Chapter 4
Customers as Assets

Maybe there is no profit on each individual jar, but we'll make it up in volume.1

Lucille Ball, Emmy- and Golden Globe–award winning comedian, model, and actress

Managers tend to obsess about their satisfaction (or Net Promoter Score [NPS]) levels. One of the first questions managers always ask us is, “What can we do to improve our score?”

Our answer seldom makes them happy. “If all you care about is the score, then cut your prices. Your scores will definitely go up.”

In fact, if you simply ask customers what the firm can do to make them happier, you can be certain that lowering price will be the most common answer. Everyone likes a bargain. Bargain prices, however, aren't always good for business.

Although this might sound obvious, it is not often seriously appreciated by managers in their quest to improve satisfaction and NPS levels. Rather, high satisfaction and NPS levels are typically treated as the end goal, with the assumption that good things will happen as a result. And to help make sure that scores go up, employees' bonuses are often tied to achieving them.

Continually devoting resources to improve satisfaction and NPS, however, has a dark side. Research shows that even when these efforts result in improved sales—which is by no means guaranteed—the return on the investment, after accounting for the cost of these efforts, is frequently near zero or even negative.2 If left unchecked, the consequences can be disastrous.

An unfortunate example of this is HomeBanc Mortgage Corporation. HomeBanc, an Atlanta-based financial institution, began in 1929 originally under the name Home Federal Savings & Loan. For most of its history, it was a small company. By 2005, however, the company had grown to become a 1,200-employee, multistate institution.3

HomeBanc's growth was driven by a focus on generating repeat business and referrals. The target market was home buyers because these customers were much more likely to be referred by real estate agents and home builders.4

To encourage referrals, HomeBanc focused on improving its NPS. It continuously surveyed its customers and used the data to rank all of its sales teams on a monthly basis.5 To demonstrate management's commitment to NPS, bonuses and promotions were tied to achieving specific NPS levels.6

The result was that HomeBanc had the highest NPS level of any mortgage bank in the United States.7 HomeBanc's NPS level was remarkably high—in excess of 80 percent. By contrast, the industry average was 3 percent.8

The outstanding NPS performance resulted in HomeBanc being prominently featured in the first edition of the book The Ultimate Question written by Fred Reichheld, the creator of the NPS. To quote the book, “From the beginning, HomeBanc's secret was to identify the customers most likely to end up in that magic sector [i.e., high-profitability promoters].”9

Moreover, “HomeBanc has effectively eliminated bad profits by offering a money-back guarantee.”10 To help make sure that customers never asked for their money back, employees faced stiff penalties if they did. Specifically, if a customer invoked the money-back guarantee, the HomeBanc employee involved in the transaction was typically “counseled” and deemed ineligible for any bonus that year. If it happened more than once, the employee was likely to be fired.11

Of course, this gave every incentive for employees to make certain that all went well when they reviewed potential homeowners' loan applications. After all, customers are far more likely to be dissatisfied (and consider it a major incident) if they are denied a loan.12

The result was that HomeBanc didn't just eliminate bad profits—it eliminated profits entirely! At the same time that The Ultimate Question was hitting bookstores in 2006, HomeBanc was hemorrhaging money. By 2007, HomeBanc had filed for bankruptcy protection and ceased operations shortly thereafter.

For those nostalgic for HomeBanc, however, the name was too good to die. CNBS Financial Group acquired the rights to the name from the defunct Atlanta-based company.13 Let's hope the future for the new HomeBanc will be different than its predecessor.

The Wallet Allocation Rule Is Not a Panacea

Unfortunately, the HomeBanc story, although tragic, is not unique. In fact, in our first book, Return on Quality (with Roland Rust and Anthony Zahorik) published in 1994, we noted several other similar high-profile catastrophes: The Wallace Company, Florida Power & Light, Centennial Medical Center, and IBM.14 At the time, each of these firms had offered some of the most highly regarded customer service programs in the world. And each met with disastrous consequences.

Fortunately, several of these companies have recovered from their self-inflicted wounds. The Wallace Company—the first small business to win the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award—did not.15 Its market share increased from 10.4 percent to 18 percent. Unfortunately, it was losing $300,000 per month.16 As a result, it was forced to declare bankruptcy shortly after winning the award and went out of business.17

As these business tragedies make clear, managers should never use the pursuit of higher satisfaction or NPS scores to justify making bad business decisions. The same is true for the pursuit of greater share of wallet.

Although the Wallet Allocation Rule makes it possible to strongly link satisfaction (and other commonly used customer loyalty metrics) to share of wallet, greater share of wallet is not a panacea. Managers must make sure that efforts to improve their brand's rank will result in not just greater share of wallet, but also in a positive return on investment.

Where the Money Really Comes From

Loyalty consultants typically claim that loyal customers bring in loads of extra money through numerous avenues. The most typically claimed benefits of loyalty are as follows:18

  1. Lower costs to serve
  2. Higher margins (i.e., less price sensitivity)
  3. Word of mouth
  4. Retention
  5. Higher spend (i.e., higher share of wallet)

In fact, based on the charts consultants present of these supposed benefits, you would think that these claimed benefits bring in loads of extra money and that they were all basically equally important.19 Sadly, that is not the case. In fact, the first two supposed benefits aren't even true.

If managers want to make a positive return on their investments to enhance the customer experience, they first need a clear understanding of where the money really comes from. So let's begin by debunking two of the myths of loyalty: (1) loyal customers cost less to serve, and (2) loyal customers are less price sensitive.

We already debunked these myths in our earlier book, Loyalty Myths20 (with Terry Vavra and Henri Wallard). Unfortunately, like a monster in a horror film, these myths are hard to kill despite evidence conclusively proving them to be false.

Myth: Loyal Customers Cost Less to Serve

The argument that loyal customers cost less to serve is this: “As the company gains experience with its customers, it can serve them more efficiently.”21

We will be the first to admit that this sounds completely plausible, which is why this myth is so tough to squash. The flaw in this theory is the belief that loyal customers behave the same as their less loyal counterparts do.

The fallacy of that is clear. Real loyalty requires different behaviors. And although there are lots of good customer behaviors for companies associated with loyalty, being easier to serve isn't one of them. Why? Companies may know more about their loyal customers, but loyal customers also know more about the companies. As a result, they may be more demanding of the company through better knowledge of the inner workings of the system. This allows them to seek recourse for what they believe to be inadequate treatment, and they are more likely to receive perks from the relationship, which cost money to administer and fulfill.

Moreover, research conclusively proves this to be the case. Eminent professors Werner Reinartz and V. Kumar conducted in-depth research into several firms to examine the impact of loyalty on the cost to serve customers. Their findings were published in both the Harvard Business Review and the Journal of Marketing.22 In no case could they find an example of loyal customers costing less to serve. In fact, when there was a cost difference for a company, the relationship was reversed: Loyal customers cost more to serve.

Myth: Loyal Customers Are Less Price Sensitive

Loyal customers are also widely reported to be less price sensitive—even willing to pay a premium to do business with the company. The argument goes like this: Loyal customers “will often pay a premium to continue to do business with you rather than switch to a competitor with whom they are neither familiar nor comfortable.”23

That statement is probably true, but it is also totally misleading. The deception is in the qualifier “rather than switch to a competitor with whom they are neither familiar nor comfortable.” In other words, “I would be willing to pay more than go someplace I don't know or like.”

But is that the real choice customers face? Almost never! Given that multibrand loyalty is the norm in most industries, customers have somewhere else to go. And one of the easiest ways to get them to go there is to charge them a price premium.

The reality is that loyal customers know when prices are good or bad relative to the norm. That's one of the benefits to customers for their loyalty—they know a good deal when they see one. As a result, loyal customers tend to be more price sensitive, not less.

Let's return to the research of professors Reinartz and Kumar. In no case could the professors find an example of loyal customers paying a higher price for the same bundle of goods. If there was a price difference, the relationship was reversed—loyal customers paid less.24

Moreover, we've taught our most loyal customers to be price sensitive. As an article in The Washington Post notes, “In a subtle shift of marketing tactics, some retailers have stepped up coupon offers directed at their most loyal customers in a bid to attract repeat visits from big spenders Eager to wean themselves from discounts for the masses, retailers hope more targeted coupons will limit big bargains to a pool of their best customers.”24

Word of Mouth

There is no question that positive word of mouth is an important element for a firm's ability to attract new customers. In fact, for many entertainment-related industries (e.g., movies, television shows, nightclubs, etc.), positive customer “buzz” is essential to success.

The Internet and social networks in particular have heightened managers' attention to the potential power of word of mouth. With the help of technology, one person has now the potential to reach hundreds, thousands, and sometimes even millions of people. Moreover, referrals from individual customers tend to have more credibility with prospective customers than company-sponsored advertisements.

As a result, customers' willingness to recommend the brand has become one of the most important metrics that managers use to measure and manage customer loyalty (second only to customer satisfaction).26 This in large part fueled the adoption of the NPS by many companies. For most businesses, however, the effect of word of mouth on customer acquisition is far less than managers tend to believe.

First, let's begin by examining the relationship between a customer's stated likelihood to recommend a product and the actual adoption of that product by members of his or her social network. Clearly, there is a seductive logic to the idea that customers' willingness to recommend a firm or brand to friends leads to increased sales. We can all think of times that we have tried a new restaurant, seen a new movie, or bought a new product based on the recommendation of friends and family. But does customers' willingness to recommend a firm or brand to friends in their social network really lead to a significant increase in sales? That's precisely the question we wanted to find out for ourselves.

Using data provided by a large U.S. telecommunications provider for 791 customers and their corresponding telephone network (11,552 individuals), we investigated the relationship between customers' willingness to recommend via word of mouth a new product they had purchased and the adoption of that same product by members of their social network.27 What we found was surprising. A customer's willingness to recommend the product had no significant impact on a potential customer's likelihood to adopt the product.

To see if other factors played a role, we also examined two elements that research has shown influences the role of word of mouth on new product adoption: (1) how recently the product was adopted by the customer (new customers are shown to be more influential) and (2) the strength of the social connection (as measured by communication time). Interestingly, none of these variables demonstrated a statistically significant relationship with adoption of the product when examined individually.

Only by examining the interaction of these variables simultaneously (i.e., recommend intention, recency of adoption, and strength of social connection) was it possible to identify a relationship to product adoption. Specifically, we found that recommend intention predicts new product adoption only when two conditions are met: (1) recommending customers have recently adopted the service themselves (as opposed to being longer-term users of the product), and (2) potential customers are in frequent contact with recommending customers.

Our findings point to the difficulty in translating social networking, recommend intention, and product adoption into a coherent marketing effort. Our results indicate that measuring word of mouth intentions on their own may not be predictive in product adoption by other potential customers. So although knowing your customers' willingness to recommend your brand is important, it is clear that other factors must be taken into consideration and measured when using this particular metric.

Second, let's look at actual word of mouth (as opposed to intention to recommend) on customer acquisition and profitability. One of the primary drivers of word of mouth is customer satisfaction, with most positive or negative word of mouth occurring at the extremes (either very highly satisfied or dissatisfied).28 Most of us inherently know this to be true.

What is surprising, however, is that positive word of mouth is three times more common than negative word of mouth.29 Clearly, negative word of mouth is bad, but it doesn't reflect the majority of customers' discussions about the brands and companies they use.

The question of overriding importance to managers is, “How does this translate into new sales?” Research into word of mouth and customer acquisition finds some unusual things. For one thing, it doesn't have the effect you would expect. For example, given that the success of movies and television shows is in large part based on generating buzz among potential viewers, you would expect word of mouth to be critical to a show's success. Research, however, finds that word of mouth volume doesn't show a consistent relationship to television ratings.30

Even more unexpected, research finds that word of mouth activities from loyal customers do not generate additional sales to new customers. Really! So the common argument that increasing customer loyalty results in increased customer acquisition from referrals isn't proving to be true. Instead, research finds that new customers generated by word of mouth come from referrals by nonloyal customers.31

If all this leaves you wondering how to make word of mouth pay off, you are not alone. What is clear is that the journey from customer willingness to recommend to gaining new profitable customers is not straightforward. Research by professors Kumar, Petersen, and Leone, reported in the Harvard Business Review, sums up the problem this way:32


The number of both companies' customers who said they intended to recommend the firm to other people was high, but the percentage who actually did was far, far lower. While 68% of the financial services firm's customers expressed their intention to refer the company to other people, only 33% followed through. Fully 81% of the telecom's customers thought they'd recommend the company, but merely 30% actually did. What's more, very few of those referrals, in either case, actually generated customers (14% at the financial services firm; 12% at the telecom company). And, of those prospects that did become customers, only 11% of the financial services firm's—and a mere 8% of the telecom company's—became profitable new customers.


This is not to suggest that word of mouth referrals are not valuable. They are! They just aren't nearly as valuable as we've been led to believe.

Customer Retention

For virtually every business, success depends on the repeat business of loyal customers. In fact, it is this recognition that spawned managers' current focus on the customer.

In their seminal Harvard Business Review article, “Zero Defections: Quality Comes to Services,” consultant Fred Reichheld and esteemed Harvard Business School professor W. Earl Sasser, Jr., triggered a massive shift in companies' strategies by declaring that “reducing defections by 5 percent boosts profits 25 percent to 85 percent.”33 Although these staggering rates of return haven't held up under more rigorous analysis,34 customer retention is nonetheless one of the most important customer loyalty–related behaviors that drive a company's revenues. In fact, research conducted by professors Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart finds that a 1 percent improvement in customer retention has a 5 percent impact on a firm's total market value. By contrast, a 1 percent improvement in customer acquisition costs corresponds to a 0.1 percent impact on firm value.35

Share of Wallet

As we have argued throughout this book, for most firms, more customers change their spending patterns than do customers who completely defect. Therefore, efforts designed to manage customers' spending patterns with a firm tend to represent far greater opportunities to a firm than simply trying to maximize customer retention rates.

McKinsey & Company argues that focusing on customers' spending patterns to improve customers' share of wallet can have as much as 10 times greater value to a company than efforts to improve retention alone.36 Our own research similarly supports the far greater impact of share of wallet relative to retention for industries in which customers tend to use multiple brands within the same category.37

As this review of the economics of loyalty makes clear, loyal customers bring in greater revenue through three primary means: customer acquisition through word of mouth, improved customer retention rates, and improved share of category spending (i.e., share of wallet). Of these three, share of wallet presents by far the greatest opportunity to grow revenues.

The problem for managers has always been identifying what it takes to grow share of wallet, particularly given that the relationship between share of wallet and metrics such as satisfaction and NPS has been extraordinarily weak. The Wallet Allocation Rule solves this problem. For the first time, managers can easily and accurately determine what it really takes to drive share.

Revenue ≠ Profits

Managers must always remember that increasing revenue is not the same thing as increasing profitability. We forget this at our peril.

The first thing to recognize is that not all—even most—customers are profitable. An examination of customer profitability invariably reveals that although organizations will always have some highly profitable customers, they are also likely to have some highly unprofitable customers. For most firms, the top 20 percent of all customers will generate between 150 percent and 300 percent of total profits. The bottom 20 percent will lose 50 percent to 200 percent of total profits. The middle 60 percent just break even (see Figure 4.1). In other words, 80 percent of a typical firm's customers do not provide an acceptable rate of return.38

c04f001

Figure 4.1 Typically, the Top 20 Percent of Customers Generate All of a Company's Profits

Most companies treat customer revenue as a good proxy for customer profitability. As a result, they tend to focus their attention on their highest revenue customers. Unfortunately, it turns out that revenue is not a good predictor of profitability. Some of the largest customers also tend to be the most unprofitable. As professors Kaplan and Narayanan of the Harvard Business School observe:39


A company cannot lose large amounts of money with small customers. It doesn't do enough business with a small customer to incur large (absolute) losses. Only a large customer, working in a particularly perverse way can be a large loss customer. Large customers tend to be either the most profitable or the least profitable in the entire customer base. It's unusual for a large customer to be in the middle of the total profitability rankings.


The revenue versus profit issue is particularly problematic for efforts to improve customer satisfaction and NPS. This is because the revenue gained from improvement initiatives frequently does not cover the cost associated with their implementation.40

Therefore, managers need to be keenly aware of the warning signs that suggest they are investing money into a black hole. It seems obvious that investments in improving the customer experience need to result in a positive return, but it is easy to get caught up in a Field of Dreams mentality: “If you build it, he will come.”41 Customers may in fact come, but if you are losing money to gain them, it is a Pyrrhic victory.

Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain

Some of the most devastating consequences of a blind pursuit of customer satisfaction (and NPS) result from short-termism (i.e., “concentration on short-term projects or objectives for immediate profit at the expense of long-term security”).42 Specifically, managers often focus on achieving near-term goals designed to make customers happier without considering the long-term consequences of their decisions on business performance.

The case of HomeBanc is an excellent example of this problem. The management of the company rightly believed that focusing on better NPS scores would drive greater revenue (in this case, mortgages) to the bank. The problem with this plan is that customer happiness is strongly linked to a positive loan outcome. Unfortunately, not every customer who applies for a loan will have the ability to repay it. When the tough times came (as they always do), those customers who were not properly denied loans became liabilities—so much so that they put the company out of business.

Short-termism runs rampant in companies. In fact, the obsession with near-term profits without an adequate assessment of the long-term risk was one of the primary causes of the financial crisis that resulted in the Great Recession.43

Despite the Great Recession, however, the drive to bring in new customers is standard for almost all companies. Moreover, the reality is that the long-term survival of companies is dependent on consistently getting new customers. If left unchecked, however, this obsession with gaining new customers frequently leads to adverse selection (i.e., customers with the highest demand also tend to bring the highest risk to the business). For example, insurers often find that those most in demand for insurance are also at a greater likelihood of experiencing loss. This is why insurance companies are especially fanatical about assessing risk. Unfortunately, most companies do a poor job of assessing long-term risk. In fairness, risks can be notoriously difficult to foresee.

As the Great Recession demonstrates, the societal consequences for large-scale short-termism can be high. Moreover, the negative consequences can be much more than economic losses. A great example of this is the American health care industry.

Patient satisfaction has become an important factor in the financial success of hospitals in the United States. One billion dollars in government payments to hospitals is determined by how patients respond to a 27-question patient satisfaction survey.44 The logic is simple and intuitive—hospitals should be paid based on performance, and who better to decide than the patients?

In the U.S. government–administered patient satisfaction survey, hospitals are assessed on things such as the following:45

  • “Area around the room was always quiet at night.”
  • “Always received help as soon as wanted.”
  • “Pain was always well controlled.”

At first glance, these questions seem perfectly valid. After all, we all want quiet rooms, help as soon as we can get it, and no pain.

Unfortunately, what patients need and what they want aren't always compatible. In health care, satisfaction and performance is not the same thing. Research shows that patients are much more likely to choose a hospital based on the amenities it offers (e.g., flat-screen televisions, room service, nail salons, etc.) than the quality of care.46

The decision about which hospital to use is far from trivial. In fact, it turns out that it is one of the most dangerous decisions we will make in our lives. Research reported in the Journal of Patient Safety finds that more than 400,000 Americans die each year from preventable hospital mistakes.47 This makes hospital error the third leading cause of death in the country!48 Moreover, serious harm to patients from preventable mistakes is 10 to 20 times more likely to occur than death from these mistakes.

For hospitals to be successful, they need patients. The fact that amenities matter more than outcomes has helped fuel a hospital construction boom. Many new hospitals now have rooms and amenities that more closely resemble hotels than the hospitals where our mothers likely gave birth to us.49

Of course, the argument could be made that negative outcomes would be reflected in patient satisfaction levels. The truth is that the two actually are related—just in the opposite direction than you would expect.

Research shows that the people who are most satisfied with their doctors are more likely to be hospitalized and accumulate more health care and drug costs.50 Worse still, they are 26 percent more likely to die than low-satisfaction patients—in other words, for every 100 low-satisfaction patients who die, 126 high-satisfaction patients die.

This isn't because higher satisfaction patients tend to be sicker (at least initially)—in fact, it is the exact opposite. More satisfied patients start out with better average physical and mental health than less satisfied patients. Instead, high satisfaction is actually associated with getting sicker.

Of course, there is a logical reason for this. Focusing on what the patient wants—let's say, minimal pain—may mean that the patient isn't getting what he needs. To quote a recent New York Times article on the topic, “Hospitals are not hotels, and although hospital patients may in some ways be informed consumers, they're predominantly sick, needy people, depending on us, the nurses and doctors, to get them through a very tough physical time. They do not come to us for vacation, but because they need the specialized, often painful help that only we can provide.”51

Of course, doctors and hospitals that get higher satisfaction ratings by giving patients what they want instead of what they need do get a higher share of their patients' health care spending—for as long as their patients are alive. But this situation is clearly not compatible with the Hippocratic Oath.

As these examples of the mortgage and health care industries make clear, it is possible to gain share in the short term by simply ignoring longer-term risks. But bad risks have a way of catching up with you.

Money-Losing Delighters

The most common problem with efforts to improve satisfaction is that the incremental revenue gained is not enough to offset the costs of these initiatives. Often this occurs because price drives satisfaction for a large segment of customers in most industries.

Satisfaction and price are almost always inversely related. As a result, lowering price tends to be one of the easiest ways to improve satisfaction levels (see Figure 4.2).

c04f002

Figure 4.2 The Relationship between Price and Satisfaction

Unfortunately, the potential to drop prices for most firms is limited. As a result, price-driven satisfaction is typically a difficult strategy to maintain. Even small errors can result in huge losses as customers rush to buy below cost.

Many retailers learned this the hard way when working with Groupon. In effect, retailers were promised that deep discounts marketed to consumers through Groupon would drive sales and pay for themselves through cross-sales at the time of purchase and repeat purchases based on satisfaction with the experience.

Without question, Groupon promotions tend to drive sales volume. But as we report in our Harvard Business School case (with Harvard professors Sunil Gupta and Ray Weaver), the happier the experience made customers, the worse the outcome for the retailer.52 In fact, four of the top six performing offers in terms of satisfaction turn out to be money losers for the merchant, and these are the only offers that consistently lose money for merchants (see Figure 4.3). Because of the high customer satisfaction associated with these offers, however, they generate a huge demand. These four categories account for 50 percent of total Groupon volume!

c04f003

Figure 4.3 Customer Satisfaction versus Return on Investment for Various Groupon Offers

These findings point to an important truth about the relationship between customer satisfaction and customer profitability. Although satisfaction and profitability are not mutually exclusive, they don't have to be aligned either. Managers typically have many competing alternatives for improving satisfaction. Not all of them will be profitable. Furthermore, not all customers can be profitably satisfied. Some are not willing to pay the necessary price for the level of service offered. Other customers demand a level of service that more than offsets any revenue they provide.

The bottom line is that there is no substitute for understanding the profit impact of your efforts to boost customer satisfaction. Armed with this information, managers can make the right—but sometimes difficult—decisions for their businesses.

Aligning Satisfaction, Share of Wallet, Revenue, and Profit

Short-termism and money-losing delighters have the potential to derail any positive impact resulting from strategies designed to improve the customer experience. Fortunately, they don't have to. Following is a three-step process that managers can follow to ensure that efforts to improve the customer experience result in a positive financial return.

Step 1: Use the Wallet Allocation Rule to Link Satisfaction and Share of Wallet

With the Wallet Allocation Rule, step 1 is easy. To link satisfaction (or NPS) to share of wallet simply do the following:

  • Survey customers and establish the brands (or stores or firms) that customers use in the category.
  • Obtain satisfaction ratings for each brand the customer uses.
  • Convert each customer's satisfaction ratings for the brands he or she uses into ranks.
  • Use the Wallet Allocation Rule to transform these ranks into estimates of each customer's share of category spending.

Step 2: Align Share of Wallet and Revenue Objectives

Improving the share of category spending that customers allocate to your brand is the primary goal, but share of wallet must always be considered in tandem with the total revenue that customers spend in the category. Clearly, customers who buy only once in a category give 100 percent of their wallet share to a single brand.

The reality is that customers who spend more in the category are much more likely to divide their spending among multiple brands (see Figure 4.4).53 The goal, of course, is not to get customers to spend less in the category to raise share of wallet. The goal is to get customers to allocate more of their purchases in the category with your brand.

c04f004

Figure 4.4 Share of Wallet Tends to Decline as More Purchases Are Made

Therefore, we need to understand share of wallet in the context of the revenue it represents. Not every customer is capable of being a high-revenue, high-share of wallet customer, nor does every customer want to be one. Some customers make purchases in the category so infrequently that unless these customers represent a significant portion of the customer base, servicing and marketing to such customers yields too little in return.

Therefore, at a minimum, we need to segment customers by the volume of business they conduct in the category. Because low-spending customers tend to be much less involved in the category, their needs tend to be very different from high-spenders.

Furthermore, high-revenue customers are almost always in the minority in terms of number of total customers. Strategies that neglect customer differentiation will inevitably tilt the scale toward break-even and unprofitable customers because they represent the majority.

High-category spending, high-share customers represent a company's core customers. The goal must be to create more of them. The only customer group with the necessary resources to move into this group is the high-category spending, low-share customers. The key to making this happen is to have a clear understanding of precisely why these customers choose to use competitors. Improvement efforts must then minimize customers' perceived needs to use the competition.

Step 3: Align Revenue and Profit Objectives

Understanding the relationship between share of wallet and revenue is not enough. As noted earlier, there are lots of ways to grow share while still losing money.

The seemingly logical answer to solve this problem is to ignore revenue and focus exclusively on return on investment (ROI). That, however, is typically not the best solution for a business either. Maximizing ROI often comes from defining the customer pool too narrowly to gain significant market share growth.

Instead the goal should be to maximize the return on each high-potential customer.54 This shifts the focus from maximizing ROI to maximizing profits. Without overcomplicating this, the key is to determine what is required to address the overriding reasons your customers use competitors and the cost of doing so. These costs are then weighed against the expected financial return.

Conclusion

The Wallet Allocation Rule measures what has generally been considered immeasurable: the impact of improving satisfaction on customers' share of spending and firm revenue. Yet although this linkage to revenue is critical, it isn't sufficient.

Managers must never lose sight of the fact that the end goal is profits, not just revenues. Using the Wallet Allocation Rule to identify opportunities to grow revenues does not justify making bad management decisions. Improvement efforts must always be treated as investments—their benefits must outweigh their costs. And the reality is that many potential opportunities to improve share of wallet and revenues will never pay off.

It's the manager's job to assess risks and evaluate costs. HomeBanc, the Wallace Company, and a host of other broke but beloved companies55 serve as a warning for all managers who forget this simple truth.

Growth is easy for firms willing to give their products away—for as long as they remain in business! But to quote Peter Drucker, “It is the first duty of a business to survive.”56

Notes

..................Content has been hidden....................

You can't read the all page of ebook, please click here login for view all page.
Reset