1 Introduction

This article tackles the central threads of this volume from the particular angle of Muslims in Europe. I assume that it is not possible to study a “religion” or a “religious minority” in an isolated way; that is to say independently from the social, political, economic and also cultural contexts. The central question, raised at the Concept Laboratory and also in the present volume, as to how a religion should appear in order to contribute to a peaceful coexistence can therefore not be answered if we do not take into account the partly conflicting worldviews surrounding the modern forms of religions, most notably within a liberal democratic context.

More importantly, I suggest that it is not possible to look at Muslims in Europe without addressing questions of the secular realm; and here, more specifically, the question of how secular powers in Europe have contributed to regulating and shaping religious worldviews and embodiments. Being interested in the question as to how liberal democratic orders deal with growing religious plurality, by secular powers I refer not only to the obvious structural inequalities resulting from post-war migration, past encounters between Europe and the Muslim world, in particular colonialism and postcolonial memories; rather, I also have in mind processes of regulation of religious plurality through which Muslims are to be turned into citizens. In the political discourse, such practices are currently labelled with the paradigm of “integration”. And I am thinking here of practices with different, partly divergent rationalities, ranging from juridical, partly disciplining approaches, to more communicative ones, which aim at including, embracing Muslims – while at the same time making sure that their religious practices take the right shape.

In this article I would like to focus on one of these practices, which is of a more inclusive and communicative kind. More precisely, I will look at a current initiative of the German state to integrate Muslims through a communication platform conceptualized as a dialogical encounter and called the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (hereafter DIK). The DIK was initiated by then minister of the interior Wolfgang Schäuble in 2006 and its goal is to enter into a structured conversation with Muslims in Germany. It brings together state representatives and Muslim representatives, both organized and individual. While plenary meetings are organized on a yearly basis, four different working groups gather to discuss issues of Muslim representation, of Islamic practices, of gender questions, of extremism, and more recently also of Islamophobia.⁷¹

Investigating the DIK as a micro-practical case for interfaith or intercultural dialogue under liberal-secular conditions, in this article I argue that the basic understanding of dialogue by the main protagonists favors normalization and consensus, while tending to reject diversity and dissent. This, in turn, appears to block anything that might lead to a serious commitment to the pluralistic character of German society. I will follow this argument by subjecting the DIK to a politico-philosophical appraisal, with the aid of which I would like to reflect on the nature of consensus-orientated dialogue (and/or deliberation⁷²). I argue that consensus-orientated dialogue, as also practiced in the DIK, is based on liberal, secular assumptions, whose normative and exclusive component is not made explicit, and which manifests itself in non-conforming utterances above all.

As the most significant representative of the idea of consensus-orientated dialogue, particular attention will be paid to Jürgen Habermas (1981; 1991; 1992; 1993; 2008; 2009), and to his later writings on discourse ethics and the role of religious pluralism in secular constitutional orders. The DIK is diametrically opposed to Habermas’ dialogue model, with its emphasis on the consensus of rational, ethnically and ideologically neutralized citizens in non-hegemonic areas of public life. Moreover, as Habermas has frequently stressed, his concept of dialogue cannot simply be applied on a one-to-one basis to political and social reality –since it is inherently “counter-factual” – although this remains a desirable ideal.

With its involvement with the state, its hierarchical structure, and its criteria for dialogue being set in advance, the DIK is a far cry from Habermas’ discourse model. We could immediately argue that the DIK essentially does not represent “true” dialogue, but is primarily a means for the government to exercise power and an instrument of state-controlled integration (cf. Peter 2010; Amir-Moazami 2009a). Even so, this specific exercise of state power is billed as dialogue. Rather than dismissing the DIK out of hand, I am interested in the question of how it exercises power and on which premises it does so. In this manner, an analysis of the DIK based on political theory can contribute to a closer investigation of this logic and identify its problematic implications; and, looking at things the other way around, this particular practice reveals that even Habermas’ idealized dialogic model contains a hidden set of basic assumptions with many preconditions, which to some extent reflect the political philosophy of this encounter.

I argue, therefore, that Habermas helps us uncover some of the tensions that emerged in the first three years of the DIK, namely that the state gets involved in formulating and managing the Good, instead of confining itself to its role as a neutral protector of contractual arrangements – meaning issues of rights and justice, to put it in liberal terms. At the same time, this particular dialogic practice reveals in an interesting manner the limitations of an idealized model of dialogue, as proposed by Habermas, in that it makes explicit the secular bias of his arguments, which he himself only partially acknowledges: mainly because he presupposes, and leaves unquestioned and untouched, the secularity of the liberal constitutional order.

Through this specific focus, I thus wish to raise some broader questions that are relevant for the central themes of this volume relating to religious plurality and the question regarding to what extent liberal secular matrixes can be considered a central component shaping the adequate expressions of the religious in the public realm, alongside particular – often unmarked – presuppositions.

2 Consensus-Orientated Dialogue in Liberal/Secular Terms

In this section I will limit myself to filtering out from Habermas’ complex discourse ethics those aspects which refer to consensus orientation and to the secular character of his model, which finds resonance in current dialogue practices with Muslims. Three closely associated argumentative threads running through Habermas’ thinking seem to me to be relevant here: firstly, the basic thought of a certain form of rational argumentation, which is tied closely to the idea of pressure for justification; secondly, the consensus orientation; and, finally, something I would term “secular prejudice”.

As do many other philosophers of language, Habermas (1991, p. 111) works from the assumption that speakers never simply describe a state of affairs, but that they, through the act of utterance, invariably expose themselves to the pressure of explaining and justifying what they say. Communicative behavior only functions for him between individuals who are prepared to hold each other accountable, and who undertake to give reasons for their own statements. That which is articulated in dialogue must therefore be delivered in a language which is understandable for all individuals concerned (see e.g. Habermas 1981a, p. 71). In order to have access to discussions, the acceptance of certain universal forms of communication is thus required.

On the other hand, communicative behavior should, according to Habermas (1992, p. 138), aim at consensus. For Habermas (1981a, p. 71) the basic principle is, however, that this consensus must not be pre-structured, but must be freely arrived at using fair conditions for discussion. Only through discussion is it possible to arrive at new insights, which have political relevance at the same time.

It must be stated, however, that essential conditions for dialogue are simultaneously pre-structured in Habermas’ work. It is particularly in his theory of communicative action that Habermas highlights the conditions for communication in such a way as renders recognizable a universal structure with normative content. In so doing, Habermas not only starts out with an ideal speech situation –which includes all citizens to an equal degree, and in which the better argument gains acceptance; he also has in mind the ideal of an articulate, reflective and independently thinking citizen who, using rational and universally comprehensible arguments, involves him or herself in political debates, and, in this way, helps to shape their outcomes. Hence all citizens should enjoy the same equal opportunity of participation in public discussion, provided always that they are able to justify their arguments convincingly and in a rational manner.

According to Habermas, it must be possible that arguments are articulated regardless of the embedding ideological context, and regardless of conceptions of the Good. Against the background of a liberal-leaning theory of justice he finds a distinction, essential for his discourse model, between the ethical conceptions of the Good Life, for which diversity needs to be preserved, and the moral obligations, which must apply in equal measure to all, and to which obligatory answers must be found in the form of valid norms:

Thus, the ethical stance of a political integration uniting all citizens would need to “be neutral towards the differences which exist within the state between ethical and cultural notions of individuals as to what constitutes the Good in an integrated community” (Habermas 1993, p. 181).

One of Habermas’ core arguments in Faktizität und Geltung asserts that institutions in democratic states justify their existence through such processes. The citizens thereby become both the subjects and the co-formers of the law. The forum in which this inclusive participation of as many citizens as possible takes place, is, according to Habermas, the public sphere, which one should ideally view as liberated from the influence of the state, and in which the citizenry are able nonetheless to pursue the processes of legislation and administration of justice, comment critically and make long-term amendments.

This focus on constitutional norms and their dynamic character should also, and primarily, be seen as an examination of German history and the – in this context – inimical ethnic/romantic idea of nationhood. In place of an ethnically and a priori defined concept of nationhood, the ideologically neutral constitutional state needs to step in, according to Habermas. As suggested by the ideal of “constitutional patriotism”, the citizens of a nation-state should not base their loyalty on its ethnic foundations; instead, they should define and identify common constitutional principles agreed on by the nation-state, but that are capable at any time of being re-negotiated through public deliberation, which is conceptualized as being as inclusive as possible.

In his response to Charles Taylor’s Politics of Recognition, Habermas spells this out particularly plainly for contexts of cultural plurality. As opposed to a particularistic model of the recognition of cultural minorities, as Taylor attempts to render plausible, Habermas stresses here the diversity-promoting power of universal constitutional norms. True, he does concede that the political culture of a nation-state, as reflected in the foundations of its constitution, is “ethically impregnated” (Habermas 1993, p. 181). As an example he quotes the historically conditioned close relationship between church and state in Germany. Through the ideal of the participating citizen, however, a diversification of the political and ethical culture of a society must inevitably arise, which is ultimately manifested in the pluralization of legal norms. Should there be an alteration of the horizon, within which the citizens have expressed themselves through their ethical and political discourses, then the discourses and results would be altered, Habermas (1993, p. 169) contends.

As will be shown later, this model also finds resonance in the social realities of society. Still, Habermas’ ideal of the rational, self-reflecting and mature citizen, who always learns from, and is persuaded by, other, better arguments, has been much criticized from various angles since the beginning of the 1980s. For the sake of my own argument, I would like to mention only one line of thought.

A frequently voiced criticism therefore leads me to think that asymmetries of power and power techniques, which inevitably pervade liberal and egalitarian societies, are consistently phased out by Habermas’ ideal of non-hegemonic discourse. Particularly in ideologically diverse contexts the structurally disadvantaged (i. e. religious minorities) will inevitably encounter unequal terms by which to shape the discourse. And here I am referring not only to overt and institutionalized power structures, but rather to those which are unspoken, written in and incorporated, and which, as a result of this neutralization, are assumed not to require translation. Chantal Mouffe, for example, criticizes Habermas and other exponents of deliberative approaches as “post-political” or “post-democratic”, particularly as they attempt to circumvent, by means of striving for consensus, the dimensions of power, conflict and antagonism, all of which are central to political struggles. Mouffe raises the objection that consensus invariably operates with mechanisms of exclusion, not least because the starting point is jointly shared background assumptions, which are not made explicit. According to Mouffe (2007, p. 22) recognition of the pluralism which constitutes democracy would be deficient without the recognition of antagonisms.⁷⁴

In addition the objection must be raised – and a number of Habermas’ critics have done so – that this highly idealized version of argumentative dialogue fails to meet the needs of those involved in dialogue, and actual speaking situations, for that matter. That is to say that the ideal of the constantly striving citizen is often characterized by undisclosed assumptions. Thus normative conflicts frequently do not involve rational arguments, but are rather a matter of “irrational” sensibilities, emotions and passions, which conflict with one another (Mouffe 2007, p. 22).

To a great extent, this also applies to the context which interests us here. What, as a rule, marks out religious movements and religiously motivated utterances is that they take precisely those ethical dimensions to the political agenda that Habermas, even if he does not seek to exclude them from public discourse, would wish to see translated into a universally comprehensible language. In this process they challenge the consensus, as defined above, on what is universally comprehensible, absorbed and consumed.

While Habermas at first paid no attention to religion, he strives in his later works to credit this “life-worldly” context with high importance, since the latter could potentially cast doubt on the previously unmentioned secular premises of his dialogue model. If his response to Charles Taylor at first aimed to point out the limitations of controlled multiculturalism in general, then Habermas has of late more consistently included religious projects as central components of cultural plurality. Despite the attempt to broaden his model, which was originally established in the context of linguistic theory and subsequently widened to political and/or religious pluralistic contexts, this is precisely where the limitations of the attempt become apparent. For it is exactly at this point that the secular bias of his discourse model comes into play.

Habermas’ starting point here is the observation of worldwide religious revivalist movements in the 20^th and 21^st centuries, which make the assumption of a gradual secularization of religion look shaky. Habermas addresses the implications of the required division in liberal thought and practice between church and state vis-à-vis this development, and asks in what way it must be redefined. Here he discusses a “classically” secular(ist) argument that mainly stems from John Rawls. It states that the democratic constitutional state must be ideologically neutral and, despite or even as a result of (individual or joint) divergences, must be based on the concept of natural reason. Habermas criticizes the all too narrowly expressed secularist, rather than “truly” ideologically neutral determination of the political role of religion, and essentially considers two lines of argument which in the sociology of religion have gained credence over the last two decades: first, the view that religious movements might also have a democracy-furthering influence;⁷⁵ and second, the assertion that faith is something too comprehensive to simply be excluded from the exercise of public reason.⁷⁶ He reaches this provisional conclusion:

If this sounds like a revision of his earlier works, then Habermas in the next breath places limitations on it, adding that he only allows religious discourses in dialogue to be subject to a general reservation of translation:

Habermas understands religion here in the classical liberal mode as something which aids the endowment of sense, which nevertheless should not exert any influence without the provision of translation into public discourse, and definitely not in an ideologically neutral state and its legislation. Although it urges those of secularist ideology to keep an open mind to the possibility of religious statements containing truth, and to enter into dialogue, his call for translatabil-ity results from an unequivocal hierarchization of secular and religious arguments:

Here we must first of all ask ourselves why worldly concepts of the Good should better stand up to unreserved discursive discussion than do religious ones. Without doubt, Habermas has in mind the dangers of “religious fundamentalism” above all, though he does not define more precisely what he means by this. Thus his attempt to activate certain forms of the religious as a resource of the democratic state indicates that religion as such disturbs him less than do certain illiberal features of monotheistic religions. Yet secularist positions presently springing up indicate that secular repertoires and sensibilities are not as a matter of principle less politicizable than are religious utterances.

In addition, the strong contrast that Habermas proposes here between religious and secular language is less convincing, chiefly because he, of his own accord, disputes the outcomes of the translation effort he demands. The secular premises of the discourse, which are particularly reflected in the secular foundation of the liberal, constitutional state, consequently prove to be precisely that ethical impregnation which Habermas, in other contexts, regarded as still being dynamic and capable of change by virtue of cultural diversity, but which he here views as sacrosanct.

Thus Habermas himself draws attention to the asymmetrical conditions of the ostensibly ideologically neutral constitutional state, while justifying this empirically by considering the truly completed secularization processes in the wake of the Reformation and the Enlightenment. “Traditional religions”, as he calls it, would need to catch up on certain points, that is to say, they would need to learn to accept the body of secular epistemes (Habermas 2009, p. 143f.).⁸⁰ While Habermas would not venture to single out Islam as the chief candidate for this catching-up process, at certain points it is very clear at which religion, in a European context above all, this requirement is aimed. For he simultaneously states that the Catholic Church, following a laborious process, has already successfully met this secular requirement. With reference to Muslims he says: “Many Muslim communities still have this painful learning process before them. Certainly, the insight is also growing in the Islamic world that today an historical-hermeneutic approach to the Koran’s doctrine is required” (Habermas 2008, p. 27f.).⁸¹

In constructing a religious norm, against which, among others, Islam must measure itself, Habermas places a heavy burden on religious groups, especially the structurally disadvantaged ones, such as Muslims in Europe. Hence established religious communities, and in particular Christian ones, benefit from a whole range of handed-down religious structures, which Muslims still need to call for. It is questionable how, faced with these unequal points of departure, they would culturally sublimate their own religious convictions in discourse.

Although Habermas views consensus as a process in which all citizens – subject always to the above-mentioned conditions – should participate equally, he hesitates to openly articulate something that we could term his own secular background as consensus. The largely unjustified, unqualified acceptance of the secular character of the constitutional state and the precedence of secular, as opposed to religious speech acts, nevertheless involve many pre-conditions and consequences. This is even more the case when we understand secularity in the sense of Talal Asad (2006). Asad reminds us that the secular largely exceeds formal and legal divisions of state and religious institutions, and should, in the first place, be understood as a mechanism in which state institutions – through micro-political power techniques – authorize and/or demarcate normative models of religion and religious ways of life, while guarding the divisions of the religious and the secular. As I will now attempt to show, at a practical level the mechanisms of the DIK display precisely that secular prejudice I pointed out in Habermas’ System itself, as well as the possible, but by no means inevitable, consequences which this may entail.

3 The DIK, “Free and Democratic” Consensus and “Constitution Plus”

Although the DIK is a far cry from the inclusive ideal of deliberative models, not least because state actors control the dialogue, this dialogue practice is based on the attempt, by means of conversations between representatives of the state and Muslims, to reach a consensus on the basis of “liberal and democratic principles”. ⁸² Although this consensus is not intended to be of a legally binding nature, it is nevertheless supposed to contribute to the creation of cohesion and conflict harmonization. Above all, organized Muslims are not even required to declare formal allegiance to constitutional principles; rather, in the course of structured conversation the constitution is reduced to an ethical substance on which it is allegedly based, as I will demonstrate in the following.

Firstly, the DIK could, in the way Habermas sets out, be interpreted as an overdue political commitment to the religious plurality in Germany. Regarding Muslims as a “section of German society” in this regard could be interpreted as a symbolic gesture of acceptance. Even extracts from the setting of the agenda reflect the well-intentioned stance of the state and its readiness to move forward the areas of demands for recognition, repeatedly put forward by Muslims, such as the training of Imams in higher education, or classes about Islam in state school curricula.

At the same time, within the DIK a certain inherent reservation can be detected, particularly with regard to pious Muslims. This very much resembles Habermas’ requirement for a translation of religious utterances, even if the way in which this requirement is articulated runs totally counter to Habermas’s concept of fair dialogue. This reservation is seen principally in the pronounced emphasis on values, something which is to be found in the whole of the previous encounters of the DIK. Thus the state rhetoric and setting of subjects for discussion make it clear, time and time again, that Muslims must first of all fulfil certain conditions in order to be truly recognized. This applies to the area of political Islam, in which Islamic communities are above all meant to appear as “security partners” (Schiffauer 2008). It also applies to aspects of embodied life conduct, values and ethics, and it is this feature which I would particularly like to focus on.

In outlining his vision of the DIK, Wolfgang Schäuble in particular repeatedly referred to the “free and democratic” premises underlying the consensus between the state and Muslims. In the course of the event it became clear, however, that the underlying values had been much more markedly loaded and idealized, and that these arise from a much thicker texture than had been suggested at first. This shows in the setting of the agenda, the course it has taken to date, but also in the general ethos of the event.⁸³ In addition, it does seem less of a question of an exchange of divergent positions, as would be expected in such an event, and more a case of a conscious process aimed at achieving a more or less pre-determined “consensus of values”.

Particularly on the fringes of the DIK, and frequently behind the scenes unofficially, a concretization and idealization of the initially abstract liberal democratic premises can be detected. Thus Schäuble, speaking on the fringes of the DIK, urged Muslims – and Muslims alone – a number of times to be sure to observe the rules and fundamentals of the constitution. In the next breath he led us to suspect that his views went even further:

In Schäuble’s appeal to the emotional and ethical side of citizens’ loyalty we can clearly see what is termed “Constitution Plus” (“Grundgesetz Plus”) behind the scenes at the DIK.⁸⁵ In the published documentation after three years of practicing dialogue, we simply find reference to a successful consensus on a “German value community”, which hardly goes beyond the constitutional status quo. However, it is very clear from conversations with DIK participants that organized Muslims in particular are often invited to recognize the value substance of the constitution. For example, in the third plenary session of the DIK, Muslim organizations were urged to agree on a document which goes beyond the mere confirmation of their loyalty to the constitution, and in which they were to pledge their identification with the “German value community” above and beyond bare legal principles.⁸⁶ Muslims were in this instance asked to endorse what was virtually an inner allegiance to the constitution. This goes far beyond the initially formulated idea of a consensus based on “free democratic” values, and so can be viewed as significantly exceeding the de-linking of ethical notions and moral obligations proposed by Habermas.

So how precisely does this ethical content of the common body, which Muslims are supposed to feel themselves a part of, manifest itself? It can be demonstrated especially clearly by the question as to how Islam and gender have hitherto been linked and negotiated. Questions of gender and sexuality, or more precisely that which has been identified as Islamically based gender norms, form a core area which runs through virtually all DIK working groups. The current DIK II goes so far as to devote a whole working group to these questions, entitled “Gender Justice as a Common Value”.

There were, during one of the workshops, moments in which the Muslims present were supposed to be prepared to identify suspect passages of the Koran, that is, with reference to the role of women.⁸⁷ On the fringes of the DIK these passages were rebuked by the commissioner for integration, Maria Böhmer, for not being open to the value of sexual equality. And in this case this would be demonstrated by a willingness to take part in mixed-sex sport and swimming lessons.⁸⁸ Hence the Muslim participants were urged to take on more than simply the participation in mixed-sex sporting activities in state schools. The negotiations have thus broadened into Muslim behavior, gender norms and ideas about sexuality. This is indicative of a sexual politics tailored to Muslims, who are unilaterally regarded as not conforming, and this policy pursues a logic beyond legal regulation, as it targets the individual’s behavior and attitudes.

In all this, it is striking that the event is so designed that it is only Muslims who are questioned about gender equality, and are urged to adopt a proactive position. For example, it remains questionable as to why the topic of gender equality has not been taken as a reason to ask about the state of affairs across the whole social spectrum, and to stimulate a general discussion on the contours and nature of this same value; but instead, with the one-sided concentration on Muslims, a concept that is anything but clear and not always necessarily accepted by non-Muslims, and is simply used as a yardstick to inspect a whole religious community.

On closer inspection, there is a kind of logic at work here which attempts to touch on ethical behavior, value concepts and emotions, while seeking to regulate these – hence assets which in the liberal/democratic constitutional state, according to Habermas’ and liberals’ ideals, should not fall within the authority of state regulation. It is particularly noteworthy that the state appears here as the chief actor, regulating religious sensibilities and making judgments on normalcy and deviation. In so doing it uses a particular religious model – tamed, secularized Christianity – as a pattern on the basis of which Muslims are to be shaped and transformed into secular subjects.

The forms, which this swearing to a joint value base take, as such run counter to the previously formulated ideal of liberal democratic consensus. It also runs counter to more general forms of deliberative initiatives, according to which such a value consensus should at best be found, through discourse and by taking account of all arguments. And yet at the same time we have here precisely that ethical foundation of constitutional norms which Habermas and other deliberative thinkers refer to as the unmarked pre-assumptions of rational argumentation, and which Habermas would like re-shaped as discourse, on certain elements of which, namely religious utterances, however, he imposes a translation requirement.

Seen through the prism of deliberative dialogue models, on the one hand the example of the DIK displays its own weak points, but also the potential of such models, which oblige us to uncover these weak points. On the other hand, however, the DIK highlights the blind spots of liberal dialogue models by bringing to light the ethical – in this case secular – foundation and the power techniques of the liberal constitutional state, which liberal thinkers such as Habermas attempt to neutralize through deliberation. For we are in such cases not dealing with exchanges between egalitarian citizens on an equal footing, who – while translating concepts of the Good and giving each other fair consideration – achieve conclusions in the form of binding normative solutions. On the contrary, asymmetries and techniques of power are not alleviated by deliberation. There remains a sovereignty of interpretation as to what is considered worthwhile, and as to what reflects the adequate use of constitutional norms. And this is, in my opinion, not only a result of the fact that in such cases the state as the sovereign actor controls the manner of dialogue, sets the agenda, and decides who takes part in discourse and who does not; rather, it is an expression of comprehensive power relations and power mechanisms which come to light in the best way during the course of deliberation, but are nevertheless not overcome. Hence I would also not claim that a dialogue which is initiated solely at the level of civil society is immune to such power techniques.

Of course, in liberal deliberative dialogue models the ethical content of the constitutional principles is not determined a priori, and hence not unilaterally laid down, but it arises ideally in dialogue conducted under fair conditions. However, the condition of universal comprehensibility is based on an ethical pre-judgment, which, one could argue, procedures such as the DIK dismantle. The call for Muslims to translate their utterances into universally understood language is therefore not dissimilar to the call to identify oneself with more than mere constitutional norms. For it is the secular norm, and hence a whole number of secular allegiances into which religious utterances are to be translated. In other words, the act of translation requires identifications that go beyond abstract universal principles, and concern those very particularities which are written into these principles. In an article on the “post-secular” character of contemporary European societies, published in 2008, Habermas indeed hints at something similar when he claims:

In this sense the political rationalities of the DIK make explicit what Habermas and other liberal thinkers address, even if they would formulate it in a less overtly particularizing and a more abstract manner: the ones who need to be required to produce translations are “traditional religious projects”, which have not yet achieved the equivalent stage of secularity as other, established religions. At the same time, the first round of the DIK, with its concentration on values, has set in motion an unexpected and probably unintended process, which partly confirms Habermas’ ideal of modified discourses through modified horizons.

4 Non-Conforming Muslim Utterances in Controlled Dialogue

What scope is available in such a dialogue context to those Muslim actors who are not prepared to pledge adherence to a prearranged value consensus? The aspect of “talking back” interests me above all with respect to the question of what possibilities of critique are permitted by the mechanisms of subjectification that apply in the DIK. Of particular interest are those actors, who, from the outset, were among the more dubious interlocutors, because they are placed into the category of “political Islam”. For here we are dealing with forms of critique of the dialogue structure and practice that, at the same time, make clear that this critique is itself a product of a liberal reflex, and is by no means operating outside liberal discourse structures.

First of all, it should be made clear that organized Muslims, and in particular those who have participated in the DIK, have a totally different concept of dialogue than most of the participants from government, as well as some of the non-organized Muslims, who have been invited to the DIK as representatives of the “silent majority”. While representatives of the government aimed to gain an impression of the (in)compatibility of Muslim views and liberal democratic premises, with a heavy emphasis on values, and so seek to stimulate discourse on the content of constitutional norms, the concern of larger organizations of organized Muslims has been to bring to life rights as enshrined in the constitution.

Organized Muslims in particular seem only to have involved themselves in the mechanisms of the DIK because they wished to drive forward the institutionalization of Islam in Germany with state aid. In particular the debate on values appears to have been perceived as an irritating co-component, which has marginalized what are to them vital issues such as the training of Imams, the building of mosques or Islamic theological teaching in state universities. Hence the various starting points reveal not only considerable asymmetries of power, but are also evidence of major divergences as regards the aims, aspirations and demands of the Other. This reveals, once more, the objection that, at the planning stage, there was no opportunity to bring these divergent interests to the table straightaway.

Of particular interest to me here are those Muslim organizations that were previously declared as embracing a conservative and political notion of Islam, and as being enemies of the constitution, such as the Islamic Organization Milli Görüs (IGMG), and which were, in the first round of the DIK at least, publicly described as “equal partners”. Let me quote an extract from a conversation I had with the head of IGMG, Oguz Ücüncü, in the aftermath of the first encounters.

I find Ücüncü’s remarks interesting from several points of view. First, they make clear the problematic implications of the attempt, as outlined above, to dictate values. Here Ücüncü indicates the fact that the state is essentially going beyond its own remit. In so doing he, to some extent, turns around those accusations, which his own movement has faced for many years: this organization, which, having been under surveillance by the German Security Service, is now reminding the state not to stray beyond the bounds of the constitution.

Second, Ücüncü in this way points to the exclusionary mechanisms – implicit in the attempt to fix a jointly shared value base in the sense of an immutable source – which do not allow non-conforming religious (Muslim) citizens to even take part in discourses subject to a translation requirement, but rather seek to exclude them by definition. Last, he reveals the manner in which some representatives of the state construct a particularistic value consensus in the process of the DIK.

The emphasis on loyalty to the constitution and the law-abidingness of the IGMG, while at the same time rejecting a uniform model of religiosity in the public domain, seems to me ultimately symptomatic of the younger generation of intellectuals who have risen to management level at the IGMG, and who Werner Schiffauer (2010), in addition to Asef Bayart, terms “post-Islamist”. In particular, the adoption of a liberally characterized legal discourse is a specific trait, which may be seen in other aspects of Islamist and/or post-Islamist movements (cf. Henkel 2005). In so doing, there is a striving for universal rights and not, contrary to the criticism which is often articulated, for particularistic rights. With his confidence in the identification-endowing powers of the constitution, Ücüncü sets out what is essentially Habermas’ ideal of a “constitutional patriot”.

There are a number of examples of organized Muslims having recourse to constitutional norms – primarily to the principle of religious freedom, but also to the concept of equality, something which permeates the core of the constitution. All too often they become involved in controversial areas which essentially deal with the legitimization of religious practice in the public domain. It is often gender issues that are on the agenda of the DIK – such as mixed sex swimming and sport lessons at school or the Islamic headscarf. Thus, for example, the deputy (female) head of the IGMG Legal Department Gülizar Keskin, in an interview concerning mixed sex swimming lessons, insisted on the right to modesty and religious sensibilities. Even in this area the admissibility of religious embodiments are consequently linked to a liberal discourse on rights.⁹¹

In the context of this article, there are two interesting aspects to this argumentation. On the one hand, some aspects of it confirm Habermas’ ideal of a consensus to be arrived at on the basis of the best arguments, and the justification that has been thought through in the best way, even if Ücüncü’s argument, querying and ultimately also bringing to light the culturalistic argumentations, might not necessarily even be “heard”. Representatives of the state have, in any case, found themselves having to supply justifications that they themselves have not anticipated, and thereby, in Habermas’ sense, have come under pressure to justify themselves.

Moreover, this illustrates clearly the potency of Habermas’ argument of the change in discourse brought about by changed conditions in society. The recourse to valid legal norms does not attack constitutional principles, but essentially reveals their pluralistic and controversial character – in sharp contrast to the attempt to attribute to the constitution a monolithic ethical content. Applying liberal democratic argumentation, one might want to read this in the sense of Seyla Benhabib (2004, chap. 5), as an expression of “democratic reiteration”. Benhabib relies on the concept of iteration (repetition) as used by Jacques Derrida, as well as on his emphasis on the pluralistic structure and on the essential semantic change in concepts: “In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce a replica of the first original usage and its intended meaning: rather, every repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever-so-subtle ways” (Benhabib 2004, p. 179).

With regard to the difficulties connected with the headscarf in France, maintains Benhabib, covered Muslim women have, through their recourse to constitutional principles such as equality and religious freedom, brought about one such “enrichment” of the meanings of these norms. By justifying their claims with constitutionally available legal norms, they have introduced religious (i.e. Islamic) components into these very norms. This act of reiteration, according to Benhabib (2004, p. 181), opens up a way for individuals to appropriate these rights, which are firmly established in democratic constitutions, and totally in Habermas’ sense, to become not only the subject, but at the same time the agent of the law.

In this sense one might similarly claim that the liberal, constitutionally based legal order in Germany enables Muslims to “reiterate” constitutional rights, with the aim of pluralizing and widening their own sphere of participation. Against the backdrop of these reiterations we can see the form of state intervention, as expressed in the DIK, as a reaction which indicates that it is primarily organized Muslims who have increasingly sought to prove their ability to secure their religiosity in constitutional terms, and without having recourse to alternative legal forms and norms.

Having said that, I would introduce a note of caution at this point, and with that conclude with respect to the potential, and also the limitations, of liberal (-legalist) dialogue models. I would be far less optimistic than Habermas or Benhabib, as to the effects of such democratic reiterations. As writers such as Wendy Brown or Judith Butler remind us, good faith in the pluralistic power of constitutional norms overlooks the thick texture itself, which is written into the contract, and which endures beyond the context of its origin by means of discursive power techniques: “[W]e might conclude that at a basic level, the entitlement to a notion of freedom that is based on contract is limited by those freedoms that might extend the contract too far, that is, to the point of disrupting the cultural preconditions of the contract itself” (Butler 2008, p. 10).

On closer inspection, Ücüncü therefore reveals the inbuilt limitations in the liberal project, above all when we examine it in the total context of the DIK and what can be thought, said and heard about it, and what correspondingly cannot be thought, said or heard. Because in liberal democratic constitutional contexts it is by no means a matter of indifference as to who speaks. Neither is it just a question of how argumentation is conducted, but often enough also who is doing the arguing, and on what ethical basis, as well as which assumptions are being made. Thus the arguments of the IGMG leadership could be considered more or less discredited, not least because the IGMG is considered a dubious organization in toto, whose reference to the constitutional basis and constitutional conformity are judged to be devious, because there is presumably no serious constitutional loyalty behind it, but simply goal-orientated tactical maneuvering (cf. Schiffauer 2010; cf. Parekh 2008).

In the case of pious Muslims this can be illustrated through the very principle of religious freedom, which Ücüncü is also driving at in the above quotation. Thus, the successful application by Islamic organizations before the Federal Constitutional Court to allow them to carry out Islamic ritual slaughter, for instance, triggered a process which revealed the inscribed ethical foundation of the constitutional state, and not just at this judicial level. Werner Schiffauer (2010, p. 298f.) gives the very clear example of how state authorities have undermined the verdict granting an exemption for ritual slaughter, using the argument of animal welfare to limit it to a minimum.⁹²

By having recourse to the principle of religious freedom, Muslims behave in a thoroughly constitutionally correct manner. However, in so doing, they frequently demand things that have not been provided for by the contract.⁹³ Although the demands are rational, legitimate and in conformity with the law, the content is frequently considered offensive. They are not necessarily offensive because they attempt to raise the religious to a sphere which is not permitted – for forms of religious expression, for instance of Christianity, are present and active in the public domain, as well; but they are considered to be an infringement on what is permitted because they challenge an inscribed form of the secular consensus (which Habermas lays down as an unmarked template) and introduce into the public and legal discourse an unknown form of the religious, which is found to be disruptive, and which is considered archaic, traditional and in need of translation.⁹⁴ Hence it is here not only the religious practices which are allowed or disallowed in law, but rather questions which touch upon embodied secular assumptions and emotions. ⁹⁵ Above all, this applies to those demands that point to a concept of arrangements regarding the sexes, which deviate from the secular norm.

This would also support Heiko Henkel’s argument. Henkel indicates that the politico-philosophical idea of constitutional patriotism developed in an age in which ideological pluralization was considered to be of far less significance than it is today, and which was primarily concerned with overcoming the ambivalent potential of an ethnically expressed understanding of nationhood with the offer of a politically expressed common bind. Thinkers like Habermas still need to provide answers to the question regarding to what extent those religious projects, which call into question the secular consensus, can be regarded as a legitimate component of the ideal of constitutional patriotism.

A pluralistic, reiterative concept of constitutional norms does not necessarily predominate in societal practice, particularly when it is a question of uncomfortable demands that do not easily fit into the predominating ideal of secularized, and hence more reticent or even publicly invisible religiousness. Contrary to the assumption made by Ücüncü, religious freedom is not per se a Good which is enshrined forever, which any of us – provided always that we present the correct argument – can make use of, but it varies in interpretation according to context and is permanently linked to certain dispositions. It is for this reason far more ethically charged than is frequently claimed in liberal-judicial discourses. Even if, for example, schoolchildren succeed in excusing themselves in accordance with the law from coeducational sport and swimming lessons at school, this hardly means that they can hope for the recognition of a religiously based sexual morality by society, which cannot immediately be translated into a liberal repertoire. It should be stressed here that the demands which are hidden behind the aimed for principle of religious freedom are equally anything but neutral, as Ücüncü and others with a tendency to constitutional patriotism suggest. Rather, they in all probability rely on a religious foundation which will not easily fit into a secular, liberal repertoire. Although I do not wish to make the accusation of using the liberal constitutional repertoire for illiberal purposes, it does seem clear in this case that even representatives of Islamic organizations frequently do not explain the ethical premises under which they have recourse to constitutional rights. Thus IGMG actors such as Ücüncü, with their assertion that concepts of the Good must immediately be separated from the domain of the law, simply repeat the contradictions inherent in liberal/judicial discourses. They do this, firstly, by suppressing their own value-orientated interpretation of these rights; and secondly, by overlooking the limitations, which in this case result from the secular impregnation of constitutional norms.

The call for equal rights for religious groups, as well as their recourse to legal discourse in particular, is hardly able to address moral forms of exclusion – not least because the law is not a neutral authority which exists independently of concepts of the Good, and is thereby isolated within society. Criticism which refers to law, and to codification above all, thus merely indicates the existence of power, but does not undermine it.

On this issue I have no conclusive answer, and not even a preliminary one. However, certain questions follow from these justified objections to the backdrop of what have hitherto been the dialogue practices of the DIK; these seem to me to be suspect, and this article has attempted to expose them: what happens when the act of reiteration does not lead to the desired establishment of the formation of democratic will – as Habermas would have it – when the discourses do not pluralize in spite of pluralized horizons, because the contract itself is being tested along with the reiteration? To what extent do making use of the law and the appeal to the courts reify the very forms of exclusion and moral injury that they were intended to cure? The challenge lies in thinking about those forms of recognition of ideological diversity that might exist beyond liberal-judicial initiatives, in order to comprehend the principle of secularity more comprehensively, even in its results, which strive for freedom, as permeated by techniques of power. Accordingly, any dialogue that supports this universal permeation of power seems to me ultimately hardly suited for the context of pluralistic (dialogue) contexts.

5 Concluding Remarks

In the preceding discussion I have attempted to show how the ideal of consensus-orientated dialogue in ideologically pluralistic contexts causes exclusive effects, despite the best intentions to be inclusive. These mechanisms of exclusion are, for one thing, evident in the theoretical premises. On the other hand, they also manifest themselves in concrete dialogue practices such as those exercised at the DIK.

How fit for purpose is a dialogue model that urges religious citizens to translate specific matters concerning a religious faith into a universal (i.e. secular) language, and, for the benefit of comprehensibility, to disregard the power implications of this universally binding objective? And how fit for purpose is a dialogue practice that, above all, does not even allow the Other, who is considered as not fitting in, to introduce into the discourse his own concept of the Good in a reflective manner, because it is led by unspoken assumptions and prejudices?

The DIK operates with mechanisms that are hard to reconcile with the concept of liberal dialogue. This is chiefly because we are not dealing here with that kind of voluntary assent to a jointly developed value consensus. At the same time it reveals the particularistic content of abstract liberal theories and thereby highlights the non-neutral, ethical character of what are ostensibly neutralized, permanently adaptable constitutional norms. In discussion of “Constitution Plus” the fact is revealed that a real sovereignty of interpretation of the ethical foundations of constitutional norms exists; the ways for non-conforming religious projects to break through this sovereignty of interpretation are limited, even if their stance vis-à-vis the constitutional framework is an affirmative one.

With its recourse to constitutional principles of ethical substance the DIK displays the related mechanisms of exclusion for non-conforming utterances, and, at the same time, the contract-specific limitations of constitutional patriotism. For this reason I regard as rather less dubious the understanding, expressed throughout the DIK, of ethically determined interpretations of constitutional norms. On the contrary, this very aspect might give some indication of the non-neutral, ethically based premises of such norms. The spirit of philosophical-hermeneutic ideas for dialogue like this might stimulate the decoding of the assumptions which hamper even dialogue models of the liberal type. Discourse on values, embodied lifestyles and ethics is something I consider to be urgently needed in view of the necessarily divergent concepts of the Good in the political and public spheres.

On the one hand, it is problematic that the DIK creates the impression that non-Muslims have unanimously absorbed all basic values in a uniform manner, whereas organized and/or devout Muslims are generally accused of having a deficit in the acquisition thereof. In such cases the need to catch up, where religious speech events are concerned, becomes acute. On the other hand, the call for a common ground is somewhat threadbare, when agreement on this common ground does not even arise in the dialogue process, but above all takes shape in people’s minds as a disrupting otherness in the process of construction. In the DIK the production of value material takes place chiefly via demarcating techniques. As may be best demonstrated in the area of Islamic norms of sexuality, the underlying concept of dialogue is mainly based on the expectation that Muslims will adhere to certain rules and norms – in this case a certain religious norm which is based on a productive notion of freedom.

Faced with these forms of state-initiated dialogue and its involvement with welfare and provisional power techniques, subjectivities are produced through processes of attribution. Even the constitutional patriotism expressed by some of the Islamic organizations is unable to penetrate these subjective positions. The organizations’ having recourse to a liberal and democratic discursive repertoire should be interpreted as a reaction to these forms of state intervention in Islamic life. They aim to resist this intervention, even if, in using this repertoire, they rely on a number of weak points in liberal theory and practice.

However, it must be stressed as a general observation that the effects of such dialogue practices conducted on liberal and secular terms are totally open, even when they operate with overtly exclusionary mechanisms, since these constraints nonetheless also offer possibilities for participation.

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