The Religious between Self-Referential Religious Communication, Communication on Religion, and Sacralization
1 Secularization or Reenchantment of the World?
The concept of secularization has been contested for quite some time. Some scholars describe the theory of secularization as an ideology or a “myth” (Aubrey 1954; Comblin 1981) with which modern society reflects on itself without regarding the “facts”. Others do not share this skeptical view and try to strengthen the notion of secularization in various modifications. However, from the perspective of conceptual history there are no pure facts as such, but facts are constructed and dealt with in order to describe and evaluate the world we live in. In his book Formations of the Secular (2003), Talal Asad presents a genealogy of the secular and of secularism, rather than a history of social and societal processes which are generally thought of as “modern”. He did not want to write a history of secularization, not even a history of secularization as a concept. Rather, his book intends to be “an exploration of epistemological assumptions of the secular that might help us be a little clearer about what is involved in the anthropology of secularism” (Asad 2003, p. 25). While the secular is “an epistemic category”, secularism is a “political doctrine” (Asad 2003, p. 1). Asad (2003, p. 25) understands the secular as “a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life”, i.e. a notion that has a certain impact on the individual’s conduct of life, perceptions and feelings – and even on the body. Secularism is a derivate from the secular and is based on “the secularization thesis [that] in its entirety has always been at once descriptive and normative” (Asad 2003, p. 181).
Following Asad’s genealogy, one might assume that there is a more complex history of religious development than the secularization thesis suggests, and maybe even a preconception inherent in empirical research on secularization. “The secular […] is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred)” (Asad 2003, p. 25). From this perspective the ambiguity of the secular and of secularism arises – whether or not one accepts secularization as a given “fact”, or tries to substitute it by confronting ideas such as “re-sacralization” or “re-enchantment” (cf. Berman 1981; Isenberg 2000), or the idea of a post-secular society (cf. Habermas 2002; Eder 2002). These notions are still just negative affirmations of the idea of secularization.
On the one hand, the epistemic concept of the secular and the derived doctrine of secularism are contingent social constructions, which – once they are in the world – have influence on our behavior, feelings and cognitions; but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that analytical notions of process are necessary within social sciences in general, and religious studies in particular, to grasp larger historical developments. If the socio-cultural reality would just be recognized as a continuum, there would be no change and no history as such and ergo no historical consciousness. In consequence: if everything simply were in flow, we could not perceive anything in its historic dimension. Notions and concepts – including the ideas of process – are necessary for perception and knowledge; this is just commonplace in philosophy. A notion – if it is not to be understood as scientific positivism – represents the condensation of a question at hand. As such, concepts represent and structure the empirical reality, as well as research programs, with an open end. Even if they are basic ideas, fundamental terms, they represent a question which only arose in its historical setting. This historicity of questions urges us to recognize that “the history of phenomena is foremost a history of the controversial explanation of these phenomena” (Graf 2004, p. 69; my translation). This statement is true for all phenomena, but especially so for religious ones, and, as such, for the idea of secularization and the questions represented by it.
Herrmann Lübbe (1965) presented the politics of ideas concerning the notion of secularization in detail, while Herrmann Zabel (1968) and Ulrich Ruh (1980) described secularization as a category of interpretation.1 Numerous sociologists of religion, the first among them Thomas Luckmann in the 1960s, and many social scientists and historians with him, doubt the concept of secularization in part or generally – to name just a few: Sarah Williams, Stephen Yeo, Jeffrey Cox or Linda Woodhead (Heelas/Woodhead 2005). Other historians like Hugh McLeod (1999) and sociologists like Bryan Wilson, Steve Bruce (2002), David Martin (2005), and in Germany Detlef Pollack (2003) for example, still think of secularization as a productive idea. In the French-speaking countries, the word déchristianisation is used instead of secularization, and Hartmut Lehmann (1997) suggested analyzing the interactions between the ideas of processes of secularization, dechristiani-zation and rechristianization. The ideas of the de-institutionalization of religion and the processes of the diffusion of religion would have to be added to Lehmann’s advice.
The heuristical power of the secularization concept depends on what is to be understood by the idea of it. In its strongest version, the concept of secularization suggests nothing less than the unilinear, irresistible and irreversible process of religion losing all of its significance – from marginalization to complete annihilation. Responsible for this is the universal and equally irresistible and irreversible process of rationalization, according to which everything is reduced to being just a question of (intentional) accountability. Or, to phrase this in accordance with the history of semantics: the complex and, historically speaking, rather dynamic relation between divine forethought and individual trials has changed into matter of fact appreciations of risks. The most radical concept of secularization combines this idea with a strong optimism toward progress, according to which the rational world view means nothing less than a total emancipation from religious dependency. Another notion in this radical concept is the idea of the deterioration of good morals and social cohesion due to religion’s loss of significance in modernity. According to both assumptions, modernity and religion are considered incompatible. Thus, religion functions as the negative blueprint for the concept of modernity.
Even if this characterization has some empirical evidence from the intellectual history of modern times, it still seems an exaggeration. If such a strong concept of secularization is purported dogmatically, it becomes mere ideology. Accordingly, this narrow concept has been softened by several modifications. What came out of this modification process, however, is secularization describing the development of religion in modern times as (a) an ongoing process and not as seasonal fluctuations, during the course of which (b) religion no longer has the importance that had formerly been ascribed to it (not taking into account the question of whether religion really did have more significance in earlier times).2 José Casanova (1994) has presented what are perhaps the most severely analytical considerations on the secularization thesis. He points to three elements in that thesis, all of which have been taken to be essential to the development of modernity: (1) increasing structural (functional) societal differentiation, (2) the privatization of religion, (3) the declining social significance of religious belief. Casanova holds that only the first and the third elements are viable.
I am not planning on adding another definition of secularization. Instead I would like to take up Asad’s definition of the secular as an epistemic concept, and, in the same instant, present some empirical observations on the social and societal history of religions – being aware of Asad’s (1994) examination of the role statistical representation has played in creating the world of modern power that social scientists inhabit. On the one hand, I agree with Asad’s methodology of genealogy: we have to sharpen the scientific understanding of the problem of handling the idea of secularization within scientific and public discourses. Thus, I will point out some dimensions that have to be distinguished when dealing with the question of secularization, and I will present some considerations concerning the interaction between the history of religions, social history, and the history of semantics. On the other hand, just reflecting on the constructions and conducting discourse analysis might be insufficient. If epistemic concepts – and as such the secular – have impact on people’s behavior (this being what Asad states), we have to look for quantitative indicators in order to be able to measure them, and thus evaluate their relevance. We certainly cannot take quantitative data as a simple copy of reality, since quantitative as well as qualitative data (such as texts) are much less complex than the social practice they represent. However, we need a heuristic epistemology of the “empirical reality” behind, or followed by, the epistemic concept of the secular. The following text proceeds abductively: after some introductory conceptual and methodological considerations, I will turn to empirical observations, and finally draw some conceptual conclusions.
2 Introductory Conceptual Considerations
With regard to both longue durée and synchronic comparative perspectives, the idea of there being a fundamental alternative between either secularization (understood as the decline of religion’s significance) or the return of religion (understood as its rising relevance) may be misleading. We probably have to consider both secularization processes and the persistence or even revival of religion. There are various reasons for this assumption.
Firstly, the social and societal impact of religion in the 21st century varies greatly when observed on a global scale. Despite globalization and de-territorialization processes, religion still seems to be bound to national conditions. I agree with Paula Montero3 when she states that the way different societies deal with religions has to do, mostly, with the historical characteristics of their nation-state construction. However, there are other factors beyond the nation state which should be mentioned, and which are responsible for the varying significance of religion, such as gender, age, economic background, and, last but not least, different characteristics of specific religious traditions.
Secondly, the assumption of a religious decline stems from an emphatic notion of religion that includes faith and a certain way of leading one’s life. It became dominant in Europe during the 19th century and is used today to evaluate the social and societal significance of religion. I very much support Martin Riesebrodt’s (2007) call for a clear-cut definition of religion;4 otherwise, we would not know what we are talking about, and how to conduct empirical research. On the other hand, diachronic and synchronic comparisons need careful conceptualization to avoid a temporal or spatial bias or even restriction. I do not want to start a theoretical discussion on what the correct concept of religion is; I only wish to suggest – as a result of my experience in trying to compare different cultures and times – taking the following elements of a definition as a starting point for further conceptualization.
The attribute “religious”, or the noun “the religious” and other notions that are in a relationship of family resemblances to “religion”, cover four dimensions –namely knowledge, experience, action, and a certain way of dealing with materiality. With regard to these dimensions the religious may be characterized by the focus on, and meaningful interpretation of, contingency, the duplication of reality (foremost by distinguishing between transcendence and immanence; cf. Luhmann 2000, p. 58–64), which includes:
- – a comprehensive and – by trend – all-encompassing, but not necessarily exclusive interpretation,
- – furthermore “[…] powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations […]” (Geertz 1966, p. 8), as well as,
- – “strong evaluations” (Taylor 1989, p. 4) to form a social identity and to guide ritual and ethical actions,
- – and, last but not least, an auratization of material objects and bodies as well as certain events and spaces.
In principle, the four dimensions interact with one another, but in a certain case one dimension might be stressed; e.g., the significance of faith as a specific articulation of the cognitive dimension and the relevance of religious rituals as an expression of the action oriented dimension strongly vary in the history of religions over time and space. The significance of religion should not be reduced to religious convictions, to emotional aspects, or to ritual, and respectively to ethical actions.
A third argument against seeing secularization and the return of religion as fundamental alternatives I would like to mention is that the presumed return of religion follows, in part, from the secularization thesis, i.e. in the form of its denial, and partly from a new interest in religious matters. I do not want to deny revival tendencies. However, we must be careful not to claim that there is a return of religion now, as a consequence of exaggerated assumptions made about a former decline of religion.
Fourthly, in order to examine the relevance of religion in modern or modernizing societies, it is important to distinguish between the micro-level of people, the meso-level of intermediary institutions and organizations, and the societal macro-level.
3 Empirical Findings and their Interpretation
After these initial conceptual considerations, I would like to turn to the interpretation of some empirical findings. The data selection might seem a bit arbitrary. However, I have tried to consider data from various countries and surveys for systematic reasons in line with my conceptual considerations.
3.1 The Religious Situation on a Global Scale
I will start with the religious situation on a global scale. Figure 1 shows a selection of countries reflecting the degrees of modernization achieved5; as an indicator I use the Human Development Index listed on the vertical axis. The percentage of the agreement to the item that religion is very or at least rather important in life may be seen on the horizontal axis. The distribution clearly shows that religious convictions are in high gear especially in less developed countries (Pearson’s correlation coefficient = –.607**). However, the often claimed incompatibility between religion and modern society cannot be upheld. As has long been known, countries like the USA, Ireland, Poland, Canada, Italy, and Singapore, show that a high degree of modernization is compatible with a comparatively high degree of religiosity.
Figure 2 shows some of the already mentioned countries in a different arrangement. The horizontal axis relates to the question of belief in God, and the vertical axis to the percentage of those who answered “yes” when asked whether they find well-being and strength through religion – the findings on both questions were again taken from different waves of the World Value Survey. In addition, I have named the countries according to each of their dominating religions. On the top right corner, where belief in God and strength derived from religion are strongest, it is apparent – with the exception of India –that exclusively countries dominated by Muslims, Roman Catholics, as well as independent Christian churches and denominations are represented. These findings support my argument that aside from the nation state, the characteristics of specific religious traditions also have an influence on the degree of religiosity.
Source of data: World Values Survey, 5th wave (2005-2008)
Having drawn attention to the dominating religion in different countries, we must also take religious diversity into account. On the world map shown in figure 3 different degrees of religious diversity are represented6. The darker the color, the higher the degree of religious diversity. We do not yet know very much about the impact of religious diversity on religious convictions and practice, but we must at least be aware of the fact that there are no monolithic blocks such as “Christianity”, “Islam”, “Judaism”, “Buddhism”, “Hinduism”, and so forth, but that religious traditions develop in mutual dependence, and that those entities are internally differentiated.
3.2 The Relevance of Religion at the Micro-, Meso-, and Macro-levels
My second point regarding empirical findings concerns the relevance of religion at the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. For reasons of availability of data, I will restrict myself to empirical data from Germany during the 20th century.
3.2.1 Micro-level: Personal Religiosity
I will start with personal religiosity at the micro-level and use two indicators, namely membership of a religious organization as an element of social identity, and the degree of individual religiosity independent of membership.
Figure 4 shows religious affiliation to the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches during the “Kaiserreich” (German Empire), the “Weimarer Republik” (Weimar Republic), the “Drittes Reich” (Third Reich), and in the reunited Germany until 2002. The two major German churches combined show no significant change in their number of members until 1910. From then on the number of members drops until 1940. From 1910 until 1925, the Catholic Church loses members while the Protestant Church gains more members. This changes between 1925 and 1939. The biggest difference concerning membership in the two major German churches arose between 1945 and 2002, which is hardly surprising. It is well known that Protestantism in the German Democratic Republic lost many, if not most of its members due to socialism along with state-decreed atheism. The Roman Catholic Church was not as severely affected during this period. A comparison of membership at specific moments in time (figure 5) illustrates this quite clearly.
Source of data: Religionswissenschaftlicher Medien- und Informationsdienst (2010).
Fig. 6: Religious Affiliation in West Germany 1900–2002.
Source of data: Religionswissenschaftlicher Medien- und Informationsdienst (2010).
Source of data: Religionswissenschaftlicher Medien- und Informationsdienst (2010).
The statistics of church membership in figure 6 show that the two major churches in the Federal Republic of Germany experience no significant change in membership from the end of WWII to the 1960s. When one church loses members, the other gains members. With the end of the 1960s the situation changes. At first, it is only the Protestant Church that loses members drastically. In the beginning of the 1990s this also happens to the Roman Catholic Church.
Still, who are the “others” mentioned in figure 6? With regard to religious diversity, about 10 % of the German population belong to religious organizations other than the two major Christian churches (figure 7 shows the respective distribution). Islam is the third largest religion after the two major Christian churches.
3.2.2 Religious Convictions
However, religiosity does not have to be restricted to an adherence to a religious organization. In contrast, affiliation to a religious community does not necessarily say something about religiosity, since adherence might have various reasons. Thus, religious convictions have to be taken into account apart from affiliation. This consideration is also reflected in various theoretical and empirical approaches to religion. Especially since Thomas Luckmann (1967) coined the term “invisible religion” in the 1960s – and from a theological point of view even as early as Friedrich Schleiermacher around 1800 – the individual and deinstitu-tionalized forms of religiosity have come under scrutiny (Davie 2008). Sociologists discuss the question of whether the paradigm of individualization should replace the idea of secularization (Pollack/Pickel 1999; Wohlrab-Sahr/Krüggeler 2000; Pollack 1996). So it is participation and affiliation as indicators for religiosity that have to be complemented by other indicators. One of these can be the personal attitude towards questions or problems arising from religion.7 As a first indicator, I would like to refer to the question of how many people deem themselves religious. A sociological survey from 2002 presents the following data:
| Valid percent | ||
|---|---|---|
| not religious -1- | 22,6 % | |
| -2- | 8,6% | |
| -3- | 7,8 % | |
| -4- | 4,0% | |
| -5- | 9,5% | |
| rather not religious | 52,50 % | |
| -6- | 8,3 % | |
| -7- | 11,1% | |
| -8- | 11,7% | |
| -9- | 6,9% | |
| religious -10- | 9,5 % | |
| rather religious | 47,50 % |
Fig. 8: Religious Self-assessment.
Source of data: Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaft 2002 (ALLBUS).
According to the data shown in figure 8, 47.5 % of the German population think of themselves as fairly religious, 52.5% as not really religious. According to the studies on changes in values conducted by Ronald Inglehart, this figure has been a little higher in Western democracies over the last 20 years, namely 55 % (Inglehart /Minkenberg 2000, p. 136ff.). However, this gives rise to the question of what such an indicator actually measures: is this really the attitude towards religion or does this have more to do with the expectations linked to orthopraxy? For this reason I will use the question of the importance of church and religion as a second indicator.
Fig. 9: Importance of Church and Religion Between 1980 and 2000 (Rounded).
Source of data: Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaft 2002 (ALLBUS).
As was to be expected, there are large differences between the East and West German population, as figure 9 shows. While 40 % of the people in the Western parts of Germany regard religion and church as important, only 18 % of East Germans think likewise. Processes of religious socialization have been largely abandoned here – and for a long time already. What I want to focus on is the fact that the numbers, and accordingly the attitude towards the church, have been roughly the same for the last 20 years in Western Germany.
Though these numbers give a rather undisputed insight into the attitude towards religion and church, one has to ask what has been measured by the indicator named “general religiosity”. While formal membership is probably too rough an indicator, measuring general religiosity is not specific enough. Therefore I would suggest taking concrete questions and statements of belief into account:
Fig. 10: Religious Convictions in West and East Germany 1991–2008 (Rounded figures).
Source of data: ISSP 1991, 1998, 2008 (Germany).
According to the data from the International Social Survey Programme (2008), about 78 % of the West German and approximately 34 % of the East German population share – at least temporarily – religious convictions (see figure 10). Around 55 % of Germans have theistic or non-theistic beliefs, and roughly a third seem to switch between belief and doubt. These figures have not varied in any substantial way over the last 20 years.
3.2.3 Meso-level: Significance of Organized Religion
Theological church statistics of the 19th century already used participation in Sunday service and communion as the most important indicator of “true religiosity”. I will now refer to communion statistics to exemplify participation in church life –not for theological reasons or consideration of church politics but rather for sociological reasons: as Lucian Hölscher mentions in his Datenatlas (2001), participation in communion is an indicator for genuine religious participation in church life, in contrast to participation at baptisms or funerals, which may simply be motivated by conventional thinking. The communion statistics for the Protestant Church in Germany show the following results (see figure 11):
Fig. 11: Communion Statistics for the Protestant Church in Germany (1910–2001).
Source of data: Bureau for Statistics of the Protestant Church in Germany.
Between 1910 and 1945, participation in communion rapidly declined. In the 1960s it leveled out at about 25 %. In the 1980s attendance suddenly increased dramatically and leveled out until today. A possible reason for this increase is a strong interest in ritual performances in addition to rites of passage. Rituals are obviously not only to be celebrated traditionally, but with a concentration on the religious dimension. The large numbers for Eastern Germany strengthen the hypothesis that the church in Eastern Germany is more dependent on its members’ declaration of belief and religious interaction than is the church in Western Germany. Secularization appears in a different light once qualitative aspects like religious actions are taken into account in addition to statistics on church membership.
3.2.4 Macro-level: Relevance of Religion in the Public Sphere
In a further step I would like to deal with the societal virulence of religion beyond the personal and organizational dimensions. When taking a closer look at the societal public, it becomes quite clear that secularization is born from modern society, beyond, and maybe even independent of, empirical evidence. Anyway, the discussion concerning “secularization” itself – and that is the point I want to make – becomes an empirical fact. The history of the idea of secularization shows that – except for the legal term “secularization” – the notion of secularization stems from theology, from within the religious sphere. The world conference on mission in Stockholm in 1928 dealt with the topic of “the fight against secularization”. Parallel to church building and the organization of mass-religiosity, Protestantism developed an idea of religious practice during the 19th century, which is based on authenticity, faith and emphasis, in light of which actual religious practice could only be seen as deficient. From within the religious field, the idea of secularization was used as a societal stimulus for religion within the public, and from thereon became an analytical term in the social sciences beginning in the 1950s. This transfer from the religious sphere, via the public, to the social sciences led to a rapid increase in the production of books concerning the idea of secularization, as figure 12 shows.
Even if one does not go deeper into the content of the books produced, the sheer number of books on the subject of secularization can be used as an indicator of secularization being in greater and greater demand during the course of the 20th century. After a slow start at the beginning of the century, the curve rises rapidly from the beginning of the 1950s until today. The responsibility for this development lies with the supporters and with the critics of the idea of secularization at the same time.
Fig. 12: German Book Titles Containing “säkular”, “Säkularisation”, or “Säkularisierung” 1900–2003.
Source of data: Gemeinsamer Verbundkatalog GBV, search criteria: “säkular”, “Säkularisation”, and “Säkularisierung” (April 2004).
In a second step I want to compare the numbers of church exits with the course of the statistic on literature concerning secularization.
The comparison in figure 13 shows that literature on secularization booms just before waves of church exits. This proves valid for the beginning of the century, at which time secularization literature was in demand, while the first large wave of church exits began in 1918. After the end of World War II, secularization literature was being produced in ever increasing numbers beginning in the 1950s. The corresponding wave of church exits started at the end of the 1960s. If taken with a grain of salt, one could propose the idea that from then on secularization literature and church exits increase in proportional progression.
I do not want to construct a singular and thus simple causal relationship between these two indicators; but they do tend to inspire the idea that the history of the concept of secularization and its scholarly reflection stimulated church exits in addition to social and religious factors, and vice versa. In addition to literature on secularization, I have recorded the number of books on religious topics in comparison with the book production in general.
The top curve in figure 14 shows the entire book production in Germany. The middle curve shows the production of scholarly literature on religion and the lower one, which rises disproportionally, shows the number of popular, non-academic literature on religion. While church membership has been in decline since the 1990s, the production of popular religious books is increasing. The “Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung” (GfK Group) diagnosed a growth rate for the esoteric book market of 20 %. In 1998, the volume of sales in this sector exceeded 100 million Deutsche Marks. If one tries to understand these facts as a growing interest in religious topics, one could easily argue that organized religion changes into “vagrant” or “vicarious religion” – in accordance with Ernst Troeltsch (1912), Thomas Nipperdey (1994), and Grace Davie (2008). Again, I do not want to state that there is a singular and direct connection between the above-mentioned topics and facts, but I just want to point out in which way indicators for societal virulence of religion can be built. The “vagrant religion” is an indicator for the growing interest in religious matters via media. However, it might not be considered religious communication, but rather as communication on religious topics. Thus, the data does not necessarily support the assumption of a religious revival, but at least is an indicator of the growing interest in religious matters.
Fig. 13: Secularization Literature and Church Exits in Germany 1900–2000.
Logarithmic scale; Sources of data: Gemeinsamer Verbundkatalog GBV, search criteria: “säkular”, “Säkularisation”, and “Säkularisierung” (April 2004); Bureau for Statistics of the Protestant Church in Germany: church exit data.
Fig. 14: Scientific and Popular Literature on Religion in Relation to the Entire Book Production in Germany 1991–2002.
Logarithmic scale; Sources of data: Gemeinsamer Verbundkatalog GBV: “Scientific Literature on Religion”, search criteria: “säkular”, “Säkularisation”, and “Säkularisierung” (April 2004); Amazon: “Popular Literature on Religion”; Buch und Buchhandel in Zahlen (1992–2003): “Entire Book Production”.
3.3 Fundamentalism
I will now turn to a topic that has been the subject of much debate, namely fundamentalism. However, this term represents a rather chatoyant concept and is used in religious, political, and scientific discourses with very different connotations. I would suggest distinguishing between religious fundamentalism –defined as a holistic and dualistic religious attitude, and characterized mainly by exclusive adherence to a particular religious orientation, on the one hand; and political fundamentalism influenced by religious elements on the other.
3.4 Religious Fundamentalism
Fig. 15: Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing Religious Fundamentalism.
Source of data: Bertelsmann Religion Monitor 2007.
According to a regression analysis of data from the Bertelsmann Religion Monitor (see figure 15 which covers surveys in 21 countries all over the world), individual and ecological exogenous factors explain religious fundamentalism to a large degree, namely 33 % of the variance. One might get the impression that religious fundamentalism tends to function as a way of compensating for economic and political disadvantages. Among the religious factors, which are behind almost another 20 % of the variance, centrality of religion for individuals (in the sense of Stefan Huber’s [2003] concept of centrality) is the most significant one, followed by adherence to a monotheistic religion. Religious diversity does not seem to have a strong influence on religious fundamentalism.
3.5 Political Fundamentalism Influenced by Religious Elements
Although different from genuine religious fundamentalism, political fundamentalism may be influenced by religious attitudes. If this is the case, it does, however, remain distinct from genuine religious fundamentalism, because it still belongs to the political sphere or is an expression of a political religion, which can be described as a mixture of politics and religion.
To find out more about the relationship between religious and political views, I have created and calculated an index for political religiosity and for national identity, respectively. The index for political religiosity is based on the respondent’s level of agreement with one of the two questions asked in the World Value Survey – “it is better for the country if more people with a strong faith take up public office” (5-point scale) and “politicians who do not believe in God are not suitable for public office” (5-point scale). The index for national identity is based on the combination of the primary attachment of the respondent to the respective country (against local, regional, or transnational belongings), and a pronounced sense of national pride. In order to identify national specificities, I have applied both indices to some countries already listed (see figure 16).
Political religiosity and national identity are particularly pronounced in Egypt and Pakistan, followed by Nigeria, Iraq, Tanzania, Algeria, South Africa, Bangladesh and Zimbabwe. Turkey, the USA and Albania are at the lower edge of the upper right-hand field. Countries like India, Canada, Poland, Ireland and Vietnam do show a high degree of national identity, but have a relatively weak level of political religiosity.
Admittedly, to analyze the findings in more depth one would need comprehensive, individual country studies. Nonetheless, I would like to give some ideas for analysis and interpretation using selected countries whose religious situation is marked by the large influence of independent Christian churches and movements, or that are predominately Roman Catholic or Muslim. As outlined above, general religiosity is very pronounced in these segments of the religious field. I intend to put this finding to the test and gain more detailed insight by using selected countries; these are:
- – Zimbabwe, with a high percentage of Pentecostal/Charismatic movements and followers of indigenous religions,
- – the USA, whose religious situation is also marked by the strong influence of independent Christian churches and movements,
- – Poland, which is very Roman Catholic,
- – Argentina, whose religious situation is also characterized by the strong influence of Roman Catholicism,
- – Nigeria, where Christian denominations face strong Muslim portions of society
Fig. 16: Political Religion and National Identity.
Source of data: World Value Service 1st – 5th wave.
- – Egypt, shaped by a majority of Sunni Muslims,
- – and Iraq, where the majority of the population are Shi’ite.
For each country, I have carried out cluster analyses (k-means) with the indices already introduced on general religiosity, national identity and political religiosity. In addition, I have also taken into account an at least moderately approving attitude towards a democratic form of governance (“A democratic political system is 1) very good, 2) fairly good, 3) fairly bad, 4) very bad for governing this country” [World Value Service 1st–5th wave]). As there is largely a high level of general religiosity in the selected countries, this usually appears as a constant variable in the cluster analyses. Generally constant variables are excluded from cluster analyses which serve the purpose of data reduction. However, in this case, and in line with the question I am researching, the variables allow different patterns of attitudes towards the relationship between religion and politics in situations of pronounced general religiosity to be identified.
3.5.1 Zimbabwe
The religious situation in Zimbabwe8 is as follows:
Fig. 17: Breakdown of the Religious Communities in Zimbabwe.
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
A look at the distribution (by percentage) of the religious communities in Zimbabwe shows that the largest group, with 43 %, are the Evangelical and Pentecostal /Charismatic movements, followed by 29% for the followers of ethnoreligions, 17% Protestants and 10 % Roman Catholics. With these figures, one must bear in mind that double affiliation is possible. Followers of Evangelical and Pentecostal/Charismatic movements usually show an especially pronounced general and political religiosity.
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
The cluster analysis shows that – with a more or less equally pronounced, relatively positive attitude towards a democratic system of government – 64 % of the population combine pronounced general religiosity with a high degree of national identity and are, at the same time, in favor of political religiosity. Eight percent have a relatively high level of general religiosity as well as a relatively high level of political religiosity, but do not identify with their country. This may be due to their expectation of their government to adopt a greater religious slant in their policies. Twenty-eight percent of the population show less pronounced general religiosity and a high level of national identity, but are not in favor of a closely institutionalized relationship between religion and politics.
3.5.2 USA
The second example I would like to give regarding the influence of independent Christian churches is the situation in the USA.
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
Forty-four percent of Americans are part of the mainstream Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal/Charismatic or independent Christian spectrum. Roman Catholics and Protestants each account for around a fifth. Regarding these figures, one must bear in mind that many Americans count themselves as part of the independent spectrum as well as of one of the two major Christian churches. Around 14 % of the population belong to other religious communities and religious movements; only the larger of these are listed in the statistics.
Fig. 20: Country-wave-study-set-year = United States [1999].
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
Six percent of Americans do not combine a relatively high religiosity with a political religiosity, and identify moderately with their country, but are also more skeptical towards a democratic form of government. Twenty-four percent are not generally religious and have a low level of political religiosity, but a high level of national identity and a positive attitude towards democracy on the other hand. Seventy percent of Americans have both a very high level of religiosity and are strongly in favor of a close institutional relationship between religion and politics under democratic conditions, and identify strongly with their nation.9
3.5.3 Poland
The religious situation in Poland is as follows:
Fig. 21: Breakdown of the Religious Communities in Poland.
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
With a figure of 92 %, the vast majority of Poles consider themselves Roman Catholic. Around 6% belong to other Christian churches and movements.
Fig. 22: Country-wave-study-set-year = Poland [1999].
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
For Poland the cluster analysis reveals the following pattern: 40 % combine a very high level of general and political religiosity, feel very close ties to their nation, but have only a moderately positive attitude towards a democratic form of government. For 9% of the Polish population, religion has no significance for, or effect on, their own lives, and there is scarcely any political religiosity. There is, however, a high degree of national identity, while democracy tends to be rejected. This may be the influence of the Communist Party of Poland coming through here. So the trend of rejecting a democratic form of government is not due specifically to religious reasons. There is, however, a certain skepticism, which can surely be considered as having something to do with religion.
3.5.4 Argentina
In the case of Argentina – a country also marked by Roman Catholicism – the situation can be described as follows:
Fig. 23: Breakdown of the Religious Communities in Argentina.
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
Just like in Poland, with a figure of 90% the vast majority of Argentinians are Roman Catholics. Members of other Christian denominations and movements account for around 17 %, although, here again, double affiliation must be kept in mind. Beyond this, Muslims account for 2% and Jews for 1% of those living in Argentina.
Fig. 24: Country-wave-study-set-year = Argentina [1999].
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
As the cluster analysis shows, in the case of Argentina three attitude patterns towards the relationship between religion and politics are, first of all, clearly different from one another, and, secondly, relatively evenly distributed. The positive attitude towards a democratic form of government overall and a strong national identity is matched, in 28 % of the population, by a very high level of general religiosity, although without any political religiosity. Thirty-seven percent are not religious and are only slightly in favor of political religiosity. Thirty-five percent of the Argentinian population, on the other hand, show a very high level of general and political religiosity at the same time.
3.5.5 Nigeria
The religious situation in Nigeria is as follows:
| Religious affiliation 2005 | % |
|---|---|
| (incl. double affiliation) | (rounded off) |
| Muslims | 44 |
| Independent Christians | 17 |
| Protestants | 15 |
| Roman Catholics | 13 |
| Anglicans | 13 |
| Ethnoreligionists | 10 |
| Marginal Christians | 1 |
Fig. 25: Breakdown of the Religious Communities in Nigeria.
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
Forty-four percent of the Nigerian population are Muslims, with the vast majority being Sunnis. Around 18 % belong to the Evangelical, Pentecostal/Charismatic or independent Christian spectrum. Mainstream Protestants account for 15%, Roman Catholics and Anglicans for 13 % each. Followers of ethnoreligions make up 10 %. With these figures, however, it is important to bear in mind that many Nigerians count themselves as both part of the independent church spectrum or ethnoreligions, as well as of one of the two major Christian churches.
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
According to the cluster analysis, 85 % of the inhabitants of Nigeria combine pronounced general religiosity with the desire for religion to have an influence on politics. They feel very close to their nation and are in favor of a democratic form of government. This finding is remarkable in the sense that the conflicts in Nigeria are partly based on religion. However, the vast majority of Nigerians believe that the conflicts should be resolved under democratic conditions. Seven percent have a high level of religiosity, which is not politically influenced, as well as a pronounced national identity, and are in favor of democracy. Eight percent of Nigerians combine a high level of general, and a very high level of political religiosity, yet do not feel close to their nation, but are supportive of democracy. Perhaps in this case there is no sense of national identity because the respondents in this group believe that politics are not defined enough by religious beliefs, or because the nation is religiously divided.
3.5.6 Egypt
In the case of Egypt, the religious situation is as follows:
| Religious affiliation 2005 | % |
|---|---|
| (incl. double affiliation) | (rounded off) |
| Sunni | 84 |
| Shi’ite | 1 |
| Oriental Orthodox | 13 |
| Protestant | 0.7 |
| Roman Catholic | 0.4 |
| Independent Christians | 0.2 |
Fig. 27: Breakdown of the Religious Communities in Egypt.
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
The vast majority of the Egyptian population are Sunnis, 1% Shi’ites, 13 % belong to the Oriental Orthodox Churches and a little over 1% to other Christian denominations.
Fig. 28: Country-wave-study-set-year = Egypt [2000].
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
The cluster analyses show that 92% of Egyptians combine pronounced general religiosity with a very high level of political religiosity and national identity, and at the same time are extremely positive towards a democratic form of government. One percent of Egyptians combine pronounced general religiosity with a very high degree of national identity, but do not demonstrate a political religiosity. Seven percent of Egyptians, on the other hand, have a very high level of general and political religiosity and identify with their country, whilst rejecting democracy. This, alongside other factors, is a religiously based potential risk to the development of democracy in Egypt.
3.5.7 Iraq
The final example I wish to cite is the situation in Iraq.
| Religious affiliation 2005 | % |
|---|---|
| (incl. double affiliation) | (rounded off) |
| Shi’ite | 65 |
| Sunni | 35 |
| Roman Catholic | 1 |
| Unaffiliated Christians | 0.5 |
Fig. 29: Breakdown of the Religious Communities in Iraq.
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
The religious situation here is characterized by 65% Shi’ites, 35% Sunnis, 1% Roman Catholics, as well as a host of religious communities not included here because of their marginal nature.
Fig. 30: Country-wave-study-set-year = Iraq [2004].
Sources of data: World Factbook (2005); World Christian Database (2005).
The cluster analysis reveals that 5% of Iraqis moderately combine general religiosity with weak political religiosity and national identity, but at the same time are positively inclined towards a democratic form of government. Four percent of Iraqis are, generally speaking, somewhat religious, have a pronounced sense of national pride, but reject democracy. The rejection of a democratic form of government is not due to religion in this case. Ninety-one percent of Iraqis combine a very high level of general and political religiosity with a high level of identification with their nation, and are in favor of democracy. The differences that exist in Iraq between Sunnis and Shi’ites should therefore be resolved under democratic conditions according to this attitude pattern. This finding, however, contradicts the fact that around one in five Iraqis firmly agrees with the statement that a truly Islamic country should not have a parliament with the right to pass laws. Of course, in the case of Iraq, geopolitical factors play an important role. The data I have used were collated in 2004, hence under the direct impression of the Iraq War. Still, to enter into this in detail would go far beyond what is possible in this article.
3.6 Religion as a Strong Identity Marker
Another point with at least political implications is the fact that religion may become a strong identity marker.
As far as we know from various studies on the connection between migration and religion, and as a survey on the religious situation in North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) shows, religion is an important factor of identity and of the way many people with migration backgrounds lead their lives. A total of about 43 % of all migrants and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe are involved in religious organizations. That is more than twice as many as in the Protestant and Catholic Churches. As church membership studies show, here 15–20 % at most belong to the inner circle of members (cf. Hero/Krech/Zander 2008).
However, these findings do not necessarily indicate a high degree of religiosity. The identity of migrants might be marked by religion due to social and cultural conflicts. Generally speaking, religion may become a strong identity marker and dominate other identity factors when labeling one’s self and others at certain stages of local, regional, national, and global social and cultural conflicts. Other examples of this assumption are the conflict in Palestine, and the differences between Hindus and Muslims in India. For the latter case, the anthropologist Julia Eckert (2004) has shown that Hindu nationalists in particular refer to religious elements when a political solution is at hand. In this case, defining the conflict as a religious one weakens the possibilities to negotiate the conflict, which would strengthen the Hindu nationalist organizations.
4 Conceptual Conclusions
I will now come to my conclusions and further conceptual considerations. Firstly, as the example of Germany during the 20th century shows, the quantitative significance of religion differs on the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. While church membership declines, there is convincing evidence to support the assumption that self-referential religious communication (indicator: communion) is becoming more clearly contoured. General religiosity can be ascribed to about 55 % of the population (according to ALLBUS 2002 and ISSP 2008), a figure which has not changed over the last 20 years. In contrast, the interest in and communication on religion (indicator: sales of popular books on religious topics) have increased. Thus, in general there is neither just a decline nor a clear revival of religion in Germany. This is probably also true for other modern societies.
Secondly, secularization may not only be understood as the loss of religion’s significance, but also as the specification of religion’s function and competence. The distinction from other societal spheres offers more freedom for recursive, self-referential religious communication.
Thirdly, processes can be observed that are distinct from self-referential religious communication, and in which non-religious contexts (e.g., politics, economics, the arts, cultural identity) are enhanced with religious elements in order to provide them with an otherwise unavailable or inescapable aura. The aforementioned political fundamentalism influenced by religious elements and – in part –the use of religion as a strong identity marker in social and cultural conflicts (at a local, regional, and global level) are examples of this process, which might be called sacralization – from the sacralization of the self to the sacralization of certain issues, such as human rights or political attitudes, and all the way to the sacralization of the nation state. By “immanent sacralization” I mean a process through which non-religious communication reverts to religious meanings of its own accord, or generates them and thereby gives “profane” circumstances a religious aura. It must be distinguished from religious communication, as well as from communication on religion, and is, to a certain extent, somewhere between the two. In contrast to communication on religion, regarding sacralization processes we are dealing with a fusion of religious elements and other areas of communication. In contrast to religious communication – which is based on the distinction between immanence and transcendence and through this distinction duplicates all of reality – sacralization “auratizes” and renders unfamiliar something that at the same time remains the object of other forms of communication. It gives circumstances which are specific, because they have already been communicatively defined, a cloak of mystery and of unquestionable validity. It is a way of dealing with the contingency of circumstances, which, at the same time, remain in other patterns of contingency management. In this way, sacralized circumstances are set apart from others, which then appear as “profane”.
Fourthly, with regard to the question of whether the social and societal significance of religion is declining, increasing, or remaining the same, it is necessary to empirically distinguish not only between the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels, but also between self-referential religious communication, sacralization, and communication on religious matters. The religious – as defined in my first considerations – may take two directions: it either leads to self-referential religious communication or attaches itself to other social and societal circumstances, especially to personal and social identity, to politics, and to the arts.
Fifthly, communication on religion has to be distinguished from self-referential religious communication, as the debates on secularization or the revival of religion show. The analytic model of functional differentiation might help to explain the rise of the secularization concept as the attempt to express the formation of religion as a functional system within society. From this perspective, secularization describes the internal differentiation between diffuse and emphatic religiosity, as well as the outer distinction between a religious and a secular description of the world. As such, secularization is part of religion’s own positioning of itself inside a modern and functionally differentiated society. This perspective makes it quite clear that the religious and the secular are interdependent; the one cannot exist without the other. Taking this one step further, one could say that secularization is an ambivalent process with two directions: secularization, if looked at from the perspective of a modern – i.e. an emphatic – concept of religion, is interpreted as a process through which the importance and significance of religion in society diminishes. At the same time, secularization reinforces and strengthens religion’s position within society as it makes religion refocus on its specific function as a distinct societal sphere.
Sixthly, as a result of sacralization processes and communication on religious topics, one might be left with the impression that religion and its place in modernity, as well as the contested distinction between the religious and the secular, are becoming a figure of reflection on modernity itself, even more so as the orthodox and orthopractic version of religion seems to be losing its relevance – at least in most of the Western societies.
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