5
Adaptation in situ: Levers for Manipulation
To understand managerial work (Chapter 3), I was naturally led to question the characteristics that define the structure of the CI (Chapter 4). Manipulation of a structure’s characteristics allows its adaptation. In other words, to carry out their work, the CI leader will manipulate the characteristics of the structure in the broad sense, that is, the tasks to be performed, the tools to implement, the objectives, the missions, etc., and also relevant interactions with actors. These latter will progressively align their representations of the CI with the particular context in which they develop and their respective interests. This adaptation is nothing more nor less than a “situated translation“ of the CI structure, which allows us to grasp the latter in its process of coming into being and disseminating itself, in short, in the process of finding its place.
What remains unclear is how these manipulations come about, that is, the levers influencing the manipulations to be implemented. I promised you a fine analysis based on my observations, my exchanges and my experiences in the broad sense. To fulfill this promise, in this brief chapter, I wish to discuss the various mechanisms through which this process of manipulation of characteristics is carried out, that is, the artifacts and the practices which make these manipulations of characteristics possible.
5.1. The role of adaptation
To properly carry out this analysis, which focuses even more precisely on what really happens inside the black box of the CI, I invite you to pay attention more broadly to the role of adaptation.
Throughout my many readings (Ouchi, 1981; Klein, 1989; Abrahamson, 1991; Young, 1992; Bolton, 1994; Wolfe, 1994; Rogers, 1995; Hilmer, 1998; Gibson and Tesone, 2001; Lawrence et al., 2002; Lozeau, Langley and Denis, 2002; McCabe, 2002; Wood and Caldas, 2002; Boxenbaum, 2004; Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Mamman, 2009), what should be noted is that the concept of adaptation and modification of a managerial innovation (MI) has been relatively neglected by those researchers who have understood the latter to be monolithic in its design, adoption and application. Many research works have concentrated on the adoption and dissemination of managerial innovations, and few have explored adaptation or modification. Understanding the process of modification and the factors influencing it offers additional advantages, in particular those of identifying the key factors of success for a managerial innovation – or, on the contrary, the reasons for failure of some innovations – and may be able to advise practitioners on the kind of adaptation to apply. Understanding also relates to developing valuable skills, which, I wager, will one day be codified by HR leaders.
For businesses, the fact that an MI is an object of development, unfinished and adaptable, is important data and implies being vigilant about the specific conditions or the context of deployment of the MI. An MI may be the bearer of values which may prove difficult to negotiate and align with those of the large group, which underlines the importance of the work of translation necessary to facilitate the adoption and transformation of the proto-institutions studied (those institutions that are under construction). In this perspective, these are concrete actions at the scale of the individuals who participate in changes while they are being carried out. This is what I mentioned in the introduction, indicating that translation – and its tool, that is, managerial adaptation – relates to a more “micro” level of analysis, allowing us to precisely analyze the micro-foundations of the institutional dynamic.
To proceed further, we must concentrate on the objects used by the leaders of incubators so as to identify the paths of development allowing us to ultimately make CI structures sustainable. This relates to inquiring about the “objects” which are called factors of influence, intimately linked to the structures’ capacity for adaptation. The literature relating to the work of certain authors (Latour, 1994; Peters et al., 2010; Lampel and Meyer, 2008) helps us identify several categories of concrete and abstract objects which participate in the process of manipulation of characteristics.
5.2. Hard facts and soft facts
In the context of my research, I have wanted to capitalize on the concepts of “hard facts“ and “soft facts“ which arise in the literature. Let us briefly recall that “soft facts” refer to vague statements which allow actors to discuss and transform them. The result of this process is a form of consensus, the revised (translated) statement, so that everyone can understand what they want (an alignment of cognitive registers). As for “hard facts”, this refers to statements which can in no way lead to confusion. The person who issues such a statement has control over it. This greatly limits the number of possible changes in the statement, and thus the dissemination of the statement itself.
Previously in our analysis (Chapter 4), I advanced the idea that containing the complexity of implementation of the internal incubation structure, enhancing or reducing the functional ambiguity of the structure, or promoting its advantages relative to other structures, constitute levels of action which CI leaders use to adapt their structure and facilitate its adoption in the field of the large group. I aim to analyze certain situations concerning characteristics, which refer to discourses based on both hard and soft facts.
5.2.1. Hard facts of the CI
In analyzing my observations, I found that hard facts seem to be mainly associated with problems to be solved and the associated objectives. You will see in the following that hard facts are generally less numerous than soft facts.
To recap:
“Problematization is the formulation of the problem. This formulation involves an initial identification of the actors who would be affected by the problem and the difficulties that would need to be resolved. This formulation is also a way for the actors who carry it out to make themselves indispensable in the eyes of the actors who would be affected by the problem. Problematization therefore suggests the alliances to be enacted and the appearance of ‘necessary points of passage’ for all the actors who want to solve the problem” (Callon, 1986).
This problematization, moreover, will not remain fixed over time, but, on the contrary, will develop over time based on the needs of the discourse. It will, however, retain one constant: the nature of its statement. The general problematization based on the analysis of the corporate contexts which the CI leader carries out in fact does not allow any doubt because it is what justifies the launch of the CI. Furthermore, it should be noted that the consequent sub-problematizations which I mention in the cases discussed are, also, stated without leaving room for doubt.
The problems to be solved, whether they are statements from top managers taken up by the CI or derived from difficulties encountered by the IC, are equally hard facts. In the case of problemizations issuing from top management, they are not simply taken up in the CI’s discourse, but also by the different channels of communication, in particular internal ones. These problematizations therefore become gospel, and do not allow any possible interpretation on the part of internal actors. It must be said that, if communication directorates publish these speeches internally and also externally, it is good to present them as certainties. It is difficult to imagine any ambiguity in this type of speech which would serve the interests of a large group publishing it.
Equally, the objectives which the CIs set themselves are in all cases expressed clearly. Although the nature of the goals may vary depending on the CI, they are in any case formulated in a clear manner. Thus, we perceive that some CIs possess double objectives. There is not only a short-term objective of developing business, but also an anticipatory objective dealing with the emergence of new domains of strategic activities for the company. Other CIs only have a short-term business development objective. In any case, CI leaders fly the flag appropriate to their environment and will be totally devoted to it. We must recognize this constant factor, whether or not it impacts the mode of operation of their structure as we will see in the following soft facts.
5.2.2. Soft facts of the CI
If the problematization and the goals are published and communicated with clarity, we nonetheless notice a certain “blurring” in their operationalization. This variable operationalization is made possible by the extreme malleability of CIs. Here now are some situations in which we must recognize that CI leaders adopt a flexible discourse to grasp the process of manipulation of characteristics.
First example: in general, there is great proximity between the CI and the communication directorates. In some cases, whether voluntary or involuntary, the CI sometimes clearly leaves its business development mission to become a “branch” of the communication directorates, which capitalize on its mere existence to mark or signify the entry of the group into the “digital” era, the era of change. It is also appropriate to remember that CIs are relatively young, as we can estimate that they date from the beginning of the 2010s. They therefore have difficulty bringing to the table tangible, quantifiable and indisputable evidence of their contribution to the performance of the group. In contrast, all the CIs we spoke to seem to consider the benefits of image for the company to be indisputable. I believe that the CI plays on its novelty as an advantage relative to other, older structures. It adapts and diverges somewhat from its role of contributing to business to ensure its self-promotion and carry out its “comms” (communications). In doing this, the CI leader can better manage the complexity of implementation of the structure they lead, hoping to take advantage of these “comms”, in other words by instrumentalizing them. However, this double role increases de facto the functional ambiguity facing the managers or teams in charge of the CI – where they exist – with respect to the “trade” actors who are more rarely in the glow of the spotlight of communications. Jealousy and its subsequent difficulties are generally not far away.
Another example: for missions which require little or no internal intervention, CIs which carry out more of the work of changing normative associations conduct activities of “internal consulting” and play the role of experimenters with new concepts or solutions, sometimes with dedicated teams. Here again, the “consulting” role increases the functional ambiguity. The object of the CI’s approach is in principle to generate business with start-ups and not to promote themselves internally. This point was systematically stressed by the CI leaders interviewed. This “advisory” role allows the CI to take on an approach of active advice-giving, which masks their real intentions of enlisting actors. They give advice on how to implement or to support future production coming from the CI (solutions produced by start-ups or co-produced by start-ups using internal teams). More generally, on this “advisory” role, we have noticed that CIs may assume the guise of financial controller, demonstrating the savings achievable by exploiting start-up solutions, or even that of a trusted third party between internal actors and start-ups, and finally that of strategic planner knowledgeable in the priorities of marketing planning.
Another example: with relation to the missions which require immediate internal intervention, we know that the work of building identity networks to interest and enlist actors is useful. We note, for example, that some CIs leave themselves wide discretion as to how they carry out the pre-selections of start-ups. For example, some CIs move from a generalist mode to a thematic mode aligned with the priorities of the business units, which gives them an advantage in terms of method with respect to other structures, in particular which it involves requesting and mobilizing some amount of internal resources. The extreme malleability of this type of structure makes this type of adaptation possible.
Final example: we should note that CIs are at least flexible as to the criteria they apply to evaluate their results. Many have remarked that succeeding in the objective of generating value may take time. This is doubtless the reason why none of the CIs interviewed clearly set out their success criteria, preferring to insist on obvious benefits such as image or the satisfaction of start-ups. We remain within a voluntarily vague discourse which does not allow anyone to correlate objectives and results (generation of value). Value is a polysemic concept which may therefore be based on several different results. There is a value in having strong expertise with start-ups and thus to be able to advise, or even to finance experiments for the business units. There is also a value in being able to save time for the business units by organizing start-up presentation sessions for all the business units at the same time as an FCE (field configuration event; Lampel and Meyer, 2008). Beyond promoting the company’s image, it is these types of creation of value that the CI revolves around. In short, the CI’s actions may be perceived as “sources of value” over time.
In the four preceding situations, the CI’s discourse will be flexible to decrease the complexity of the structure, increase the ambiguity of its function and give itself relative advantages. The malleability and flexibility of operation of CIs allow the latter to adapt in real time to situations, while trying to remain coherent with the objectives being pursued. The CI tests itself and its environment, in a word, seeks its path within the organization.
5.3. “FCE-influencers”
As I have stressed, several actors operate in the field of CIs. To these internal actors, we must add external actors, for example mentors and above all the start-ups themselves. The CI becomes a privileged communication place for meetings between these different actors, whether internal and/or external. This meeting can come about in various ways, abstract or concrete. We speak of field configuration events which will influence what happens. Some illustrations of this way of doing things are as follows.
Managerial statements, first of all: they constitute an abstract “place” of meeting between, firstly, the CI and internal actors, secondly, the CI and external actors; and thirdly and finally, between internal actors and external actors. Internal actors, even if it is difficult to mobilize them, can only adhere to managerial statements – at least, on the surface – so as not to put themselves at odds within the organization. The structures of large groups are still today largely heirarchical. Who wants to get into trouble faced with a statement from top managers based on analyses and studies carried out by armies of executive directors and other consultants? Apparently, no-one internal! Moreover, we must not underestimate the impact which may be produced on employees by press statements from a top manager who talks about the CI in such or such a way. Translation for many means thinking that the CI is in high esteem and thus has a certain power. Thus, the balance of power tips in favor of the CI, to which everyone, sincerely or not, will attribute qualities. As for external actors, whether they are coaches and thus motivated by payment and/or association with a large group, or whether they are the start-ups themselves, they become stakeholders in the CI on the basis of communications from the CI based partly on managerial statements. I have always been surprised by the effect that press statements may have on proposals, for example, for mentoring carried out by various people in the CI. The start-ups themselves, when you contact them to discuss an alliance between them and the large group, rely on such or such statements that they may have read. Managerial statements constitute abstract FCEs which undeniably influence the constitution of actor networks around the CI.
Another way for actors to meet is, for example, selection committees which require internal actors, external actors and start-ups to interact face-to-face. It is difficult not to think that the exchange aims to actively involve and align internal actors (e.g. business units) with the start-ups and their advocate (the CI). The CI may set up meetings with all the brands so as to allow them to see the start-ups at the same time, and thus to save time. In doing this, the CI gives itself a tool of sharing. It can set up thematic selection committees. It can also clearly separate within its process of operation those activities dedicated or orientated towards start-ups from activities linked to internal issues or questions, thus splitting its activity into two separate objects. Finally, the CI can considerably rely on meetings with local business actors for the identification of start-ups and to suggest financing experiments in line with the start-up market. These are physical events, preambles to launching the CI’s program. We could almost compare these periods to an evaluation of the allies whom we will able to make in order to carry out the program.
Finally, we can mention more generally the many events sponsored by large groups with CIs as the “stars”. Among these events, the best known is “Demo Day”. This is a privileged moment – a sort of High Mass – during which the supported start-ups will present their solutions to actors in the large groups, to external partners (customers), to investors, etc. “Demo Days”, selection committees, work meetings and internal or external meetings constitute privileged moments of exchange through which CIs gain legitimacy and build their identity within the field of the large group.
It would be remiss of me to fail to mention another form of FCE-influencers. You have doubtless noticed the profusion of logos of large companies at multiple start-up events. I think that you must have also noticed that these events are regularly a chance for the large group to present themselves and assert their brand. Whoever is presenting themselves, the CI leader or others, we must stress that the discourse becomes tangible in capitalizing on the existence of structures of the CI type. Beyond what we might qualify as the large groups “trawling” for start-ups, the interesting aspect is to consider these moments as chances for the large group to exert its influence. Large events such as Vivatech, for example, certainly shape the field of activity for corporate incubators, whose existence is widely exploited by large groups for the occasion. Furthermore, from where are the start-ups which are sent by large groups to other big events such as the Las Vegas Customer Electronic show or the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona? In large part, these start-ups are those incubated by these same large groups. These start-ups become standard-bearers which help in very concrete ways, by their presence and their possible media statements, to uphold the influence of the large group and its CI. All these events, which are not operated by the CI but which their respective large group sponsors, are configurators of the field of activity which the CI embodies: the start-up–large group relationship.
5.4. “FCE-products”
The CIs studied are not yet in the phase of full stabilization. It may thus prove delicate to speak of “FCE-products”, that is, events resulting from the CI’s field of activity. But we may still suggest two situations which make me believe that they exist, nevertheless.
In a very hierarchical organization with large investment from the CEO, we might interpret certain moments of exchange as markers of the institutionalization of the CI. A CEO who chairs the final start-up selection committee, who directly interacts with the CI or who elevates the CI to their management team; these are all signs which are not neutral. These are rare results, but they can be observed particularly in certain cases in this book.
Furthermore, I spoke above of press statements as abstract FCE influencers. They may in some cases be considered as FCE-products. When a large group invests in a start-up, or a partnership is formed between a start-up and a large group, a press statement is always released. This kind of event, certainly an influence on the field of activity, is also a notable result of this same field of activity. If you look around on your preferred search engine, you will no doubt find this plethora of press releases, which in the end send us a message. This says that the large group in question is fully invested in relations with the start-up, since this start-up got the contract. In summary, press releases legitimize the CI in its activity, as the latter is rarely forgotten when it is mentioned that the start-up was incubated by the large group. I believe that this approach strengthens the CI’s credibility, particularly externally but without forgetting the internal aspect.
Finally, another result of the activity of CIs has become recently visible: the convergence between large groups, not only on the public stage, but also in common activities with start-ups. In a somewhat caricaturized way, for a long time, CIs thought of themselves in the vertical dimensions of a large group; that is, a given CI would base itself on a large group. A certain phenomenon seems to be appearing more and more: that of multicorporate incubation. This phenomenon has developed for two reasons. The first reason is the delay or uncertainties which many large groups still have when embarking on this adventure. For these, it seems more reassuring to ally with a large group which already has a CI. The second reason, I believe, is more economic in the sense that it responds still more quickly to market imperatives. It so happens that on certain subjects, two or several large groups wish to advance on the basis of a solution issuing from a start-up. For the start-up, it is an exercise which may prove more delicate: two large groups to deal with when you are small, imagine the scene. For the large groups, this explicitly relates to incubating start-ups together. The development of this phenomenon of a multicorporate CI does not mean the birth of new CIs as such. These are existing CIs within the large groups involved who take on operational alliances. It is a sign of legitimacy, and a result showing that these CIs have become institutionalized within their enterprise.
It thus seems envisageable to think that certain “events” are instead a result of the activity of the CIs involved. These CIs may be considered as being institutionalized, or at least they are not far from it.
5.5. Conclusion
CI leaders will over time use objects which seem appropriate to them to carry out their missions. There is a collection of approaches which, in the end, allow us to “translate” the CI into the reality of the actors and promote its adoption. Hard facts, soft facts, events as influences and events as results constitute a number of ingredients which CI leaders may use in the process of manipulation of the characteristics of the CI for an adaptation whose ultimate goal is institutionalization.
The first of these objects is the CI itself, as the abstract incarnation of an ambition justified by the overall goals of the company. Is it not the CI which in the first place assembles different types of actors involved around itself? In addition to this, CI leaders will communicate more or less precisely, always with this objective of attracting and capturing resources that are useful for its structure. Furthermore, the organization of privileged events allowing the connection of a larger panel of actors seems to us at least an essential point: this is part of embodying the CI by giving it a concrete character. It is also, without the shadow of a doubt, a good way to build up a portfolio of knowledge which will not fail to be useful in the future.
It seems suitable to me to end this chapter by somewhat enriching the sketch from the previous chapter.
Figure 5.1. Conceptual framework of levers for manipulation
(source: Pascal Latouche, 2017, inspired in particular by the works of Callon (1986), Latour (1994), Mamman (2009) and Ansari et al. (2010))