Bomb Threat Planning
Things Have Changed
James H. Windle is employed as a Police Sergeant in Charlotte, North Carolina, where he serves as a certified bomb technician and is assigned as the Bomb Squad Commander and Arson Supervisor. He is certified as a North Carolina Law Enforcement Instructor and has advanced instructor training in Specialized Police Driving, Firearms and Hazardous Materials. He is an instructor of the United States National Domestic Terrorism Preparedness Program and has delivered terrorism training to numerous governmental agencies, both police and military, as well as to private security.
Jim was a member of the United States Marine Corps, providing training in mines and booby traps domestically and with NATO forces abroad. He graduated from the F.B.I.’s Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal and the ATF’s Advanced Explosives Destruction Techniques, Advanced Post Blast Investigation and Home Land Security Live Agent WMD School. He is also crossed trained as a Hazardous Materials Technician. He has worked site security and threat assessment in conjunction with the U.S. Secret Service and U.S. State Department for domestic and foreign dignitary protection missions. He was sent to Israel to train with Israeli bomb technicians on countermeasures against suicide bombers and vehicle bombs and was recently sent to England to work with London Met Police and Royal Navy EOD squads.
Jim is an active member of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI) and also a member of the High Technology Crime Investigation Association (HTCIA). Both groups are highly-respected international organizations whose primary mission is to share information, train and help in the prevention and prosecution of high technology and terrorist crimes.
Introduction
When I look at the history of attacks in the US involving bombings I see a couple of common denominators: first, most of the attacks were made on “soft” targets, and two, there was no threat plan or threat assessment made prior to the attack. As I write this I want you to know that I am coming to you as a practitioner, not as a theorist. I am the one who has to answer to the customer and the employees as part of any plan. When I give a presentation to people I am standing in front of them, preaching the gospel of protection, and the scripture of change. I am selling a difficult product, which is behavior change.
I look at where bombings are taking place and analyze what works and what fails. Let’s look at Israel, let’s look at London, Ireland, Columbia. … its clearly a numbers game. In the Iraq theater of operations, every day provides new challenges to our military, but many people don’t realize that ATF and FBI have agents on the ground learning new things about the enemy. It has proven to be a valuable avenue of intelligence gathering for bomb technicians. The information also provides great threat assessment for us at home.
Iraq is not only a great source of intelligence for us, but it is also a proving ground for bombers: in September 2004 there were 2,400 bombings in Iraq alone. The US has also seen its share of attacks in recent history. The significant attacks are explosive-laden and have caused much loss of life and billions of dollars in property damage. At the end of each year I receive intelligence reports from my federal law enforcement counterparts, which show plenty of activity in the US involving explosives incidents. For example, the ATF reports that in the US as recently as 2006 there were 3,797 reported bombing incidents, with 135 injured and 14 killed.
Terrorists take on many faces, from Arab–Israeli conflict supporters, to Asian radical fundamentalism such as the Aum Shinrikyo attacks in the Tokyo subway, to the radical Muslim movement involving 9/11, to domestic terrorists like Ted Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh, and Eric Rudolph. In addition to world-wide extremism, we do a pretty good job of attacking each other here in the US. We know that there are terrorist cells working here in the US, and domestic terrorism is alive and well in organized hate groups.
Bomb threat planning and suspicious package mitigation can be daunting for managers. Balancing security and productivity is a difficult task but can be done if everyone realizes that there is a mutual benefit to business and law enforcement. Bomb threats are felonies in most cases, and there must be some mechanism in place for property owners to assist law enforcement in bomb threat investigations. There also must be the realization that the managers of a business are responsible for the safety of their employees. Most businesses that ask me to assist them on bomb planning are shocked when I criticize their plan (most likely last updated in the 1970’s), which in some cases calls for a simple automatic evacuation upon receiving a threat. They remember the days of Irish Republican Army, the Red Brigade, and Symbionese Liberation Army, which kidnapped Patty Hearst. They remember the call that said: in thirty minutes there will be a bomb going off in your building….and in thirty minutes it happened. Today, most terrorists take credit after an event happens. I find that many managers are not well versed in threat assessment and find themselves failing to adequately plan for such events. Taking proactive measures for target hardening is good for the company and good for employees.
The Day Our World Changed
It was a beautiful crisp morning. The North Carolina sky was blue, there wasn’t a cloud in the sky, and it was a brilliantly clear day, a great day for training with our Advanced Local Emergency Response Team (ALERT). The ALERT team is a 90-member team with members of the Charlotte Fire Department (CFD), FBI, Federal Marshals, Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Department, Emergency Medics, and the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police SWAT and Bomb Squad.
As the Bomb Squad Commander, I split my team into two squads, a Render Safe Procedure (RSP) team and a Recon team, for this training event. We dressed out in Level B, splash protection, with breathing apparatus and headed down range to locate the simulated WMD that had been released into the air, killing several and wounding hundreds. We partnered with our CFD HazMat Techs, for air monitoring. My FBI WMD coordinator partner, Special Agent Dave Martinez and I went over the plans as the buzz of the many troops worked tirelessly setting up tents and preparing triage, all working in concert to complete the mission of scene stabilization, rescue, and rehab. Suddenly Dave received a page on his pager.
He looked surprised and concerned as he read the page. “Is every thing okay?” I asked him. He responded, “That’s strange, I just got a page saying that a plane struck the World Trade Center in New York. It’s probably a small Piper Cub that got lost in the cloud cover,” he said, dismissing it. Minutes later Dave received another page and said, “Jim, we just had a second plane hit the other tower in New York and something is going on. The office is calling me back. I have to go.”
An hour later that day the word came down that we were under attack. The training stopped and the realization hit that this would forever change the way we view preparedness. Charlotte is a major banking and medical center, and we are home to some of the largest banks in the country. Because physical protection is paramount for the banking industry and our tallest skyscrapers are bank headquarters, suddenly they are a target. The many days following the attack were met with numerous calls about suspicious individuals and items and vehicles. The calls at the Charlotte Police Department went though the roof, from 10 calls a month to 15 calls a day.
Insider Information: Where Do These Guys Get This Stuff?
Insider information theft is an integral part of terrorism. Intel theft is at an all-time high with the increase of technological storage devices such as camera phones, iPods, and disguised flash drives. Collecting sensitive information from trash, overheard conversations, stolen laptops, and plain old espionage is clearly one of the first steps in terrorism planning. We call it “recon”. Leaked, stolen or improperly shared sensitive information used effectively can motivate criminals to commit crime at the target location. It can allow a peak at the activities of the business or it can allow a criminal to take information and make up half-truths about a target, helping to recruit others to assist in the crime. My investigators have seen bad guys use this type of information early on in crime planning.
I have worked cases were criminals made access using these strategies and committed a variety of crimes that impacted the business. Free access to any part of your building by anyone is never a good idea. Unrestricted access under buildings with large vehicles is even worse. Clearly, the fact that truck parking without inspection was allowed under a building such as the World Trade Center contributed to the plan to bomb it in 1993. Whether it’s theft of sensitive electronic info or building plans, or passive security that allows free roams of your business, every bit of info that the bad guys can use to formulate attack against you should be safeguarded or properly disposed of.
I have investigated thefts of explosives where work crews were storing explosives in an onsite work trailer. The work trailer had a single key hidden under the steps so many of the engineers could have access to the trailer. This was common knowledge to most employees, even at the lowest level. ATF reports that 98,596 pounds of explosives were stolen in the United States from 1998 to 2003 alone. Where did it go? Did half, some, or any of these explosives wind up in criminal hands? Were they smuggled elsewhere for future attacks?
The Terrorist Profile
Domestic terror targets in the US have followings that are usually either far left wing or far right wing extremists. Far right wing extremist entities have deep-rooted beliefs that the government is out of control and that they must help the common man regain his foothold on a free America. These are the Tim McVeigh’s or Eric Rudolph’s of the world. Common political focus points are gun control, white supremacy, and anti-government/anti-taxation. These types will focus their attention on federal offices, governmental agencies, or businesses that they feel support governmental policies or agendas. Tactics for these groups include property damage, arsons and bombings.
One notable recent example of a right wing extremist is Timothy McVeigh. In 1995, McVeigh and his Army buddy, Terry Nichols, planned and carried out their plan to blow up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in military fashion. McVeigh delivered his vehicle bomb filled with thirteen 55-gallon drums of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil causing a catastrophic collapse of that building and damaging an additional 324 surrounding buildings. The blast blew out windows and doors as far away as 50 blocks. The explosion caused the death of 168 people and injured more than 500 others. McVeigh was apprehended less than two hours later. He was tried and convicted of federal murder charges and was executed June 11, 2001. Terry Nichols was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and federal and state bombing charges and is serving a life sentence in a federal prison. He was also ordered to pay the government $14 million for the damage caused to the Murrah Building. Prosecutors said the bombing was an attempt to avenge the deaths of about 80 people in the government siege at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas exactly two years earlier.
Left wing terrorist groups involve revolutionary socialist doctrinaires trying their hardest to stop capitalism. They believe they are the protectors against imperialism, among other left wing beliefs. Identified under this umbrella are special interest groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and environmental groups such as the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF). Other groups may include anti-abortion or abortion-rights groups. These groups target public health facilities, universities, and businesses. Tactics include arson, sabotage, and bombings.
International terror groups are foreign-based and oppose the US and its policies. Foreign terrorists have attacked US citizens and interests overseas, including the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland, which killed 189 Americans in 1988, the vehicle bomb outside the Khobar Towers in Dharan, Saudi Aribia, which killed 19 military personnel in 1996, and the bombings of two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killing 12 in 1998. No attacks by international terrorists were recorded in the US between 1984 and 1992. All this changed on February 26, 1993 when, for the first time, foreign terrorists bombed the World Trade Center. The FBI has divided these groups into three sections: foreign sponsors of international terrorism, formalized terrorist groups, and loosely affiliated international radical extremists.
The State Department has listed five countries as foreign sponsors of international terrorism: Syria, Iran, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba. All of these countries have directly supported terrorists and terrorist operations using official state agents. All still support terrorism and some now conceal activities by the use of operatives to conduct certain operations.
Formalized terror groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and PIJ have their own business infrastructure, financial backing, and training centers. They can plan and operate overseas as well as within the US. They are involved in criminal activity in the US engaging in identity theft, passport fraud, harboring fugitives, and weapons and explosives theft.
Loosely affiliated international radical extremists do not represent a specific nation. Loosely affiliated extremists may pose the most urgent threat to the United States at this time because they remain relatively unknown to law enforcement. They can travel freely, take on a variety of identities, and recruit like-minded sympathizers from numerous countries.
Potential Terror Targets
There are four primary classifications for targets: Statement Targets, Infrastructure Targets, Commercial Targets, and Transportation Targets.
Statement Targets
Statement Targets include certain governmental buildings, like federal court houses, and iconic buildings such as World Trade Center. Local specific targets include sensitive religious sites such as Jewish or Muslim compounds in certain jurisdictions. Depending on the size of these establishments, rescue plans and alternative entrances and exits should be identified. Planning for response and multiple evacuation routes and locations should also be considered. Normally, the workforce in these locations are sensitive to their respective threat levels, but need direction on how to better harden their environment. One clear way is for these organizations to build a relationship with local law enforcement and response entities. Keeping tabs on local threats and fostering two-way communications with local security heads and law enforcement is a good way to head off potential threats.
Infrastructure Targets
Terrorists attack infrastructure targets to cause maximum inconvenience to the general public to ensure that their cause remains in the forefront of public opinion. Targets can include power sub-stations, gas facilities, oil pipelines, water pumping stations, the road and rail system, and airports, among others. It would take a considerable amount of any product to contaminate water sources, although an attack of small proportions could cause a pumping station to fail. A coordinated attack of this nature could leave a region vulnerable when it comes to pumping water for firefighting and decontamination and rescue events. Virtually all major terrorist groups operating in the world today have attacked infrastructure targets at some point.
Another example of a high-value infrastructure target is communications facilities. As an emergency responder, I know the value of a well-balanced and functional communication system and the ability to coordinate efforts. Cellular communication is a viable means of communication, although somewhat fragile in an emergency situation where large groups of people try to call the police or fire department. Thousands of cellular calls made at the same time can collapse a system, making all cell phones in the area useless. This can be catastrophic if the private sector security is relying on communication with arriving response units to coordinate via cell phones. Most private security companies do not have radio communication with local police and fire departments and rely on other means of communication integration. Cellular communication has become a staple of informal communication and a tool for on-scene coordination. Employees that work communication and utility facilities must take ownership of their environment and realize that they are a valuable target and have a workable plan to with local responders.
Another example of a valuable infrastructure target is a utility facility such as power grid switching stations. Many facilities may have few or no employees and instead rely on SCADA systems to run the facility and have become a regular target for domestic terror. Recently, in south Florida, several power grids went down and prevented the use of traffic signals, lights, and alarms throughout several counties. Although this may not have been a criminal event, it shows the value of the target.
Commercial Targets
Targeting of the commercial heart of a state is an effective means of bringing the terrorist message home to one of the places where it hurts the government most – the financial wealth of the country. In Charlotte we are the largest banking center on the east coast south of New York. We have implemented several buffer zone protection strategies throughout the city. Target hardening strategies require increased threat knowledge for the workforce in these facilities, who represent the front line of defense. The minute that the workforce fails to take ownership of a facility and relies solely on its security staff is when it becomes a “soft target”.
Transportation Targets
Transportation security efforts have increased substantially since 911, although there is still a lot to be learned. Events like the Madrid Train bombings in 2004, where four stations were attacked and 191 killed, and London bus bombings in 2005, where three train stations and one bus were attacked and 56 killed, still demonstrate the adage that terrorists attack the easiest targets. The terror organization in Madrid was believed to have stolen the explosives from a mine in northern Spain along with a stolen van used to transport the explosives used to commit the bombing. Once again, intel and theft gained the upper hand.
What Should I Be Looking For?
We have talked about groups, motivation, and a little bit about attitude within your business as to security. Now I want to brush you up on recognition. You need to know what to look for. Often, bits and pieces of evidence to a crime go unnoticed because we fail to recognize what we are seeing. Investigators executing a search warrant at a safe house in New York in relation to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center came across several papers written in Arabic that were dismissed as religious literature, failing to recognize that this was evidence of the terrorists’ intent to start a holy war against the US. It’s this kind of reasoning I use to highlight the importance of being able to recognize parts of an IED. Bombers make mistakes and get interrupted by security and sometimes flee, leaving behind parts and pieces. If you know what to look for as a trained eye you may be able to quickly realize the severity of the situation.
There are five components that make up an explosive device: The container, power source, switch, initiator and main charge.
The Container
The container can be used to cover a series of obstacles for the bomber. Typically, it is made to blend into its surroundings. It aids in transporting the explosive device in public and may assist in placing it in a populated location. The container may also enhance the effects of the device. The fact that low explosives are contained makes them more lethal, by combining a fragmentation effect and increasing blast pressure.
As a security official, I am often concerned with lower-level VIP missions that simply use metal detectors as a first line of defense. Containers come in every shape and size. There are plenty of non-metallic containers that can house explosive charges. Many devices are plastic in construction, for example, PVC pipe. Security officials should be aware that some missions require a hand search of bags and containers. Other options for searching for devices in secure areas are the use of magnetometers and explosive sniffers.
The Power Source
Power sources are another component in an improvised explosive device. Several device designs use electrical power, from simple batteries like AAA or 9 volts, to watch batteries, mini 12 volts and specialty batteries. Batteries can also be used as a way to initiate the device by decay. There could be enough battery power to get the device to the target, then, due to a collapsing circuit, the device detonates soon thereafter. Since security officials do not know the true count down time on an electrically powered device, time to perform an evacuation becomes critical.
Switches
Switches are probably the most deadly part of a device. A switch can come in several forms. One device may have several firing and/or arming switches. The creative bomber can use an arming switch to allow him or her to reach the target location safely, and then get away once the device is secreted. Arming switches are normally some type of count down timer, such as a clock, watch, 555 timer, etc. To activate a count down timer the bomber may calculate the time to get to the target or may use another switch to activate the timer. Never assume what a switch may or may not do and never touch any switch on a suspected package!
Firing switches could be victim-operated. An example is a mercury switch that activates the device when the victim or unsuspecting individual picks up the device and the liquid mercury closes the circuit. Other victim-operated switches include photo cells, Magnetic reed switches, and pressure/pressure release switches, such as clothes pins. I have seen devices that have a series of firing switches in them, all victim-activated. Cell phones, pagers and cameras all have switches and have been used to construct devices.
Remote control switches are also worth noting, since most law enforcement and security officials use hand held and car two way radios. Any time there is a belief that a remote control switch may be used, stay away from the use of two way radios within 150 feet of the threatened area, for fear of radio frequency interference or RF interference. This is a constant preaching point for me as a trainer of police officers.
Initiators
Initiators are what cause the explosive charge to detonate, the most common being a blasting cap. Blasting caps that are commercially made are the most sensitive of all. They are normally a short tube with one end, the business end, closed, and the other end open, allowing you to look inside. They may have protruding leg wires or a plastic straw-like attachment. Blasting caps are the first step in a firing chain to set off high explosives. High explosives require heat and shock to set them off and the blasting cap does just that. They have caused more damage than any one single component and are very lethal if mistreated. They are sensitive to heat and shock and should never be handled, except by trained personnel. Electric blasting caps are easily recognized by the leg wires coming out of one end. The leg wires are normally single strand wire, coated with an insulator and are different colors. This color coding allows commercial blasters to set up chain explosive charges and makes the difference between a series circuit and a parallel circuit clear to the blaster. Leg wires can range in size from one inch to three or four inches if a delay is built into the cap. It’s important to realize that bombers may cut leg wires at the target location for last minute assembly of the components. In post-blast investigations leg wires can often be found and colored insulation still intact. These can be traced back to a manufacturer and sometimes narrow down the purchase or theft location of explosives. Blasting caps also come without leg wires and facilitate the use of time fuses. These caps are completely open on one end, which allows the time fuse to be placed in one end and crimped on to the fuse. Initiators can also be homemade, which makes them even more dangerous than commercial caps. Homemade initiators or improvised initiators can be made from small light bulbs, electric matches and squibs.
Main Charge
The main charge can be either high or low explosives. Low explosives are ones that explode or detonate at speeds below 3,300 f.p.s. Examples include black powder, smokeless powder and double base smokeless powder. All of these can be purchased legally at sporting good stores and reloading supply stores. They are a main charge in any pipe bomb. Just because they are designated as “low” explosives does not mean they are less dangerous than high explosives.
High explosives consist of substances that explode or detonate at speeds greater than 3,300 f.p.s. Some military explosives detonate in the 20,000 f.p.s. range. High explosives can take many forms. Examples are cast explosives like TNT, which look like plaster of Paris, or Dynamite, which is really a liquid explosive poured into an inert substance like sawdust and rolled up in waxed paper. They can also take the form of rope. Detonating cord is a high explosive. It is sometimes used as a booster to cause other explosives to detonate when wrapped. We commonly use Det cord to wrap TNT or Dynamite to safely detonate it. Slurries and ditching charges like ANFO are common high explosives used in road and land development. Slurries typically look like large sausages. They are flexible and have an outer plastic and fabric skin. They are designed to be forced down a drilled hole and detonated to break up rock and earth. ANFO is an acronym for Ammonium Nitrate and Fuel Oil. When those two ingredients are mixed at the right percentages they become explosive. The industry standard for ANFO is a binary explosive with the proper amounts packaged in separate containers. Most manufacturers use a colored fuel oil mixture which is really Nitro Methane. This allows the user to recognize when the container of fertilizer has become mixed with the fuel and is now an explosive.
Military explosives are normally packaged in OD green with yellow makings and letterings. One of the highest military explosives is C4. It is a plastic explosive that is white in color and is designed to be molded into any shape. Another type of military explosive is the training grenade. They either look like the WWII pineapple grenade or the more current version, which resembles a baseball. Both types have fuses on top with handles, called spoons, running down their sides. The main body, called the hull, has a hole on the bottom to allow spent gases and any fragmentation from the cap on the inside to expel out. The primary way to inspect these training grenades is to look first at the color of the fuse on top with the spoon. It should be sky blue. This indicates training. It does not indicate if it has been shot, however. These are easily booby trapped and modified. Law enforcement officers should not handle these without trained officers with them.
One other common high explosive worth noting is Data Sheet or Flex–ex. It’s a sheet explosive that comes in a variety of colors, most commonly OD green or pale white. It has many applications for disposal work for bomb squads and is a favorite for letter bombers.
The main charge can also be made from improvised explosives. Peroxide-based explosives are very common in the Middle East. They commonly take the shape from rock candy to sugar, depending on the skill of the maker. They may also have a brown tint to them. They also normally have a strong chemical smell.
When a bomb has all five components it’s called an Improvised Explosive Device or IED. It’s imperative to know all you can about the recognition of explosives and the parts of an improvised explosive device.
Searching: What Am I Looking For and Where?
Ok, so now we have looked at organizations, motives, and components… now wouldn’t it be nice to know where the bad guys are going to hide the device? As bomb technicians, we sometimes feel we are kind of like professional gamblers. We are highly trained and have numerous strategies and techniques to assist us. We also take into consideration the totality of the circumstances surrounding the event. But on that initial approach you’re hoping to have the right cards to win. You must treat every threat or package as if it were the real thing. The minute you don’t you will lose. We have a saying in bomb disposal: “initial success or total failure”. When we look at the history of bombings world wide and in the U.S., we can see that there are some statistics that crop up. The facts are that most bombings occur outside. When we look at significant events in just our own country the major events have occurred outside: Oklahoma, World Trade ‘93, Atlanta abortion clinics, Olympic Park, Atlanta night club bombing…all happened outside.
The second most likely place where bombs are hidden in the U. S. is in common areas. For businesses, common areas refer to any place the public can go to with out being restricted. Lobbies, stairwells, and bathrooms are all common areas. Bad guys normally want a soft target, and an unattended lobby is perfect for a bomber to place his package and leave. Bathrooms with cabinets that don’t lock or are not secure are another great place. You may have gone into your favorite movie rental store or convenience store and noticed that no matter what the clerk is doing, they turn to you and welcome you. That is not necessarily because they are polite. This is a target hardening strategy or a crime deterrent technique. Bad guys don’t want to get noticed, and greeting is equivalent to getting caught in some cases.
The other common denominator is the type of devices. In this country, the most popular type of explosive device is the pipe bomb, hands down. Pipe bombs are the easiest type of explosive device to construct and there is little tracking of the components needed to make the device. Ted Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph were both successful pipe bombers. Almost all the pieces for a pipe bomb can be purchased lawfully and over the counter. A pipe bomb can be activated with a variety of switches, from electric time delay to victim-activated to the suspect lighting a time fuse and walking out of the building. So what does that mean to us? Well several things on the onset. One of which is you are now armed with the knowledge of where most common location devices are placed, and the second most likely location. So if your plan calls for an automatic evacuation on a bomb threat, that means you will take people past the common areas and deliver them to the outside, just where the majority of real bombings actually take place.
Recommendations for Target Hardening
So what should you do? I can not talk about response with out mentioning prevention. Hoping you won’t be bombed is not an effective plan. This couldn’t be more true when it comes to bomb threat mitigation and planning. If most devices are placed outside, then we need to insure a couple of things. First is employee culture. Express to employees that work has to be a safe place and that it is everyone’s responsibility to protect the work location. This means training employees to look for things out of place, especially when they are outside their work environment.
Outside
Make sure that outside storage rooms remain locked and that vegetation is kept away from the building. You should be able to look down the length of a building and see a space between the hedges and the building itself. The bases of trees and hedges should be kept clear so as not to provide hiding places for packages in the foliage. Exterior flower boxes are another great place for bombers to conceal a device easily and have good target value. The window is fragile and produces additional fragmentation. Exterior trash cans overflowing with trash are a perfect place to hide a device. Think twice about having them along evacuation routes.
Vehicles from visitors should not be allowed to park next to the building. It makes sense to have employees with background checks and cars with employee stickers to park next to the building as a layer of added protection. A bomb threat involving a vehicle could take a bomb squad several hours to remotely search it. Extra precautions should be made if your parking is below the building.
Employee Identification
Security should also have a system to recognize employees; a photo ID is always a good thing. Visitors should be escorted, or at least issued temporary badges with the date and time on the badge. This allows anyone to examine a badge and check its authenticity.
Cameras
Cameras that monitor the outside and common areas are a great tool for security. Any camera mounted outside communicates to bad guys that you have taken steps to advance your security efforts. After the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, security installed cameras that only clicked on when movement was detected. This type of system allows security staff to focus on actual activity, and not just constant closed-circuit television viewing. Detectives solve many crimes through the use of recording cameras. These recordings also allow us to broadcast still pictures with on local TV stations, and can be used in criminal trials.
Deliveries
Deliveries are always a concern, and you should not let unexpected deliveries under the building. Once the car bomb is close to or, worse yet, under the building, it’s too late. In several sensitive targets in Charlotte you will see trucks blocked from entering below-ground parking by retractable Ballards while being swept by security. In some cases, the business entity will not allow entry of the delivery unless it calls ahead using a code stating that they are coming for a delivery.
Interior
When we look to target hardening the interior I must say that the front line of defense is the person that greets you at the door. Several high rise buildings in my jurisdiction have moved a security desk into the lobby area as a deterrent. Having security officials greeting or screening visitors is a great tool.
Security should insure that hallways remain clear of boxes and open storage containers. Not only is this a security problem but a safety problem for evacuation. The same is true for stairwells. Most jurisdictions prohibit the storage of any containers in stairwells. Remember, stairwells are an evacuation route and should always be sterile—even the void under the ground-floor staircase.
Interior doors that house computer switching stations or phone closets or office supply closets. First, they should never be marked. You don’t need to direct the bomber where to find the least visited room in the building. These rooms should always be locked and key control should be required.
Bathrooms with storage closest or storage cabinets under the sink are a great place to hide a bomb. These cabinets often contain half empty boxes of paper or cleaning supplies and can easily hide an explosive device. These rooms also contain chemicals that can cause additional issues if the device malfunctions and only partially detonates and causes a chemical spill.
Mail rooms
Mail rooms or delivery drop off points are considered a sensitive area and restricted access should be the rule. All employees, not just mail clerks, should be trained in package recognition. In the fall of 2001 a series of letters laced with anthrax were mailed to news media and congressional staffers. Five people died and twenty two fell ill from the attack. Explosive devices delivered by mail or currier will always be an easy avenue for a bomber to attack a specific target. Since packages are handled roughly, they are not normally activated by movements, and because the time of delivery is not known, they are normally victim-activated, unless delivered by the bomber. Ted Kaczynski in 1978 started one of the most famous mail bomb campaigns in US history protesting advancements in technology. He eluded the FBI for 18 years until his capture. It can be difficult to determine if a package is suspect or not there are some indicative signs:
Postage Stamps: Excessive postage or pre-posted parcels. The bomber doesn’t want to get caught and therefore applies more postage required to insure the package arrives at its destination point.
The package is heavy for its size and is uneven in weight: This may be indicative of a pipe bomb on one side of the package and its trigger mechanism on the other side causing it to be heaver than one would expect and lopsided.
Wooden containers or containers in containers.
Rigid envelope: On a small soft sided package the bomber has put cardboard sides in place to protect the device from rough handling or prevent handlers from feeling the components of the device.
Protruding wires or foil: In the event of a package tear or actual directions on the outside of the package to Open here or pull to open, the victim may see protruding wires. Foil is a conductor of electricity and has also been used for device construction.
Oily stains or discoloration: Many high explosives commercially and home made exude a chemical residue that may absorb into the paper package giving clues as to what may be inside.
Restrictive markings: If the bomber has a specific target in mind they may use “for your eyes only” or Personal and confidential”. I have even see just the word “photos” used giving the delivery person or victim the urgency of opening the package.
No return address or fictitious address: One key point worth noting is checking the return address to see if it matches the postage stamp location. If the return address says Florida but the postage stamp reflects Texas for instance, that would be a red flag. The use of an unprofessional or incorrect address such as a poorly handwritten address, as if to disguise the penmanship, is also worth noting.
Unexpected package: Unexpected packages are always worth scrutiny. Large facilities have x-ray devices to screen packages as a defensive tool.
Having learned the profile for suspect packages is a valuable tool … but only if you use it.
Evacuation Plans
If you are faced with a bomb threat you have three options: evacuate, stay and search, or a blend of both.
If you decide to evacuate you should have a few elements in place. Evacuation elements include assembly locations, routes, accountability of personnel and employee knowledge. Plans should not differ between fire, weather or bomb evacuation planning. The use of fire wardens is recommended for a clear-cut chain of command. Fire wardens should be located on every floor of a building and they should report to managers, ensuring the plans are carried out in each location. Communication among and accountability for employees is paramount, and with a system using fire wardens, facilitates scene stability. Fire wardens need to be held accountable for their respective physical areas. Evacuating employees also need to understand that accountability is very important to responding rescue and law enforcement officials. One way of promoting this is a three-person buddy system. Evacuees should report to their respective fire warden that their partners are accounted for or missing at the assembly location.
There should be more than one evacuation location. Locations should include protection from the elements and potential blast protection. Evacuation assembly locations should be shared with a neighboring building if possible. Partnering for emergencies allows evacuees to move to another shelter for protection in inclement weather and provides blast protection.
A plan should have the following in place:
Trained management and employees. Training should include where to search, based on risk assessments set out by management. Employees should be taught how to search and have knowledge about vulnerable locations.
Management should lead with security in mind on all levels, including information security, physical security and security awareness.
Summary
My philosophy has always been that the more people that are educated about the recognition of explosive devices and the motivation of criminals, the better we can safeguard our lives and businesses against such attacks. Clearly, my time working in Israel in 2004 was an eye opener. Not only have the Israelis suffered hundreds of attacks, but they have prevented thousands. One strategy they have developed is an 80,000 uniformed volunteer force. This allows the paid national police force to focus on true crime leads and the apprehension of criminals and terrorists, while maintaining a connection with the public and their everyday needs. This volunteer force in some form or fashion patrols the streets every day. This group is trained in recognition of components and IEDs. These volunteers also are members of the local economic workforce. They bring these strategies back to their respective place of employment. Educating the work force on not allowing tailgating on secure doors, or not propping open secure doors, challenging visitors, and keeping the workplace clean and free of debris, especially outside, are simple social engineering changes that can have a huge impact on target hardening. I am not suggesting that you go to your local law enforcement department and head up a volunteer force. What I am suggesting is that we take on the posture of watching for things and people that are obviously out of place or in violation and reporting them immediately. If you are a manager, fostering this type of ideal within the business is paramount to safety and security.