4
Topography: the Characteristics of a Structure
In Chapter 2 of this book, I suggested that we assimilate CI, a form of OI, to an MI. We were able to establish together that the fundamentals of MI – “novelty”, “operationality”, “intentionality” – could be applied to OI and thus to CI. These can be understood as three characteristics of a CI. However, I also explained that managerial innovation and open innovation relate to the concept of process. This process is at the same time structural and social.
Now, is it enough to leave things there on the characteristics of CI? These fundamentals do not encapsulate, strictly speaking, the idea of a social-organizational process of institutionalization, that is, of acceptance of the structure in the general organization of the company. In fact, how do “novelty”, “operationality” and “intentionality” relate to these social and organizational dimensions? Furthermore, could everything that is new, operational and intentional be considered as CIs? This is obviously false. It thus seemed more than necessary to me to go further and to seek to specify a little further the characteristics of CI, to even go as far as to qualify these characteristics precisely, based on my numerous observations.
In fact, the analysis in the cases presented subsequently in this work as well as many discussions over time have allowed me, during my four years of research, to identify for CIs what the literature refers to as structural characteristics. This is an essential concept in the sense that it allows us to know what to manipulate in a structure. In Chapter 5, we will see the goal of this manipulation. In the current chapter, I will restrict myself to the “what?”.
Before introducing what I see as characteristics of a CI, it seems useful to me to give you some concrete and useful explanations for understanding this chapter.
4.1. The characteristics of a structure
During a process of dissemination/adoption of MI, and here a CI, actors will continue to refine and modify the latter to stimulate and strengthen its adoption. You can well imagine that when a new structure appears in an organization, it does not remain fixed. A company is a complex and unstable environment, and it is unimaginable that a new structure would not undergo adaptations in order to fit in. It is women and men who bring these structures to life, and they are influenced by the environment.
It is thus quite natural that integrating the concept of “managerial adaptation” (Mamman, 2009; Ansari et al., 2010) into the framework appears pertinent. This term “adaptation” is, as I indicated in the introduction of this book, equally used to speak of changes carried out in an organization to welcome an MI, or to speak of changes made to the MI itself to assimilate it to the organization (we speak of adjustment or of alignment).
In the existing academic literature, managerial adaptation is generally understood through studying the components and characteristics of the MI, and it is useful to appropriate these two fundamental concepts.
Components define the structure of an innovation, and characteristics are the factors that influence the components, thus allowing the structure to adapt and to continue to exist over time. Note however that components may be perceived in different ways by authors (Mamman, 2009; Ansari et al., 2010; Dubouloz, 2013). Without going into a trait-by-trait comparison of these different approaches to the components of an MI, I have nevertheless drawn three important conclusions. First, we notice that each of these approaches explicitly stresses the importance of the technical and social dimensions associated with organizational innovation, contrary to the structuralist approach (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981), that is, the approach which does not take into account people in some way. Second, we notice that these authors all mention the existence of characteristics of MI which are likely to influence its components. Finally, some authors remain quite fluid in their approaches to components and this is likely to pose problems of operationalization and interpretation of data.
Starting with these observations, I was therefore interested in further exploring the technical and social (sociotechnical (Levit, 1965; Dubouloz, 2013)) approach, which seemed to me the most concrete and in any case the most digestible for the world of business. I have emphasized the following components: “actors”, “structure“, “tools” and “tasks”, which can be described as follows. By “actors”, we mean all the stakeholders who carry out or influence work, including the direct members of the organization. By “structure”, we mean the modalities of the organization of work, of communication, of authority and of decision-making. As for the system of “tasks”, this refers to the goals and the manner in which work is carried out. Finally, by “tools” we mean the technologies, and the process of production mobilized.
These components, which I retain, would thus be influenced by the characteristics of the MI. Moreover, these latter must be understood.
Many authors have focused on the characteristics of innovation (Downs and Mohr, 1976; Rogers, 1995; Mamman, 2009; Ansari et al., 2010). In reference to these works in particular, the literature agrees in dividing the characteristics of an innovation into two categories: those which refer to the intrinsic characteristics and objective qualities of the innovation, and those which refer to the perceived characteristics, that is, the (subjective) interpretation of actors. The only limit involves one question: does it involve technological innovations or managerial innovations, or is it mobilizable for all innovations? In my analysis, capitalizing on these characteristics for all types of innovations seems to make sense. I suggest that the modification of technological artifacts and organizational artifacts proceeds according to the same dynamic. This dynamic relates to an activity of design which, far from confining organizations to being simple passive receptacles, fully rehabilitates the role of the manager(s) in the dissemination of an innovation, whether technological or managerial. Note in particular that the subjective assessments of an innovation, drawn from the personal experiences and perceptions of individuals, and transmitted through interpersonal networks, participate in the process of implementing the innovation. The characteristics of innovations thus seem to allow a technological and social reading of the dynamic of dissemination–adoption of an innovation. These characteristics – manipulated by actors – play a moderating role in the nature and magnitude of the changes to be undertaken. In other words, the type and level of modification of the components of the innovation will be influenced by many characteristics throughout their implementation in an organization.
The characteristics offered by the literature are numerous. However, I have decided to retain only three of them, which have stood out in the context of my work and which have clearly emerged from the field. They are complexity, ambiguity and relative advantage. Let us define these three characteristics for managerial innovation.
Relative advantage is defined as follows:
“It is the appreciation on the basis of which we consider innovations better than what is currently used. The relative advantage of an MI would be determined on the basis of its capacity to meet the purpose for which it was adopted. An MI which presents a significant relative advantage will be less subject to changes because they might hold back its adoption” (Rogers, 1995).
Complexity:
“This is the level at which an MI is perceived as hard to understand, to implement and to use” (Rogers, 1995).
As for ambiguity, this is subject to many interpretations (Benders and Van Veen 2001; Giroux, 2006), which I feel can be summarized as follows: it is the possibility for an MI to be interpreted differently by the actors concerned, thus opening up the spectrum or the field of uses. Some practices have a greater probability of adaptation because they offer themselves to multiple interpretations and may be adapted to multiple agendas. Keeping ideas ambiguous may allow an organization to utilize them better. The words used to express these ideas may have several meanings, relating to different situations, or may not even be able to be defined. This allows the organization to interpret and use the innovation in different ways, thus decreasing the natural resistance to change.
The choice of these three characteristics seems to me to be widely relevant, all the more in that two of them, complexity and pragmatic ambiguity, are frequently used by authors dealing with the modification of innovations in the context of their adoption by organizations (Canet, 2012). Thus, as you would have understood, managerial innovation is only possible because actors will play with the characteristics of the MI to modify its components, and thus to adapt it to the organizational design of the company (the large group) and ensure that it finds its place in the field of the large group. This game and these social interactions are part of a process called translation (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1994), with the goal of its adoption, and are part of the framework of managerial work.
The figure below allows us to illustrate the influence of the characteristics of the MI on the components. Note that the three attributes presented above are not exhaustive, but allow us to simplify and clarify our understanding of what is happening.
Figure 4.1. The attributes or characteristics influencing adaptation
CI, which is an MI, can thus take advantage of lessons on the characteristics of the latter. The characteristics of the CIs studied may thus be grouped into three large categories or themes. These are relative advantages, complexity and ambiguity. However, I think it is useful to further refine these characteristics, as they may be seen as valid for many structures other than CI. A thorough qualification is required. Let us pass over each of these characteristics in review, therefore, and bring them closer to the reality of CI. This delicate exercise is based on our observations and, obviously, on the in-depth case studies dealt with in this book.
4.2. Relative advantages
The involvement of leaders with these new, very visible structures constitutes a real advantage, in particular with regard to structures that are older and have less media exposure. It is difficult not to highlight the exchange of good processes, which operates in the context of this support from leaders, and it is a point that I have already shared with you. CI embodies a new, more open strategy on the part of large groups, a strategy promoted by their leaders. This is a good thing, as without this dynamic, CIs would have never seen the light of day and would probably not exist. But the support of these leaders comes at a price. CI, this very fashionable incarnation, is a stage on which leaders do not hold back from commenting, and on which they do not hold back from taking steps to enact their own agenda, at the risk of obliterating the essential: the goal of the CI approach. Moreover, we must note that support from directors is exploited in various ways by the CI. Some will mainly use the writings and speeches of their leaders. No one will be offended, I hope, if I say that the abundance of communications issuing from companies and sprinkled with quotations from leaders is commonplace. In this world of everything-goes communication, it is also more than essential. It is thus not very difficult for CI leaders to put these writings and speeches to good use. Other CI leaders, no doubt closer to the leaders in hierarchical level, want to capitalize not only on their writings and/or speeches, but also on their physical presence, in particular on the occasion of certain important events or key moments for the CI. For a moment, these leaders also become CI leaders in front of internal audiences, as external ones. These moments, even if they do not last – these are temporary events – crystallize the posture of CIs and leave valuable traces that CIs can intelligently exploit.
We may also note – and particularly because large groups know nothing about these types of structures – that CIs enjoy an autonomy which allows them to play with the missions which have been assigned to them. This autonomy may be expressed in different ways. For example, we have seen that certain CIs have the knack of financing experiments, a role generally vested in research departments, or even of investing in start-ups to make them more attractive to the business units. In summary, CIs become structures which by nature, under the pretext of giving full service to start-ups, may sometimes develop diverse and varied services. Misunderstanding, for example, by research departments of the world of start-ups gives them little incentive to question the approaches of CIs on the subject. We might speak of the privilege of experts. Another example that expresses this autonomy well is the ability of CIs to set up useful procedures in strong autonomy. CI leaders decide on the “volume” of internal actors, which they will invite to their selection committee or decide to carry out thematic selections to better motivate all the actors involved and to begin a coherent series of events. This is far from being anecdotal. Deciding on the “volume” of internal actors invited to a selection committee implicitly marks out the specific intentions of the CI. Carrying out thematic (rather than generalist) selections supposes taking a strong position, as this means excluding other themes judged not relevant at the moment. It is good to act intelligently, because do not forget that excluding certain actors from a given selection may antagonize them or may create a strong interest in the next selection. This is a double-edged sword, and having intelligence on situations and persons is important. It is better, in summary, to create envy than to create rejection.
Another undeniable relative advantage is the interest that communications directorates of large groups have in CIs. These often see the CI as a way of creating “buzz” in digital news, in other words to get the group talked about and to get media coverage for the activities carried out by their CI. As far as I can tell, the domain of start-ups is quite “fun” for communications directorates. This changes daily life for the team that gets caught up in the game. We understand on these occasions the extent to which the start-up/large group relationship may have the value of exceptionally recognizing the importance of the human factor. Start-ups are not technological solutions, but women and men. I have very often had the pleasure of realizing the extent to which the eyes of actors in communication may light up when you put them in the presence of these entrepreneurs, who are very different from the internal profiles commonly encountered. In any case, the CI becomes the flagship of the group, as much internally as externally. This implication for “directors of communications” is obvious and the evidence is on the web. One look on your preferred search engine will demonstrate this. Some CIs even sometimes regret that communication’s involvement does not go even further. In fact, out of caution, some communications directorates wait for commercial partnerships or other concrete and significant realizations to be established before communicating. Anything-goes experiments with start-ups will obviously no longer be enough. This is a point worth discussing, as an experiment between a large group and a start-up (once it gives rise to a balanced co-financing agreement) may prove profitable for both actors. The operational and media benefits may be reaped by both sides. For the start-up, it is the chance for live market testing, as well as becoming more widely known. For the large group, the chance is to pre-test the start-up’s solution, and to emphasize at the same time their support for the latter’s development.
It is also useful to return to the CI’s allegiances within the group. It seems to be a given fact that all CIs develop in the context of business directorates. In itself, this does not constitute an absolute advantage with regard to business units for the relationship with start-ups and the enactment of OI. This attachment of CI to business directorates, however, becomes a comparative advantage when it is combined with another factor. The teams in charge of the CI – generally quite small – are fully dedicated to relationships with startups, which is not the case for the business units. The teams in charge of the CI can thus very quickly – precisely because of their closeness to the start-ups – develop expertise and knowledge of the field and have a kind of head start on this field of OI with start-ups. It is difficult to encounter so many start-ups at events or in calls for proposals without creating a deep culture around the trends, the start-ups to avoid, news about a particular contractor. Uncontestably, and this is recognized for all those who deal with start-ups, there is a real dexterity to being able to comment on start-ups’ solutions and teams, in a word to avoid that which is most feared by the business units and the organizations more generally: to back the wrong horse among the start-ups. We have seen the aversion of organizations to risk and their assumptions about start-ups; Chapter 2 dealt with this at length. We must understand that this start-up expertise of the CI allows them to be implicit in a position to monitor the markets for the large group involved. For CIs, this “advance” or head start allows the CI again to position itself as an indispensable entity in the group.
Finally, the absence of technological constraints in implementing CIs seems to constitute an asset that furthers their adaptability within the large group. In fact – and we see it in all of our illustrative cases – there is no need for anything but a small budget and above all human resources to get a CI going. The technological dimension is only a background with respect to the start-ups, but it does not constitute an obstacle once the business unit has bought the project from the start-up.
I propose at the end of this first section to retain several elements to qualify the characteristic of “relative advantages” for the CI to bring it closer to reality: the involvement of top management; autonomy; their “flagship” position for communication; the focus on start-ups and, finally, their malleability. There are enough qualifications here specific to a CI that we can decently consider them as relative advantages.
4.3. Complexity
I have observed a very varied panel of CIs from the point of view of their sector of activity, their maturity and their “culture of openness”, the manager’s profile or their leadership profile. We must recognize that one recurrent problem arose for all of the structures studied: complexity in all its forms.
The complexity of CIs is linked to their very position as interfaces between the interior (CI) and interior (group with diverse actors or stakeholders), and also as interfaces between the interior (CI) and exterior (start-ups, partners). This double configuration of interfacing generates complexity on two kinds: a social complexity (irrational?) and an organizational complexity (rational?). In both cases, these complexities that arise from my observations, as well as from my own experience, constitute markers for the CI and more generally for OI structures.
4.3.1. Irrational complexities
To start with a first, “irrational” complexity of CIs, I would say that the latter are structures whose comprehension and implementation are complex. Why work with start-ups, when you could simply buy their solutions? As we have seen, if many companies were used to customer–supplier relationships with start-ups, CIs take a position of reinventing this relationship in a win/win dynamic. The start-up brings its innovative solutions and, in exchange, the large group gives it access to a voluminous customer base. The objective for the large group is to accelerate the bringing to market of innovations and to maintain its competitive position. The objective for the start-up is to ensure its growth by gaining new customers. At the risk of antagonizing some web media with regard to their many such ventures, being a start-up is not joining a competition of “how much funds have been raised?”. Fund-raising is a means, and all serious start-ups know that their challenge is first of all to gain customers! This approach for start-ups is compatible with the needs of large groups: marriages can theoretically be consummated with the “architects” of the CI. Yet, the irrationality of internal reactions within companies towards start-ups does exist. One response to this irrationality may no doubt be to consider that working with a start-up in a win/win way is a means of answering a point which we can put in the form of a question: “is it not true that your company always demands more results with fewer resources?”. In this context, start-ups may be a good way of responding to this, as they are remote resources which in large part do not represent a burden for the large group. For the latter, producing innovation itself is a long and expensive process. Working with start-ups may be risky, but every risk can be managed with a little bit of rigor. Many CIs have demonstrated this.
Another “irrational” complexity may be shown in the following two anecdotes. Put a start-up and a business unit in the same room together and go around the world a thousand times. You will see that not much will happen. Put a start-up and a business unit in the same room together and ask them separately to describe their conversation. The start-up and the business unit will not have understood the same thing from this conversation. What is this mystery?
As for the first anecdote, it should be said that temporality is not the same for a start-up and for a business unit of a large group. For the start-up, time is a deadly given. For the business unit of a large group, this is less the case. A business unit of a large group can do, undo and redo as long as it knows how to justify it to the organization.
As for the second anecdote, we gladly refer you to work on effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2009), a fashionable term in the past few years. You will forgive me for taking a shortcut around the precious works of the designer of this theory (Saras Sarasvathy), but I prefer to give you my own personal and direct interpretation of it in a few words. As I see it, Saras Sarasvathy affirms in substance that start-up entrepreneurs “function” in an “effectual” mode, that is, that start-ups evaluate the resources at their disposal and raise the question of what they can do with them. In short, it is not amazing that a start-up is always in motion and thus seen as speedy. The author distinguishes this from the mode of functioning of large groups, which is more “causal”. A business unit of a large group sets its objectives, and then gives itself the resources to attain them. This is a matter of two modes of thinking, which if not contradictory remain different, some would say complementary, to remain constructive. Start-up actors will not therefore reason like actors in a business unity, neither from a point of view of temporality, nor of mindset. I admit that it is difficult for me not to agree, as so many observations that I have made in the last few years confirm this fully. It is these experiences, moreover, which have led me to devote my nights, weekends and other days off to a research project, because I wanted to put in words what I saw and what I heard. I understood that for a CI which finds itself in the watchtower, an extension of the large group and also a host for start-ups, the dilemma is sometimes great. The CI has no other choice but to monitor the permanent alignment of actors, the prerequisite conditions to avoid slip-ups of all kinds. Let us recall here a particularly important point of which many are unaware, or no one speaks openly. For a large group, working with a start-up carries a significant and often underestimated risk: their brand image. In fact, choosing a start-up and supporting it with great communications effort means a well-established brand (that of the large group) relying on that of a very fragile structure. I hope that entrepreneurs will not resent me for this term “fragile”; it is to my eyes a fact and not meant pejoratively. There may be problems in this relationship: poor anticipation of deadlines, broken promises of partnerships for legitimate reasons or otherwise, etc. In this type of context, it may happen that the start-up ceases its activities, because it is exhausted, and ceases to exist. In this case I will leave it to the reader to guess who, out of the large group or the start-up, will be attacked by certain media who are attracted to things not going right.
On the topic of “irrationality”, it should be noted that the emergence of CIs constitutes a response to a challenge of culturally opening up the company, to recognizing a change in the norms of production of innovation (OI) and also to safeguarding relationships between start-ups and large groups. On this last point in particular, all CI leaders are attentive to these relationships over time, and it is sometimes a pity that the large groups in which they work are not aware of the magnitude of this approach to safeguarding. Organizational transformations naturally confront the inertia, entropy and weakness shown by experts who work within large groups. As always, time must be left to do its work.
4.3.2. Rational complexities
A more “rational” complexity is found in the knowledge of what is really represented by a commercial partnership between a start-up and a large group. A commercial partnership, when it succeeds, is only the written expression of a technological integration, which is made between the external solution and the internal information system of the large group. It is not simple to implement internal innovations within a large group. Just imagine the difficulty of implementing external solutions. This may require not only resources, but also a certain level of genius on the part of these same resources. Many are those – whether direct or indirect actors in the IC – who are likely to abandon it. Others, rarer, will not let go and welcome these complex situations as challenges.
As for resources, again they will have to be foreseen. This point of anticipation constitutes another “rational” complexity. The start-up “market” is a market of opportunities. At the end of the year, business units negotiate their budget for the following year on the bases of documented product plans. What happens in the case where the CI presents a start-up during the following year? Where will the resources be found to deal with it? It would be useful, no doubt, for large groups to demonstrate a certain flexibility towards their business units, and to avoid plunging the latter into a form of schizophrenia. I use the term “schizophrenia” advisedly, as it is a term which I have more than once heard from the mouths of CI leaders when they speak about the situation that they experience internally. What large group is not familiar with budgetary sequences? What large group does not know that start-ups, and thus innovative solutions, appear every day? How can these facts be ignored? And yet, they are still too often overlooked. There are doubtless simple solutions, and one in particular: certain CIs, thanks to their own resources, can help the business units. This is unfortunately not often the case, and this help will always be limited. No doubt organizations would benefit from anticipating opportunities for their business units.
In any case, some CIs, to get out of these complexities and avoid environmental schizophrenia, also sometimes choose to put themselves on the margins of the group. In summary, for all or part of their activities, CIs may want to become simultaneously “classical” and “specific” business units: “classical”, as CIs will function like any other business unit with the need to negotiate resources with regard to short-term, mid-term or long-term objectives, and “specific”, as the products coming from these CIs will be start-up solutions. The CI is thus a business unit for anticipating the future for their respective group. It is organizational transformation itself which may then be lost, as the CI can no longer contribute to it by osmosis. The OI cell which was supposed to open the large group to the outside becomes a closed cell which works with the exterior. I will describe for you two examples in the chapters devoted to illustrative cases.
4.3.3. The assessment
In the end, as I see it, “rational” complexity (resources) can largely be mastered, subject to the willingness of the company to allocate useful resources in one way or another. It may involve allocating them to business units, or to the CI itself; it is a choice. But “irrational” complexity (that is, understanding this type of structure and successfully working with start-ups) may prove more difficult to overcome. The significant efforts made by managers of all CIs, with the support of internal communication and of top management, are evidence of this. Changes in mindset within large groups will take time, and this is human nature. It may be accelerated once we avoid thinking that working well with start-ups means understanding start-ups; this is necessary, but very certainly not sufficient! What we should ask from the employees of large groups is not just to try to understand start-ups by reading two or three brochures. More than that, it involves understanding, and acquiring tools to build bridges, because it is in the latter that value and interest reside.
I thus propose, at the end of this section, to retain several elements to qualify the characteristic of “complexity“ of the IC to be closer to its reality: “irrational” complexity (understanding the structure and relationships with start-ups) and “rational” complexity (resources). These are the qualifications relevant to the complexity of CI.
4.4. Ambiguity
To manage these complexities, and to articulate the draft responses sketched in the preceding section, CIs may act on the ambiguity of the width, the depth and the nature of the functions performed by incubation structures. I will speak below a little more about functional ambiguity, and not of ambiguity in itself, and I will explain why.
For example, the ambiguity of some CIs is extremely weak as the function of these incubators is very clear: it involves developing business between start-ups and the business units of the companies concerned. In contrast, the ambiguity of other CIs is very strong, as their function seems less clearly defined, or seems to have a variable geometry. Thus, beyond developing the large group’s business, other functions co-exist: those of anticipating tomorrow’s business without a real need to involve today’s business units, contributing to intrapreneurship, etc.
Holding on solely to this expression of ambiguity is not enough. Let us recall that the ambiguity of CIs is not intended to distort the general vocation of CIs, which rests on a common base of a mission that brings together its activities by definition: seeking innovative solutions with start-ups. This therefore leaves serious latitude to play with this characteristic of ambiguity.
This ambiguity can also be expressed in a more or less significant way in terms of objectives, and can often be expressed in certain “trades” or “expertise”. There are, for example, trades linked to investment, or to research, as I mentioned in the previous section. There is also expertise in mediation, intermediaries with added value. In summary, this ambiguity ultimately resides in the art of exploiting and mobilizing assets and idiosyncratic resources at the right moment, with respect to the right people in the right situations. I will speak in the conclusion about the intelligence of people and situations. Ambiguity thus becomes a vehicle allowing the management of many irrational or rational complexities, as I will now illustrate.
As for the irrationality of the personnel inside the company about working with start-ups, a CI may demonstrate that start-ups are a good way to compensate for a business unit‘s lack of resources under the pressure of generating turnover. In this case, we suppose that the IC does not simply take up the task of supporting the start-up–business unit relationship, but in fact socially and economically constructs this relationship. A “pass-through” CI will most certainly fail. Economically, the CI must be an actor responsible for an operating account which is not its own. Socially, the CI must be involved in managing the human interaction between the start-up and the business unit. The CI may set itself the goal of a quasi-weekly alignment of the start-up and business unit actors, positioning itself clearly as a trusted third party for them.
As for “rational” complexity concerning resources, if the CI does not shrink from gaining a fine knowledge of the strategic and tactical axes of the business unit, it is probable and even certain that it will be able to anticipate the kinds of start-up solutions which may enter into the business unit’s development plans. Start-ups will thus no longer be entirely a market of surprise opportunities, but a market of planned opportunities. This supposes in this context that the CI becomes a kind of strategic planner.
Thus, we can understand that the varieties of “trades” and “expertise” that the CI will have to include will constitute a functional ambiguity on a daily basis. It can adapt itself and also adapt its mode of functioning based on the assets and resources at its disposal, thus leading to certain differences in the modes of operation observed. I have thus noticed something which I will express in the form of a question: is a CI not in itself a start-up? This is a question which seems very interesting to me, in the sense that I perceive in CIs the same attributes found in start-ups in terms of mode of functioning, in terms of mindset, except that, on the one hand, its mission is to build a bridge between two banks (start-up and large group) and that on the other hand its investor is exclusively (or at least in most cases) the large group.
I thus propose at the end of this section to retain the functional element to qualify the characteristic of “ambiguity” of the CI to be closer to its reality, and we must recognize that the malleability of the CI (one of its relative advantages) may greatly nourish the latter.
4.5. Conclusion
The literature has been very useful for putting words to my observations. Understanding the characteristics of a structure is essential at the very least, as this relates to understanding what may allow us to adapt it, that is, “what” to manipulate.
We notice a degree of homogeneity as to the characteristics of the CI. Complexity, both “irrational” (understanding the structure and relationship with start-ups) and “rational” (resources), relative advantages (the involvement of top management, autonomy, the “flagship” position of communication, the start-up focus and, finally, its malleability), and functional ambiguity (width, depth and nature of its functions) all seem to characterize the structures of CI. Analyzing these characteristics as far as qualifying them in detail allows us in the end to identify this object in what is most specific about it.
To conclude this chapter, as with the previous one, it is difficult to resist the temptation to offer you a figure that came to my mind, which is centered on manipulation of the characteristics. I thus give you this supplement; it is only an image.
Figure 4.2. Conceptual framework of the characteristics of a structure
(source: Pascal Latouche, 2017, inspired in particular by the works of Callon, 1986; Latour, 1994; Mamman, 2000; Ansari et al., 2010)
It is through the manipulation of its characteristics that the CI can influence the state of its structure in the host organization (that is, the large group). This manipulation of characteristics aims to ground the CI in the organization as a fully-fledged institution. Furthermore, we should note that all my analyses on the way of playing with characteristics relate to situations which, far from being fixed, may on the contrary be contextualized. It thus seems necessary to me at this stage to go further in qualifying the mechanism at work. I speak of adaption in the process of action that we could call “situated adaptation” (adaptation “in situ”) and this is the theme of Chapter 5.