7.1. Corporate context of CI A

CI A has the backing of an international large-scale French private corporate group.

Innovation marks the story of this group. Its values are articulated around humanity, reactivity and progress so as to develop a vision resolutely positioned towards business development (specifically profitability) and regular modernization as a means to conduct its business (business model innovation). The group benefits from a good image in terms of innovation. The opinion of the manager of the incubation structure is, “As regards innovation the group has a good image! …It has been driven to reinvent itself several times during the course of its history”. We can legitimately observe that the interviewee put forward the group’s permanent capacity for reinvention as an established practice, that is to say, its “trademark”. It is a term which is in no way misleading (in field publications, a “hard fact”) and to which we will return, particularly because it is an influential factor or an action lever for the managerial work realized by this CI manager.

The company is perceived by start-ups “…as an industrial partner of considerable size”. The company “had a few exchanges with the world of start-ups by being their customer”. Interactions between the group and the start-ups were actually relatively new and managed until recently by business units which conducted relationships with these same start-ups going with the flow.

The group’s CI was created during the last five years on the basis of the company CEO’s decision, which saw it as a means to stimulate more supported and structured relationships with the world of start-ups. The presence, as much in terms of managerial discussions, as in terms of the actual CEO investment, as we will see in what follows, is particularly outstanding. This structure is clearly set out by the group as a strategic initiative that should contribute to its development. Table 7.1 summarizes the main elements of the corporate context for CI A.

7.2. CI A players

This CI groups together both direct and indirect players. By direct players, I am referring to those players directly attached to the structure and developing within the sphere of the CI. By indirect players, I am referring to players internally related to the company from institutional fields (business units, corporate communication services, top management and others), or external to the group (suppliers, customers and other stakeholders).

One of the key players for this incubator is the CEO of the group. He may be perceived as both a direct player and an indirect player in CI A. It appears that he is behind the creation of CI A and moreover is very involved in its development. The manager of CI A says, “The CEO had this vehicle in mind for a number of years, of the order of five to six years […] without having the capacity to define the form that it was going to take or concrete aspects of the business plan. He needed to have a plan to help the group to innovate in a different way by enrolling external partners and particularly start-ups, by changing both methods and modes of operation. There was a will to speed things up and move to something that was more concrete. Consideration was given to the issues involved […] and in the end, the decision was taken upon the need for a dedicated team to lead and run [CI A…] without which it would not have taken off!”

This consideration refers to three points that return to the decision-making process to start up the CI. On the one hand, there is the strategic positioning of the CI, with authority to gain a foothold within the institution as representing the CEO’s will to innovate differently. Indeed, the CI A manager indicates that the problem facing the CEO regarding the group relates to innovation and the innovation factory. On the other hand, the hesitation and the time necessary to make the decision to develop a CI in the end illustrate the group’s lack of experience within the sphere of OI and in particular that of incubation, but also the genuine will to look into the subject and consider it, so as not to simply improvise. Lastly, appointing a dedicated manager to run the incubation structure reflects the transparent nature of the group’s management, which is aware of the fact that managerial work was necessary to “organize” the work and missions of the incubator. One of the first positive actions taken after the management’s analysis was the recruitment of a CI manager.

The three points evoked (strategic positioning, period for maturity and dedicated management team for operation) do not appear to be unique to this CI. It is important to indicate one of the fundamental ideas: the emergence of a CI is not through chance, although its implementation may be improvised. In any case, the existence of the CI is neither due to chance nor even improvisation. It is appropriate to underline that the ideas held above by the manager of CI A are the starting point for the stage of problematization of the situation, the stage in which the CEO plays a central role – the ignition point for reflection leading to action.

In the case of CI A, this idea approximately goes back five or six years (from when we met with the manager of CI A). During this entire period, the group has not stopped innovating. The will of the CEO to pursue the group’s continual reinvention through a corporate incubation plan has played a key role in the decision to start up the CI – the “hard” fact indicated above – and this being so even if the decision took a long time to be made. We also notice that this decision translates the will to develop greater interactions with external players and will give rise to a manager external to the group. We could suggest that through this approach and this choice, the CEO has preconfigured a new institutional field open to external influences, translating the acknowledgment of the strategic role that, from now on, the relations with the world of start-ups, and de facto the CI, assume. This could be interpreted as the initial work produced on the CI for the future and that it will clearly be a political choice based upon the CEO’s authority. We find similar elements in other cases studied, confirming the significance of a strong managerial involvement to legitimize the role and place of the CI within the group’s field.

When I prepared this study, the management team of CI A was made up of a manager and a manager’s assistant – two people. Now, it has far more resources. The CI manager at the time confirmed his willingness to increase its means. This willingness was noticeably followed by the management which confirmed these recruitments.

Concerning indirect players, it is appropriate to distinguish two categories. On the other hand, there are the other entities, areas of innovation within the group, with which the CI asserts having good relationships. Upon this point, he states: “These entities work instead upon what I call ‘today’s matters’ in the sense that they return to business fundamentals. In respect of more disruptive topics which are outside of their areas of expertise, there is the incubator.” The position of the CI A manager clearly marks a good understanding of the corporate context, of the division of roles within the institution and of the need for the CI to find its rightful place.

This point stresses one of the issues which the manager of CI A – and more generally, the other incubator managers studied – must face. This is imperative that the incubator finds its rightful place within the field of the large group, especially to legitimize its tasks and better define its business perimeter. It is through managerial work that the CI manager will succeed in forging alliances with other players. In other words, the more the CI manager has a detailed understanding of the corporate context in which its structure evolves, the better it will be armed to enroll supporters and forge productive alliances to ensure the CI’s sustainability. In short, maneuvering within a large structure for the benefit of relationships between start-ups and large groups may presuppose having the knowledge of at least one of the two worlds and mainly that of the operational mode of large groups.

This knowledge of a large group enables, right from the outset, the implementation as is the case here of a definition-based work with significant communication effort: the CI A manager says, “It is necessary to communicate with many people within the group […] and there must be time for managers to understand the message.” It is indeed necessary to be clear to assist internal players to grasp this novelty that the incubator embodies. Moreover, the manager of CI A says: “In this regard […] this is something which is hyper-new for the group. […] Moreover that demands significant involvement!”

Beyond the observation formulated above, the position of CI A demonstrates both its lucidity and its willingness to act, even interact, with other institutional players for them to be better informed as to CI operations, and through this means, occupy the informational space and thus better establish a foothold within the group’s field and its proximal environment, that is to say, its Umwelt (the German word for “environment” – von Uexküll, 1965).

During its launch, the CI A had a clear objective to support the business units – BU – in their innovation. We will see that a “supporter” in this context comes back to the capacity of the CI to create a value for such players, “We have around 15 start-ups that are all trying to contact our market lines […] they start with one market line, then a second, and a third, and so on. You have to realize that the owners of the various market lines do not necessarily communicate with each other. As a result, all of this generates a lot of meetings and is a waste of time for everybody! We are not the unique gateway, but we can offer services, make recommendations to market lines on subjects of interest to them, or bring ten or so start-ups together for the day and set out all of them to the market lines.”

The position of the CI A manager demonstrates his capacity to “problematize” the situation, as he identifies “problem areas” to pragmatically place himself and respond accordingly. Beyond that, this enables him to establish the CI on a compulsory transit point (although this approach is often somewhat refrained from) to regulate the problem encountered. It thus makes the CI the solution: saving time on market lines. As a counterpoint, it is also a matter for the CI A manager to seek to “standardize” the relationships between the different entities of the large group and the start-ups. By this means, he constructs a common identity as to the incubator role, an identity based upon acknowledging its operations. The work produced by the CI A manager aims, above all, to involve the various players.

To do so, establishing these events where all start-ups are gathered together and set out enables a “gain” to materialize and undeniably constitutes FCEs¹ which enables CI A to acquire a legitimacy and to better mark its field of activities, that is to say, relationships with start-ups. Moreover, these events can even be considered as influencing the situation (the will to “standardize”), than as the result or the embodiment of a strong political will: the need for an incubation structure entrusted to a team entirely dedicated to the management of interactions with start-ups. We spoke within our thesis works on “FCE influencers” and “FCE products” to mark the duality which the FCE can assume in terms of objectives. The FCEs are, in the end, creators of virtuous circles useful in legitimizing the CI structure, since they can be as much consequences as inductive elements themselves.

7.3. The structure of CI A

When I began my research, the corporate incubation plan had just been implemented within the group. According to the CI A manager, this structure had the ambition of being relatively autonomous and independent, while being able to capitalize on group resources and the CEO’s support. It might be quite fun to bring up a paradox here: “to feel autonomous thanks to the support of the CEO”, knowing that a CEO is the person who dictates everything. This paradox is not actually one of them. Indeed, within large groups, even actively involved CEOs are fixing the various courses, but the operational aspect remains in the hands of those who are in charge of making these things happen. In addition, in such a context, a CEO can effectively become a lever, indeed a guardian for operational autonomy for those players running the CI.

The manager adds a significant element. The incubator’s vocation is to indeed open up to other partners and stakeholders in the future. This point deserves to be underlined as the perspective of opening up the CI to other external actors (partners) that can prove to be important in the choice of future incubator directions. The interviewee takes care to return to this point by stressing that the CI was indeed a plan of the CEO – “the silent partner”, and to state: “The CI was initiated and started by the CEO, but he must support other initiatives of tomorrow!” No doubt, it was a course, an ambition for the CEO to use the CI as an instrument for capturing new external partners, that is to say, other large groups. Indeed, we know that large groups are interested in this topic. As a large group, the concerned company takes the initiative, in starting up a CI and by this means attracting the attention of other large groups, which it would be able to make its allies. The CI, which in principle is dedicated to start-ups, also becomes a bridge to forge strategic partnerships between large groups.

It is a question of a strategic element of the group. For the CI manager, the success of the latter serves to prove the viability of the model within the group but also outside of the group by becoming the instrument for new alliances with external partners, for example, within the rationale of resource mutualization. In other words, the managerial work produced by the manager of CI A is doubled: the legitimacy of the incubator practically sitting within the field of the group in indeed carrying out its operations and appealing to external partners who wish to capitalize upon this incubation structure, which comes back to a further type of operation that I will return to.

The various positions expressed by the manager of the CI A appear to indicate its willingness to construct the incubator around the principle of autonomy in relation to the group, the autonomy labeled by the CEO and which enables him to directly reach customers of various market lines: “For the corporate incubator, establishing a direct relationship between start-ups and customers of the group, would be the goal.” In that respect as well, the interviewee is clear and fully appreciates the road which remains to be traveled before reaching this objective and, as a result, the managerial work which needs to be undertaken for it to succeed. Moreover, the manager of CI A has already started to construct its autonomy and record its evolution, saying, “I am the group’s plan, but as the very foundation, we will have autonomy, and we will think differently within the CI!” This claim has certain similarities to a “hard fact” which influence the operations of CI A. Indeed, operations that demand great interactions with internal actors, and especially brands, cannot be conducted in complete autonomy. As I show later, this element enables us to explain why the CI A manager has decided to direct operations of the CI towards activities enabling it to acquire this autonomy.

My conversations with this manager and the various events, which I attended and participated in, enable me to advance the idea by which this manager “spins his web”, that is to say, progressively configures the CI field within the field of the large group by producing significant internal communication work to inform and motivate the various players. “We are trying to communicate internally around the activities of the CI […] especially via the company’s social network […] by pressing home a fair amount of information. This is something that we must take advantage of!”

This communication work within the company’s field aims to configure a given space, a field unique to CI A to evangelize within the group and outside of the group. “We are doing something fairly original and naturally trying to position the CI, to indeed make known who we are and what we do.” Moreover, the manager of the CI A clearly envisages accompanying the group’s international development. For all that, it is appropriate to observe that this operation does not feature in the CI’s strategic agenda. It reflects a willingness for emancipation which is also an element of strategy.

This internal managerial work, as with external work, is a progressive work of evangelization and motivation through communication to arouse interest and enroll players within practical activities. The CI manager says, “Little by little, we become firmly rooted as to who we are and our identity! How should our story be told […] that is a genuine subject in itself”. Communication is an essential lever for this approach, but not the only one. Indeed, the work produced by the CI A manager seems to rest upon this original legitimacy conferred by the CEO’s decision to inaugurate an incubation structure to differently innovate and notably better organize and structure the activities of the group with the various start-ups.

This original legitimacy – a form of “enthronement” – obtained by the CEO, confirmed by a particular attention within the current nature of the group (for example, the presence of the CEO during the given events), translates a willingness to redefine the relationships between all of the practices and the moral and cultural foundations of these practices within the group. The CI manager considers that his mechanism should participate in the group’s rebuilding, saying, “This incubator can serve to create a more favorable context for certain projects and to develop this intrapreneurial spirit! […] Nowadays, we still have very little decline. I wish to state that we are ourselves a start-up and that our model will continue to evolve.”

By assimilating the CI into a start-up, the manager of the incubator clearly wishes to position its structure as “something new”, embodying another way of innovating, by testing new solutions and by constructing, in the end, a context favorable to the emergence of a new innovative factory for which the CI will be the flagship. Such an ambition is largely based upon the support which the CEO seems to grant to the structure. The CI A is the “boss’s thing” and the manager of the CI A, an armed wing which will, as I am going to show you, introduce the strangers (the start-ups) within the citadel.

7.4. The tasks and operations of CI A

To understand the tasks implemented by the CI A manager, it is appropriate to briefly discuss the CI’s operations. These have a dual purpose. “One is to accelerate digitalization and the development of the group within the modern connected world, and there is a further operation, which is that which I have set out to you. This is to invent the future, therefore it is not the same time frame or the level of risk-taking!” These two operations – accelerating the digitalization of the group and inventing its future – do not require the same type of work.

The manager of CI A says that we may consider this operation of “inventing the future” as being more specifically linked to the promotion and anticipation of a sector within which the group intends to value innovative solutions from start-ups. This operation may be tackled more simply and does not appear to necessitate a high level of interactions with group players. It is about much more for the manager of CI A to indeed define his plans, no doubt meeting with the CEO. On the other hand and because this operation is “simpler”, it will have no impact on the development of business in the medium or the long term, with the risk for the incubator to remain a proto-institution, that is to say, an institution without any actual legitimacy and acknowledgment in relation to its vocation for transformation of the innovative production model. This analysis seems to us to be all the more tainted with the truth since this operation does not involve high levels of enrollment of all internal actors. This operation is managed in an autonomous mode. CI A would then simply be considered as a new innovation space, a new tool within the group’s innovation factory, but without transformational aims (the alteration of internal standards).

For the manager of CI A, his second operation, “accelerating the digitalization of the group” is more clearly an operation of co-development for innovations with incubated start-ups. It directly impacts on short-term organization and demands a high involvement of internal players, as, “Often, this requires integration, time spent with the group, changes to the road map and other such changes. Moreover that can thus bring everything to a standstill at that level. The group cannot absorb everything.” A certain complexity emerges to produce this operation, the advantage of which would be to change the mode of manufacture of the innovation, even if the aim may be short term. Here, we may believe, especially because the internal players are directly impacted, that the construction of a network with a common identity is necessary. Within this context, it is indeed necessary for the CI A manager to rapidly rely on internal resources to manage interactions with start-ups and especially the integration of solutions with the “start-up” hallmark within internal road maps.

This case presents a certain functional ambiguity, having regard to dual operation. Nowadays, the interviewee has instead made “the choice of an 80-20 course”, that is to say, instead to place himself around the activities where the group can be of assistance, without being the leader of development, while providing, from time to time, solutions a little more immediate or “ready-to-use” for other group entities and especially brands. This choice is highly influenced by the will for autonomy of CI A, as indicated above.

This dual orientation of the operations falls within a process which is anything but linear and in which the CI manager advances by feeling his way along, by testing, assessing and by questioning operational modes, especially the selection of start-ups, which constitutes a problem for him to resolve, “After the selection, it is a little harder, as it is a mechanism which changes, there are many criteria which come back in play, that is to say that internally, this selection has indeed illustrated what we would like to do!”

The selection of start-ups is a key moment within the life of a CI. This is what makes it possible to switch from theory to practice. It is appropriate to stress through its selection approach, and the manager of CI A tries to reconcile its different ambitions by adapting the CI’s selection mode: “For now I take the view that afterwards I will find sponsors, then it is maybe something that will change, maybe tomorrow we will do the opposite. I am almost sure that if I operate by involving future sponsors very soon within the process of selection this will fluidify but this will also achieve what I can only capture for certain types of issues”.

Indeed, we realize that when we speak of adaptations, these can have different effects and may or may not respond to a given objective of the structure. We are witnesses to an approach which has similarities to testing or prototyping, as we cannot perceive in any case certainties on behalf of the manager of CI A as to how to perform things. This is a critical point as through the interviewee’s ideas, the latter will indeed realize that he will differently configure his field of activity, according to the choices that he is able to make.

In addition, this aspect takes on even more importance when you consider other operations that CI A wishes to implement. The initial axis of extension for CI activity is that of creating spin-offs, justified by the wish to make the approach known and create given vocations. This operation participates in work which aims to change the idea that players have as how to innovate and stimulate internal creativity. This operation accords with the spirit of the initial operation of CI A that we set out above. The second axis of extension of CI activity is the corporate venture, an activity that is complementary to the basic accompaniment for start-ups. These two other axes for incubator development will have the consequence of multiplying the interactions and the contact areas with various players and increase functional ambiguity and, as a consequence, its chances to arouse the interest of group players.

It appears that for CI A, it is essential for it to find its place within the field of the large group by cultivating a certain ambiguity as to its future operations. For all that, the opinion of the CI A manager is, “There is no question of the CI coming in the role of a proxy for all of the relationships between the group and the start-ups. It does not work this way!” However, we may question this assertion: is this a way to wish to occupy a given field, while avoiding being too wide not to create pointless frictions with other internal players? As the last arrival within the structure, those within the CI are no doubt aware that its adoption will entail the capacity to reconcile with its environment, despite its ruthless ambition.

7.5. The tools of CI A

The tools used by CI A are simple and all are very common. Press releases, the social network Twitter, the Web and the internal social networks are used. During our various exchanges with the CI A manager, I recall the two following verbatim comments which summarize CI A’s approach on this point:

“…using a pragmatic and empirical method, saying what happens if we issue our call for projects, that we post two or three Tweets and we issue a press communiqué […] and that led to quite a good reaction”.

This initial word-for-word comment reveals the use of press releases and Twitter. We must stress that this tool, Twitter, highly sought-after by the target start-up, enables the “dredging” of start-ups during calls for projects. There are numerous CIs that use this:

“Communicating via the company social networks also press home a fair amount of information, but this is something which we should develop further”.

This second word-for-word comment reveals the use of a relatively recent communication mode within companies: the internal social network. The principle of this type of an internal social network is the same as a social network such as Facebook or LinkedIn. Given communities develop around areas of focus, people or structures. This communication mode therefore has its significance and can facilitate the composition of communities of interest within the company around a given topic. A virtual space for communication and permanent exchanges is thus formed around a given set of themes or a structure, making all the members of this space co-owners of the set of themes or structure.

These tools are powerful levers of appropriation for new objects or subjects and facilitate the co-construction of given representations and the alignment of viewpoints.

Moreover, we should stress that all these tools are very flexible and have no technological constraints. They enable CI A to remain malleable, indeed may strengthen its malleability, an essential point as soon as the structure seeks to constantly adapt.

7.6. Overview of CI A

The corollary of a very new structure (when I encountered this incubator) is of course the lack of decline of the structure, in relation on the one hand to the type of work produced, and on the other hand to the profits that the structure is able to provide the group.

In the case of CI A, everything happens if there was, at the beginning, an initial work of global problematization of the situation to justify the choice of a start-up used. This problematization is linked to the corporate context and associated issues. The group is positioned in a market which is converted and intends to take advantage when the innovation potential carried by incubation start-ups to succeed in establishing its positioning for itself, but also in its relationships with other large groups. You will recall that until the decision to launch a CI, the group had somewhat informal one-off relationships with the start-up world and the latter were considered as simple suppliers of technological solutions, rather than actual partners. The implementation of CI A translates a point of inflexion and awareness-raising of the need to change various aspects, in particular, as regards innovation.

Moreover, and as I progressed in analyzing this case study, the manager of CI A clearly indicated to me that he was producing a specific work – which broadly capitalized on the point previously mentioned, that is to say, that the official views of management legitimizing the interest of a CI – to promote the image of CI A in the opinion of the various representatives within the group. In this sphere, the manager of CI A proved particularly active, particularly within the work of advocacy, definition and motivation; types of work through which he intended to effectively promote CI A’s plan and operations. Indeed, the manager of CI A considers that since the CI concept – as with the incubator itself – is new it appeared necessary to him to produce this promotional work and widely communicate the operations devolved to the group incubator. The efforts made by the CI manager in this sense partake in managerial work which aims to better define the institutional field relevant to the incubator of the group.

We notice that according to the accent placed upon one or other of the operations devolved to the CI – inventing the future versus commercial partnerships – the work completed by the CI manager is not the same, neither are the effects upon the structure.

Indeed, when the operation has very little or no appeal to internal players (operation: inventing the future with start-ups), the managerial work produced aims mainly to change normative associations relating to the innovation factory. As indicated, the implementation by CI A rests in very large part on external players (start-ups), with the occurring later issue of internal reintegration of innovations or innovative solutions. It is for the CI A manager to find and anticipate what the future might hold by collaborating with start-up companies.

By contrast, when the operation demands greater involvement of internal players (operation: commercial partnerships with start-ups), the managerial work produced is to work in building common identities and networks. Being able to count upon willful players to support a given start-up having developed a ready-to-use solution then becomes an essential aspect. One of the arguments put forward by the manager of CI A in this form of construction work is the time that it can save for internal players (of given brands). Moreover, we note that the CI A manager questions the significance of further mobilizing internal players in start-up selection committees. He says that if we understand this is not desirable for the first operation, then for the second operation, such questions appear legitimate.

The components above indicate that the CI A manager “plays” with the complexity of implementation and the functional ambiguity of his plan, so as to facilitate its progressive adaptation, even if he does not know what will actually be achieved tomorrow. However, the complexity of implementation and functional ambiguity are not the only levers activated for managerial work produced by the CI A manager.

Indeed, we can also note the temptation to further strengthen the functional ambiguity of the plan with the manager of CI A, by relying upon the malleability and the testability of the given plan. The manager of CI A wishes to develop two new operations: the corporate venture and spin-offs. By increasing the activity perimeter, the manager of CI A can potentially grow the number of players involved and develop new alliance networks which contribute to propel the CI onto the center stage as regards innovation within the group and outside of the group. The diversity of these operations would likely strengthen the comparative advantage of the CI in relation to other structures or internal innovation spaces in the group.

Regarding the results obtained by incubator CI A, its manager wishes to be humble but, despite this, has ambitions. He says that it is still too early to be able to appreciate, in practical terms, the profits that will be credited to the account of the CI and even less its contribution to the group’s results. This situation is not rare. On this point, communication and satisfaction of incubator start-ups constitute the main markers of success of the plan to date. “For the moment, I have the impression that all of these practices in the end now completely support the group’s image”.

However, the ambition of the manager of CI A to shoulder the central role mentioned above seems to us to fall within the framework of a long-term project: “Me, my KPIs will in two or three years have started two or three delightful stories, whether around spin-offs, investment or integration”.

It emerges from our analysis of CI A and the various exchanges with its manager that the latter is aware of managing a project under construction which will necessitate adaptation, thus falling within the process and time-based nature of its actions. The manager says “An internal continuous evangelization which is linked to the nature of the project. This requires many explanations before we grasp the nature of the project. It will be easier to tell the story when we have operated the machine once or twice”.