his personal case against Alyeska. However, he decided that he could not ignore the other victims. Hamel stated, “We were all victims … We were living in a conspiracy of silence waiting for an environmental disaster to occur” (Lustgarten 2012, p. 29). In 1985, Hamel took the whistleblowers’ concerns to the Alaskan government, members of Congress, and the EPA. Subsequent investigations confirmed many of their accusations. For instance, Lustgarten points to investigations into Hamel’s claims that revealed the use of a smokestack that had been broken for ten years; Alyeska was “pretending that it was still working.” Similar revelations were uncovered at other facilities in Alaska. With each complaint, BP and Exxon acted to counter Hamel’s negative voice. Their actions drove Hamel to push harder in the pursuit of “public justice.” Alyeska, simultaneously, continued a public relations campaign against Hamel, painting him as crazy. Hamel later said, “The harder Alyeska tried to discredit me publicly, the more their employees came to me with information privately” (Lustgarten 2012, p. 40). The media, however, stopped taking Hamel’s environmental safety concerns seriously—until Exxon’s Valdez tanker ran aground in 1989. This example of thoughtlessness related to communication ethics in action depicts a major point of Bok; whistleblowing unmasks corporate irresponsibility, but in the context of personal and professional risk.

Thoughtlessness: Retaliation

Bok’s explication of whistleblowing illustrates the fundamental importance of assessment before, during, and after public corporate challenges. At the time of the Valdez oil spill in 1989, discussion had been centered on opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) for drilling. At that time, a bill was “sailing through the Senate and had been expected to come up for a vote” (Dionne 1989, April 3). The ANWR drilling would be a “bonanza” of up to 16 billion barrels of recoverable oil (United States Geological Survey 1988; USGS Fact Sheet FS-028-01 2011, April). The ability to drill depended upon Congressional trust of industry standards. Thus, after the Exxon Valdez spill of 1989, 21 years before the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, Lustgarten (p. 35) points out that the oil industry in Alaska could not afford the increasing negative press about perceived “habitual recklessness” coming from Hamel. The objective of the Alaskan oil companies (mostly BP, ConocoPhillips, and Exxon) was to stifle bad press and work toward repairing industry reputation.

A few months after the Valdez spill, Alyeska president Jim Hermiller (a BP employee) invited Hamel to Alaska for a discussion. When Hamel arrived, Hermiller cancelled without reason. From that point on, Hamel found himself under investigation by various firms and agencies hired by Alyeska. As pointed out by Lustgarten, the oil companies also aggressively pursued workers who had complained about the company’s “safety record in Valdez.” Alyeska, led by a BP executive (Hermiller), cared more about silencing whistleblowers than addressing uncovered safety and environmental problems. They decided to fire employees connected with Hamel, and the retaliatory practices from Alyeska included illegally searching Hamel’s personal records and research. In the midst of this increasingly complex conflict, Alyeska’s leaders acted with vengeance, intentionally ignoring illegal activity.

The decisions by these actors led to the “Wackenhut Scandal.” Wackenhut was a private investigative firm, hired by Hermiller to use sophisticated surveillance equipment; highly trained private investigators monitored and reported communication from oil industry critics such as Hamel and Congressman George Miller.⁵ Miller was the chairman of the House Interior Committee and a prominent critic of the oil industry’s poor environmental record. Congressman Miller was a threat to the approval of ANWR for drilling; thus, Alyeska and Wackenhut were working to discredit Miller and Hamel by spying on them and attempting to frame them for “stealing” Alyeska documents. The hearings uncovered documents drafted by Alyeska’s lawyers that illustrated “an elaborate plan for embarrassing or seeking the indictment of Mr. Miller on charges of stealing Alyeska’s documents” (Schneider 1991, November 6). The committee “hauled Wackenhut … and the executives of Alyeska and the big oil companies up to the Hill for a public flogging” (Lustgarten 2012, p. 39). The actions of Wackenhut proved illegal. The “Wackenhut scandal” displayed to the employees, the internal constituencies of Alyeska and BP, that “their own supervisors, executives, and safety managers couldn’t be trusted to keep them safe” (p. 40). Hamel became a symbolic point of public concern and protest. He exposed Alyeska as unwilling to listen and stated that “more persistent cancers [were] growing” in Alaska and “British Petroleum’s operations elsewhere” (p. 40). The actions of Alyeska, the Wackenhut investigation firm, and executives connected with events surrounding Valdez provided a murky ethical background of thoughtlessness making the events of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster close to inevitable. The activities surrounding the 1989 Valdez oil spill include the constant safety and environmental neglect in Prudhoe Bay, the intentional neglect of safety equipment leading up to the 2005 Texas City refinery explosion, and the Deepwater Horizon disaster; all display the dominant pattern of thoughtless neglect.

Summary

Bok’s (1980) theoretical contribution on whistleblowing, tied to ethical conflicts within organizational life, provides pragmatic implications for understanding the danger of thoughtless communication ethics in action. Early examples of conflict ignorance in BP’s history point to the continuing problem of communication behaviors that inevitably escalated the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster into crisis. This section considered the theoretical and practical implications of arrogant conflict ignorance:

Bok’s theoretical contributions provide insight into the destructive consequences, intentional or otherwise, that ignorance of communication ethics in action can yield when an organization faces serious ethical dilemmas. When leadership misses opportunities for engaging with stakeholders, the openings for communication ethics in action are not perceived, thus keeping ethical responses dormant and inviting potential crises.

Leadership: Missed Opportunities

Conflict is complex, ubiquitous, and constant, affecting internal and external stakeholders simultaneously. Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002, p. 318) contend that conflict resolution and escalation are communal activities; public relations practitioners, leaders, and internal constituencies must engage in conflict responsiveness attentive to “community infrastructures of risk communication.” The 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster exemplified the complexity of conflict, amplifying the scope that conflict ignorance can have. Arguably, the Gulf disaster affected the entire world; thus, we were all stakeholders. However, the disaster affected some stakeholders much more directly than others, especially those who had to battle on the front lines both the spillage and the conflict that washed ashore. In the weeks and months following the explosion, BP had many opportunities to take responsibility and start making amends for this environmental disaster. At some level, BP leadership was in conflict with every imaginable stakeholder group, and they missed every opportunity for positive action, constructive discourse, and growth.

This section examines leadership inattentiveness to communication ethics in action through three major conflict considerations: (1) local conflict, (2) national conflict, and (3) international conflict. These areas of conflict ignorance reveal the thoughtlessness and inattentiveness to communication ethics in action demonstrated by BP, which eventually resulted in inevitable crisis.

Leadership and Missed Opportunity: Local Conflict

Few external constituencies suffered more immediately and directly during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster than the local Gulf of Mexico fishermen, especially those in Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi (see Figure 9.1). This calamity put thousands out of work. After the explosion at the Macondo well site and the subsequent escalation of issue into argument, then conflict, then crisis, the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard designated both BP and Transocean as “responsible parties” (Fleming 2010, June 16). The government entities made the companies liable for restitution to those who had suffered harm, including “environmental … and economic loss.” BP had two weeks to advertise claims processes, which would allocate much-needed relief to those directly affected. It received more than 450,000 claims. By December, only one-third of the adversely affected had received any financial support. BP’s public response was “ill-planned, poorly executed, and insufficient” (Juhasz 2011). Moreover, during this emerging tragedy, BP launched a $93 million advertising campaign designed to counter its increasingly negative public image. The company website did little to assist affected families and businesses; it was mere PR. BP missed the opportunity to build trust with Gulf coast constituencies; their ethics focused instead on self-serving concerns.

Figure 9.1 http://telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/earthpicturegalleries/8453474/BP-oil-spill-30-pictures-of-the-Deepwater-Horizon-Gulf-of-Mexico-disaster-one-year-ago.html?image=1

BP planned three main responses, each demanded by Homeland Security and the Coast Guard: “Vessels of Opportunity (VOO), beach cleanup, and the claims process” (Juhasz 2011, pp. 180-181). Each of these responses embraced the agenda of curtailing negative press coverage and limiting further liability. BP required all workers to sign confidentiality agreements as they assisted in activities such as the beach cleanup. The claims process had a similar clause, commanding that those who filed claims could not sue the company. A volunteer for cleanup, Les Switzer, recalled his initial contact with BP; after viewing a contract with a confidentiality clause, he realized “it was just like a crime scene. … They killed our Gulf, and now the murderer is in charge of cleaning up the scene of the crime” (p. 198). He recalled breaking down and crying at the moment of that revelation.

BP’s Vessels of Opportunity had the potential to meet the needs of local constituencies but failed. The VOO advertised job creation for displaced commercial fishermen. The program served two purposes for BP:

Ideally, the VOO would skim oil off the surface while transporting supplies and people throughout the Gulf. The program was unsuccessful; it lacked financial resources and proper implementation. BP called only about 10 percent of commercial fishers and others impacted to participate in VOO. Those who were registered for VOO waited by their landlines for months, afraid to leave their homes for fear that they would miss a call to return to work. Unfortunately, many who called for job assistance were recreational boaters from out of state, not local commercial and charter boat owners and employees whose livelihoods had been so dramatically disrupted (Kindy 2010, August 14). Those hired through VOO went without pay for many weeks, causing increasing stress in the local fishing communities (Juhasz 2011). Community workers and volunteers were increasingly frustrated and angry, an anger which manifested in the form of protests. In early June, fishermen from Alabama formed a blockade on the way to the Mississippi Sound near BP’s operations center. Protest signs read: “BP: Liars from the beginning, liars to the end,” “Commercial 1st: We need work,” and “44 Days still pumping, BP Lied” (p. 179). Members of the blockade met resistance: stopped, handcuffed, and arrested. BP had once again demonstrated total disregard for a conflict with local financial implications, and their disregard continued to direct national attention upon them.

Leadership and Missed Opportunity: National Conflict

Disregard for local conflict and stakeholder problems generated significant national attention and conflict, further damaging BP’s reputation. Immediately following the capping of the well on July 15, 2010, BP halted cleanup activities except for those on the beach itself. BP’s website displayed pictures of cleanup workers walking on pristine beaches; BP continued to manipulate reality. Because of the security and confidentiality agreements signed by cleanup crews, it is unknown how much BP invested into their beach cleanup efforts. BP went so far as to bus workers to beaches during press events, especially when celebrities or politicians visited. One such incident occurred with the arrival of President Obama. BP then brought in 400 workers “to create a spotless beach. … As soon as the President was en route back to Washington [,] … the workers were clearing out” (Dykes 2010, May 28). A local councilman, Chris Roberts, called the charade a “sad stunt … to mislead the President and the American public.” He added that BP was trying to “make it appear as though they’ve been on top of their game in mobilizing assets when that’s not been the case at all” (“BP Buses in 400 Workers During Obama’s Visit” 2010, May 29). In the key moments of the crisis, BP’s concern was for its own national image and liability, a self-preservation strategy that generated national concern over not only the Deepwater Horizon tragedy itself but also BP’s subsequent actions.

National conflict emerged with BP’s refusal to allow “concerned citizens to volunteer to participate” in cleanup (Juhasz 2012, p. 198). BP sought to control the cleaning crews; however, “BP’s desire to maintain control over access to information” outweighed their obligation to protect the Gulf, its beaches, and its people. Juhasz reports that environmental activist Casi Callaway recalled that “we had five thousand volunteers trained and ready to deploy … but BP wouldn’t let them clean the beaches.” Refusal to engage constituencies continued to fuel BP’s conflict with the public. BP’s massive disregard for internal and external constituencies exemplifies thoughtlessness and inattentiveness to the necessary ethics in action in a local environment.

Leadership and Missed Opportunity: International Conflict

The thoughtlessness and neglect of BP created conflict locally and nationally with increasing international implications. BP, as a British-owned multinational corporate network with operations in 70 countries, which included over 17 billion barrels of oil reserves and 17,200 service stations, now found multiple divisions in their operations and multiple parts of the world distrusting their decisions (BP 2015). BP’s largest division is BP America, producing 28 percent of BP’s oil and gas in 2015 (Katakey 2016, April 12). Because BP is complex and interconnected, poor decisions made in one part of the network (such as extraction of oil in the Gulf) affected operations in other divisions throughout the world.

Throughout modern history, oil has functioned as a catalyst for international conflict between private and public oil industries, with private international companies like BP holding 7 percent of the world’s oil and gas reserves and 65 percent held by state-owned oil companies. One example of such international conflict involves Russia, with President Vladimir Putin attempting to re-nationalize the oil industry through Rosneft, a state-owned oil company—BP became a stakeholder in this same company in 2013, a mere three years after the Deepwater Horizon incident. (Hill and Fee 2002). Russia’s international activity in Crimea and Ukraine in 2014 spurred the United States and the EU to place sanctions on Russia, including restrictions on “the export or sale of certain technologies suited to the oil industry for use in deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects” (Overview of the US and EU Sanctions on Russia 2014, October). These significant sanctions affected BP’s international interests, where Rosneft made up roughly one-third of BP’s total oil output and more than 21 percent of its fourth-quarter profits (BP 2015, February 3). Russia’s problematic political and international activities did not affect BP’s profitability, unlike U.S. companies such as Exxon; EU sanctions, which applied to BP, only prohibited new contracts, while U.S. sanctions with companies like Exxon applied to existing contracts (Department of the Treasury 2014, September 12). One cannot underestimate the complexity of these situations. BP’s corporate practices on an international scale, so quickly after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon crisis, reveal a continuing lack of communication ethics in action and a failure to learn lessons from previous conflicts. With a focus on profit, BP’s approach to relationships between and among internal and external stakeholders on the international scale revealed deeply embedded corporate practices that disregard the ethical and the thoughtful.

Summary

BP’s leadership lacked communication ethics in action, escalating multiple sources of conflict into full-blown and inevitable crisis. This section considered the lack of attentiveness and disregard for the constructive conflict that should have propelled communication ethics in action, examining these missed opportunities through three significant areas:

Chapter Summary

Ignorance not only of communication ethics in action but also of the constructive nature and potential benefits of conflict and the role of internal and external stakeholders in conflict escalation have all plagued BP’s corporate practices throughout its history. Through BP’s disregard for communication ethics in action, conflict between and among local, national, and international constituencies escalated into unmitigated crisis. Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) contend that crises damage stakeholders well beyond the confines of organizational walls and interests—a multitude and diversity of stakeholders are impacted by disregard for conflict clues and communication ethics in action. The history, behaviors, and communicative practices of BP illustrate the evolution of issue to argument to conflict to crisis through a failure of communication ethics in action. The final stage, crisis, is a pivotal moment in an organization’s history, yielding significant corporate communication implications about the pragmatic necessity of engagement between and among its internal and external stakeholders.

Chapter 9, “Communication Ethics in Action: BP and Conflict Thoughtlessness,” revealed the problematic nature of ignoring argument and conflict, which inevitably results in public crises. At such a moment, the corporate entity and all stakeholders are at risk. BP is a case study of precrisis attentive ineptness. Chapter 10, “Crisis in Review,” returns to the question of BP. This final analysis works with three macro-metaphors: precrisis, crisis, and postcrisis. The aim of this final chapter is to outline the type and manner of thinking and action necessary at each macro stage of crisis.

¹ Bob Dudley was the president and CEO of TNK-BP between 2003 and 2008. He returned to BP in 2009 with his appointment to BP’s board. Between June 23, 2010 and September 30, 2010, Dudley served as president and CEO of BP’s Gulf Coast Restoration Organization in the United States. He became group chief executive on October 1, 2010.

² The public relations agency hired by Hayward was Freud Communications, located in London, United Kingdom.

³ Sissela Bok is a Harvard-educated philosopher and ethicist. She is the daughter of two Nobel Prize winners and author of eight books on topics that include morals, ethics, peace, happiness, and public health. She is currently a senior visiting fellow at the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, located in the Harvard School of Public Health.

⁴ Alyeska’s president in 1989 was a BP employee. Today the president is Thomas Barrett, who was formerly a vice commandant in the Coast Guard and deputy secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation.

⁵ George Miller was a California congressman who was the chairman of the Interior Committee during the Wackenhut scandal. Miller had a history of criticizing the oil industry’s environmental record.