CHAPTER 6

Communication Ethics in Action

British Petroleum and Argument Thoughtlessness

The opportunity for argument materializes when an issue obtains and retains attention without appropriate response from organizational leadership. Argument construction occurs daily within organizational contexts. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster illustrates the necessity of communication ethics in action—ethics requiring thoughtful and reflective argument in response to emerging concerns. British Petroleum’s lack of thoughtfulness concerning preventative maintenance escalated into disregard for emerging arguments over public evidence. Heath and Douglas (1990) contend that involvement is key in sustaining argumentative interests. They claim that stakeholder interests announced via issues and arguments raise questions requiring public evidence and information. Thoughtless neglect of these arguments results in crisis escalation. This chapter considers stakeholder responsiveness, leadership action, and argument through a continuing examination of BP’s thoughtless contempt for communication ethics in action. It considers the interplay of argument and communication ethics in action in the following three sections:

As noted in Chapter 3, the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster began with the issue of the lack of preventative maintenance. This escalated into an argument, and then a crisis, as BP refused to respond to stakeholder evidence. Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) contend that an organization’s “actions, product, or service is named as a likely suspect” and, thus, becomes susceptible to scrutiny through the use of any and all “available evidence” manifested in public argument (p. 147). BP’s thoughtlessness and ignorance over emerging arguments announce the communicative necessity of argumentative response with publicly vetted evidence. Argumentative ignorance dwells within inattention and thoughtlessness.

Ignorance: Argument and BP

Arguments shift from one arena to another, changing in scope, influence, and constituencies. Communication ethics in action must engage multiple arguments, different stakeholders, and contrasting understandings of truth, engaging all with temporal resolution requiring publicly identified evidence. Heath (2011) contends that argument is the very “essence” of what shapes communicative “environments,” determining the resources needed to “attract” and “affect” “interested” parties. His work assumes the classical rhetorical tradition of Cicero (see Chapter 1), who stressed invention as the first and foremost of the five canons of rhetoric. Invention is also central to Aristotle’s emphasis on discovering all available means of persuasion. Corporate argumentation and advocacy requires invention and persuasion situated in evidence that is public and responsive to emerging problems/opportunities.

This section considers the importance of argument thoughtfulness and stakeholder responsiveness through three key considerations: (1) participation, (2) values, and (3) choice. Aristotle’s understanding of argument assumes that these three core considerations compose the issues that call forth communication ethics in action.

Argument Ignorance and BP: Participation

Arguments tied to stasis theory (see Chapter 1) emerge over fact, value, and/or policy. Arguments of fact seek temporal public truth supported by data inherent in policy arguments. Participation by both internal and external stakeholders encourages the adoption, interpretation, and communication of key data that influences organizational decision making in the public sphere. BP’s inconclusive pressure tests constitute data that exposed their decision to forgo the cement logs necessary to curtail potential leakage from the Macondo well. This preventative maintenance failure resulted in the Macondo well seal leakage, which ultimately created the Deepwater Horizon disaster. BP’s refusal to attend to facts that could have prevented error created an argumentative process void of communication ethics in action. BP ignored the voices of frontline workers at Deepwater Horizon, those who warned that safety equipment was outdated, broken, and in disrepair; BP’s Deepwater Horizon actions were consistent with its history of problematic inattentiveness at Prudhoe Bay and Texas City.

To engage in argument while refusing to seek truth thoughtlessly ignores stakeholder concerns. Such thoughtless reasoning embraces a cause-and-effect dependence upon blame. The Deepwater Horizon disaster demonstrates the attempt to diffuse blame, ignoring data that announced BP’s culpability. Deductive blame begins with effect and works backward. Inductive blame determines the cause of a problem/opportunity after thoroughly examining routine experiences or assumptions related to the effects of a communicative action. Stanley Deetz,¹ critical theorist and organizational communication scholar, comments on corporate and public decision making, arguing that corporate decisions properly inherit blame when those decisions are constructed without regard for stakeholder concerns. Deetz (1982) argues for the reclamation of participation by both internal and external stakeholders; he interjects critical theory into organizational communication, arguing for struggle, conflict, and argument as necessary conditions for ongoing vigilant reflection. BP did not engage in critical decision making; their practical corporate values failed to embrace thoughtful responsiveness and, instead, demonstrated the failure of communication ethics in action.

Argument Ignorance and BP: Values

Core corporate values are to be upheld as communication ethics in action. The Deepwater Horizon consequences were negative and demonstrated the necessity of argument based on values. The stasis of value commences with quality; it then asks questions about the good and the ill and the seriousness of a given issue. BP ignored value arguments, which resulted in increasing cost cutting and deferred maintenance. BP used a defective blowout preventer, skipped a vital cement bond log, and made numerous last-minute changes approved by partial regulators. Disaster ensued, displaying the reality of blame connected to value questions that go unattended.

Virtue questions are resonant with the insights of Fritz (2013), who argues for a virtue ethics that extends civil virtues into the public sphere. Fritz argues that “virtues enacted by professional practitioners” support goods capable of enhancing and protecting organizational purpose (p. 23). Values manifested through corporate practices and habits must align with organizational mission. BP practiced habits of thoughtless disregard for emerging arguments about preventative maintenance. The New York Times reported a worker survey revealing that “production demands” overshadowed safety and that “only about half the workers” felt sufficiently safe to report such conditions (Lehner 2010, p. 12). BP’s choices reveal lack of argumentative responsiveness to emerging issues.

Argument and BP: Choice

Choice is future oriented and centers on arguments attentive to decision making. Aristotle contended that such arguments require definition in order to facilitate critical thinking and reasoning. Clarifying arguments begins with publicly understood definitions—to change a definition shifts the path of reasoning. For instance, “Is the BP oil spill an economic issue or an environmental health issue?” Each path invites a different line of reasoning.

Johnson and Sellnow (1995) argue that deliberative argument, consisting of ongoing choice, is crucial to risk and crisis communication. They equate productive responsiveness with binding “policy and character” to organizational deliberation that attends to emerging arguments and future considerations. Deliberative argumentation moves the focus from blame to future choice and future courses of action. Attending to the not yet opens a crucial understanding of communication ethics in action.

Summary

The insights of BP’s argumentative ignorance elucidate the role of thoughtful choice and action. This section underscored three key metaphors:

The 2010 BP oil spill crisis was a product of participation, values, and choice that announced corporate thoughtlessness. Communication ethics in action advocates for thoughtful responsiveness to emerging arguments, and being ever aware of unintended consequences resulting from an argumentative disregard of issues in the public sphere.

Thoughtlessness: Unintended Consequences

Thoughtless communication ethics in action yields unintended consequences. BP engaged in thoughtless communication through “morally problematic” practices such as coercion, manipulation, and exploitation (Wood 2014). Allen Wood² differentiates between these concepts:

Because of these communicative practices, BP workers feared retaliation for questioning safety practices or reporting risk. Heath (2006) contends that efforts to control “narratives” and arguments—precrisis, crisis, and postcrisis—undermine organizational health and stakeholder trust. A thoughtful engagement of communication ethics in action, on the other hand, would permit a multitude of voices to shape and mold the narratives about the circumstances that are meaningful for both internal and external stakeholders. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, in its unethical refusal to pay attention to preventative maintenance, elucidates critical implications for communication ethics in action.

This section illustrates the problematic nature of inattentive communication in argument escalation through three considerations: (1) policy and argument, (2) balance, and (3) how and why. These concepts reveal the theoretical and pragmatic implications of the unintended consequences resulting from thoughtless and unreflective communication ethics in action.

Thoughtlessness: Policy and Argument

Communication ethics in action recognizes the role of argument in organizational and public policy, with argument working to unify word and deed. Early on and before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP engaged in asymmetrical communication, proclaiming their commitment to fight global warming. For instance, BP’s CEO from 1995 to 2007, John Browne, was being responsive to emerging social norms related to environmentalism. Browne shifted BP’s brand icon, which featured the Helios logo (see Figure 6.1), to increase attention to green symbolism, as announced in Browne’s 1997 speech at Stanford University. That speech permitted BP to become one of the first major oil companies to acknowledge global warming. Browne claimed the objective of reframing the industry as “sustainable and environmentally responsible” (Lustgarten 2012, p. 54). His speech argued against global warming and for sustainability.

Figure 6.1 The BP Helios, an organizational artifact launched in 2000

In a TV interview soon after the speech, Browne stated that the environmental agenda moved BP to the head of the table on discussions about global warming (Lustgarten 2012, p. 55). Browne understood the value of multiplicity and attended to the multiple voices engaged in increasing consciousness about the environment. However, by 2010, only three years after his departure from BP, the Deepwater Horizon crisis demonstrated a thoughtlessness of action that revealed disconnect between words and deeds in BP leadership. Without public and private linkage between word and deed, organizations claim a communication ethic no longer practiced in everyday activity.

Thoughtlessness: Balance

Argumentation balances multiple perspectives, in contrast to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster in which communication was propelled by the single perspective of greed. This inattention to balance between and among differing arguments had been given birth institutionally in the Minerals Management Service (MMS) in 1982, a government entity created by Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, who supported offshore drilling and its revenue implications. However, the MMS also assumed responsibility for regulatory oversight, displacing the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Don Kash, the chief of the USGS Conservation Division, contended that the personnel charged with the oversight of offshore drilling was now in short supply. The oversight organization could not adequately train enough personnel.

Kash’s contention was correct, as revealed in the 2011 Report to the President on the inadequate number of trained regulators, with demand pushing well beyond the institution’s capacity (Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster, 2011, January). The MMS systematically lacked the “resources, technical training, [and] experience in petroleum engineering that is absolutely critical to ensuring that offshore drilling is being conducted in a safe and responsible manner” (Broder and Krauss 2011, April 17). Argumentative balance between corporate profit and safety ceased as “fifteen risk-based decisions” made the disaster inevitable (Achenbach 2011).³ Five of these decisions showed a clear conflict between cost and safety, as identified in a letter to Tony Hayward and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations from U.S. Congressional Representatives Henry Waxman and Bart Stupak:

Investigators interviewed vested parties in the disaster, finding agreement on one basic assertion: minimal safety precautions and lack of personnel made the accident inevitable (Lehner 2010). Organizational cultures similarly void of balance, perspectives, and values invite thoughtless communication ethics in action and a lack of responsiveness to suppressed, ignored, and silenced contrary voices. Cumulative decisions that minimize safety disconnect the how and why of communication ethics in action.

Thoughtlessness: How and Why

The disparity between the how of policy argument and the why of ethics became a complete separation as the explosion and aftermath of Deepwater Horizon unfolded. A large oil slick in the water sparked questions of how bad the disaster truly was and why it had occurred in the first place. In a press conference two days after the event, Coast Guard Rear Admiral Landry attributed the oil slick to residual oil “from the fire and the activity that was going on on this rig before it sank below the surface” (Juhasz 2011, p. 61). Both Landry and BP minimized the “why” of the initial oil slick to diminish potential liability for the “how.”

The Deepwater Horizon Joint Information Center (made up of BP, the Coast Guard, Transocean, Cameron, the manufacturer of the blowout preventer, and Wild Well Control, contracted to lead the efforts to cap the well) coordinated media coverage to downplay the how and the why of the oil mishap. BP stated that the oil flow was only 1,000 barrels a day; however, the actual amount of oil released into the bay was between 64,000 and 110,000 barrels per day (Solomon and Mehta 2010, June 3). John Amos, geologist and scientist, was the first independent expert to counter BP’s position. The next day, the Coast Guard offered a public rejection of BP numbers. Increasingly, BP appeared cavalier, thoughtless, and engaged in a cover-up.

Summary

The major consequences of BP’s thoughtless communication, void of evidence, violated communication ethics in action, and are revealed by three major considerations:

Thoughtlessness tied to public argument and disregard for evidence challenges ethos, reputation, and market position. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster exemplifies a lack of communication ethics in action, a failure that commenced with inattention to stakeholder arguments. Repeatedly, opportunities for leadership were missed as evidence and stakeholder opinions went unattended.

Leadership: Missed Opportunities

Communication ethics in action depends upon responsive leadership, one that is knowledgeable of emerging opinions and arguments. Heath, Bradshaw, and Lee (2002) contend that ongoing relationship building and interactive efforts at consensus begin with the identification of salient arguments. They contend that information dissemination from organizations to constituencies is not enough to effectively deflect argument escalation. Internal and external stakeholders must identify arguments and positions and must negotiate meaning together, discovering responsive future courses of action. Leaders miss opportunities for growth and reputation enhancement when they fail to respond to stakeholder concerns.

This section considers the interplay of argument, stakeholders, and leadership through three considerations: (1) responsive action, (2) accountability, and (3) change. Failure to engage communication ethics in action results from leadership, either unintentionally or intentionally, ignoring crucial arguments.

Leadership and Missed Opportunity: Responsive Action

Thoughtless inattention to internal and external stakeholders enhances the probability of argument escalation. The thoughtless response to the Deep-water Horizon disaster assured a crisis. The oil spill reflected a failure to respond to necessary policy/value arguments. The first policy argument that BP violated was the necessity to attend to any sign announcing the need for preventative maintenance. BP violated a second policy argument by disregarding the mounting evidence and information about a leak of hydraulic fluid, as well as a dead battery in the Macondo well miles below the ocean surface. BP did not adequately respond to the Macondo well leak; the unresponsiveness of leadership gave rise to this environmental disaster.

The 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster resulted from a blowout preventer failure. BP was nonresponsive to the potential “scope of the disaster,” failing to communicate “contingency plans” or to address the “developing situation” in any clear and appropriate way (Center for Catastrophic Risk Management 2010, July 15). By keeping vital information from decision makers, failing to utilize relevant industry studies, and refusing to contemplate contingencies, BP wasted time and resources throughout this crisis. Leadership was unresponsive and thoughtless; their lack of accountability manifested a performative lack of communication ethics in action.

Leadership and Missed Opportunity: Accountability

Leadership missed opportunities for building relationships with stakeholders through the identification of their salient arguments. Thoughtful communication ethics in action privileges stakeholder arguments as opportunities for growth and development. BP’s active thoughtlessness led to a significant escalation in the crisis, with significant amounts of oil leaking per day. They lied to local media outlets, reporting that only 42,000 gallons came from the well (Achenbach and Fahrenthold 2010, August 2). Internal documents from both BP and the Coast Guard released through the Freedom of Information Act⁹ confirmed that leadership did not share the true rate of the leak with external stakeholders (Juhasz 2011). BP consistently disregarded stakeholder claims about public evidence over the oil spillage. Leadership was not transparent and was persistently unresponsive to stakeholder concerns.

Policy arguments over accountability measures inevitably arose as the evidence increased that BP was lying. Following the Deepwater Horizon sinking, dozens of vessels arrived with the objective of evaluating the spillage and assisting its stoppage. Known as “Top Kill,” this relief effort sparked increased media attention. Inaccurate oil leak estimates from BP fueled mistrust, exposed BP’s disregard for stakeholder arguments, and resulted in increasing tension between BP, the U.S. government, and the public at large. Lack of confidence in BP and impatience with their addressing of the disaster revealed mounting public distrust of their leadership (Auchenbach 2011).

Leadership and Missed Opportunity: Change

Leadership possesses the communicative power to identify areas for responsive change in the midst of problems/opportunities. BP’s lack of thoughtful responsiveness led to policy arguments between and among external stakeholders that resulted in change for the oil and gas industry. In the 2011 Report to the President [Barack Obama], in response to increased argument escalation, stakeholders argued for the dissolution of the MMS and called for three separate bodies (Lehner 2010). These three entities would focus on: (1) offshore safety and environmental enforcement, (2) leasing and environmental science, and (3) managing natural resource revenues. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar, signed an order reassigning the responsibilities of the MMS to three agencies: (1) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, (2) the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, and (3) the Office of Natural Resource Revenue. These organizations would “police … offshore oil and gas operations,” stressing accountability and open communication (Straub 2010, May 20). Clearly, BP’s failure to handle the situation through ethical and effective procedures urged change.

BP leadership understood the need for change in preventative maintenance, but still remained unresponsive. As argument escalated into conflict, new policy/value initiatives were necessary to address leadership failures. Following recommendations from the Report to the President, new regulations from the Obama administration and the Department of the Interior required oil and gas drillers to test and maintain blowout preventers with a yearly third-party review for confirmation. All blowout preventers would require a detailed inspection every five years (Larino 2015, April 13). This argumentation process resulted in improvements to safety planning. BP’s disregard for communication ethics in action actually led to changes in the industry through the active intervention of multiple stakeholders.

Summary

BP illustrates argumentation-ignorance in an organizational culture that silenced internal frontline voices and consistently prioritized finances over worker and environmental safety. This section identified three major considerations:

Chapter Summary

The 2010 BP oil spill yields communicative implications for argument escalation in the marketplace. The Deepwater Horizon disaster reveals how consistent unresponsiveness and thoughtlessness lead to an eventual conflict of public consequence. Ulmer, Seeger, and Sellnow (2007) contend that corrective action and change are the necessary conditions for strong and responsive organizational communication in the midst of argument, conflict, and crisis escalation. While attentive to postcrisis discourse, they suggest that—before argument escalation—organizations must foster and sustain “positive relationships” between and among external stakeholders. Once argument has escalated into conflict, these communicative relationships require further maintenance, attention, and care to manage effectively problems/opportunities relevant to internal and external stakeholders.

This chapter reveals that the knowledge of argumentative theory and strategy and awareness of the diversity of stakeholders is inadequate if a willingness to understand and respond to ongoing arguments remains nonexistent. British Petroleum revealed counter-examples for responsive action, accountability, and change. Their shortsighted strategy damaged the reputation of the company and curtailed the prosperity of many in the Gulf region.

¹ Stanley Deetz was the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Conflict, Collaboration and Creative Governance and long-term Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program when he taught at the University of Colorado. Currently, he is professor emeritus at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

² Allen W. Wood is professor of philosophy at Indiana University and a world-renowned philosopher specializing in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. He is the author of 13 books and the editor of an additional six.

³ Joel Achenbach, A Hole at the Bottom of the Sea. 2011. p. 29; Some of these 15 risk-based decisions included well design—especially the well casing, last-minute changes to the drill plan, using far fewer centralizing spacers than recommended by modeling, not reading relevant risk reports—such as Halliburton’s OptiCem model, failing to follow the American Petroleum Institute’s recommendation for mud circulation, cancelling the cement bond log, and using a faulty blowout preventer.

⁴ Despite warnings of increased risk, BP’s Brian Morel made the final decision to use a long-string casing with two gas barriers as opposed to a liner/tieback casing with four oil and gas barriers because it saved seven to ten million dollars.

⁵ Centralizers are spacing brackets on the steel pipe inserted into a well, allowing for uniform cementing between the pipe and the rock. This keeps gas from flowing up and around the sides of the pipe. BP hired Halliburton to run a simulation using their OptiCem modeling software. The model recommended 21 spacers. BP’s Brian Morel made a decision to use only the six spacers they had on site in order to remain on schedule.

⁶ A 2007 study by the MMS shows that cementing was the single most significant factor in Gulf well blowouts. The cement bond log checks the integrity of the cement after it has been pumped down into the well. Anytime there is a possibility of channeling, one requires a bond log. Despite Halliburton’s report showing this possibility, and after losing 3,000 barrels of drilling mud somewhere in the well, BP cancelled the Schlumberger contract for a bond log, saving time and $170,000. (2007 MMS study retrieved from Chris Morrison, “Gulf Oil Spill: Who’s to Blame? BP, Halliburton and the Feds Are All Implicated,” CBS Interactive Business Network, May 3, 2010).

⁷ According to the American Petroleum Institute, it is best practice to circulate the drilling mud from the bottom to the top of the well before it is cemented. This allows for the separation of any absorbed gas into the mud, preventing buildup of gas pressure as it travels up the pipe, from high pressure to low pressure. The estimation of the time is between six and twelve hours. BP did not complete a full circulation (See Chris Morrison, “Gulf Oil Spill: Who’s to Blame? BP, Halliburton and the Feds Are All Implicated,” CBS Interactive Business Network, May 3, 2010).

⁸ Excerpt from a letter sent to Tony Hayward from the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, drafted by U.S. Congressional Representatives Henry Waxman and Bart Stupak. The full letter can be found at http://mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/congress/article24585364.html. When inserted into the wellhead, a lockdown sleeve prevents the high well pressure from uplifting the casing hanger and seal assembly from the wellhead. This may have prevented the blowout, but was not standard practice when abandoning a well, suggesting an industrywide safety issue.

⁹ The Freedom of Information Act is a law mandated by the U.S. government that requires disclosure of public sector information to the country, explicitly referring to executive branch governmental agencies.