CHAPTER NINE
Standards Setting and Enforcement by Watchdog Agencies

§ 9.1 OVERVIEW OF NONGOVERNMENTAL REGULATION

A phenomenon in the realm of regulation of fundraising for charitable purposes is the role of nongovernmental regulation by a variety of independent so-called “watchdog” agencies. Regulation by these groups continues; their influence has been enhanced by the growing interest in the governance of public charities.1

This type of regulatory function is undertaken in three ways. One is the establishment and application of standards applicable to charitable organizations engaging in fundraising. The second is the distribution of ratings or rankings of these organizations, based on the extent of their compliance with these standards. The third of these regulatory functions is the preparation and dissemination of reports on selected charitable organizations.

Donors—individuals and corporations—rely on the ratings of and reports on charitable groups by these agencies in deciding whether to make contributions, as do some grantors, such as private foundations. The media frequently relies on the pronouncements of these organizations in evaluating entities in the philanthropic sector.2 Thus, the status of a charitable organization in relation to one or more sets of these ratings and reports can have material economic consequences.

It is appropriate to consider the role of the watchdog monitoring agencies in the context of government regulation of fundraising for charitable organizations because (1) the standards promulgated by the agencies, and the interpretations accorded the standards by them, have much in common with the provisions of state charitable solicitation acts; and (2) state regulators work closely with these agencies in evaluating charitable groups, and, concurrently, the status of a charity in relation to an agency's rating can have an impact on its status in relation to a state charitable solicitation act. (The reverse is also true.) Further, the IRS has been known to rely on the treatment by these agencies of specific charitable organizations in formulating its own evaluation of them. Further, as discussed later, the courts may pass judgment on the validity of these standards and their enforcement. These judicial determinations may well be of significance when applied to the provisions and applicability of state charitable solicitation acts.

The principal promulgator, monitor, and enforcer of standards was, when these watchdog agencies first emerged, the Philanthropic Advisory Service (PAS) of the Council of Better Business Bureaus.3 Others of the watchdog groups include the Wise Giving Alliance, the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability, the Standards of Excellence Institute, Charity Navigator, and Charity Watch.4

The rationale for and role of the watchdog agencies have been well expressed in an analysis prepared by the PAS, which is shown in the following section.5

§ 9.2 ROLE OF AN INDEPENDENT MONITORING ORGANIZATION

A brief look at how and why the Council of Better Business Bureaus got into the “business” of developing standards and monitoring charitable solicitations is required at the outset. The explanation, in two short words, is public demand. Since the first BBBs were formed in 1911, and increasingly over the years, the public has turned to the Bureaus for verification of the “legitimacy” (as the question was most often posed) of soliciting charities. Turning to a BBB in this area seemed to stem naturally from the public habit of asking a BBB about marketplace experience with particular for-profit businesses. Many Bureaus became active in monitoring and reporting on solicitations, in some cases working jointly with local government or other organizations, and in a few instances serving as the official registering body in a community. Many local BBBs developed “Guides for Giving,” listing basic standards for groups soliciting in their areas, in response to the public demand for reports incorporating an evaluation. When the national organization was formed, it logically assumed, at the request of the Bureaus (and along with many other national functions), the job of developing information and reports on nationally soliciting organizations, for use by the many BBBs in answering their public inquiries. The Bureaus retained their important role in monitoring local and regional solicitations, and provided input to the CBBB on national groups located in their areas.

As public interest and inquiries increased at a rapid pace, the CBBB invited Helen O'Rourke to assume directorship of the national program, which expanded rapidly beginning in 1971 and which is now administered by the Philanthropic Advisory Service, a division of the CBBB. Increasingly, the BBBs, public inquirers, and corporate members pressed for some type of evaluative conclusion to CBBB reports, based on objective criteria. This demand, plus the realization that local “Guides for Giving” were far from uniform, led the Council to consult widely with nonprofit organizations, their “umbrella” groups, and related professionals about the possibility of working together to develop basic, realistic standards that would apply to a wide range of types of groups. The encouraging response resulted in a series of formal meetings, informal discussions, and written responses in 1973 and 1974. Several drafts were produced and, finally, the BBB Standards for Charitable Solicitations were issued in the fall of 1974.

The PAS is often described as a “watchdog agency” and “donors' representative.” While not inaccurate, the descriptions are a little harsher, in the first instance, and more limited, in the case of “donors' representative,” than our conception of our role.

We start from the admittedly rather obvious premise that any standards, and particularly voluntary standards, will be much more effective if they have the general support and cooperation of the particular group to which they will be applied. This is especially true of what is, fortunately for all of us, the independent-minded and diverse voluntary sector. (Our thinking stems rather logically from the traditional BBB role of developing basic service standards in cooperation with both business and consumers, monitoring advertising for accuracy, attempting to resolve consumer complaints, and reporting to consumers when firms either fail to cooperate in the resolution of complaints or refuse to abide by basic advertising and performance standards.)

In a general sense, then, we see our role as a kind of partnership with donors, philanthropic organizations, and the various regulatory and self-regulatory mechanisms in pursuit of the goals we all share: strengthening the voluntary sector, private giving, and public confidence by promoting responsible use of funds for the purposes intended by the donor.

It follows that we do not see our role as an adversarial one. When it does become adversarial, as it inevitably does with a few groups, we see that partly as a failure on our part. In practical terms, this viewpoint affects the way we develop and apply standards, and the spirit in which we deal with individual organizations in daily meetings and discussions. It means (1) that we do everything we can to help a cooperative “noncompliant” group meet the standards as quickly as possible, and (2) that we place a primary emphasis, in developing and applying standards, on the collective advice of responsible representatives of philanthropic groups and allied professions, donor representatives, and state and local monitoring agencies.

In our view, the most productive role of a “third-party” monitoring and reporting agency can be summarized by means of the following functions:

  1. Education and counseling on how to meet standards, when invited.
  2. Objective application of standards that are basic enough to:
    1. Incorporate the principal provisions of more detailed self-regulatory standards developed by and for specific categories of groups.
    2. Be applicable also to most nationally soliciting organizations, which are not covered by accrediting bodies of self-regulatory “umbrella” groups.
    3. Complement state and federal governmental monitoring, which is primarily concerned with prevention and detection of fraudulent activities; and try, along with other groups, to preclude any need for additional legislation, by promoting self-regulatory action to meet donors' reasonable expectations (e.g., responsible policymaking procedures and fundraising practices, use of funds for the purposes given, financial accountability through external audits, and truthful information materials).
  3. Provide advisory services, and reports on individual groups, to potential donors and other inquirers such as the media and state regulatory agencies. In providing these services, the monitoring group should try to communicate, when necessary, an understanding of extenuating factors that may produce unavoidably high fundraising costs, and other special circumstances that should be considered in evaluating, for example, new organizations. In addition, all reporting of noncompliance with standards should explain the reasons, so readers may evaluate independently and make their own decisions about giving.

In its relations with charitable groups, the monitoring/reporting agency does act as the donors' “stand-in,” since it is trying to help ensure that tax-exempt charities, with their privileged status in society, carry out their fiduciary responsibilities in a manner consistent with their stated purposes and donors' reasonable expectations about how their contributions will be used.

To represent the donors' interests most effectively, and also deal fairly with philanthropic organizations, the monitoring or “watchdog” agency must ensure that:

  1. The standards applied are attainable by responsible organizations operating in the “real world,” rather than idealistic goals that might produce unjust “ratings” discouraging socially useful efforts. Put another way, they must be reasonable enough to encourage well-intentioned groups to cooperate in trying to meet them, thus contributing to an overall improvement in operating standards and more effective use of many millions of donors' dollars.
  2. The standards are applied consistently and objectively to all groups, yet incorporate enough flexibility to take into account genuine and unavoidable extenuating circumstances (not an easy balance, which is why we continually seek input and advice from a wide variety of sources).
  3. The standards, and supplementary guidelines, are specific and detailed enough so that (a) interested organizations can readily determine what is required to meet them, and (b) potential donors may use them as practical guides to independent evaluations.
  4. The monitoring agency works cooperatively rather than punitively with inexperienced or uninformed organizations, so that potentially valuable efforts are encouraged rather than squelched.

Perhaps the most fruitful path to more effective monitoring and enforcement of standards is greater communication and coordination among all groups involved in these efforts. Our efforts in this area have been concentrated thus far in these activities:

  1. Involvement of charities, accountants, legal experts, professional fundraisers, donors, and others in the development of standards.
  2. Establishment of an Advisory Committee on Standards Application, representing the same categories, to advise us on guidelines for applying the standards as equitably as possible. It is important for the monitoring agency to establish formal mechanisms for continual communication and feedback from both donors and the philanthropic community. To provide this kind of input, we also consult with our Corporate Advisory Committee on the needs and expectations of this donor category, and a Better Business Bureau Advisory Committee to keep us in touch with the needs and views of the Bureaus' public inquirers across the country, as well as BBB problems and needs as local monitoring/reporting groups.6
  3. Regular consultations with professionals such as nonprofit accounting specialists, as well as daily exchanges of information with many state regulatory agencies.

We see a need to increase communication with the other standard-setting and self-regulatory organizations. We are developing a file of existing sets of standards, and plan to help identify the broad areas of agreement among them (as well as divergences), to pinpoint areas where focused communication may prove fruitful.

§ 9.3 STANDARDS APPLIED BY WATCHDOG AGENCIES

A charitable organization that is made subject to standards set and enforced by a watchdog agency has certain rights with respect to the standards themselves and the manner in which they are applied.

For the most part, these rights cannot rise to the level of constitutional protections, such as are accorded pursuant to the principles of due process enunciated in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and in comparable provisions in the constitutions of states. This is because due process rights are generally granted only with respect to actions by a government. The state action doctrine, however, can mandate adherence to due process requirements by a nongovernmental organization when there is sufficient entanglement between government and the nongovernmental group, such as in the form of support or activities in tandem.7

Nonetheless, where a nongovernmental organization promulgates and enforces standards, there are two situations where the law requires that the standards and the application of them be fair.

The first of these situations is the presence of an economic factor. That is, where the power of the standards enforcement agency becomes so great as to cause adverse economic consequences to the charity that is ranked as not meeting standards, the courts can intervene to rectify the application of unfair standards or the unfair application of standards.8 The test in either circumstance is whether the standards and/or the administration of them are fair or reasonable.9 There is no question that the ratings of and reports on charitable organizations by watchdog agencies have economic consequences to the affected charities; individual and corporate donors rely on the listings in determining which organizations are to receive their gifts; private foundations and other grantors similarly rely on these listings in determining their grantees; state governmental agencies take the status of charities in relation to the independent agencies' standards into account in determining the status of charities under the states' charitable solicitation acts; and the IRS from time to time relies on the rankings of these agencies.10 Moreover, the watchdog agencies readily provide information to the media, and the resulting publicity can cause one or more of the same three results to occur.

The second of these situations is when the agency's ratings power is in an area of public concern.11 Again, there is little doubt that these agencies envision themselves as operating in the public interest, by forcing disclosure of information to the public and otherwise acting to benefit prospective donors. Public reliance on the watchdog agencies' pronouncements has become so great as to make a national organization's fundraising success significantly dependent on a favorable rating, or to divert gifts from a national organization that receives a negative rating. A positive rating accorded a charity by a watchdog agency may well confer on the charity a significant “competitive” advantage in relation to one or more organizations that receive an adverse rating.

The foregoing two principles have been succinctly stated elsewhere: “Self regulation programs should be based on clearly defined standards that plainly indicate what is considered proper and improper. Vague standards invite arbitrary action,” and “[s]tandards once set also should be administered in a reasonable manner.”12

The setting and application of standards by the watchdog agencies are squarely subject to both of these threshold tests; fundamental fairness dictates that their enforcement of standards be on the basis of processes that are reasonable.

§ 9.4 PHILANTHROPIC ADVISORY SERVICE STANDARDS

The PAS was the division of the CBBB that monitored and reported on nationally soliciting charitable organizations. The primary goal of the division, which began substantive operations in 1971, was to promote ethical standards of business practices and protect consumers through self-regulation and monitoring activities. The PAS standards are considered here because of their historical significance.

The PAS standards covered five basic areas: public accountability, use of funds, solicitations and informational materials, fundraising practices, and governance.

(a) Public Accountability

In the area of public accountability, PAS required that a charity provide, on request, an annual report that includes various items of information about the charity's purposes, current activities, governance, and finances. A charity also was required to provide on request a complete annual financial statement, including an accounting of all income and fundraising costs of controlled or affiliated entities.

A charity also was required to provide “present adequate information [in financial statements] to serve as a basis for informed decisions.” According to the PAS, information needed as a basis for informed decisions includes items such as significant categories of contributions and other income, expenses reported in categories corresponding to major programs and activities, a detailed description of expenses by “natural classification” (e.g., salaries, employee benefits, and postage), accurate presentation of fundraising and administrative costs, the total cost of multipurpose activities, and the method used for allocating costs among the activities.

Organizations that received a substantial portion of their income as the result of fundraising activities of controlled or affiliated entities were required to provide, on request, an accounting of all income received by and fundraising costs incurred by these entities.

(b) Use of Funds

As to “use of funds,” PAS required that a charity spend a “reasonable percentage” of total income on programs, as well as a “reasonable percentage” of contributions on activities that are in accordance with donor expectations. In this context, PAS defined a “reasonable percentage” to mean “at least” 50 percent. Charities were also expected to ensure that their fundraising costs were “reasonable.” In this context, fundraising costs are reasonable if those costs do “not exceed” 35 percent of related contributions. In the area of total fundraising and administrative costs, PAS standards also provided that these costs be “reasonable.” In this latter context, these costs were reasonable if they do “not exceed” 50 percent of total income. A charity was required to establish and exercise “adequate controls” over its disbursements.

Soliciting organizations were required to substantiate, on request, their application of funds, in accordance with donor expectations, to the programs and other activities described in solicitations.

(c) Solicitations and Informational Materials

In the area of “solicitations and informational materials,” PAS standards required that these materials be “accurate, truthful and not misleading, both in whole or in part.” These terms were not defined. Solicitation materials also were required to include a “clear description” of the program and other activities for which funds are requested. Solicitations that describe an issue, problem, need, or event but do not clearly describe the programs or other activities for which funds are requested did not meet the standard for accuracy and truthfulness.

Direct contact solicitations (including telephone appeals) were required to identify the solicitor and his or her relationship to the benefiting organization, the benefiting organization or cause, and the programs or other activities for which funds are requested. Solicitations in conjunction with the sale of goods, services, or admissions were required to identify, among other things, the “actual or anticipated portion” of the sales or admission price that will benefit the charitable organization or cause.

(d) Fundraising Practices

As to fundraising practices, PAS standards provided that soliciting organizations must “establish and exercise controls” over fundraising activities by their staff, employees, volunteers, consultants, and contractors, including the use of written contracts and agreements. Organizations must establish and exercise “adequate controls” over the contributions they receive. Donor requests for confidentiality were required to be honored, including requests that a donor's name not be exchanged, rented, or sold. Fundraising was required to be conducted “without excessive pressure.” Examples of excessive pressure included solicitations in the guise of invoices, harassment, intimidation, coercion, threats of public disclosure or economic retaliation, and “strongly emotional appeals which distort the organization's activities or beneficiaries.”

(e) Governance

In the category of “governance,” PAS standards required three elements. First, an “adequate governing structure” was required. This meant that the governing instruments must set forth the organization's goals and purposes, define the organization's structure, and identify the body having authority over policies and programs (including the authority to amend the governing instruments). A governing structure was defined to be inadequate if any policymaking decisions of the governing body or executive committee were made by “fewer than three persons.”

Second, an “active governing body” was required. To meet this standard, the governing body was mandated to, among other things, meet formally “at least three times annually, with meetings evenly spaced over the course of the year, and with a majority of the members in attendance (in person or by proxy) on average.” If the full board met only once annually, at least two additional, evenly spaced executive committee meetings during the year were required.

Third, adequate governance required that there be an “independent governing body.” Organizations did not meet this standard if “directly and/or indirectly compensated board members constitute[d] more than one-fifth of the total voting membership of the board or of the executive committee.” (The ordained clergy of a “publicly soliciting church,” however, were excepted from this 20 percent limitation.) Organizations did not meet this third standard if board members had material conflicting interests resulting from any relationship or business affiliation.

§ 9.5 BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE STANDARDS

The BBB (Better Business Bureau) Wise Giving Alliance was formed in 2001, the product of the merger of the National Charities Information Bureau into the CBBB Foundation and the PAS. The Alliance is affiliated with the CBBB.

According to its website, the Alliance “collects and distributes information on hundreds of nonprofit organizations that solicit [contributions] nationally or have national or international program services.” It “routinely asks such organizations for information about their programs, governance, fund raising practices, and finances when the charities have been the subject of inquiries.”

The Alliance “selects charities for evaluation based on the volume of donor inquiries about individual organizations.” The organization serves “donors' information needs” and helps donors “to make their own decisions regarding charitable giving.”

The Alliance issued 20 “Standards for Charity Accountability.” These standards include the following.

(a) Board Oversight

The Alliance standards seek to ensure that the governing boards of charitable organizations are “active, independent and free of self-dealing.” To meet these standards, an organization must have a governing board that “provides adequate oversight of the charity's operations and its staff.” Evidence of this oversight includes “regularly scheduled appraisals of the CEO's performance, evidence of disbursement controls such as board approval of the budget, fund raising practices, establishment of a conflict of interest policy, and establishment of accounting procedures sufficient to safeguard charity finances.”

(b) Finances

The Alliance is of the view that a charity's finances can “identify organizations that may be demonstrating poor financial management and/or questionable accounting practices.” It seeks to ensure that the charity is “financially transparent and spends its funds in accordance with its mission and donor expectations.” Acknowledging that there may be cases where an organization may not meet certain of these standards, the Alliance leaves open the possibility that an organization may nonetheless demonstrate that its use of funds is reasonable and complies with these standards.

One standard is that an organization must expend at least 65 percent of its funds for program. Another standard requires that an organization spend no more than 35 percent of contributions, derived from fundraising, on fundraising efforts. Still another standard mandates that the charity's unrestricted net assets available for use should not be more than three times the size of the previous year's expenses or three times the size of the current year's budget, whichever is higher.

A charitable organization should include in its financial statements a breakdown of expenses, such as salaries and travel, that shows the portions of these expenses that were allocated to program, fundraising, and administrative activities. If the organization has more than one major program category, there should be a breakdown for each category.

A charitable organization must accurately report its expenses, including any joint cost allocations, in its financial statements. The Alliance notes that financial statements that “inaccurately claim zero fund raising expenses or otherwise understate the amount a charity spends on fund raising, and/or overstates the amount it spends on programs[,]” do not meet these standards.

(c) Solicitation Materials

The Alliance observes that a “fundraising appeal is often the only contact a donor has with a charity and may be the sole impetus for giving.” Thus, the standards “seek[] to ensure that a charity's representations to the public are accurate, complete and respectful.”

One Alliance standard requires that solicitations and informational materials be “accurate, truthful and not misleading, both in whole and in part.” It is said that “[a]ppeals that omit a clear description of program(s) for which contributions are sought will not meet this standard.” Also, a charity should be able to “substantiate that the timing and nature of its expenditures are in accordance with what is stated, expressed, or implied in the charity's solicitations.”

A charitable organization should have an annual report, available to all, and website disclosures that include the entity's mission statement, a summary of its prior year's program service accomplishments, a roster of the members of the governing board and its officers, and financial information that includes total income for the prior year, expenses in the program, fundraising, administration categories, and ending net assets.

§ 9.6 EVANGELICAL COUNCIL FOR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY STANDARDS

The primary watchdog agency for religious organizations is the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (ECFA). Founded in 1979, ECFA promulgated and monitors member organization compliance with its “Seven Standards of Responsible Stewardship.” (Nonmember organizations are not monitored.) On its website, ECFA states that its standards are “drawn from Scripture” and are “fundamental to operating with integrity.”

(a) Governing Board

ECFA standards require that member organizations have “responsible” boards consisting of at least five individuals. A majority of this board must be “independent,” defined to exclude employees of the organization, those who are related by blood or marriage, and those who receive “significant” remuneration from the organization. The board must meet at least semiannually to “establish policy and review its accomplishments.”

(b) Financial Statements

Every ECFA organization is required to have complete and accurate financial statements. The governing board or a committee consisting of a majority of independent members must approve engagement of an independent certified public accountant, review the financial statements, and maintain “appropriate communication” with the CPA. The board is to be advised of any “material weaknesses in internal control or other significant risks.”

(c) Fundraising

The ECFA standards state that, in securing charitable gifts, “all representations of fact, descriptions of the financial condition of the organization, or narratives about events must be current, complete, and accurate.” References to past activities or events must be appropriately dated. There must be “no material omissions or exaggerations of fact, use of misleading photographs, or any other communication which would tend to create a false impression or misunderstanding.”

An appeal for charitable gifts should only contain information that is specifically relevant to the purpose of the appeal. The appeal should provide financial information that is as current and timely as possible. The appeal should “include all the information necessary for the prospective giver to gain a full and total understanding of the facts related to the appeal.”

Statements made about the use of gifts by an organization in its charitable gift appeals must be honored. A donor's intent relates both to what was communicated in the appeal and to any instructions accompanying the gift, if accepted by the organization. Appeals for charitable gifts must not create unrealistic expectations of what a gift will in fact accomplish.

ECFA organizations must issue appropriate gift acknowledgments for charitable gifts and must refrain from issuing gift acknowledgments for transactions that do not represent charitable contributions. It is said that “[p]roviding proper gift acknowledgments for cash and noncash contributions is a fundamental way for organizations to comply with the law and demonstrate integrity with givers.”

When dealing with persons regarding commitments on major gifts, an ECFA organization's representatives must seek to guide and advise donors to “adequately consider their broad interests.” An organization must make every effort to avoid knowingly accepting a gift from, or entering into a contract with, a contributor that “would place a hardship on the giver or place the giver's future well-being in jeopardy.”

An ECFA organization may not base compensation of outside “stewardship resource consultants” or its staff, directly or indirectly, on a percentage of charitable contributions raised. ECFA states that percentage-based payments “have the potential to place the self-interest of the person raising the funds above the donor's.”

§ 9.7 STANDARDS FOR EXCELLENCE INSTITUTE STANDARDS

The Standards for Excellence Institute is a membership organization of charitable entities that claims, in its marketing material, to uphold higher standards “than the minimal requirements imposed by local, state, and federal laws and regulations.” This program was launched to “strengthen nonprofit governance and management, while also enhancing the public's trust in the nonprofit sector.” This organization “promotes widespread application of a comprehensive system of self-regulation in the nonprofit sector.” These standards are based on the “fundamental values of honesty, integrity, fairness, respect, trust, compassion, responsibility, and accountability, and provide guidelines for how nonprofit organizations should act to be ethical and accountable in their programs operations, governance, human resources, financial management, and fundraising.”

The Standards for Excellence Institute publishes its “Standards for Excellence: An Ethics and Accountability Code for the Nonprofit Sector.” The Institute's goals for this program are to “strengthen nonprofits and improve the public's trust of nonprofit organizations.”

(a) Legal Compliance

The Institute states that nonprofit organizations must be “aware of and comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws.” This includes laws pertaining to “IRS filing requirements, governance, human resources, licensing, financial accountability, taxation, valuation of in-kind gifts, unrelated business income, document retention and destruction, related entities, data security, accessibility, fundraising, lobbying, and advocacy.”

(b) Financial Reporting and Monitoring

The Institute states that nonprofit organizations should, on a timely basis, create and maintain reports that accurately reflect the financial activity of the organization. Internal financial statements should be prepared at least quarterly, be provided to the members of the governing board, and identify and explain any material variation between actual and budgeted revenue and expenses. The board should annually review the percentages of the organization's resources expended for program, administration, and fundraising.

(c) Resource Development Plans

The Institute requires a resource development plan, namely, a plan in the nature of a “framework for ensuring appropriate financial resources for the organization, and a reasonable process to evaluate cost effectiveness of all resource development activities.” This plan should be board-approved, regularly reviewed, and be in accordance with the organization's budget.

(d) Fundraising Costs and Activities

The Institute's view is that an organization's fundraising costs should be “reasonable over time.” On average, over a five-year period, an organization should “realize revenues from fundraising that are at least three times the amount spent on conducting them.” Organizations with a fundraising ratio of less than 3:1 should “demonstrate that they are making steady progress toward achieving this goal, or should be able to justify why a 3:1 ratio is not appropriate for their organization.”

The Institute states that solicitation and promotional materials should be “accurate and truthful and should correctly identify the organization, its mission, and the intended uses of the solicited funds.” All statements made by the organization in its fundraising appeals “about the use of a contribution should be honored.” Solicitations should be “free from undue influence or excessive pressure, and should be respectful of the needs and interest of the donor or potential donor.”

When using the services of a paid professional fundraising consultant, organizations should only use the services of professional solicitors and fundraising consultants who are “properly registered with the appropriate state authorities.” Organizations should exercise control over staff, volunteers, consultants, contractors, other organizations, or businesses that are known to be soliciting contributions on behalf of the organization. Resource development personnel, whether employees or independent consultants, should not be compensated on the basis of a percentage of the amount raised or other commission formula.

(e) Donor Relationships and Privacy

The Institute states that nonprofit organizations should “respect the donor's right to determine how their name and contact information is used, including providing opportunities to remain anonymous, request that the organization curtail repeated mailings or telephone solicitations from in-house lists, and have their names removed from any mailing lists which are sold, rented, or exchanged.” Organizations must “honor the known intentions of a donor regarding the use of any and all types of donation,” including cash, securities, cryptocurrency, and in-kind gifts.

(f) Acceptance of Gifts

An organization should have policies in place to govern the acceptance and disposition of charitable gifts. These policies should include “procedures to determine any limits on individuals or entities from which the organization will accept a gift, the purposes for which donations will be accepted, the type of property which will be accepted, and whether to accept an unusual or unexpected gift in light of the organization's mission and organizational capacity.”

§ 9.8 PANEL ON NONPROFIT SECTOR FUNDRAISING PRINCIPLES

The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, convened by Independent Sector, issued, in 2007, its “Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice” for public and private charitable organizations. At that time, the Panel stated that the principles are predicated on the need for a “careful balance between the two essential forms of regulation—that is, between prudent legal mandates to ensure that organizations do not abuse the privilege of their exempt status, and, for all other aspects of sound operations, well-informed self-governance and mutual awareness among nonprofit organizations.” These principles, organized under four categories, are legal compliance and public disclosure, effective governance, strong financial oversight, and responsible fundraising. The principles were revised in 2015.

The fundraising principles state that solicitation materials and other communications addressed to prospective donors and the public “must clearly identify the organization and be accurate and truthful.”

Contributions “must be used for purposes consistent with the donor's intent, whether as described in the relevant solicitation materials or as specifically directed by the donor.”

A charitable organization “must provide donors with specific acknowledgments of charitable contributions, in conformance with [federal tax law] requirements.”

An organization should adopt a clear and appropriate gift acceptance policy.

An organization “should provide training and supervision of the persons soliciting funds on its behalf to ensure that they understand their responsibilities and applicable federal, state, and local laws, and do not employ techniques that are coercive, intimidating, or intended to harass potential donors.”

An organization “should not compensate internal or external fundraisers based on a commission or a percentage of the amount raised.”

An organization “should respect the privacy of individual donors and, except where disclosure is required by law, should not sell or otherwise make available the names and contact information of its donors without providing them an opportunity at least once a year to opt out of the use of their names.”

§ 9.9 CHARITY NAVIGATOR STANDARDS

Charity Navigator, it states on its website, “guides your intelligent giving.” The entity “help[s] people give to charities with confidence and shine[s] a light on truly effective organizations.”

(a) Rating Criteria

Generally, Charity Navigator rates public charities13 that file a Form 990 annual information return.14 It, however, does not rate schools (including colleges and universities) and their foundations, hospitals and their foundations, donor-advised funds,15 sorority and fraternity foundations, and fiscal sponsors.

This agency utilizes the following criteria for the charitable organizations it rates; they must be (1) charities that generate at least $1 million in revenue for two consecutive years; (2) organizations that have been in existence for at least seven years;16 (3) organizations that have at least $500,000 in public support, which accounts for at least 40 percent of their total revenue for at least two consecutive years; (4) organizations with at least 1 percent of their expenses allocated to fundraising for three consecutive years; and (5) organizations that have at least 1 percent of their expenses allocated to administration for three consecutive years.

(b) Standards

Charity Navigator employs a two-tiered charity classification system. There are 11 widely used categories of charitable activity, with 38 causes under these categories. It uses the activity codes that charities select in their filings with the IRS, it determines the charities' activities, and it examines the charities' financial information to determine their financial functionality.

Charity Navigator states that its “ratings show donors how efficiently a charity will use their support, how well it has sustained its programs and services over time, and their level of commitment to accountability and transparency.” It notes that its “ratings aren't rankings—we designate charities' specific ratings based on their score in our two categories of evaluation.”

This organization believes its ratings “improve the quality and quantity if information available to intelligent givers.” Its ratings are said to provide “clear, objective, and reliable assessments of both the Financial Health and Accountability & Transparency of charities.” By using its ratings, Charity Navigator states, “donors can learn how a charity compares on these performance metrics with other charities throughout the country.”

Other information, outside its ratings, is provided by Charity Navigator. The items include compensation of charities' chief executive officers, an income statement, total net assets, and the organizations' mission statement.

(c) Advisories

Charity Navigator states that, when it learns of information (presumably adverse) about the operations of a charity or an alleged charity, the information is reviewed by the CN Advisory Issuance Committee. This can lead to publication of a CN Advisory. When considering publication of an advisory, this committee considers (1) the credibility and timeliness of the information; (2) the nature, scope, and seriousness of the allegations or convictions; (3) whether the allegations have been proven; and (4) other factors on a case-by-case basis. The CN Advisory System categorizes advisories into three levels of concern: low, moderate, and high. The committee lacks the capability to independently assess the accuracy of the information. The committee, Charity Navigator states, “views its role as determining if a donor might find such information helpful when considering a contribution to the organization.”

If a charity's contact information is accessible, Charity Navigator notifies the organization in advance of publication of an advisory to provide the charity an opportunity to submit information about the issue(s) that gave rise to the proposed advisory. Charities with a CN Advisory may provide information concerning it at any time. Even if the information does not warrant revocation of the advisory, Charity Navigator “reserves the right to make the information available to ensure donors have access to all recent and relevant information.”

Low Concern CN Advisories generally remain in place at least six months; High-to-Moderate Concern CN Advisories generally are in place for a minimum of 12 months. If a charity can provide reliable and accessible documentation to demonstrate that the issues identified have been resolved and steps have been taken to prevent the issue from recurring, an advisory may be removed sooner. If a rated charity has a CN Advisory for failing to report fundraising costs, Charity Navigator will consider removing the advisory if it receives an amended Form 990 detailing the charity's fundraising expenses, along with evidence that the IRS has also received the amended return. If a charity in this circumstance does not amend its return, Charity Navigator will consider removing the advisory if the charity reports fundraising expenses on its Form 990 for three consecutive years going forward. For a CN Advisory to be lifted in this instance, fundraising expenses must amount to no less than 1 percent of the charity's total functional expenses.

When Charity Navigator removes a CN Advisory, an archived version of the advisory will remain in the historical section of the charity profile page. An archived advisory will include information that caused removal of the advisory. Thus, Charity Navigator states, “donors have an opportunity to learn about and understand the issues the charity previously faced and how it resolved those issues.”

§ 9.10 CHARITYWATCH STANDARDS

The watchdog agency CharityWatch has been in existence since 1992, founded as the American Institute of Philanthropy. (The name change occurred in 2012.) On its website, CharityWatch characterizes itself as “America's most independent, assertive charity watchdog.” The organization observes that it “does not merely repeat what a charity reports using simplistic or automated formulas” but “dive[s] deep to let you know how efficiently a charity will use your donation to fund the programs you want to support.”

(a) Evaluation Procedure

CharityWatch states that its analysts perform “in-depth evaluations of complex charity financial reporting,” including audited financial statements, annual information returns, and state filings. Once this analysis is complete and “any required adjustments are made,” CharityWatch engages in two “end calculations.” One calculation focuses on the percentage of funds a charity expended during the year involved on its charitable programs. The other calculation determines an organization's fundraising costs percentage. Thereafter, CharityWatch assigns the charities it evaluates a “letter grade efficiency rating” on an A+ to F scale.

CharityWatch considers a charity to be “highly efficient” when its end calculations produce a program percentage of at least 75 percent and a fundraising cost percentage of no more than 25 percent. A charity is bestowed a rating of A+ when, for the year involved, its program percentage is in the range of 90–100 percent and its fundraising cost percentage is no more than 4 percent. A charity receives a grade of F where, for the year, its program expenditure is 35 percent or less and its fundraising cost percentage is in the 60–100 percent range.

In making its determinations, when computing fundraising cost percentages, CharityWatch compares fundraising costs to only related contributions. That is, in computing this percentage, revenue sources such as investment income, sales proceeds, and program service revenue are disregarded.

(b) “Required” Adjustments

As to the matter of “required adjustments,” there are at least four warranting mention. In making these percentage calculations, CharityWatch does not take into account value of noncash gifts and gifts of services. (This is said to be the case because charities “have incentive to inflate the values they place on” these types of contributions.) Likewise, CharityWatch does not adhere to the accounting profession's rules concerning “joint costs”17 and, in that context, reallocates the amount the charity allocated to program to the fundraising category in making its “end calculations.” When a charity's available assets in reserve exceed the amount of its annual budget for three years, CharityWatch downgrades its final letter grade rating. Where a complex organizational structure requires several entities, CharityWatch's audits may eliminate related-party transactions.

(c) Publication Policy

CharityWatch states that it publishes its ratings to “help donors understand how efficiently their contributions to charities are being raised and spent.” It stresses that the letter grade ratings “represent the opinion of CharityWatch and are based solely on financial efficiency measurements.” It states that it “encourages donors to consider a charity's financial efficiency along with other qualitative factors when making their giving decisions.”

§ 9.11 STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT

There is no law bearing specifically on standards enforcement by watchdog agencies regarding charitable organizations involved in fundraising. Analogous principles of law, however, are developing with respect to comparable membership association activities and similar activities carrying antitrust overtones (such as accreditation). It is possible to extrapolate from these parallel fields of law to arrive at some basic conclusions concerning standards setting and enforcement in the charitable fundraising context.

(a) General Principles

Courts are reluctant to intervene in the matter of independent standards enforcement. Thus, one court observed that “[c]ourts ordinarily ought not to intrude upon areas of associational decision involving specialized knowledge” and that “[p]rivate associations must have considerable latitude in rule-making in order to accomplish their objectives and their private law generally is binding on those who wish to remain members.”18 The organizations that are rated by the watchdog agencies usually are not members of the agencies, but the courts—in the absence of compelling circumstances—are likely to avoid passing on the merits of watchdog agency fundraising standards.

Similarly, there is no legal obstacle to the promulgation of such standards. Again, to allude to the law of membership associations, it is clear that these organizations have the power to establish operating rules and to set guidelines for the expulsion of members.19

Associations also possess the inherent right to suspend or expel a member or otherwise to enforce disciplinary rules.20 Again, the point of the analogy is that watchdog agencies have the authority not only to establish standards, but also to apply them.

Just as disciplinary action by an association against one of its members must be reasonable,21 however, so must enforcement of watchdog agency fundraising standards be fair. If there ever is intervention in this field by a court, it will undoubtedly be in this context to preclude the application of standards in a manner that will unjustly cause damage or otherwise be unfair to those to whom the standard is being applied. Thus, courts “will relieve against any expulsion based on rules which are in conflict with public policy.”22

(b) Fair Enforcement of Standards

Fair enforcement of these standards includes the following elements:

  1. The standards must be understandable, so that an organization will have an authentic opportunity to comply with them and be on notice that certain consequences will follow where this compliance is not achieved. For example, the PAS standards require fundraising costs to be reasonable. As noted, this raises substantive questions as to definition and computation.23 Yet there were no public pronouncements by the PAS as to the meaning of this requirement, although there were cases in which organizations were on the PAS “Do Not Meet Standards” list because their fundraising costs were said to not meet the standards. Needless to say, it is difficult for any organization to rebut such a finding when it is not provided with the reasons for the finding.
  2. Before any adverse action (such as publication of ratings), the agency should afford the charitable organization the opportunity to refute the charges against it. An ex parte investigation alone is insufficient in relation to the requirements of a fair procedure.24 An organization in these circumstances “should fashion its procedure to insure a fair opportunity for an applicant to present his position.”25
  3. An organization must be provided with a written explanation of the reason or reasons underlying a conclusion that it does not meet one or more standards. While this is an element of the first point, it also goes beyond it. The law requires—as elements of a fair procedure—that a charitable organization be provided with a reasonably adequate written statement of the basis for the decision, a reasonably adequate description of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, and a reasonably adequate disclosure of the information and data upon which the agency relied.26 That is, aside from the inherent fairness of knowing why a particular standard is ostensibly violated, this knowledge—in writing from the source—can be used to educate the organization's governing groups and perhaps be used in a process of remedying the situation. Also, a written explanation helps narrow the issue and enables the organization effectively to frame an appeal.
  4. Some form of meaningful appeal mechanism should be available. This mechanism does not have to be adorned with all the trappings of appellate court procedure, but there should be an opportunity for an organization—having been advised that a standard has ostensibly been violated and why—to obtain reconsideration of that decision by an objective reviewer (or review group) or at least by one who was not a participant in the decision. Thus, in one case, after observing that these matters call for “the minimal requisites of a fair procedure required by established common law principles,” a court stated that (in the face of adverse association action) “an affected individual must at least be provided with some meaningful opportunity to respond to the ‘charges’ against him.”27 Another court stated that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of justice that no man may be condemned or prejudiced in his rights without an opportunity to make his defense, and this principle is applicable not only to courts but also to labor unions and similar organizations.”28
  5. There must be a reasonable interval between the time a decision about a standards violation is announced to the organization and the time the next rating list of organizations is published. During this interim, the organization can review and perhaps revise or otherwise rectify the practice in question or pursue a more formal type of appeal. In too many cases, an organization is, for example, rotated from a “Meets Standards” listing to a “Does Not Meet Standards” listing at the same time it is notified of the change of status.
  6. In interpreting standards, a watchdog agency should not substitute its judgment on a technical matter for that of professional advisors. One of the most egregious examples of lack of adherence to this principle is where, in a situation involving a standard requiring an organization to report its finances in conformance with generally accepted accounting principles, and the organization's financial statements are accompanied by an opinion of a certified public accountant that these principles have been satisfied, the enforcers of watchdog agency standards take issue with the organization on a matter involving one or more accounting principles or reporting practices.
  7. Some watchdog agencies, in addition to formulating and enforcing standards, prepare and circulate to the public analytical reports on the programs and practices of charitable organizations. When this is done, the agency should be certain that the information contained in the report is accurate and reasonably current. While this may seem an obvious precaution, in one instance a major watchdog agency was—in one year—circulating critical information about a charitable organization taken from the organization's financial statement for its fiscal year ending four years before, even though the matter involved was rectified in subsequent fiscal years.

A watchdog agency that attempts to apply unreasonable standards or that fails to afford procedural safeguards to an organization that is the subject of its ratings may find that it is liable for damages. As one court observed: “Groups that wield economic power or exist solely for economic purposes have almost uniformly been held to a higher standard of procedural formality and regularity than voluntary noneconomic organizations.”29 While the matter may come down to a question of proof, the agency may well be found to have acted irrationally (i.e., without a reasonable basis), acted in violation of judicially protected rights of “fairness,” and maligned the organization's reputation in the philanthropic community and hence impaired its ability to attract contributions and grants. Further, it is not inconceivable that the members of the governing boards of these agencies may be found personally liable as the result of the agency's standards enforcement efforts, such as for knowingly permitting the dissemination of derogatory and damaging information known to be misleading and/or derived pursuant to illegal procedures, knowingly violating an organization's rights to a fair procedure, and otherwise willfully causing injury and damage.

(c) Litigation Potential—A Case Study

Little litigation has been initiated by fundraising charitable organizations against watchdog agencies by reason of application of one or more elements of their standards.30

The strict position of CharityWatch (then, the AIP) on the amount of assets a charitable organization should hold and its rating scheme in this context31 has been detrimental to some large, well-respected charitable organizations, including Father Flanagan's Boys Town. This case illustrated how the AIP influenced donor reactions. In 1994, the AIP assigned Father Flanagan's Boys Town an “F” grade in its Charity Guide. AIP's Charity Guide did not inform the reader that the “F” grade was automatic because Boys Town held $567 million in assets (about a five-year reserve), much of which were held in a foundation, nor did the Charity Guide provide any illuminating data regarding that foundation. Rather, the Charity Guide contained statements about illicit foundations, widespread abuse, and creative mismanagement of monies in the nonprofit world.32

The Charity Guide stated: “Some charities do a great job of ‘juggling the numbers.’ They exaggerate how much they actually spend on their charitable mission by keeping large sums of money in phony endowments or shell corporations, hoarding enough funds to operate for years, and still asking you for more … AIP is not afraid to challenge the wrongdoing of shady operators … AIP also serves as an advocate for the charitable giver by pushing nonprofit organizations and their fundraisers, attorneys and accountants to stop corrupt and wasteful practices.”33 The guide characterized Boys Town as one of the “least needy charities.”

Consequently, many donors to Boys Town understood the AIP's statements, along with its “F” rating of Boys Town, to mean that Boys Town was linked to corrupt conduct.34 The following provides some examples of the outraged responses that Boys Town received from its donor base:

“After reading the rating you received … I am surprised you would have the nerve to ask for another contribution from anyone. All these years I thought Boys Town [was] one really good charity and now it is just another rip-off.…” —Crown Point, IN

“[I've] learned that you got an F.… Too bad [Father Flanagan's] values have been abandoned.” —North Hills, CA

“Please take me off your mailing list. After reading this, I'll not be sending any more money.” —Indianapolis, IN

“Remove me from your mailing list. I will not support your fraudulent practices.” —Topeka, KS

“We cannot in good conscience send money this year because of the enclosed article. We want to support the children, not high salaries and perks for those who really don't care. We were so sorry to read this about Boys Town.” —Indianapolis, IN

“You have the nerve to ask for funds when you have a rating of F. Please don't ask me for any more funds.” —San Jose, CA

“Shame! Shame! Shame! … Enclosed is an article that opened my eyes to how you continually fleece your supporters.” —Fairfield, CT35

In response, Boys Town sued the AIP for defamation, an injunction prohibiting dissemination of the guide, and damages for the impact that the AIP's statements and implications had on Boys Town's past and potential donors. The president of the AIP was quoted as saying that the “donating public has a right to know [the facts and] … could be the big loser if we stop publishing this guide.”36 By contrast, the executive director of Boys Town said that this “watchdog has become an attack dog” and “[s]omebody has to muzzle it” because it “is causing great harm to worthy charities.”37 The parties settled the case, however, with the AIP agreeing to include a separate ranking for charities that held large asset reserves.

§ 9.12 COMMENTARY

The major problem with these watchdog agencies is the potential of their force for inflicting significant operational and financial harm on charitable organizations. A negative rating from one of these watchdogs can cripple an organization's program and fundraising efforts. Once the damage is done, it is difficult to rectify.

These agencies, as has been seen, have differing and inconsistent criteria by which they evaluate and rate charities. A charitable organization can receive a positive review under one watchdog's purview and simultaneously experience a negative review while in the clutches of another.

Ideally, one or more courts will eventually circumscribe the range of the watchdogs' standards and the manner in which they are enforced, but courts generally are reluctant to pass judgment on rules promulgated and enforced by private organizations.38

(a) Watchdog Agencies in General

There is nothing inherently inappropriate with the concept of watchdog agencies evaluating the processes of fundraising for charitable purposes. Some find this form of regulation preferable to regulation by government, but government regulation of fundraising has hardly been abated by watchdog groups or any other force.

The fact is, however, that these watchdog agencies have too frequently squandered the opportunities presented them and abused the trust they have aggregated. Mysteriously, the public, media, governments, donors, and grantors—almost without exception—unquestioningly accept the pronouncements of these organizations. For example, their proclamations on the potential for deception in charitable giving and their positions on individual charitable organizations are touted in the media; they are accepted without challenge and repeated as if objective truth.39

These agencies disseminate the ratings far and wide with statements such as “does not meet standards” or “failed to submit adequate information.” Most recipients of this material do not parse the details—an individual sees “does not meet standards” and makes his or her gift to another charity, even though the failure to meet the standards may hinge on some technicality. Thus, for example, as noted, CharityWatch, not liking a charity's level of endowment, once gave it an “F” rating and disseminated the classification to the public. These actions can cause great damage to charities that depend on public goodwill and financial support.

(b) Watchdog Agency Functions

A review of watchdog agencies' functions is warranted. Without question, the most vexing function of these entities is the rating system. It simply is not possible to, in a fair manner, condense and compare the characteristics of charitable organizations on such a simplistic plane. The standards, as well, are often so flawed—and inconsistent with legal requirements and good management practices. There is nothing wrong with reports on charitable organizations, as long as they are objective and current. Overall, however, the most useful assignment for the agencies would be the publication of educational materials about charitable giving and fundraising, largely directed at prospective donors, rather than efforts to target specific charitable organizations and to demean the sector.

One of the many ironies associated with the operation of these watchdog agencies is that their portrayal of themselves is less than forthright—indeed, is most misleading to the public. That is, they loftily characterize themselves as voluntary organizations and their standards as voluntary ones. Yet, this is blatantly false. There is nothing voluntary about adherence to these standards; charitable organizations are coerced into compliance out of fear of the otherwise adverse publicity that can quickly be unleashed by these agencies, which can whip up a material negative impression of a charity in a quote to a reporter or in a single mailing.40

Another dimension to this distressing dilemma is the enormous amount of credibility these groups have acquired, even though it is not warranted. Overzealous reporting and rating, often coupled with outright or subtle bias against the sector,41 does not deter these entities from substituting their judgment for that of accountants, fundraising executives, and lawyers, and from asserting rules that contravene sound management and legal principles for charitable organizations. It is by no means clear how this state of affairs has developed—that is, how these watchdog groups became invested with this aura of ultimate and overriding knowledge and invincibility. (The summary of the origins of the PAS observes that its image in the public mind became extrapolated from the positive reputation engendered by the CBBB because of its consumer protection services.)42

A final thought on this matter of nonproductivity. It is sad but true that the watchdog agencies, as a justification for their existence, must constantly portray the charitable sector in the darkest of terms. For example, the PAS aggressively discussed the results of a survey containing a variety of conclusions, including these: one-third of the respondents believed that charities had become less trustworthy during the previous year, 74 percent of them believed that more regulation of public charities is needed, and 49 percent said they were very concerned about levels of fundraising costs.

As another illustration, in the fall of 1994, the president of the NCIB gave a speech in which he painted a disheartening picture of the charitable sector, replete with case studies and statistics showing all manner of wrongdoing (such as excessive fundraising costs) and manipulation (such as rapacious officers) involving the nation's charitable organizations. The true impact of this portrayal was to depress everyone in the room; the listeners felt somewhat cheapened and ashamed for being associated, no matter how remotely, with such nefarious activities. Fortunately, the next segment of this program provided a tonic. That speaker observed that there is no empirical evidence to back up the immense breadth and depth of the problem as it is being depicted by the watchdog groups. He asked: “Does all of this activity amount to hunting flies with an elephant gun or chasing elephants with a flyswatter?”43 It is the former, and perhaps some day a study of the “problem” will be undertaken. It would show that only a tiny minority of charities (or ostensible charities) are causing difficulties.44

The believability of these groups has evolved to the point that few charitable organizations possess the fortitude to challenge them; charities meekly—and involuntarily—struggle to conform with the standards because of the immense power, including the ability to swiftly decrease giving to targeted charitable organizations, that the watchdog agencies have amassed. Attracted by its simplicity, these organizations tend to highlight the subject of fundraising costs, despite the unfairness of the approach; this seems to be where public charities are the most vulnerable, which contributes to their obsequiousness.45

In the meantime, the standards-setting “voluntary” agencies seize on the perception (which they assiduously foment) that much wrongdoing is occurring in charitable fundraising. Their ratings and reports continue to flow. Some day, some court—it may be hoped—will intercede and portray these groups as they really are and trim the scope of what they do.

There may come a time when an enterprising reporter or perceptive and bold judge will see through the watchdog agencies' skein of standards and ratings and expose the misleading rationale for the existence of these groups and the often harmful and counterproductive outcomes they thrust on the charitable sector.

(c) Comments on Standards

Watchdog agencies' standards pose three principal difficulties, in some instances, for fundraising charitable organizations and their advisors: (1) the continuing puerile insistence on application of percentages as to permissible or minimum expenditures for program and fundraising, (2) substitution of their views on topics for those addressed by law or accounting standards, and (3) inconsistencies within sets of standards.

As has been seen, many of these standards perpetuate the tiresome requirements that at least a certain percentage of expenditures be for program (e.g., 65, 75, or 80 percent) and that a certain percentage of expenditures be the maximum that may be expended for fundraising (e.g., 35 or 20 percent). Organizations that fail these arbitrary and capricious percentages may be permitted to demonstrate that their use of funds is nonetheless reasonable. The use of percentages in this fashion persists, even though the U.S. Supreme Court, beginning over 40 years ago, proclaimed that they are improperly used as proxies for ascertainment of the merits of fundraising charities. The Court's pronouncements struck down laws invoking these percentages and presumptions as being unconstitutional violations of free speech principles;46 these principles almost always do not apply with respect to watchdog agencies' standards.47 But the underlying rationale articulated by the Court for denigrating this use of these percentages is equally applicable in the watchdog setting.

In the first of the cases decided by the Supreme Court, the governmental entity involved regulated on the premise that any charitable organization “using more than 25 percent of its receipts on fundraising, salaries and overhead is not a charitable, but a commercial, for-profit enterprise and that to permit it to represent itself as a charity is fraudulent.”48 The Court, however, stated that this is not the proper conclusion to be drawn from these facts and that “this cannot be true of those organizations that are primarily engaged in research, advocacy or public education and that use their own paid staff to carry out these functions as well as to solicit financial support.”49 Four years later, the Court reiterated the point, observing that “there is no necessary connection between fraud and high solicitation and administrative costs.”50

It is rather astounding, then, that some watchdog agencies persist with this percentage approach even though the reasoning undergirding the practice has been so thoroughly and repeatedly discredited in the law.

These standards often meander into areas of charitable organizations' operations that are addressed by federal and/or state law. Some of this overlap is outside the realm of fundraising, such as the size and composition of governing boards, the role of these boards, term limits, and conflicts of interest. As to the latter, conflicts of interest are not inherently derogatory or illegal; sometimes these conflicts are unavoidable or even beneficial to a charitable organization. Yet, some of these standards prohibit “material conflicting interests.” That is overreaching; the emphasis should be on disclosure.

Here are some instances where watchdog agencies' standards meddle in matters involving fundraising that are best left to laws and accounting standards:

  • Some of these standards place restrictions on (or even punish for) accumulations of funds, the notion being that the monies involved should instead be currently used for programs. Some fund accumulations are in fact used for current programs, such as funds supporting scholarships, fellowships, research, and college and university chairs. These standards, however, target accumulations in the nature of reserves, endowment funds, and related “foundations,” dictating the number of years' reserves that are needed for prudent financial management. CharityWatch has a strict position on this point.51 The matter of fund accumulations should be the province of legal and financial requirements and practices, not the whims of standard-setters conjuring absolute, inflexible restrictions.
  • The federal tax law imposes detailed rules concerning charitable gift substantiation.52 Some watchdog agency standards also concern themselves with gift substantiation matters. The federal law places the responsibility for securing the requisite written acknowledgment on the donor. The ECFA standards and the Panel on Nonprofit Sector principles, however, require the organizations to provide the gift substantiation to donors. The ECFA and the Panel state that it is a federal tax law requirement for charitable organizations to provide this substantiation, although there is no such requirement. The ECFA states that its standard “is in harmony with the U.S. tax rules and does not purport to establish requirements for acknowledgments to givers beyond these rules.” But the standards do just that—impose a requirement not in the law. The standards conclude with the observation that “[p]roviding proper gift acknowledgments for cash and noncash contributions is a fundamental way for organizations to comply with the law and demonstrate integrity with donors.” The second element of this observation is correct; the first element is not.
  • The PAS standards allowed board members to vote by proxy, even though this is contrary to common law principles and is permitted by statute in only a few states.

As noted, a third problem with these watchdog standards is inconsistency within them. The ECFA standards, for example, state that, to be deductible, a charitable gift must be an “unconditional transfer of cash or property.” Elsewhere in these standards, however, it is recognized that donors may impose “restrictions” on gifts; indeed, it is added that an organization must “fulfill its responsibility to honor donor stipulations for particular exempt purposes.”

As another illustration of this point, the ECFA standards prohibit use of tax-deductible gifts to “pass money or benefits to any named individual for personal use.” Yet donor-restricted gifts are permissible. Since every individual has a name, this rule, read literally, would prohibit an ECFA organization from making scholarships, fellowships, and awards. Presumably, this standard (warranting an improvement in writing) frowns on the naming of recipients by donors.

Most of these standards state that an organization must be in compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. Certainly, ignorance of the law is no defense to a violation. Yet, in the context of charitable fundraising, how many charitable entities that fundraise nationally and are in compliance with federal law and applicable state law are also in compliance with the charitable fundraising ordinances of all of the nation's counties, cities, and towns?

Guess what the last of these transgressions is: failure to respond promptly to matters brought to the organization's attention by the watchdog agencies involved. That amply illustrates just how voluntary these standards are.53

§ 9.13 A WATCHDOG AGENCY'S RESPONSE TO COMMENTARY

The foregoing commentary attracted a response from the NCIB.54 This Response, lightly edited to conform to the book's format, follows.

The Commentary on the “watchdog” agencies is disappointing, distressing, and dishonest.

It is disappointing to those who might have expected the even-handedness of [treatment of] law in the book. It is distressing to those who are concerned with the health of the charitable sector, who believe in openness and accountability, and who promote supporting as generously as possible charities that do what they say they do and meet donors' expectations. And it is ultimately dishonest—you knew what NCIB has been saying and doing, and clearly chose to ignore or misstate facts that did not fit your preconceptions.

You are entitled (without my or anyone's permission, of course) to express any opinion you wish about organizations such as NCIB and PAS but, in a book that purports to be a standard legal reference for those concerned with fundraising, one might have hoped that the strangely nonconforming chapter on “watchdogs” had been more clearly labeled as opinion, rather than cloaked in lawyerly sounding, morally outraged phrasing. The low road traveled in high-falutin' language remains the low road.

You are so wrong in so many statements that I hardly know where to begin or end a commentary on what you have written. Let me, for the record, cite a few of the more blatant examples of your adherence to wrong opinion and incorrect fact.

It is stated: “In too many cases, an organization is, for example, rotated from a ‘Meets Standards’ listing to a ‘Does Not Meet Standards’ listing at the same time it is notified of the change in status.” That is an outright untruth. NCIB gives organizations prior notice of such a change in status and sends all organizations prepublication copies of new reports about them, along with an explanatory letter seeking their input. We state a future date on which we will make our new report available to the public if we do not hear back. If organizations perceive the time as too short, they may call us and seek an extension, which we always agree to, even if it is several weeks or even longer. During this waiting period, an organization is listed as “Report on Update” and is never “rotated” from a “Meets” to “Not” listing as you describe.

When it was written that “it is sad but true that the watchdog agencies, as a justification for their existence, must constantly portray the charitable sector in the darkest terms,” you are again stating something you know to be untrue. That is an absurd statement. NCIB has clearly and strongly stated that “the great majority of charities do their work well and merit the generous support of contributors”—a statement we have made in several ways, consistently, in print and in speaking, over an extended period, including while the book was being prepared and well before it was published. You are the party with the dark paintbrush and preconceived vested interest here.

Outrage was professed in the Commentary that, in “an egregious lack of adherence to … principle,” NCIB and PAS “take issue with the organization on a matter involving one or more accounting principles or reporting practices” after that organization has reported its finances in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Either the Commentary is based on a naive belief that GAAP guidance is precise, concrete, and all-satisfying, or it offers a new and definitive example of disingenuousness. If you become interested in factual candor at some future time, you may wish to begin your education about GAAP and other matters by reading Regina Herzlinger's article in the March–April issue of the Harvard Business Review, entitled “Can Public Trust in Nonprofits and Governments Be Restored?” You may also know of Professor Herzlinger as the senior author of Financial Accounting and Management Control of Nonprofit Organizations. Professor H. David Sherman's sidebar on “The Gaps in GAAP” might be enlightening to one who seeks enlightenment. The point is, as representatives of AICPA and FASB routinely state, that GAAP allows wide interpretation, and any given interpretation may not satisfy all relevant perspectives. One can reasonably assume that an expert like you already knew all of this and deliberately chose to distort the picture by ignoring it.

The Commentary harps on my talk at the “Fund Raising and the Law” meeting in Washington. Yes, I did report what reliable polls indicate concerning public opinion about the trustworthiness, efficiency, and effectiveness of the philanthropic sector and specifically about fundraisers. I did not make up the “statistics,” nor did I think that playing ostrich as if people's opinions did not exist or did not matter was an appropriate exercise. I also did not think I was asked to give a pep talk—although I will freely admit that I might appropriately have put more positives into that particular presentation. My purpose was to encourage those attending the conference to adopt three courses of action: to conduct themselves professionally in accordance with such principles as those expressed in the “Donor Bill of Rights,” to work hard to restore public confidence in sound charities and sound fundraising, and to drum out of the profession those who consistently bring philanthropy and fundraising into disrepute. If the effect of my words was “to depress everyone in the room,” I did not succeed in my goal—although a reliable witness asserts that it was you, bad-mouthing my presentation after I left, who worked hard to convince the participants that they should be depressed. It is not a matter of either elephant guns or flyswatters, but of facing up to reality and building up the goodwill and credibility that philanthropy and fundraising must have.

Finally, as I have previously informed you more than once, I personally do not subscribe to a “dark” picture of America's charities, nor would I lead an organization that did. I have devoted three decades of my life to this sector and have been raising funds for most of that time. I firmly believe that fundraising for charitable causes is a desirable means to a desirable end. I applaud it and those who do it properly and well—and I absolutely believe that is the overwhelming majority of those involved. I condemn the small minority whose actions sling mud on good practitioners and on our sector precisely because they injure contributors, charities, and all the good fundraisers.

All these things you have known, but chose to ignore. Where, one wonders, in your definition of law, does such purposeful ignorance and misstatement as you have put forth become just plain distortion, dishonesty, and defamation? There is no need for you to try to respond, as the self-serving bias of any answer you might give is already abundantly clear.

Your readers surely hoped for more integrity and less pandering to personal prejudgments and special interests than you have shown. I write far more in sorrow than in anger at the serious disservice you have done to our sector.

§ 9.14 REPLY TO RESPONSE

By virtue of the foregoing Response, one is not confined to the watchdog agencies' reports on charitable organizations to glean examples of the literary devices they so often employ: the arrogant tone, misleading phraseology, innuendo, misstatement of fact, attention-shifting to irrelevant points, and emphasis on insignificant detail to either obscure or taint the big picture.

For arrogance, nothing can surpass the concession that commentators are entitled to express opinions on the watchdog agencies absent their prior consent. Concerns about fair process are dismissed as “lawyerly sounding” phrasing and “high-falutin'” language. The Response stated that NCIB ceased rotating charities from one category to another without notice. That was a commendable development and it was nice that the organization stopped engaging in the practice, but was a trivial point in relation to the vast panorama of due process violations routinely committed by the watchdog agencies.

The most casual comparison of the Commentary with the Response yields the fact that the latter wholly sidestepped the essence of the former, which is that (1) the watchdog agencies are self-appointed and self-styled; (2) they are accountable to no external authority or constituency; (3) they falsely portray themselves as “voluntary” agencies; (4) they wield enormous leverage over hapless charities (which often comply out of fear) because of the power of the watchdogs' ratings and reports; and (5) they have never been subject to much external scrutiny. The Response is silent across the board in these regards.

The one concrete example to be found in the Response is telling in two respects. This is the matter of application of generally accepted accounting principles. There is no question that these principles are the subject of considerable interpretation. But it should be obvious that the place to begin in understanding and applying GAAP is the principles themselves and the interpretations by those who are professionally competent to interpret them, namely, certified public accountants. The bias of the NCIB in this regard was dramatically revealed when the Response stated that, to understand GAAP, one must initially turn to sources that criticize the principles. The fact is that the watchdog agencies often do not like the conclusions mandated by GAAP, and thus they openly attach themselves to any source that denigrates them. The point of the Commentary was not that the watchdog agencies interpret GAAP; it was that they substitute their judgment for that of the professionals who possess the competence to interpret these principles.

Overall, a lawyer's concern for the procedural and substantive rights of charitable organizations caught up in the clutches of one or more of the watchdog agencies becomes characterized by the Response as pandering to “special interests.” Over five decades of law practice (in the case of the senior author), witnessing charities mistreated and miscast by these groups becomes “personal prejudgment” and “self-serving bias.” And that is just the beginning: What to make of charges of “distortion, dishonesty, and defamation”? Probably the best approach is to simply accord these claims the credence they are due, as reflected in the fact that the source of them grandly asserts that a mere Commentary in one chapter of a book constitutes a “serious disservice” to the charitable sector. The sector is hardier than that, as evidenced by its ability to survive the pretensions of and material damages inflicted by the watchdog agencies.55

§ 9.15 RATING THE RATERS

Finally, an effort was made to objectively assess and analyze the watchdog agencies; it is found in a (revised) report issued in 2005, by the National Council of Nonprofit Associations and the National Human Services Assembly.56 This analysis opened with the thought that the watchdog agencies tracking the functions of charitable organizations “serve a noble purpose, in concept: helping donors make responsible choices when donating” to a charitable organization. It observed that how a charitable organization is rated or ranked by the watchdog organizations “can have a significant impact” on the charity's level of contributions and, thus, on the charity's ability to fulfill its mission. The primary concern underlying the report was that donors “fully understand the information they are receiving from such ratings and rankings so they can make well-informed judgments and not be misled and/or misinformed.” This analysis concluded: “There is great potential for these ratings to be misinterpreted and misused, which would cause more harm than good to both donors and [charitable organizations]. In the worst-case scenario, donors could withhold vital contributions from a worthy organization based on inaccurate, incomplete, or misunderstood information they received from an evaluator.”

This analysis noted that charitable organizations “are not easily measured or compared based on simplistic criteria and/or benchmarks.” The “programmatic, mission-based work” of charitable organizations is “complex.” Thus, “[s]imple financial ratios and/or measures that apply in some circumstances may not apply at all in others.” Also, “financial efficiency remains the primary focus in most third-party ratings/rankings,” rather than the effectiveness of charitable organizations in providing services.

The major conclusions of this study are these:

  • The methodologies and criteria used by the watchdog agencies “vary significantly” among the various rating and ranking organizations, “making it difficult for a donor to understand the ratings and/or rankings, and making it difficult for an individual [charitable organization] to satisfy the varied criteria.”
  • Not all of the watchdog agencies make it easy for the donor or the charitable organization being evaluated to determine the evaluation method and criteria being used, making it difficult for the donor to understand how the rating or ranking was established and making it difficult for the charitable organization to respond.
  • There are major differences in the financial, operational, organizational, and governance structures of charitable organizations. Thus, “[u]nless the rating or ranking organization takes such distinctions into account in applying its criteria and/or explains such distinctions to the donor, a donor can be misinformed or confused by the information conveyed.”
  • A couple of watchdog agencies seek information on whether subject organizations evaluate program effectiveness, but “financial efficiency” remains the “primary focus” of the watchdog agencies.
  • It is “virtually impossible for the donor to determine the relevant credentials, expertise, and/or experience of the rating or ranking organization's staff, which is particularly important due to the complex and somewhat unique nature of [charitable organizations] and the accounting and financial reporting rules that apply.”
  • Not all of the watchdog agencies “meet the same standards or expectations that they apply to” the charitable organizations they evaluate and/or are not subject to the same “transparency” requirements (such as public disclosure of financial information and funding sources). This makes it difficult for a donor to ascertain or measure the credibility of a watchdog agency.
  • Some watchdog agencies obtain data from public or indirect sources while others obtain it directly from the charitable organizations. Not all of these agencies interact with the charitable organizations to validate the accuracy of the information the evaluator is using and/or allow a charitable organization to provide clarifications, explanations, and/or corrections to the information used in the evaluation.
  • Some watchdog agencies use their ratings as a critical component of their own revenue model (such as generation of membership/subscription fees, licensing fees, report fees, and website advertisements); this leaves open to question whether their motivation is to inform donors or garner media attention that enhances their revenue stream.

This analysis concluded that donors and charitable organizations are best served by a watchdog agency that (1) makes its methodology and criteria readily available to donors and the charitable organizations being evaluated, (2) provides sufficient information about the relevant expertise and/or experience of its management and staff to enable donors to judge its overall competence to evaluate charitable organizations, (3) interacts with the charitable organization being evaluated to validate and/or clarify the information being used and allows the charitable organization to appeal or otherwise challenge any conclusions drawn by the agency, (4) provides its findings without charge to potential donors and the charitable organizations being evaluated, (5) complies with the same criteria and standards it applies to the charitable organizations being evaluated, (6) meets the same transparency requirements that apply to the charitable organizations being evaluated (such as public scrutiny of financial data, information returns, and officer and executive staff compensation), (7) applies its criteria and publishes its findings in a way that recognizes major differences in the types and structures of charitable organizations, and (8) provides resources (such as training and reference materials) to assist the charitable organization being evaluated in meeting the agency's criteria.

This analysis added that watchdog agencies' ratings and rankings “would serve the public better if they either qualified the scope and limitations of their assessments,” such as noting whether they primarily measure “financial efficiency” or whether they also address “program effectiveness,” or included indicators or measures of program effectiveness, ethics, and fundraising practices in their assessments. It concluded: “Reasonable overhead and fundraising-to-program expenditure ratios are desirable but insufficient: How well a nonprofit delivers on its promises should be a primary consideration as well.”

NOTES

  1. 1.  In general, Tax-Exempt Organizations § 5.11; Nonprofit Governance § 3.14.
  2. 2.  As an illustration, the July 20, 2001, edition of USA Today explored the fundraising and other activities of a charitable organization established by athletes; a portion of the analysis was based on this organization's compliance (or lack of it) with a watchdog agency's standards.
  3. 3.  Another of the principal watchdog agencies, the National Charities Information Bureau (NCIB), merged with the PAS. An analysis of the work of the NCIB appeared in “Rating Charities,” IX Phil. Monthly (No. V) 19 (1976); “Rating Charities—Part II,” IX Phil. Monthly (No. VI) 14 (1976); and “Rating Charities—Part III,” IX Phil. Monthly (No. VII) 31 (1976).
  4. 4.  For discussion of other voluntary standards, see, e.g., Peavey, “The Self-Regulation Alternative,” XII Phil. Monthly (No. 9) 5 (1979); “New Fund-Raising Rules in the Catholic Church,” X Phil. Monthly (No. 11) 25 (1977). As may be expected, with the advent of various sets of voluntary standards, there are elements of competition and discord among the self-regulators, e.g., the NCIB Report on the Church League of America, dated October 31, 1977, reporting that the organization was refusing to provide information to the NCIB because it is a standards-setting agency providing information to the public; and the PAS Report on The Fund Raising Council of the United States, dated February 1977, which held itself out as the “recognized accrediting body for organizations involved in fundraising as a means of financial support in whole or in part.”
  5. 5.  This analysis, prepared by Ruth M. Atchison, then Assistant Director of the Philanthropic Advisory Service, for the Philanthropy Monthly Forum on Standard Setting, Monitoring and Enforcement, held on April 23, 1979, and edited for use as part of this chapter, is reproduced with the permission of the Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. Despite the passage of time, this analysis remains a classic explication of the rationale for these agencies. Her contribution is gratefully acknowledged by the authors.
  6. 6.  Authors' note: This Advisory Committee, long since disbanded, proved to be a misstep for the PAS. The committee immediately refused to confine its work to matters presented to it by the PAS and persisted in looking into issues (particularly pertaining to the assessment of fundraising costs) that the PAS staff preferred to leave unexplored. The committee was abolished within two years of its formation, to stifle the substantive inquiries into various PAS assumptions and practices that the committee was pursuing.
  7. 7.  E.g., Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001); McGlotten v. Connally, 388 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1972). Thus, the state action doctrine could mandate applicability of due process standards to action by a watchdog agency where it is shown that, for example, an organization's status in relation to the standards is relied on by a state governmental agency in reaching a determination, under the state's charitable solicitation act, about the charitable organization. In general, Hopkins, Tax-Exempt Organizations and Constitutional Law: Nonprofit Law as Shaped by the U.S. Supreme Court (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), Chapter 6.

    In one instance, a state regulatory official with responsibility for administering a charitable solicitation act that then contained a rebuttable percentage limitation on the compensation of professional fundraisers advised a charitable organization that its fundraising costs were not in conformance with the state's statutory requirements solely because he understood that the organization had been found not to satisfy the fundraising cost standard promulgated by the CBBBs.

    The federal government as well relies on the pronouncements of these watchdog agencies. An illustration of this was the IRS's citation of the failure of an organization to meet the agencies' standards in a case involving revocation of the organization's tax exemption because of its fundraising practices (see § 5.9).

  8. 8.  E.g., Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 170 A.2d 791 (N.J. 1961).
  9. 9.  E.g., Higgins v. American Society of Clinical Pathologists, 238 A.2d 665 (N.J. 1968).
  10. 10. As noted (supra note 7), these latter two circumstances may likely trigger the state action principle in which the panoply of due process responsibilities would be visited upon the watchdog agency.
  11. 11. E.g., Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Association of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. den., 400 U.S. 963 (1970).
  12. 12. MacArthur, Associations and the Antitrust Laws (1976), 53, 54.
  13. 13. See § 6.4.
  14. 14. See Chapter 7.
  15. 15. See § 10.14.
  16. 16. This watchdog agency believes it is “unfair to hold new nonprofits to the same benchmarks expected of established organizations,” inasmuch as “[n]ewer organizations understandably incur abnormally higher overhead costs in their first few years of existence.”
  17. 17. See § 4.1(c)(i).
  18. 18. Higgins v. American Society of Clinical Pathologists, 238 A. 2d 665 (N.J. 1968).
  19. 19. 7 C.J.S. Associations § 25.
  20. 20. Cowen v. New York Stock Exchange, 265 F. Supp. 462 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1967).
  21. 21. Molinas v. National Basketball Association, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 191); State v. Delaware Fire Co. No. 3, 177 A. 129 (1922).
  22. 22. Higgins v. American Society of Clinical Pathologists, 238 A.2d 665, 671 (N.J. 1968).
  23. 23. See § 4.1.
  24. 24. Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hospital District, 345 P.2d 93 (Cal. 1959).
  25. 25. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 264 (Cal. 1974) (emphasis by the court).
  26. 26. Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 377 F. Supp. 227, 240 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
  27. 27. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 256 (Cal. 1974).
  28. 28. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Association, 231 P.2d 6, 11 (Cal. 1951).
  29. 29. State Marine Lines, Inc. v. F.M.C., 376 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
  30. 30. A public charity filed a lawsuit against the CBBB, on the basis of its application of the PAS standards (see § 9.4). The lawsuit was filed on a Friday, in the District of Columbia. Over the ensuing weekend, the CBBB moved its headquarters from D.C. to Virginia (where the law is more favorable to watchdog agencies). The complaint was withdrawn.
  31. 31. See § 9.10(b).
  32. 32. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. American Institute of Philanthropy and Daniel Borochoff, 94 Civ. 0289, Amended Complaint (E.D.N.Y., June 6, 1994), p. 7.
  33. 33Id.
  34. 34Id. at 9.
  35. 35Id. at 9–10.
  36. 36FRM Weekly, Jan. 26, 1994, at p. 1.
  37. 37Id.
  38. 38. See § 9.11(a).
  39. 39. An exception to this observation occurred in response to the attempt by the PAS to impose a standard in the context of direct-mail fundraising appeals, where a charity includes an educational message to the fundraising letter and allocates a portion of the cost of the mailing to program or administration. E.g., Cook, “Aim of New CBBB Standard: To Control What Nonprofits Say,” XXVII Phil. Monthly (No. 3) 24 (Apr. 1994); Surhke, “In Your Face ‘Disclosure,’” id. at 2; Surhke, “Reprieve on CBBB Cost Allocation Disclosures,” XXVII Phil. Monthly (No. 5) 10 (June 1994); Cook, “Assault on Freedom—Part II,” id. at 13–14.
  40. 40. An executive director of a charitable organization, commenting on a rating system that uses stars, lamented: “Once you put that star up there, it's just like a hotel. Where would you rather stay? A five-star hotel or a one-star hotel? Donors are going to read into those stars and draw conclusions no matter what type of information you provide” (Willhelm, “Charity Under Scrutiny,” XV Chron. of Phil. (No. 4) 25 (Nov. 28, 2002). This aspect of the matter is compounded by the proliferation of watchdog groups and varying approaches as to criteria for evaluation of charities.
  41. 41. In some respects, subtle antipathy can be more effective. As an example, in commenting on a survey indicating that charitable organizations are paying larger salaries and benefits than previously, a spokesperson for NCIB said: “I think they're giving more money [in salaries] in order to retain the talent they have” (Associated Press, as reproduced in the Wash. Post, Sep. 5, 1995, at E1, E2). Note the phraseology: “giving” more money. Also: “What they also have to keep in mind, however, is that it is a public record” (id. at E2), suggesting that these organizations have something to hide. These insinuations may have contributed to a headline accompanying this newspaper article: “Nonprofits Generous to CEOs.”
  42. 42. See § 9.2.
  43. 43Fund-Raising Reg. Rep. (No. 1) 8 (Jan./Feb. 1995).
  44. 44. At that time, the report that came the closest to such a study is an analysis of the overall usefulness of the Council of Better Business Bureaus (Mirable, “Better Business Bureaus Are a Bust,” 24 Money (No. 10) 106 (Oct. 1995)). See, however, § 9.15.
  45. 45. The differing views on this point are explored in greater detail in Stokeld, “Charitable Watchdogs: Fair or Foul?,” 68 Tax Notes (No. 5) 534 (July 31, 1995).
  46. 46. See §§ 4.1, 4.22.
  47. 47. See § 9.3.
  48. 48. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980).
  49. 49Id. at 636–637.
  50. 50. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 961 (1984).
  51. 51. See § 9.10(b).
  52. 52. See § 5.4.
  53. 53. At a BoardSource Leadership Forum in Washington, DC, on September 15, 2004, representatives of the Alliance summarized the purposes of and, in some instances, the substance of some of its standards. When asked to explain why the standards contain rules such as a set minimum number of board members and meetings, and the percentage limitations as to fundraising costs, the response was that the use of terms such as reasonable and substantial are too difficult to administer, inasmuch as this approach requires the use of judgment on a case-by-case basis, and that it is much easier to enforce standards that have specific, measurable requirements. In other words, arbitrary and unfair (and perhaps nonsensical) standards are desirable because they facilitate ease of enforcement, raising once again the questions: (1) Do those who write these rules really understand and appreciate the magnitude of what they are doing? and (2) for whose benefit are these rules really written, that of the charitable sector and donors or the administrative convenience of the watchdog regulators?
  54. 54. Letter to Bruce R. Hopkins from James J. Bausch, in his then capacity as president of the National Charities Information Bureau, dated May 30, 1996. See supra note 3.
  55. 55. It was observed in § 9.12(b) that the watchdog agencies often demonstrate outright bias against the charitable sector. A classic example of this prejudice against the sector was the reaction of the heads of the PAS and the NCIB to the court decision rendering several provisions of the Los Angeles city and county charitable solicitation ordinances unconstitutional (Gospel Missions of America v. Bennett, 951 F. Supp. 1429 (C.D. Cal. 1997)) (see §§ 4.3, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8). The former said: “The reduction of such local government regulatory activities places more of a burden on the donor to check out charities on their own”; the latter said he was disappointed in the holding: “The donor has the right to know how his [or her] donation is used” (Craig, “Judge Strikes Down Key Parts of Los Angeles's Tough Rules for Charities,” 9 Chron. of Phil. (No. 8) 25 (Feb. 6, 1997)). These views amply illustrate that the watchdog agencies champion unchecked government regulation of fundraising by the sector even to the point of its serious damage (the charitable organization involved was unjustifiably raided by 40 county sheriffs, and subjected to search and seizure at gunpoint)—irrespective of whether the law is egregiously unconstitutional. In the case, the court found 15 provisions of the ordinances to be unconstitutional on their face in violation of free speech rights, 6 provisions to be unconstitutional because of the unbridled discretion vested in government officials, and 5 provisions to be unconstitutional for various other reasons, including vagueness and violation of the Constitution's establishment clause! It is shameful that the watchdog agencies champion this type of law.

    This antipathy of the watchdogs against the sector was revealed in another context—this time in the aftermath of publication by the accounting profession of new rules concerning joint cost allocations (Statement of Position 98-2, published by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as an adjustment to rules written in 1987). Many charity officials had objected to the original version of these rules, finding them to be “too strict and … biased against legitimate fund-raising activities” (Billitteri and Blum, “Unsettled Accounts,” X Chron. of Phil. (No. 11) 41 (Mar. 26, 1998)). Predictably, the principal watchdog agencies decided that the “revised policy is too lenient, allowing charities to hide some fundraising costs in other accounting categories” (id.). Thus, while one of the nation's premier accountants in the nonprofit field (who participated in the writing of the statement), Richard Larkin, said that the “underlying concept” of the 1998 rules “is still the same” as that of the 1987 rules, and that the “difference is only in the details,” the president of the NCIB said: “The bottom line is that contributors deserve better” (id. at 42). See § 4.1(c)(i).

  56. 56. “Rating the Raters: An Assessment of Organizations and Publications That Rate/Rank Charitable Nonprofit Organizations” (May 6, 2005), available at www.ncna.org (this report is found in Features).
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