CHAPTER FIVE
Federal Regulation of Fundraising: Administrative Matters

There is not, today, a federal charitable solicitations law,1 nor is there any immediate prospect of one. Nonetheless, the federal government aggressively regulates the process of raising funds for charitable purposes. Indeed, in a dramatic change of policy,2 regulation of charitable fundraising is a major component of IRS oversight of the charitable sector. Other components of the federal government, including the Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Postal Service, and the Federal Trade Commission, play roles in this regard.

§ 5.1 FEDERAL REGULATION OF FUNDRAISING: HOW IT BEGAN

The IRS is using its inherent authority, in conjunction with its task of administering the federal tax laws, to regulate in the field of fundraising for charitable purposes. In part, this is the result of mandates to the IRS, from Congress, to step up its review of charitable fundraising.3

The impetus for regulation in this area stemmed from a phenomenon that is sweeping and, in some instances, swamping the charitable—and other tax-exempt organizations—field: disclosure. At the beginning, the push was for disclosure of transfers of money or property to charity that were not contributions. Other aspects of disclosure followed. This force has yet to abate.

A segment of the legislative history of one of these laws,4 contained in a report of the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives, accompanying what was to become the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987,5 is meaningful for charitable organizations. While recognizing that this law is inapplicable to charitable organizations, the committee expressed its concern that “some charities may not make sufficient disclosure, in soliciting donations, membership dues, payments for admissions or merchandise, or other support, of the extent (if any) to which the payors may be entitled to charitable deductions for such payments.”6 The committee reviewed situations where charities may “suggest or imply” the deductibility of payments where that is not the case, contrasting them with “other charities [that] carefully and correctly advise their supporters of the long-standing tax rules governing the deductibility of payments made to a charitable organization in return for, or with expectation of, a financial or economic benefit to the payor.”7

The House Committee on the Budget launched this aspect of the IRS regulation of charitable fundraising with its expression of its “anticipat[ion] that the Internal Revenue Service will monitor the extent to which taxpayers are being furnished accurate and sufficient information by charitable organizations as to the nondeductibility of payments to such organizations where benefits or privileges are received in return, so that such taxpayers can correctly compute their Federal income tax liability.”8 As will be seen, however, the IRS has considerably expanded this mandate beyond the bounds of “monitoring.”

The IRS includes analysis of fundraising programs of charitable organizations in its examinations and other reviews of these entities. This process started in earnest in early 1990, as manifested by documentation developed by the National Office of the IRS and issued to its agents in the field, including a remarkable checksheet. Although this checksheet is no longer in use, it set the stage for the IRS's scrutiny of charitable fundraising and reflects a certain attitude or mindset toward the subject.

(a) History

Before engaging in a discussion of this checksheet and its implications, some background is appropriate. Today's fundraising regulation initiatives by the IRS can only be fully appreciated in light of this history.

The fundraising community long dreaded the inevitable day the IRS began to actively regulate the process of raising funds for charitable purposes. This new activism directly affects not only the charities that raise funds but also the fundraising professionals who assist them.

This occasion did not materialize as most observers had expected. That is, no great exposé of fundraising fraud by a particular organization was uncovered by the media; no IRS audit led the IRS to act. There was no development of new regulations on the subject at the Department of the Treasury, no enactment of a far-reaching statute by Congress.

Instead, fundraising regulation through the tax system arrived because the IRS decided to act with respect to a long-standing problem—some characterize it as an abuse. The problem is the casting of a payment to a charitable organization as a deductible gift when in fact the transaction does not involve a gift at all or is only partially a gift.

The IRS position or, for that matter, the law in this regard is not new: a payment to a charitable organization is not a gift where the donor receives something of approximately equal value in return. That position was made explicit in 1967, when the IRS published an extensive revenue ruling on the point.9 At that time, and since, it has been the view of the IRS that charities have an obligation to notify their patrons when payments to them are not gifts, or are only partially gifts, particularly in the context of a special fundraising event.10

There were, over the years, a few instances of deliberate and blatant wrongdoing in this area. Undoubtedly, there were individuals who wrote a check, for example, to a school for something acquired at the school's annual auction and who could not resist the temptation to report the payment as a deductible gift on their tax return. The same may be said of raffles, sweepstakes, book sales, sports tournaments, dinner and theater events, dues payments, and the like. But there was no evidence of abuse sufficient to justify a massive IRS regulatory response.11

Matters changed somewhat when some charities began explicitly or implicitly telling “donors” that their payments to the organizations were deductible as gifts, when in fact they were not or were only partially deductible. This practice became so overt and pervasive that the IRS decided that the time had come to act.

It needs to be said, however, that most charitable organizations that advertised gift deductibility, when this deductibility was not available, acted in good faith. They simply lacked an understanding of the rules. Most fundraising professionals did not contemplate the meaning of the word gift and were unaware of the 1967 pronouncement from the IRS or, if they were aware of it, did not fully understand its import.12 (From a legal standpoint, of course, these are not adequate defenses for wrongdoing.)

The distinction between deductible and nondeductible payments to charity is not always clear. Murky questions can and do arise where the payor receives admissions or merchandise, or other benefits or privileges, in return for the payment. Indeed, in 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote: “A payment of money [or transfer of property] generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor expects a substantial benefit in return.”13 Essentially the same rule was articulated by the Court in 1989, when it ruled that an exchange having an “inherently reciprocal nature” is not a gift and thus cannot be a charitable gift, where the recipient is a charity.14

The seriousness of the IRS's intensity on this subject was revealed at the final meeting of the IRS Exempt Organization Advisory Group, on January 10, 1989. Then-Commissioner Lawrence B. Gibbs opened the session with the charge that charities and their fundraisers are engaged in “questionable” and “egregious” fundraising practices, notably suggestions that certain payments are deductible gifts when in fact they are not. Then–Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations Robert I. Brauer made clear the IRS view that these abuses are not isolated but are “widespread practices that involve quite legitimate charities.” Commissioner Gibbs stated that charities must “clean up their act in this regard” or face stiff regulation from the IRS.15

(b) Special Emphasis Program

The IRS launched its attack on these forms of fundraising misperformance by inaugurating a Special Emphasis Program. This program came to have two parts: an educational phase and an audit phase.16

The first phase of the Special Emphasis Program took place throughout 1989: the IRS engaged in educational efforts to explain the rules to charities. This aspect of the program consisted of speeches by representatives of the IRS, workshops with charitable groups, and the encouragement of educational efforts by national charitable organizations.

During this phase, the IRS began reviewing charities' annual information returns (principally, Form 990) for 1988. Special emphasis was placed on the returns filed by organizations that were engaged in gift solicitation. Charitable organizations that were not in compliance with the disclosure rules received letters from the IRS requesting immediate conformance with the requirements. There was also talk of more audits of charities and donors, review of donor lists, and the imposition of various tax penalties.

The regulation by the IRS of fundraising for charity became much more serious when the second phase of the Special Emphasis Program was initiated, in early 1990. This aspect of the IRS's involvement and scrutiny was evidenced in the aforementioned extraordinary checksheet sent by the IRS National Office to its agents in the field, to enable them to review the fundraising practices of charitable organizations.

(c) Checksheet

The checksheet, bearing the formidable title “Exempt Organizations Charitable Solicitations Compliance Improvement Program Study Checksheet,” reflected the beginning of the second phase of the IRS's Special Emphasis Program concerning solicitation practices of charitable organizations.17 As noted, the first phase consisted of programs designed to educate charities and their fundraising professionals about the law governing the extent of deductibility of contributions.

This checksheet required the auditing agent to review, in conjunction with examinations of annual information returns, the fundraising practices of charities, including the solicitation of gifts where the donor is provided a benefit, the use of special events, the conduct of bingo and other games of chance, travel tours, thrift stores, and the receipt of noncash contributions. A special section inquired about the use of professional fundraisers. The checksheet consisted of 82 questions, plus requests for financial information.

Regarding the use of fundraising professionals, the checksheet required IRS agents to obtain the name and address of the fundraiser, details about direct mail fundraising (including the cost of the mailings, the number of donor responses, and the amount of gifts generated from the mailings), a copy of any written agreement between the fundraiser and the charity, the nature of the fundraiser's compensation (flat fee or commission), and information about whether the fundraiser had check-writing or check-cashing authority.

One question asked the agent to determine whether the charity met the commensurate test. This test, established by the IRS in 1964,18 basically looks to see whether a charitable organization is carrying on charitable works commensurate in scope with its financial resources. In the particular facts underlying the ruling, the charity derived most of its income as rent, yet preserved its tax exemption because it satisfied the commensurate test. Until 1990, the commensurate test was not applied in the fundraising context; in applying the test in this setting, the examining agent is supposed to ascertain whether the charitable organization involved is engaging in sufficient charitable activity in relation to its available resources (including gifts received through fundraising efforts), as compared to the time and expense of fundraising.19

Other questions were asked about the use of fundraising professionals. One of them was: “Was the charity created by an owner, officer, director, trustee, or employee of the professional fundraiser?” Another was: “Is any officer, director, trustee, or employee of the charity employed by or connected with the professional fundraiser in any ownership of business, investment venture, or family relationship?”

The checksheet focused on the nature of benefits, goods, or services provided to donors. These items included retail merchandise, new and donated merchandise received at an auction, tickets for a game of chance, tuition at an educational institution, travel, tickets to an athletic or other event, discounts, free subscriptions, and preferential seating at a college or university athletic event. The document asked whether the charity made any reference to deductibility of the payment in its solicitation or promotional literature or in any thank-you letter, receipt ticket, or other written receipt.

As to gifts of property, a list of all noncash gifts whose fair market value exceeds $500 during the year under examination must be provided to the IRS. The IRS asked who valued the gift property, whether a proper receipt was provided, whether there was an agreement between the donor and donee as to disposition of the property, and whether the requisite forms were properly completed and filed.

The questions concerning travel tours spotlighted IRS concerns in this area. Questions included: “Did the promotional travel literature and/or other written documentation indicate that the tours were educational? Did the promotional travel literature and/or other written documentation contain discussions of any social or recreational aspects of the tour? Did the charity have a contract or do business with a for-profit travel agency? If yes, did the charity receive any fee from the travel agency?”20

The inquiry into the conduct of bingo and other games of chance illustrated the degree of complexity this field of law can stimulate. The first question concerned whether the bingo activity satisfies the tests by which it can be exempted from the definition of unrelated business.21 If not, the agent was expected to determine whether an income tax return22 was filed and, if not, to secure the delinquent return. A set of questions pertained to the conduct of games of chance. Another question asked whether the game of chance or income from it was embraced by one of the statutory exceptions (such as a business substantially conducted by volunteers). The checksheet required the agent to find out whether the charity timely filed the proper information returns23 and withholding returns24 for the winners of the games. Finally, the IRS wanted to know whether the charity hired outside contractors to specifically operate bingo and other games of chance.

The agent was requested to report on any penalties they assessed against the charity. These included failure to file a tax return,25 failure to pay a tax,26 failure to file a complete or accurate exempt organization information return,27 substantial understatement of liability,28 promotion of abusive tax shelters,29 aiding and abetting understatements of tax liability,30 failure to file certain information returns,31 failure to file certain payee statements,32 and failure to include correct information on an information return or payee statement.33

(d) Audit Guidance

In directions sent to the field in February 1990, concerning the phase II examinations, the IRS headquarters wrote that “it is essential that the examinations be thorough.” It continued: “The EO [Exempt Organizations] examiner must pursue the examination to a point where he/she can conclude that all areas and data concerning fundraising activities have been considered.”34

This guidance stated that the second phase of the program will “focus on all aspects of fundraising and charitable solicitations.”35 Some of the practices the IRS was looking for were the following:

  • Misleading statements in solicitations literature that “imply deductibility of contributions, where none probably exists.”
  • Contracts with professional fundraisers, where they use “questionable” fundraising methods to solicit contributions from the general public.
  • Solicitations that mislead donors into thinking that their donations will be used for charitable purposes, when in fact the donations may be used for noncharitable purposes (such as administrative and fundraising costs that constitute a significant portion of the solicited funds or property).
  • Fundraising activities that result in other tax consequences (such as the generation of taxable income).

These directions continued: “The scope and depth of the examination should be sufficient to fully disclose the nature of abusive situations involving fundraising activities that mislead donors to claim the incorrect charitable contribution deduction; misrepresent the use of the solicited funds; engage in questionable fundraising practices or techniques, etc.”36 There was such an insistence on thoroughness because the results of this study were “to be used in a report that will be submitted to Congress.”37 As far as can be ascertained, however, a formal report on this subject was never prepared by the IRS.

Thus, what started out in 1967 as concern with overdeductibility in the setting of payments to charities evolved and blossomed into an examination by the IRS of all “questionable fundraising practices or techniques.”

(e) Perspective

The launching of this Special Emphasis Program, particularly the preparation and dissemination of the checksheet, was one of several significant developments, illustrating the fact that the federal government, particularly the IRS, is monitoring and regulating the charitable fundraising process. This checksheet represents an extraordinary use of the IRS's resources to investigate charitable fundraising. One particularly striking aspect of this matter is that some of the information requested, particularly that pertaining to the use of professional fundraisers, had little or no correlation with any requirements of law—at least at that time.

In a sense, the Special Emphasis Program did not work. That is, it was unsuccessful to the extent it was intended to preclude the enactment of statutory law on the subject.

The Special Emphasis Program is part of a larger message: the federal government is now firmly entrenched in the regulation of charitable fundraising. This regulation is an important component of government oversight and intervention in the philanthropic process.

§ 5.2 FUNDRAISING DISCLOSURE BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

It has long been the position of the IRS that a payment to a charitable organization, where the payor receives something of equivalent value in return, is not a gift for charitable deduction purposes. The long-standing position of the IRS in this regard has also been that a payment to a charity, where the payor receives value in return, is deductible as a charitable gift only to the extent that the amount transferred exceeds the value received by the donor. Further, it has long been the position of the IRS that it is the responsibility of charitable organizations to inform their patrons of this distinction between deductible and nondeductible payments.38 The latter includes dues, payments for admissions or merchandise, and other material benefits and privileges received in return for the payment.

These rules have, on occasion, been honored in their breach. As a consequence, in mid-1988, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent this message to the nation's charities: “I … ask your help in more accurately informing taxpayers as to the deductibility of payments by patrons of your fundraising events.”39 This message from the IRS announced the aforementioned Special Emphasis Program, whereby the IRS was seeking to “ascertain the extent to which taxpayers are furnished accurate and sufficient information concerning the deductibility of their contributions.”40

The Commissioner's message focused on fundraising events, where part or all of a payment to a charitable organization is attributable to the purchase of admission or some other privilege. In this context, the law presumes that the total amount paid is equivalent to the benefits received in return. That presumption can be rebutted in appropriate instances, where there is a true gift element in the payment.

This matter has several manifestations. One is the fundraising event, where something of value is provided to the patron, such as a dinner or entertainment. The charity is expected to determine the fair market value of the event and to notify the patron that only the amount of the payment that is in excess of that value (if any) is deductible as a charitable gift. For example, a fundraising event may center around a dinner; the ticket is $70 and the dinner is worth $50. In compliance with the IRS position, the patron should be told that only $20 of the $70 is deductible as a charitable gift. (The portion of the total amount paid that reflects the purchase of the dinner may, in certain circumstances, be deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense.)41

In determining fair value, a charity must look to comparable circumstances. The cost of the event to the charity is largely irrelevant. Thus, a charity may have a dinner provided to it without cost (such as a donation from a caterer), yet the dinner still has a value to the recipient.

Another manifestation of this problem occurs when a donor makes a contribution and receives something of value in return. A payment of $20 that results in a T-shirt or tote bag worth $10 is a gift of $10, not $20. This distinction is sometimes difficult to ascertain; often, it is relative. Is the donor of $1 million supposed to reduce the gift deduction by $10 because he or she is sent a T-shirt? The answer is no, yet it is hard to draw the line in this regard between a $20 donor and a $1 million donor. This is the dilemma, for example, with respect to the distribution of greeting cards by veterans’ organizations.42

A third aspect is a payment to a charitable organization that is not deductible at all. Obvious examples include payments of tuition to tax-exempt schools and payments for health care services to tax-exempt hospitals. Other payments of this nature are dues, subscriptions, purchases made at auctions,43 and purchases of raffle and sweepstakes tickets.

Thus, the IRS expects charities, before solicitation, to determine the nondeductible portion of a payment and to clearly state the separate amounts on a ticket or other evidence of payment furnished to the contributor.

The IRS privately ruled that there are no sanctions for violation of these disclosure rules.44 There has been discussion, however, of application of the aiding and abetting and other penalties,45 and of potential litigation in this area. There has also been discussion of the use of the unrelated income rules in this setting,46 as well as of theories by which an organization's tax exemption could be revoked for failure to comport with these rules.

In 1990, the IRS issued guidelines to enable charitable organizations to properly advise their patrons as to the deductibility, if any, of payments made to them where the patrons are receiving something in return for their payments.47 These guidelines were issued as part of a program at the IRS to require charitable organizations to disclose to donors and other payors the extent to which the payments are deductible, where a benefit or service is provided by the payor. These guidelines are also being used by reviewing IRS agents.

One of the many problems facing charitable organizations because of the disclosure requirement is what to do about small items or other benefits that are of token value in relation to the amount contributed. These guidelines contain rules whereby a benefit can be regarded as inconsequential or insubstantial, so that the full amount of a payment to a charity becomes deductible as a charitable gift.

Under these guidelines, benefits received in connection with a payment to a charitable organization will be considered to have insubstantial fair market value (so that the payment is fully deductible as a gift) for purposes of advising donors, where two requirements are met:

  1. The payment occurs in the context of a fundraising campaign in which the charity informs patrons as to how much of their payment is a deductible contribution, and
  2. Either—
    1. The fair market value of all of the benefits received in connection with the payment is not more than the lesser of 2 percent of the payment or $50 (adjusted for inflation), or
    2. The payment is $25 (adjusted for inflation) or more, and the only benefits received in connection with the payment are token items bearing the organization's name or logo.

For these purposes, token items include items such as bookmarks, calendars, key chains, mugs, posters, and T-shirts. Also, the costs of all of the benefits received by a donor must, in the aggregate, be within the statutory limits established for a low-cost article; this is an article with a cost not in excess of $5 (indexed for inflation), that is distributed incidental to a charitable solicitation.48

With respect to the first of these two requirements, where a charitable organization is providing only insubstantial benefits in return for a payment, disclosure of the fair market value of the benefits is not required. Fundraising materials should, however, include a statement to this effect:

Under Internal Revenue Service guidelines, the estimated value of [the benefits received] is not substantial; therefore, the full amount of your payment is a deductible contribution.

In a situation where it is impractical to state in every solicitation how much of a payment is deductible, the charitable organization can, under these guidelines, seek a ruling from the IRS concerning an alternative procedure. This circumstance can arise, for example, in connection with the offering of a number of premiums in an on-air fundraising announcement by an educational organization.

Resolving what was a difficult problem for many organizations, these guidelines state that newsletters or program guides (other than commercial quality publications) are treated as not having measurable value or cost if their primary purpose is to inform members about the activities of an organization and if they are not available to nonmembers by paid subscription or through newsstand sales.

The charitable community was unable to achieve a level of compliance with these IRS disclosure guidelines that was satisfactory to Congress. Consequently, efforts commenced to write statutory law on the subject, which came to be known as substantiation requirements49 and quid pro quo contribution rules.50 Legislation to this end was nearly enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1992 and was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.

The legislative history of the 1992 proposal contained the following, which is indicative of the attitude of Congress as to the need for these rules:

Difficult problems of tax administration arise with respect to fundraising techniques in which an organization that is eligible to receive deductible contributions provides goods or services in consideration for payments from donors. Organizations that engage in such fundraising practices often do not inform their donors that all or a portion of the amount paid by the donor may not be deductible as a charitable contribution. Consequently, the [Senate Finance] [C]ommittee believes … it appropriate that, in all cases where a charity receives a quid pro quo contribution (i.e., a payment made partly as a contribution and partly in consideration for goods or services furnished to the payor by the donee organization) the charity should inform the donor that the [federal income tax charitable contribution] deduction … is limited to the amount by which the payment exceeds the value of the goods or services furnished, and provide a good-faith estimate of the value of such goods or services.51

§ 5.3 RECORD-KEEPING LAW

A charitable contribution deduction is not allowed for any contribution of a monetary gift (such as a contribution in the form of cash or by check) unless the donor maintains as a record of the gift a bank record or a written communication from the donee organization, showing the name of the donee, the date of the contribution, and the amount of the contribution.52

An individual who itemizes deductions must separately state (on Schedule A of the federal income tax return, Form 1040) the aggregate amount of charitable contributions of money and the aggregate amount of charitable gifts of property.

These requirements apply to donors. Technically, compliance with them is the responsibility of the donor, rather than the charitable donee. Nonetheless, as a matter of donor relations, charitable organizations should consider providing their donors with the requisite communication concerning the record-keeping requirements, provide the substantiation documentation53 on a timely basis, and otherwise assisting them in connection with the other (including appraisal)54 requirements.

§ 5.4 CHARITABLE GIFT SUBSTANTIATION LAW

A significant dimension was added to the federal law of charitable fundraising regulation when Congress enacted charitable gift substantiation requirements. Under these rules, for example, donors who make a separate charitable contribution of $250 or more in a year, for which they claim a charitable contribution deduction, must obtain written substantiation from the donee charitable organization.

(a) $250 Threshold Law

More specifically, the charitable deduction is not allowed for a separate contribution of $250 or more unless the donor has written substantiation from the charitable donee of the contribution in the form of a contemporaneous written acknowledgment.55 In addition, there is no charitable deduction for a contribution of money unless the donor maintains as a record of the gift a bank record or a written communication from the charitable donee showing the name of the donee organization, and the date and the amount of the contribution.56 (Many fundraising professionals are providing this written communication to the charity's donors, irrespective of the amount of the monetary gift, and doing so with a document that satisfies the requirements of a contemporaneous written acknowledgment.)

An acknowledgment meets this requirement if it includes the following information: (1) the amount of money and a description (but not value) of any property other than money that was contributed; (2) whether the donee organization provided any goods or services in consideration, in whole or in part, for any money or property contributed; and (3) a description and good-faith estimate of the value of any goods or services involved or, if the goods or services consist solely of intangible religious benefits, a statement to that effect.57

The phrase intangible religious benefit means “any intangible religious benefit which is provided by an organization organized exclusively for religious purposes and which generally is not sold in a commercial transaction outside the donative context.”58 An acknowledgment is considered to be contemporaneous if the contributor obtains the acknowledgment on or before the earlier of (1) the date on which the donor filed a tax return for the taxable year in which the contribution was made or (2) the due date (including extensions) for filing the return.59 Even when no good or service is provided to a donor, a statement to that effect must appear in the acknowledgment.

As noted, this substantiation rule applies with respect to separate payments. Separate payments generally are treated as separate contributions and are not aggregated for the purpose of applying the $250 threshold. Where contributions are paid by withholding from wages, the deduction from each paycheck is treated as a separate payment.60

(b) Donee Substantiation Law

The written acknowledgment of a separate gift is not required to take any particular form. Usually, the acknowledgment is in the form of a letter or card prepared and sent by the charitable donee. A donee charitable organization may prepare a separate acknowledgment for each contribution or may provide donors with periodic (such as annual) acknowledgments that set forth the required information for each contribution of $250 or more made by the donor during the period.61 This element of the law was expanded by the IRS in early 2002, when the agency wrote that a charitable organization “can provide either a paper copy of the acknowledgment to the donor, or an organization can provide the acknowledgment electronically, such as via email addressed to the donor.”62

(c) Nondonee Letter Substantiation

The U.S. Tax Court, to its credit, has found a way to salvage charitable gift substantiation where the charitable donee has not supplied a gift substantiation letter (or not a qualifying one) to the donor, at least in the context of gifts of easements: the deed of easement may serve as the gift substantiation document. The court's reasoning in this regard entails a discussion of topics such as merger clauses and peppercorns of consideration. But first a little history.

The court first considered whether a deed of easement qualified as a contemporaneous written acknowledgment in 2009. In that case, the court held that a deed of a facade easement may constitute this type of an acknowledgment if it is properly executed by the donee and is “contemporaneous.”63 In the case, however, the court did not examine the text of the deed of easement or consider the content of its granting provision. It did not address the statutory requirement that an acknowledgment must provide information concerning the provision of goods or services by the donee.

Subsequently, the Tax Court considered the features a deed of easement must display in order to qualify as a contemporaneous written acknowledgment. In the first of these cases, the granting provision stated that the donor conveyed a perpetual conservation easement in consideration of $10, “plus other good and valuable consideration.” The court held that the deed of easement did not qualify as a contemporaneous written acknowledgment.64 The court considered that language, noting that the phrase about consideration “might be regarded as boilerplate, reflecting an unfortunate (if centuries-old) habit of lawyers to state a ‘peppercorn’ of consideration even in contracts for the conveyance of a charitable gift.”65 But, the court concluded, even if this phrase were disregarded and the donee did not provide any consideration, the “written acknowledgment must say so in order to satisfy” the statutory requirement.66 It held that the deed of easement did not qualify as a contemporary written acknowledgment because there was no indication that the donee “provided no goods or services.”67

In the next of these cases, the granting provision stated that the donor conveyed a perpetual conservation easement “in consideration … of the mutual covenants, terms, conditions, and restrictions hereunder set forth and as an absolute and unconditional gift, subject to all matters of record.” The deed of easement did not include an explicit averment that the donee had provided no goods or services to the donor in consideration of the easement. This deed, however, included a merger clause, which stated “[t]his instrument sets forth the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the [e]asement and supersedes all prior discussions, negotiations, understandings, or agreements relating to the [e]asement, all of which are merged herein.” The court held that this easement deed qualified as a contemporaneous written acknowledgment.68

The deed was properly executed by the donee and was contemporaneous. Moreover, this deed stated that the “conservation easement is an unconditional gift, recite[d] no consideration received in exchange for it, and stipulate[d] that the conservation deed constitute[d] the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the contribution.”69

The court later explained this decision, stating that “[b]y stipulating that the deed of easement constituted the parties' ‘entire agreement,’ the merger clause negated the provision or receipt of any consideration not stated in that document.”70

The court said that it “concluded that the merger clause, read in conjunction with other statements in the deed of easement, supplied the affirmative indication required by” the statutory rule.71

It accordingly held that the deed of easement “taken as a whole, provides that no goods or services were received in exchange for the contribution.”72

A similar case was thereafter decided. The granting provision stated that the donor conveyed a perpetual conservation easement “for and in consideration of the covenants and representations contained herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and legal sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged.” The deed also included a merger clause, providing that “[t]his instrument sets forth the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the [e]asement and supersedes all prior discussions, negotiations, understanding, or agreements relating to the [e]asement, all of which are merged herein.” The court held that this easement deed qualified as a contemporary written acknowledgment.73 The deed was properly executed by the donee and was contemporaneous. The deed “d[id] not include consideration of any value other than the preservation of the property.”74 The deed stated that it “constitute[d] the entire agreement between the parties regarding the contribution.”75 In light of other provisions in the deed, the court concluded that the granting provision's recitation of “other good and valuable consideration” was “boilerplate language and has no legal effect for purposes of” the statutory requirement.76 The court thus concluded that the deed of easement, “taken as a whole, states that no goods or services were received in exchange for the contribution.”77

Another case is rather similar to the previous one. The deed of easement, which was found to be a contemporaneous acknowledgment, included an “affirmative indication” that the donee did not provide any goods or services to the donor in consideration for the gift.78 The deed explicitly stated that it represented the parties' “entire agreement” and that “[a]ny prior or simultaneous correspondence, understandings, agreements, and representations are null and void upon execution hereof unless set out in this instrument.” This phraseology, said the court, “negated the provision or receipt of any consideration not stated therein.”79 Apart from the charitable conveyance and the covenants attending the easement, the only “consideration” mentioned in the easement deed was the granting provision's reference to consideration of $1 “and other good and valuable consideration.” Neither party contended that the donee furnished the donor with any goods or services in exchange for the gift. Once again, the court regarded the consideration clause as “boilerplate language” having no legal effect for purposes of the substantiation requirement.80 The court wrote that “[t]aken as a whole, therefore, the deed of easement includes the required affirmative indication that [the donee] supplied [the donor] with no goods or services in exchange for its contribution,” causing the deed to constitute a contemporaneous written acknowledgment substantiating the gift.81

Still another case is similar to the previous two cases. The Tax Court ruled that a charitable deduction for a gift of a conservation easement was available to the donor, which did not receive a substantiation letter from the donee, because of the existence of a suitable merger clause in the deed of easement.82

The donor in this case executed a deed of historic preservation and conservation easement granting a qualified public charity an easement over the facade of a building. This deed of easement's granting provision recites $10 of consideration, as well as “other good and valuable consideration.” The deed states that in “further consideration” for the benefits to be received by the donor, the donor agreed to pay the donee a one-time “donation fee” to be used to endow periodic easement monitoring and related costs and support a preservation easement defense fund. This easement is said by the deed to be “in perpetuity over and across” the easement area.

Aside from the charity's monitoring activities and the donor's fee payment, the deed of easement does not contain any reference to any valuable goods or services being furnished to the donor and does not recite any receipt by the charity of any consideration for providing goods or services. The parties stated their understanding that the deed reflects the entire agreement of the parties. The charity did not provide the donor with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment in connection with the gift; it provided an acknowledgment to the donor more than two years after the gift was made. Neither party contended that the donee furnished the donor with any valuable goods or services.

The easement deed in this case was contemporaneous and included an “affirmative indication” that the donee supplied no goods or services to the donor in exchange for its gift.83 The court stated that this deed “thus negated the provision or receipt of any consideration not stated therein.”84 The clause concerning consideration of $10 and other good and valuable consideration was held to constitute “boilerplate language [that] has no legal effect” for purposes of the substantiation rule.85

The court considered whether the charity's monitoring activities should be considered a “service” provided in exchange for the gift. In ensuring compliance with the easement's restrictions, the court said that the charity “would be discharging its own enforcement responsibilities as a charitable organization holding conservation easements.”86 The court added that the charity's monitoring would be an “odd form of ‘service’ because it could generate no upside for [the donor] but only downside,” such as the seeking of an injunction requiring the donor to restore the property to the status quo.87 Moreover, because the easements held by the charity are its property, as the court noted, “any contribution to an ‘easement defense fund’ would seem to benefit it rather than its donors.”88 The court concluded that the donee supplied the donor with the requisite description and good-faith estimate of the value of its monitoring activities, noting that the tax law “does not prohibit a charity from providing services to a donor.”89

By contrast, a properly executed deed in a subsequent case did not contain the requisite language, nor did it meet the as a whole test; thus, the document did not serve as substantiation acknowledgment.90

Aside from substantiation documents provided by charitable donees and deeds of easement, other documents may satisfy the no-goods-or-services requirement. The requisite substantiation language may be found in a gift agreement. A series of documents evidencing a bargain sale91 was ruled satisfaction of the substantiation rules.92 Suitable substantiation was found in a letter signed by a government official.93 The Tax Court held, however, that a settlement agreement between a donor and donee cannot serve as an appropriate substantiation document.94

The Tax Court has held, however, that the recitation in the substantiation document must adhere to the specific statutory requirements for there to be allowance of the charitable contribution deduction.95 That is, the doctrine of substantial compliance96 is inapplicable in this context.97

(d) Other Substantiation Law

For the substantiation to be contemporaneous, it must be obtained no later than the date the donor filed a tax return for the year in which the contribution was made. If the return is filed after the due date or extended due date, the substantiation must have been obtained by the due date or extended due date.

It is the responsibility of a donor to obtain the substantiation and maintain it in his or her records. (Again, the charitable contribution deduction depends on compliance with these rules.)

This substantiation procedure is in addition to:

  • The rules that require the provision of certain information if the amount of the claimed charitable deduction for all noncash contributions exceeds $500.98
  • The rules that apply to noncash gifts exceeding $5,000 per item or group of similar items (other than certain publicly traded securities), where the services of a qualified appraiser are required and the charitable donee must acknowledge receipt of the gift and provide certain other information.99

Tax regulations pertain to contributions made by means of withholding from individuals' wages and payment by individuals' employers to donee charitable organizations. (The problems in this setting include the fact that the donee charity often does not know the identities of the donors/employees nor the amounts contributed by each.) These regulations state that gifts of this nature may be substantiated by both:

  • A pay receipt or other document (such as Form W-2) furnished by the donor's employer that sets forth the amount withheld by the employer for the purpose of payment to a donee charity, and
  • A pledge card or other document prepared by or at the direction of the donee organization that includes a statement to the effect that the organization does not provide goods or services in whole or partial consideration for any contributions made to the organization by payroll deduction.100

For purposes of the $250 threshold in relation to contributions made by payroll deduction, the amount withheld from each payment is treated as a separate contribution.101 Thus, the substantiation requirement does not apply to contributions made by means of payroll deduction unless the employer deducts $250 or more from a single paycheck for the purposes of making a charitable gift. The preamble to these regulations contains a discussion of this question: Can a Form W-2 that reflects the total amount contributed by payroll deduction, but does not separately list each contribution of $250 or more, be used as evidence of the amount withheld from the employee's wages to be paid to the donee charitable organization? The IRS noted that the statute provides that an acknowledgment must reflect the amount of cash and a description of property other than cash contributed to a charitable organization. When a person makes multiple contributions to a charitable organization, the law does not require the acknowledgment to list each contribution separately. Consequently, an acknowledgment may substantiate multiple contributions with a statement of the total amount contributed by a person during the year, rather than an itemized list of separate contributions. Therefore, said the IRS, a Form W-2 reflecting an employee's total annual contribution, without separately listing the amount of each contribution, can be used as evidence of the amount withheld from the employee's wages. (The IRS determined that the regulations need not address this point.) The donor may also use a pledge card that includes a statement to the effect that the organization does not provide goods or services in consideration for contributions to the organization by payroll deduction.

A charitable organization, or a Principal Combined Fund Organization for purposes of the Combined Federal Campaign and acting in that capacity, that receives a payment made as a contribution is treated as a donee organization for purposes of the substantiation requirements, even if the organization (pursuant to the donor's instructions or otherwise) distributes the amount received to one or more charitable organizations.102

This preamble also contains a discussion of a problem, the answer to which from the IRS was: Stop engaging in the practice. This concerns the making of lump-sum contributions by employees through their employers other than by payroll deduction. Employees may make contributions in the form of checks payable to their employer, who then deposits the checks in an employer account and sends the donee charity a single check drawn on the employer account. When employees' payments are transferred to a donee organization in this manner, it is difficult for the charitable organization to identify the persons who made the contributions, and thus the employees may be unable to obtain the requisite substantiation. These difficulties, the IRS advised, can be eliminated if the employees' contribution checks are made payable to the donee organization and the employer forwards the employees' checks to the charitable organization. (In the context of political fundraising, this is known as “bundling.”) The donee organization then is in a position to provide the necessary substantiation as it otherwise would. (The regulations remain silent on the subject.) This rule is inapplicable, however, in a case where the distributee organization provides goods or services as part of a transaction “structured with a view to avoid taking the goods or services into account in determining the amount of the [charitable] deduction.”103

The regulations define a good-faith estimate as meaning the donee charitable organization's estimate of the fair market value of any goods or services, “without regard to the manner in which the organization in fact made that estimate.”104

These regulations also define the phrase in consideration for. A charitable organization is considered as providing goods or services in consideration for a person's payment if, at the time the person makes the payment, the person receives or expects to receive goods or services in exchange for the payment.105 Goods or services a donee charity provides in consideration for a payment by a person would include goods or services provided in a year other than the year in which the payment is made.106

This disclosure requirement was considerably expanded by the U.S. Tax Court, in a holding that payments made to a charitable organization were not deductible as charitable gifts, because the substantiation requirements were not met, in that there was an undisclosed return benefit in the form of an expectation.107 The donors contributed money to the charity with the understanding, albeit not a legally binding requirement, that the entity would invest the funds in a manner that would provide them with a benefit. (The investment vehicle was a charitable split-dollar life insurance policy pursuant to which the donor's family trust would receive 44 percent of the death benefit.) The court ruled that the charitable organization “provided consideration” for the payments because, at the time of the payments, the couple “expected” to receive a share of the death benefit under the policy.108 The charity did not state in its substantiation documents that it paid premiums for the insurance policy under which the donors would receive a portion of the death benefit, nor did it provide a good-faith estimate of the value of these benefits. Thus, because the substantiation provided by the charity was deficient, the court held that charitable contribution deductions were not allowable.109

Certain goods or services may be disregarded when applying these substantiation rules:

  • Those that have an insubstantial value, in that the fair market value of all the benefits received is not more than 2 percent of the contribution or $50 (indexed for inflation), whichever is less.110
  • Those that have an insubstantial value, in that the contribution is $25 or more (indexed for inflation) and the only benefits received by the donor in return have an aggregate cost of not more than a low-cost article, which generally is one with a cost not in excess of $5 (indexed for inflation).111
  • Annual membership benefits offered to an individual for a payment of no more than $75 per year that consist of rights or privileges that the individual can exercise frequently during the membership period.112 This exception is not available with respect to payments made in exchange for the opportunity for preferred seating at athletic events of educational institutions, for which there are special rules.113 Examples of these rights and privileges include free or discounted admission to the organization's facilities or events, free or discounted parking, preferred access to goods or services, and discounts on the purchase of goods or services.
  • Annual membership benefits offered to an individual for a payment of no more than $75 per year that consist of admission to events during the membership period that are open only to members of the donee organization.114 For this rule to apply, the organization must reasonably project that the cost per person (excluding any allocable overhead) for each event is within the limits established for low-cost articles.115 The projected cost to the donee organization is determined at the time the organization first offers its membership package for the year.
  • Goods or services provided by a charitable organization to an entity's employees in return for a payment to the organization, to the extent the goods or services provided to each employee are the same as those covered by the previous two exceptions.116 When one or more of these goods or services are provided to the donor, the contemporaneous written acknowledgment may indicate that no goods or services were provided in exchange for the donor's payment.

These regulations illustrate the rules pertaining to membership benefits, rights, and privileges. An example is offered concerning a charitable organization operating a performing arts center.117 In return for a payment of $75, the center offers a package of basic membership benefits, which includes the right to purchase tickets to performances one week before they go on sale to the general public; free parking in its garage during evening and weekend performances; and a 10 percent discount on merchandise sold in its gift shop. In exchange for a $150 payment, the center offers a package of preferred membership benefits, which includes all of the benefits in the $75 package as well as a poster that is sold in the center's gift shop for $20. The basic membership and the preferred membership are each valid for 12 months and there are approximately 50 performances of various productions at the center during a 12-month period. The gift shop is open for several hours each week and at performance times. An individual is solicited by the center to make a contribution, being offered the preferred membership option. This individual makes a payment of $300. This individual can satisfy the substantiation requirement by obtaining a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the center that includes a description of the poster and a good-faith estimate of its fair market value ($20) and disregards the remaining membership benefits.

There is another example.118 A charitable organization operating a community theater organization performs four plays every summer; each is performed twice. In return for a membership fee of $60, the organization offers its members free admission to any of its performances. Nonmembers may purchase tickets on a performance-by-performance basis for $15 a ticket. An individual, being solicited by the organization to make a contribution, is advised that the membership benefit will be provided for a payment of $60 or more. This individual chooses to make a payment of $350 to the organization and receives in exchange the membership benefit. This membership benefit does not qualify for the exclusion because it is not a privilege that can be exercised frequently (due to the limited number of performances offered). Therefore, to meet the substantiation requirements, a contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the $350 payment would have to include a description of the free admission benefit and a good-faith estimate of its value. (The example does not continue to state that that value is $60 and the charitable deduction thus is $290.)

If a person makes a contribution of $250 or more to a charitable organization and, in return, the charity offers the person's employees goods or services (other than those that may be disregarded), the contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the person's contribution does not have to include a good-faith estimate of the value of the goods or services but must include a description of those goods or services.119

An individual who incurred unreimbursed expenditures incident to the rendition of services is treated as having obtained a contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the expenditures if the individual:

  • Has adequate records to substantiate the amount of the expenditures, and
  • Timely obtains a statement prepared by the donee charity containing (1) a description of the services provided, (2) a statement as to whether the donee provides any goods or services in consideration, in whole or in part, for the unreimbursed expenditures, and (3) the information summarized in the third and fourth of these items that must be reflected in the written acknowledgment.120

The substantiation rules do not apply to a transfer of property to a charitable remainder trust or a charitable lead trust.121 They do, however, apply with respect to transfers by means of pooled income funds. The reason for this distinction is grounded in the fact that the grantor of a remainder trust or lead trust is not required to designate a specific organization as the charitable beneficiary at the time property is transferred to the trust, so in these instances there is no designated charity available to provide a contemporaneous written acknowledgment to a donor. Also, even when a specific beneficiary is designated, the identification of the charity can be revocable. By contrast, a pooled income fund must be created and maintained by the charitable organization to which the remainder interests are contributed.

If a partnership or S corporation makes a charitable contribution of $250 or more, the partnership or corporation is treated as the taxpayer for gift substantiation purposes.122 Therefore, the partnership or corporation must substantiate the contribution with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the donee charity before reporting the contribution on its income tax return for the appropriate year, and must maintain the contemporaneous written acknowledgment in its records. A partner of a partnership or a shareholder of an S corporation is not required to obtain any additional substantiation for his or her share of the partnership's or S corporation's charitable contribution.

If a person's payment to a charitable organization is matched, in whole or in part, by another payor, and the person receives goods or services in consideration for the payment and some or all of the matched payment, the goods or services are treated as provided in consideration for the person's payment and not in consideration for the matching payment.123

The federal tax law provides for additional charitable gift substantiation requirements. For example, rules apply where the value of contributed property exceeds $500, other rules apply where the value of the property exceeds $5,000, and still other rules apply where the value is in excess of $500,000.124 Special substantiation rules apply in the context of gifts of motor vehicles, boats, and airplanes.125

A charitable deduction otherwise allowed for a gift to a donor-advised fund126 is allowed only if (1) the sponsoring organization is not a war veterans' organization,127 a domestic fraternal society,128 a cemetery company,129 or a nonfunctionally integrated Type III supporting organization,130 and the donor obtains a contemporaneous written acknowledgment131 from the sponsoring organization of the fund that the organization has exclusive legal control over the contributed assets.132

§ 5.5 QUID PRO QUO CONTRIBUTION LAW

Congress appreciably added to the federal law of charitable fundraising regulation in 1993 when it enacted certain quid pro quo requirements. A quid pro quo contribution is a payment “made partly as a contribution and partly in consideration for goods or services provided to the payor by the donee organization.”133 The term does not include a payment made to an organization, operated exclusively for religious purposes, in return for which the donor receives solely an intangible religious benefit that generally is not sold in a commercial transaction outside the donative context.134

Specifically, if a charitable organization (other than a state, a possession of the United States, a political subdivision of a state or possession, the United States, and the District of Columbia)135 receives a quid pro quo contribution in excess of $75, the organization must, in connection with the solicitation or receipt of the contribution, provide a written statement that (1) informs the donor that the amount of the contribution that is deductible for federal income tax purposes is limited to the excess of the amount of any money and the value of any property other than money contributed by the donor over the value of the goods or services provided by the organization and (2) provides the donor with a good-faith estimate of the value of the goods or services.136

It is intended that this disclosure be made in a manner that is reasonably likely to come to the attention of the donor. Therefore, immersing the disclosure in fine print in a larger document is inadequate.137

For purposes of the $75 threshold, separate payments made at different times of the year with respect to separate fundraising events generally will not be aggregated.

These rules do not apply where only de minimis, token goods or services (such as key chains and bumper stickers) are provided to the donor. In defining these terms, prior IRS pronouncements are followed.138 Also, these rules do not apply to transactions that do not have a donative element (such as the charging of tuition by a school, the charging of health care fees by a hospital, or the sale of items by a museum).139

A nearly identical disclosure provision was part of the Revenue Act of 1992, which was vetoed. The report of the Senate Finance Committee, which accompanied the proposal, however, contained the following explanation of the need for these rules:

Difficult problems of tax administration arise with respect to fundraising techniques in which an organization that is eligible to receive deductible contributions provides goods or services in consideration for payments from donors. Organizations that engage in such fundraising practices often do not inform their donors that all or a portion of the amount paid by the donor may not be deductible as a charitable contribution. Consequently, the [Senate Finance] [C]ommittee believes … it is appropriate that, in all cases where a charity receives a quid pro quo contribution … the charity should inform the donor that the [federal income tax charitable contribution] deduction … is limited to the amount by which the payment exceeds the value of goods or services furnished, and provide a good faith estimate of the value of such goods or services.140

A penalty may be imposed for violation of these requirements.141

Under final regulations issued in 1996, a charitable organization is able to use “any reasonable methodology in making a good faith estimate, provided it applies the methodology in good faith.”142 A good-faith estimate of the value of goods or services that are not generally available in a commercial transaction may, under these regulations, be determined by reference to the fair market value of similar or comparable goods or services. Goods or services may be similar or comparable even though they do not have the “unique qualities of the goods or services that are being valued.”143

Two examples are offered. One concerns a charitable organization operating a museum.144 In return for a payment of $50,000 or more, the museum allows a donor to hold a private event in one of its rooms; in the room is a display of a unique collection of art. No other private events are permitted to be held in the museum. In the community, there are four hotels with ballrooms having the same capacity as the room in the museum. Two of these hotels have ballrooms that offer amenities and atmosphere that are similar to the amenities and atmosphere of the room in the museum; none of them have any art collections. Because the capacity, amenities, and atmosphere of the ballrooms in these two hotels are comparable to the capacity, amenities, and atmosphere of the room in the museum, a good-faith estimate of the benefits received from the museum may be determined by reference to the cost of renting either of the two hotel ballrooms. The cost of renting one of these ballrooms is $2,500. Thus, a good-faith estimate of the fair market value of the right to host a private event in the room in the museum is $2,500. Here, the ballrooms in the two hotels are considered similar and comparable facilities in relation to the museum's room for valuation purposes, notwithstanding the fact that the room in the museum displays a unique collection of art.

In another example, a charitable organization offers to provide a one-hour tennis lesson with a tennis professional in return for the first payment of $500 or more it receives.145 The professional provides tennis lessons on a commercial basis at the rate of $100 per hour. An individual pays the charity $500 and in return receives the tennis lesson. A good-faith estimate of the fair market value of the tennis lesson provided in exchange for the payment is $100.

In this context, the regulations somewhat address the matter of the involvement of celebrities. This subject is not addressed by a separate regulation but rather by an example.146 A charity holds a promotion in which it states that, in return for the first payment of $1,000 or more it receives, it will provide a dinner for two followed by an evening tour of a museum conducted by an artist whose most recent works are on display there. The artist does not provide tours of the museum on a commercial basis. Typically, tours of the museum are free to the public. An individual pays $1,000 to the charity and in exchange receives a dinner valued at $100 and the museum tour. Because the tours are typically free to the public, a good-faith estimate of the value of the tour conducted by the artist is $0. The fact that the tour is conducted by the artist rather than one of the museum's regular tour guides does not render the tours dissimilar or incomparable for valuation purposes. This rule as to celebrity presence is more important for what it does not say than what it says. Basically, the regulation states that if the celebrity does something different from what he or she is known for (e.g., a painter conducting a tour), the fact that he or she is part of the event can be ignored for valuation purposes.147

Five types of goods or services are disregarded for purposes of the quid pro quo contribution rules.148 A comparable rule as to goods or services provided to employees of donors is applicable in this context.149

No part of this type of a payment can be considered a deductible charitable gift unless two elements exist: (1) the patron makes a payment in an amount that is in fact in excess of the fair market value of the goods or services received, and (2) the patron intends to make a payment in an amount that exceeds that fair market value.150 This requirement of the element of intent may prove to be relatively harmless, as the patron is likely to know the charity's good-faith estimate figure in advance of the payment and thus cannot help but have this intent. Still, proving intent is not always easy. This development is unfortunate, inasmuch as the law has been evolving to a more mechanical (and thus less reliant on subjective proof) test: any payment to a charitable organization in excess of fair market value is regarded as a charitable gift.151

§ 5.6 FUNDRAISING DISCLOSURE BY NONCHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

Congress brought the IRS into the field of regulation of fundraising when it legislated certain fundraising disclosure rules.152 These rules are not applicable to charitable organizations,153 although the legislative history accompanying them strongly hinted that this type of statutory law would be extended to charities if they persisted in securing payments from individuals that are not gifts (such as dues, payments for raffle tickets, or bids at auctions) under circumstances where the payors think, sometimes because of explicit or implicit suggestions from the charity involved, that the payments are gifts and try to deduct them as charitable contributions.154

These fundraising disclosure rules, which are thus applicable to all types of tax-exempt organizations, principally social welfare organizations,155 other than charitable ones, are designed to prevent these noncharitable organizations from engaging in fundraising activities under circumstances in which donors will assume that the contributions are tax-deductible, when in fact they are not. These rules do not, however, apply to an organization that has annual gross receipts that are normally $100,000 or less.156 Also, where all of the parties being solicited are tax-exempt organizations, the solicitation need not include the disclosure statement (inasmuch as these grantors have no need for a charitable deduction).157

Technically, in general, this law applies to any organization to which contributions are not deductible as charitable gifts and which (1) is tax-exempt,158 (2) is a political organization,159 (3) was either type of organization at any time during the five-year period ending on the date of the fundraising solicitation, or (4) is a successor to one of these organizations at any time during this five-year period.160 The IRS is accorded the authority to treat any group of two or more organizations as one organization for these purposes where “necessary or appropriate” to prevent the avoidance of these rules through the use of multiple organizations.161

Under these rules, each fundraising solicitation by or on behalf of a tax-exempt noncharitable organization must contain an express statement, in a “conspicuous and easily recognizable format,” that gifts to it are not deductible as charitable contributions for federal income tax purposes.162 (The IRS has promulgated rules as to this statement; these rules are discussed as follows.) A fundraising solicitation is any solicitation of gifts made in written or printed form, by television, radio, or telephone (although there is an exclusion for letters or calls not part of a coordinated fundraising campaign soliciting no more than 10 persons during a calendar year).163 Despite the reference in the statute to “contributions and gifts,” the IRS interprets this rule to mandate the disclosure when any tax-exempt organization (other than a charity) seeks funds, such as dues from members.

Failure to satisfy this disclosure requirement can result in imposition of penalties.164 The penalty is $1,000 per day (with a maximum of $10,000 per year), albeit with a reasonable cause exception. In an instance of an intentional disregard of these rules, however, the penalty for the day on which the offense occurred is the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the aggregate cost of the solicitations that took place on that day, and the $10,000 limitation is inapplicable. For these purposes, the days involved are those on which the solicitation was telecast, broadcast, mailed, otherwise distributed, or telephoned.

The IRS promulgated rules in amplification of this law, particularly the requirement of a disclosure statement.165 The rules, which include guidance in the form of “safe-harbor” provisions, address the format of the disclosure statement in instances of use of print media, telephone, television, and radio. They provide examples of acceptable disclosure language and methods (which, when followed, amount to the safe-harbor guidelines), and of included and excluded solicitations. They also contain guidelines for determining the $100,000 threshold.

The safe-harbor guideline for print media (including solicitations by mail, newspapers, and other print mediums [including websites]) is fourfold: (1) the solicitation includes language such as the following: “Contributions or gifts to [name of organization] are not deductible as charitable contributions for federal income tax purposes”; (2) the statement is in at least the same type size as the primary message stated in the body of the letter, leaflet, or advertisement; (3) the statement is included on the message side of any card or tear-off section that the contributor returns with the contribution; and (4) the statement is either the first sentence in a paragraph or itself constitutes a paragraph.

The safe-harbor guideline for telephone solicitations includes the first of the above elements. In addition, the guideline requires that (1) the statement be made in close proximity to the request for contributions, during the same telephone call, by the telephone solicitor, and (2) any written confirmation or billing sent to a person pledging to contribute during the telephone solicitation be in compliance with the requirements for print media solicitations.

Solicitation by television must, to conform with this guideline, include a solicitation statement that complies with the first of the print medium requirements. Also, if the statement is spoken, it must be in close proximity to the request for contributions. If the statement appears on the television screen, it must be in large, easily readable type appearing on the screen for at least five seconds.

In the case of a solicitation by radio, the statement must, to meet the safe-harbor test, comply with the first of the print medium requirements. Also, the statement must be made in close proximity to the request for contributions during the same radio solicitation announcement.

Where the soliciting organization is a membership entity, classified as a trade or business association or other form of business league,166 or a labor or agricultural organization,167 the following statement conforms to the safe-harbor guideline: “Contributions or gifts to [name of organization] are not tax-deductible as charitable contributions. They may be tax-deductible, however, as ordinary and necessary business expenses.”

If an organization makes a solicitation to which these rules apply and the solicitation does not comply with the applicable safe-harbor guideline, the IRS is authorized to evaluate all of the facts and circumstances to determine whether the solicitation meets the disclosure rule. A “good-faith effort” to comply with these requirements is an important factor in the evaluation of the facts and circumstances. Nonetheless, disclosure statements made in “fine print” do not comply with the statutory requirement.168

This disclosure requirement applies to solicitations for voluntary contributions as well as solicitations for attendance at testimonials and similar fundraising events. The disclosure must be made in the case of solicitations for contributions to political action committees.

Exempt from this disclosure rule are the billing of those who advertise in an organization's publications, billing by social clubs for food and beverages, billing of attendees of a conference conducted by the organization, billing for insurance premiums of an insurance program operated or sponsored by an organization, billing of members of a community association for mandatory payments for police and fire (and similar) protection, and billing for payments to a voluntary employees' beneficiary association as well as similar payments to a trust for pension and/or health benefits.

General material discussing the benefits of membership in a tax-exempt organization, such as a trade association or labor union, does not have to include the required disclosure statement. The statement is required, however, where the material both requests payment and specifies the amount requested as membership dues. If a person responds to the general material discussing the benefits of membership, the follow-up material requesting the payment of a specific amount in membership dues (such as a union checkoff card or a trade association billing statement for a new member) must include the disclosure statement. General material discussing a political candidacy and requesting persons to vote for the candidate or “support” the candidate need not include the disclosure statement, unless the material specifically requests either a financial contribution or a contribution of volunteer services in support of the candidate.

§ 5.7 EXCESS BENEFIT TRANSACTIONS LAW

The excess benefit transactions law169 constitutes the most dramatic body of statutory law affecting public charities and those who engage in fundraising for them, since the creation of the fundamental tax rules for charities in 1969.170 The most significant aspect of these rules is the emphasis on the sanctioning (taxation) of those persons who engaged in impermissible private transactions with public charities, rather than revocation of the organizations' tax-exempt status.171

These sanctions are sometimes termed intermediate sanctions, because they generally are posited between what was, before their enactment, two extremes: when the IRS found an act of private inurement, its formal choices were to terminate the organization's tax-exempt status or do nothing.

(a) Basic Concepts of Intermediate Sanctions

Pursuant to the intermediate sanctions rules, tax sanctions—structured as penalty excise taxes—may be imposed on the disqualified persons (discussed later) who improperly benefited from the transaction and on the organization managers (discussed later) who participated in the transaction knowing that it was improper. These rules do not prohibit a transaction between an applicable tax-exempt organization and disqualified persons with respect to it. Rather, the rules require that the terms and conditions of the transaction be reasonable.

(i) Tax-Exempt Organizations Involved.   The sanctions apply with respect to tax-exempt public charities,172 tax-exempt social welfare organizations,173 and tax-exempt health insurance issuers.174 These organizations are termed applicable tax-exempt organizations.175 Organizations of this nature include any organization described in one of these three categories of exempt organizations at any time during the five-year period ending on the date of the transaction.176

There are no exemptions from these rules. That is, all tax-exempt public charities, social welfare organizations, and health insurance issuers are applicable tax-exempt organizations.

(ii) Excess Benefit Transactions.   This tax regime has as its heart the excess benefit transaction. Essentially, an excess benefit transaction is the same as a private inurement transaction. In an instance of one of these transactions, tax sanctions can be imposed on the disqualified person or persons who improperly benefited from the transaction and perhaps on any organization managers who participated in the transaction knowing that it was improper.

The term excess benefit transaction is based on the contract law concept of consideration, which means the approximately equal benefits that parties to a contract must receive from the arrangement; consideration is required for the agreement to be enforceable. An excess benefit transaction is any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person, if the value of the economic benefit provided by the exempt organization exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing the benefit.177 This type of benefit is known as an excess benefit.178

The principal focus is on compensation, which generally is all economic benefits provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization in exchange for performance of services. Compensation generally includes all forms of cash and noncash compensation (including salary, fees, bonuses, severance payments, and deferred compensation), payment of liability insurance premiums, payments to welfare benefit plans (such as medical, dental, life insurance, severance pay, and disability benefits plans), and fringe benefits.179

An economic benefit may not be treated as consideration for performance of services unless the organization clearly intended and made the payments as compensation for services.180 In determining whether payments or transactions of this nature are forms of compensation, the relevant factors include whether the appropriate decision-making body approved the transfer as compensation in accordance with established procedures and whether the organization and the recipient reported the transfer (other than in the case of nontaxable fringe benefits) as compensation on relevant returns or other forms.181

The phrasing directly or indirectly means the provision of an economic benefit directly by the organization or indirectly by means of a controlled entity. Thus, an applicable tax-exempt organization cannot avoid involvement in an excess benefit transaction by causing a controlled entity to engage in the transaction.182

Existing law standards, including those established under the law concerning ordinary and necessary business expenses,183 apply in determining reasonableness of compensation and fair market value.184 In this regard, an individual need not necessarily accept reduced compensation merely because they render services to a tax-exempt, as opposed to a taxable, organization.185 If there are comparable institutions in the for-profit sector (such as hospitals), compensation paid to their executives may be taken into account in determining reasonableness.

There is no requirement, generally, that a disqualified person know that a transaction is an excess benefit transaction. An individual can act in good faith and nonetheless be penalized for engaging in what turns out to be an excess benefit transaction.

The first of the intermediate sanctions cases involved the issue as to whether certain transactions—the sale of assets of applicable tax-exempt organizations to disqualified persons—constituted excess benefit transactions. The court held that they were, in that the value of the transferred assets “far exceeded” the consideration paid by the disqualified persons.186

Automatic Excess Benefit Transactions. An economic benefit may not be treated as consideration for the performance of services unless the organization providing the benefit clearly indicates its intent to treat the benefit as compensation when paid (such as by issuance of an IRS Form W-2 or 1099).187 These transactions are known as automatic excess benefit transactions. A transaction can be an automatic excess benefit transaction even though its terms and conditions show that it is, in fact, reasonable. Transactions of this nature include the provision by an applicable tax-exempt organization to a disqualified person, for personal purposes, of use of a vehicle, access to the organization's charge accounts, and payment for the expenses of spousal travel.

(iii) Revenue-Sharing Transactions.   To the extent provided in tax regulations, the term excess benefit transaction includes any transaction in which the amount of any economic benefit provided to or for the use of a disqualified person is determined in whole or in part by the revenues of one or more activities of the organization, but only if the transaction results in impermissible private inurement.188 In this context, the excess benefit is the amount of impermissible private inurement.

This type of compensation structure is a revenue-sharing arrangement. These rules, technically, are not in force because accompanying tax regulations have not been promulgated.189 Nonetheless, the IRS is applying the general rules to revenue-sharing arrangements.

A revenue-sharing arrangement may be an excess benefit transaction if it permits a disqualified person to receive additional compensation without providing proportional benefits that contribute to the charitable organization's accomplishment of its exempt purpose.190

(iv) Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness.   There is a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness with respect to compensation and other arrangements with disqualified persons. Where the criteria of the presumption are satisfied, the burden of proving an excess benefit transaction shifts to the IRS. The presumption arises where the arrangement was approved by a board of directors or trustees (or committee of the board) that was composed entirely of individuals unrelated to and not subject to the control of the disqualified persons involved in the arrangement, obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to comparability, and adequately documented the basis for its determination.191

(v) Disqualified Persons.   In this context, the term disqualified person means any person who was, at any time during the five-year period ending on the date of the transaction involved, in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.192 The term also means a member of the family of an individual who meets this definition and an entity in which persons described in either of these two categories own more than a 35 percent interest.193

The following persons are deemed—automatically—to be disqualified persons (i.e., to have substantial influence): voting members of the governing body; presidents, chief executive officers, and chief operating officers; and treasurers and chief financial officers.194 Persons deemed to not have substantial influence include other tax-exempt charitable organizations and employees who are not highly compensated employees for employee benefit purposes.195

Certain facts and circumstances are considered in determining whether a person is a disqualified person. Facts and circumstances that tend to show substantial influence include the fact that the person founded the organization; the person is a substantial contributor to the organization; the person's compensation is primarily based on revenues derived from activities of the organization that the person controls; the person has or shares authority to control or determine a substantial portion of the organization's capital expenditures, operating budget, or compensation for employees; or the person manages a discrete segment or activity of the organization that represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the organization, as compared with the organization as a whole.196

Facts and circumstances that tend to show no substantial influence over the affairs of an organization include the fact that the person has taken a vow of poverty on behalf of a religious organization; the person functioned as a lawyer, accountant, or investment manager or advisor; or the person does not participate in any management decisions affecting the organization as a whole or a discrete segment or activity of the organization that represents a substantial portion of the organization's activities, assets, income, or expenses.197

Disqualified persons include organization managers. These are individuals who are trustees, directors, or officers of an applicable tax-exempt organization, as well as those having powers or responsibilities similar to those of trustees, directors, or officers of the organization.198 The term member of the family is defined as (1) spouses, ancestors, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and the spouses of children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, and (2) the brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half-blood) of the individual and their spouses.199

(vi) Initial Contract Exception.   The intermediate sanctions rules do not apply to a fixed payment made to a person pursuant to an initial contract. A fixed payment is an amount of money or other property specified in the contract, or determined by a fixed formula specified in the contract, which is to be paid or transferred in exchange for the provision of specified services or property.200 A fixed formula may incorporate an amount that depends on future events (such as an increase in the Consumer Price Index) or contingencies, provided that no person exercises discretion when calculating the amount of a payment or deciding whether to make a payment (such as a bonus). A specified event or contingency may include the amount of revenues generated by (or other objective measure of) one or more activities of the charitable organization.

A fixed payment does not include any amount paid to a person under a reimbursement or similar arrangement where discretion is exercised by any person with respect to the amount of expenses incurred or reimbursed.

An initial contract is a binding written contract between an applicable tax-exempt organization and a person who was not a disqualified person immediately before entering into the contract. This exception, however, does not apply to any fixed payment made pursuant to an initial contract during any tax year of the person contracting with the organization, if the person fails to perform substantially the person's obligations under the contract during that year.

A written binding contract that provides that the contract is terminable or subject to cancellation by the applicable tax-exempt organization (other than as a result of a lack of substantial performance by the disqualified person) without the other party's consent and without substantial penalty to the organization is treated as a new contract as of the earliest date that any such termination or cancellation, if made, would be effective.

A compensation package can be partially sheltered by these rules. For example, a person can have a base salary that is a fixed payment pursuant to an initial contract and also have an annual performance-based bonus.

(vii) Tax Structure.   The intermediate sanctions penalties are structured as excise taxes. A disqualified person who benefited from an excess benefit transaction is subject to an initial excise tax equal to 25 percent of the amount of the excess benefit.201 An additional tax, in an amount equal to 200 percent of the amount involved, may be imposed on a disqualified person where the initial tax was imposed and if there was no correction (defined below) of the excess benefit transaction within a specified period.202

An organization manager who participated in an excess benefit transaction, knowing that it was this type of a transaction, is subject to an initial excise tax of 10 percent of the excess benefit where an initial tax is imposed on a disqualified person.203

Taxes on excess benefit transactions that are corrected (see following discussion) within the correction period may be eligible for abatement.204

(viii) Correction.   In addition to payment of the tax penalties, the transaction must be corrected. The term correction means undoing the excess benefit to the extent possible and taking any additional measures necessary to place the organization in a financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards.205

The correction amount with respect to an excess benefit transaction is the sum of the excess benefit and interest on the excess benefit.206 The amount of the interest charge is determined by multiplying the amount of the excess benefit by an interest rate, compounded annually, for the period from the date the excess benefit transaction occurred to the date of correction.

Caution should be exercised when correcting an excess benefit transaction. If not undertaken properly, the attempted undoing of the arrangement can cause another excess benefit transaction.

(ix) Reporting of Excess Benefit Transactions.   Disqualified persons and organization managers liable for payment of excise taxes as the result of excess benefit transactions are required to file Form 4720 as the return by which these taxes are paid. An excess benefit transaction must also be reported on the annual information return of the applicable tax-exempt organization.207

(x) Scope of Sanctions.   These intermediate sanctions may be imposed by the IRS in lieu of or in addition to revocation of an organization's tax-exempt status.208 The sanctions are, in general, to be the sole sanction imposed in those cases in which the excess benefit does not rise to such a level as to call into question whether, on the whole, the organization functions as a charitable or social welfare organization.

In practice, the revocation of tax-exempt status, with or without the imposition of these excise taxes, is to occur only when the organization no longer operates as a charitable or social welfare organization.209 Preexisting law principles apply in determining whether an organization no longer operates as a tax-exempt organization. The loss of tax-exempt status could occur in a year, or as of a year, the organization was involved in a transaction constituting a substantial amount of private inurement.210

(xi) Additional Penalties.   A person may be assessed penalties for acting willfully and flagrantly in the intermediate sanctions setting.211 In one instance, a tax advisor explained the private inurement rules to a disqualified person, who nonetheless continued a pattern of engaging in excess benefit transactions, thereby incurring this penalty.212

(xii) Interrelationship with Private Inurement Doctrine.   The intermediate sanctions penalties may be imposed by the IRS in lieu of or in addition to revocation of the tax-exempt status of an applicable tax-exempt organization.213 In general, these sanctions are the sole penalty imposed in cases in which the excess benefit does not rise to such a level as to call into question whether, on the whole, the organization functions as an applicable tax-exempt organization.214

Revocation of tax-exempt status, with or without imposition of intermediate sanctions taxes, is to occur only when the applicable tax-exempt organization no longer operates as an applicable tax-exempt organization.215 Existing law principles apply in determining whether an applicable tax-exempt organization no longer operates as an exempt organization. For example, the loss of exempt status would occur in a year, or as of a year, the entity was involved in a transaction constituting a substantial amount of private inurement.

Tax regulations provide that, in determining whether to continue to recognize the tax exemption of a charitable entity that engages in an excess benefit transaction that violates the private inurement doctrine, the IRS will consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including (1) the size and scope of the organization's regular and ongoing activities that further exempt purposes before and after one or more excess benefit transactions occurred, (2) the size and scope of one or more excess benefit transactions in relation to the size and scope of the organization's regular and ongoing exempt functions, (3) whether the organization has been involved in multiple excess benefit transactions, (4) whether the organization has implemented safeguards that are reasonably calculated to prevent future violations, and (5) whether the excess benefit transaction has been corrected or the organization has made good-faith efforts to seek correction from the disqualified person or persons who benefited from the excess benefit transaction.216

The fourth and fifth of these factors “weigh more heavily” in favor of continuing tax exemption where the organization has discovered the excess benefit transaction and takes corrective action before the IRS learns of the matter. Correction of an excess benefit transaction after the IRS discovers it, by itself, is never a sufficient basis for continuing recognition of exemption.217

(b) Excess Benefit Transactions Law as Applied to Fundraising

In the fundraising setting, the issues basically involve the circumstances when a person involved in the fundraising process is a disqualified person and when a transaction in the fundraising context is an impermissible transaction (i.e., one giving rise to taxation).

(i) Tax-Exempt Organizations Involved.   These intermediate sanctions apply with respect to all charitable organizations, other than private foundations. That is, the sanctions apply with respect to all public charities. Therefore, from the standpoint of charitable fundraising, the charity involved is almost certain to be an applicable tax-exempt organization.

(ii) Disqualified Persons in Fundraising Context.   Generally, a fundraising executive is not a disqualified person with respect to the charitable organization being served. He or she is not normally in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization. This is usually the case when the fundraiser is an employee (such as a director of development) or a consultant (independent contractor).

There are, nonetheless, situations where the fundraising professional is a disqualified person. The fundraiser may be an organization manager. If the fundraising function is in a related entity, such as a foundation218 directly affiliated with a university or hospital, and the fundraiser is the chief executive officer of that foundation, he or she would be a disqualified person with respect to the foundation under the general rule. Occasionally, a fundraiser will be a disqualified person by virtue of being a member of a family that includes a disqualified person.

An independent fundraising person may be considered a disqualified person. This is particularly the case where the person has control over a fundraising program of a charitable organization that is a meaningful source of the organization's revenue. It is noted that the fact that a person manages a discrete segment or activity of an organization, that represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the organization, tends to lead to the conclusion that the person is a disqualified person.

This is an area where charities and their fundraising professionals need to proceed with caution. The IRS is of the view that a person who manages a discrete, meaningful segment or activity of a charitable organization is a disqualified person. The IRS tried, by means of proposed regulations, to make that the absolute rule.219 Because that would be overreaching in relation to the statutory definition, however, the IRS was relegated to placement of this factor as an element in a facts-and-circumstances test.

As an example, a charitable organization decided to use bingo games as a method of generating revenue. The charity entered into a contract with a company that operates these games. This company managed the promotion and operation of the bingo activity; provided all necessary staff, equipment, and services; and paid the charity a percentage of the revenue from the bingo activity. The company retained the balance of the proceeds. The charity provided no goods or services in connection with the bingo operation other than the use of its hall for the bingo games. The annual gross revenue earned from the games represented more than one-half of the charity's total annual revenue. The company's compensation is primarily based on revenues from an activity that it controls. Because the company managed a discrete activity of the charitable organization that represented a substantial portion of the charity's income, the IRS is of the view that the company is a disqualified person with respect to the charitable organization.220

(iii) Excess Benefit Transactions in Fundraising Context.   The most obvious instance of the existence of an excess benefit transaction in the fundraising context is the payment of excessive compensation to the fundraising executive, as employee or consultant, assuming the fundraiser is a disqualified person.

Some fundraisers are compensated, in whole or in part, on the basis of the revenue flow of the charitable organization involved. This arrangement may be structured as a commission or some other form of percentage-based compensation. In any event, it is likely to be a revenue-sharing arrangement.

At the present, as noted, the specific provision concerning revenue-sharing arrangements is not in force. Nonetheless, the IRS is reviewing these compensation structures, using the general definition of the term excess benefit transaction. It may be advisable to limit the amount of this type of compensation, irrespective of how it is ascertained. The fact that a revenue-sharing arrangement is subject to a cap is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of the compensation.221

As noted, the fact that a person's compensation is primarily based on revenues derived from activities of the organization that the person controls is a factor leading toward a decision that the person is a disqualified person.

One of the greatest concerns in this setting pertains to arrangements involving special events, where the events are coordinated, if not entirely conducted, by for-profit companies. As discussed, a company of this nature can be regarded as a disqualified person. In that event, the fees paid to the company would be tested against a standard of reasonableness.

Indeed, the first technical advice memorandum issued by the IRS applying the intermediate sanctions rules involved fundraising. The case concerned a charitable organization that was established by a used car salesman; the organization solicited contributions of used vehicles. The IRS concluded that excess benefit transactions occurred in connection with the payment of his salary, repayment to him of undocumented loans, payments to a towing company (owned by his son), lease payments paid by the charity to his company for the leasing of an automobile, and the furnishing of automobiles to members of his family.222

Fundraising professionals may act as a team. Nonetheless, if they are disqualified persons, in determining whether these persons received any excess benefits in a particular year, the total value of each disqualified person's services provided to the applicable tax-exempt organization in that year must be compared with the value of the benefits received by that particular disqualified person for that year. That is, each person's compensation must be tested for reasonableness, rather than the team as a unit.223 Presumably, this outcome is different where there is a partnership or other formal joint venture.

(iv) Automatic Excess Benefit Transactions.   A tax-exempt charitable organization was formed to provide housing, employment, and other services to veterans. It hired veterans to solicit cash contributions for it, allowing them to retain a percentage of the funds as payment for their services. There was no evidence of this organization's intent to treat these payments as compensation. The IRS classified these payment arrangements as automatic excess benefit transactions (without discussion as to whether any of the payees were disqualified persons).224

(v) Initial Contract Exception.   The initial contract exception can be of considerable utility in the fundraising setting. It is available when a charitable organization hires a fundraising professional, whether as an employee or independent contractor, where the person was not a disqualified person immediately before entering into the contract.225 When the parameters of the exception are satisfied, the compensation arrangement is totally exempted from the intermediate sanctions law penalties.

It is clear, then, that the charitable organization and/or fundraising professional who believes there may be liability associated with a transaction with a charitable organization should endeavor to satisfy the criteria of the initial contract exception.

(vi) Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness.   The rebuttable presumption of reasonableness can also be useful for the fundraising professional, particularly in circumstances where the initial contract exception cannot apply. The fundraiser should endeavor to be certain that the various elements of the presumption are satisfied, to shift the burden of proof to the IRS in the event of a challenge to the reasonableness of compensation.

(vii) Reporting of Excess Benefit Transactions.   It is sometimes said that the intermediate sanctions rules are a concern only to disqualified persons and not to the charitable organization involved or other persons who are not disqualified persons; however, this often is not the case. From a fundraising perspective, a charitable organization embroiled in an excess benefit transaction is expected to report that transaction on its annual information return, which is a public document.226 The result, at a minimum, can be adverse publicity, which can harm the programs of the charitable organization involved and perhaps fundraisers who are not disqualified persons.

(viii) Tax Penalties.   If a fundraising professional, who is a disqualified person and hired by a charitable organization, is paid excessive compensation, the arrangement would be a taxable excess benefit transaction, assuming inapplicability of the initial contract exception.

Assume, as an illustration, that this fundraising professional was paid a compensation package of $200,000 for a three-year period. Following audit, the IRS concluded that this individual's services were worth only $100,000. This fundraising executive would then owe initial excise taxes totaling $75,000 (a $25,000 tax per year on the excess benefit of $100,000). Also, this compensation arrangement would have to be corrected by the fundraiser, by means of payment of $300,000 to the charity, plus suitable interest. If these steps were not timely taken, the fundraiser may have additional excise taxes imposed, totaling $600,000. The total obligation of the fundraiser would be $975,000, not including penalties, interest, and legal fees. A board member of this charity who approved this compensation package, knowing it to be excessive, would be liable for $10,000 in taxes and perhaps the taxes of one or more other board members.

(ix) Third-Party Summons: Statute of Limitations.   In general, the statute of limitations for assessing an intermediate sanctions excise tax is three years.227 The statute of limitations begins to run on the later of the date the tax-exempt organization files the annual information return involved or the due date for the return.228

If a fundraising professional is a disqualified person and the IRS is investigating the possibility of that person's participation in an excess benefit transaction, the IRS may issue a third-party summons to the charitable organization involved in pursuit of facts. The disqualified person may object to the summons if it is issued after the three-year statute of limitations has run. According to a court, that is not a basis for quashing the summons. All that is required to sustain the validity of the summons is that the IRS must show that the “investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the [IRS's] possession, and that the administrative steps required by the [Internal Revenue] Code have been followed.”229 Thus, the court declined to quash a summons issued, after the three-year statute of limitations with respect to a charitable organization had run, seeking information from the organization as to whether a disqualified person participated in an excess benefit transaction.230

§ 5.8 UNRELATED BUSINESS LAW

One of the ways in which the IRS is regulating fundraising for charitable purposes is by means of the unrelated business rules. Before an analysis of the application of these rules to charitable fundraising, however, an overview of the rules is appropriate.231

(a) Basic Concepts of Unrelated Income Taxation

The law of tax-exempt organizations divides the activities of charitable and other tax-exempt organizations into two categories: those that are related to the performance of tax-exempt functions and those that are not. The net income derived from the latter group of activities, termed unrelated activities, is subject to tax. That is, the revenues associated with unrelated activities are taxable, taking into account the deductible expenses generated by or allocable to these activities.

Therefore, even though a charitable organization generally achieves federal income tax exemption, it nonetheless remains potentially taxable on any unrelated business income.232 This tax is levied on nonprofit corporations and unincorporated associations233 at the corporate rates234 or on charitable trusts235 at the individual rates.236

(i) Introduction.   The taxation of unrelated income, a feature of the federal tax laws since 1950, is based on the concept that tax-exempt organizations should not compete with for-profit organizations. Also, the unrelated income rules are believed to be a more effective and workable sanction for authentic enforcement of the law of tax-exempt organizations than denial or revocation of tax-exempt status.

The unrelated income rules are based on a simple concept: the unrelated business income tax applies only to active business income that arises from activities that are unrelated to the organization's exempt purposes. Yet, despite the simplicity of the tax structure, it is not always easy to determine which activities of a tax-exempt organization are related to exempt purposes and which are unrelated businesses.

If a substantial portion of an organization's income is from unrelated sources, the organization will not qualify for tax exemption. That is, to be tax-exempt, a nonprofit organization must be organized and operated primarily for exempt purposes. An organization may satisfy the requirements for tax exemption as a charitable organization, however, even though it operates a business as a substantial part of its activities, where the operation of the business is in furtherance of the organization's exempt purposes and where the organization is not organized and operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated business (technically termed a trade or business). In determining the existence or nonexistence of this primary purpose, all of the circumstances must be considered, including the size and extent of the business and of the activities that are in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.237

At the other end of the spectrum, incidental business activity will not alone cause a charitable or other type of tax-exempt organization to lose or be denied tax exemption, although the income derived from the activity may be taxable.238 That is, the federal tax law allows a tax-exempt organization to engage in a certain amount of income-producing activity that is unrelated to exempt purposes.

Business activities may preclude initial qualification of an otherwise tax-exempt organization as a charitable or other entity. This can occur through failure to satisfy the operational test that determines whether the organization is being operated principally for exempt purposes.239 Likewise, an organization will not meet the organizational test if its articles of organization (the document by which it was established) empower it, as more than an insubstantial part of its functions, to carry on activities that do not further its exempt purpose.240

The unrelated business income tax applies with respect to all charitable and nearly all other types of tax-exempt organizations.241 They include religious organizations (including churches), educational organizations (including universities, colleges, and schools), health care organizations (including hospitals), and scientific organizations (including research entities).242 This tax also applies with respect to any college or university that is an agency or instrumentality of any government or political subdivision of a government, or that is owned or operated by a government or political subdivision, or by any agency or instrumentality of one or more governments or political subdivisions, and further applies to any corporation wholly owned by one or more of these colleges or universities.243

Beyond the realm of charitable entities, the rules are applicable with respect to social welfare organizations (including advocacy groups),244 labor organizations (including unions),245 trade and professional associations,246 fraternal organizations,247 and veterans' organizations.248 Special rules249 tax all income not related to exempt functions (including investment income) of social clubs,250 homeowners' associations,251 and political organizations.252

The few tax-exempt organizations that are excepted from the tax are instrumentalities of the federal government,253 certain religious and apostolic organizations,254 farmers' cooperatives,255 and shipowners' protection and indemnity associations.256

Certain organizations are not generally subject to the unrelated business rules simply because they are not allowed to engage in any active business endeavors. This is the case, for example, with respect to private foundations (within limitations) and title-holding organizations.257 As to the former, the operation of an active business (externally or internally) by a private foundation would likely trigger application of the excess business holdings restrictions.258 As to the latter, tax-exempt title-holding corporations are allowed to engage in unrelated business activities to the extent the income derived is from the holding of real property and generally as long as the unrelated income is not in excess of 10 percent of annual gross income.259

The original concept underlying these rules was that of the outside business owned and perhaps operated by a tax-exempt organization. In 1969, however, Congress significantly expanded the reach of these rules by authorizing the IRS to evaluate activities conducted by exempt organizations internally—so-called inside activities.

The primary objective of the unrelated business income tax is to eliminate a source of unfair competition for for-profit businesses by placing the unrelated business activities of tax-exempt organizations on the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which they compete.260 Thus, the report of the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means that accompanied the 1950 legislation states that the “problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed here is primarily that of unfair competition” and the “tax-free status of … [nonprofit] organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits remaining after taxes.”261 The Senate Finance Committee reaffirmed this position in 1976 when it noted that one “major purpose” of the unrelated income tax “is to make certain that an exempt organization does not commercially exploit its exempt status for the purpose of unfairly competing with taxpaying organizations.”262

The absence or presence of unfair competition, however, is not among the criteria generally used to assess whether the revenue from a particular activity is subject to the unrelated income tax. Thus, it is possible for an exempt organization's activity to be wholly noncompetitive with an activity of a for-profit organization and nonetheless be treated as an unrelated business. For example, in a case finding that the operation of a bingo game by an exempt organization creates unrelated business income, a court observed that the “tax on unrelated business income is not limited to income earned by a trade or business that operates in competition with taxpaying entities.”263 Yet, the IRS and courts increasingly take the concept of unfair competition into account in application of the unrelated income rules.

The term unrelated trade or business is defined to mean any trade or business that is regularly carried on, the conduct of which is not substantially related to the exercise or performance by the exempt organization of its exempt purpose or function.264 The conduct of a business is not substantially related to an organization's exempt purpose solely because the organization may need the income or because of the use the organization makes of the profits derived from the business.

Therefore, absent an exception, gross income of a charitable or other tax-exempt organization is subject to the tax on unrelated business income where three factors are present: it is income from a trade or business, the business is regularly carried on by the organization, and the conduct of the trade or business is not substantially related to the organization's performance of its exempt functions.265

Thus, in adopting these rules in 1950 and in amplifying them in 1969, Congress has not prohibited commercial ventures by nonprofit organizations nor has it levied taxes only on the receipts of businesses that bear no relation at all to the tax-exempt purposes of nonprofit organizations. Instead, it struck a balance between, as the U.S. Supreme Court phrased it, “its two objectives of encouraging benevolent enterprise and restraining unfair competition.”266

The unrelated business rules are in a peculiar state of affairs these days. Despite the statutory scheme, the courts are simultaneously developing additional and sometimes different criteria for assessing the presence of unrelated business. It is out of this context that the doctrine of commerciality is emerging.267 The result is considerable confusion about the law in this area and the extensive judgmental leeway on the part of the courts and the IRS in applying it.

A large part of the impetus for revision of the law of unrelated income taxation was the charge by the small business community of unfair competition. The difference between the circumstances in the 1950s and 50 years later is that the competing activities of nonprofit organizations in the 1950s were of the unrelated variety, while as of the turn of the twenty-first century many of the competing activities are, under existing law, related to exempt functions. Moreover, increasingly, activities that were once thought to be fundraising (nontaxable) functions are being considered unrelated businesses, with the net income subject to taxation.

(ii) Deduction Law.   Generally, the term unrelated business taxable income means the gross income derived by an organization from an unrelated trade or business, regularly carried on by the organization, less business deductions that are directly connected with the carrying on of the trade or business.268 For purposes of computing unrelated business taxable income, both such gross income and business deductions are computed with certain modifications, as discussed as follows.

To be directly connected with the conduct of unrelated business, an item of deduction generally must have a proximate and primary relationship to the carrying on of that business. In the case of an organization that derives gross income from the regular conduct of two or more unrelated business activities, unrelated business taxable income is the aggregate of gross income from all such unrelated business activities less the aggregate of the deductions allowed with respect to all these unrelated business activities.269 Expenses, depreciation, and similar items attributable solely to the conduct of unrelated business are proximately and primarily related to that business and therefore qualify for deduction to the extent that they meet the requirements of relevant provisions of the federal tax law.270

Where facilities or personnel are used both to carry on exempt functions and to conduct unrelated trade or business, the expenses, depreciation, and similar items attributable to the facilities or personnel (as, for example, items of overhead) must be allocated between the two uses on a reasonable basis. The portion of any such item so allocated to the unrelated trade or business must be proximately and primarily related to that business and is allowable as a deduction in computing unrelated business income in the manner and to the extent permitted by the federal tax law.271 In certain cases, gross income is derived from unrelated trade or business that exploits an exempt function. Generally, in these cases, expenses, depreciation, and similar items attributable to the conduct of the exempt function are not deductible in computing unrelated business taxable income. Because these items are incident to a function of the type, which is the chief purpose of the organization to conduct, they do not possess proximate and primary relationship to the unrelated trade or business. Therefore, they do not qualify as being directly connected with that business.272

Tax-exempt organizations are allowed, in computing their unrelated business taxable income (if any), a federal income tax charitable contribution deduction.273 This deduction is allowable irrespective of whether the contribution is directly connected with the carrying on of the business. The deduction may not exceed 10 percent of the organization's unrelated business taxable income computed without regard to the deduction.

The net operating loss deduction274 is allowed in computing unrelated business taxable income.275 The net operating loss carryback or carryover (from a tax year for which the exempt organization is subject to the unrelated business income tax) is determined under the net operating loss deduction rules without taking into account any amount of income or deduction that is not included under the unrelated business income tax rules in computing unrelated business taxable income.

(iii) Trade or Business.   The term trade or business includes any activity that is carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of services.276 Moreover, an “activity does not lose identity as trade or business merely because it is carried on within a larger aggregate of similar activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or may not, be related to the exempt purposes of the organization.”277 Additionally, “[w]here an activity carried on for profit constitutes an unrelated trade or business, no part of such trade or business shall be excluded from such classification merely because it does not result in profit.”278

By enactment of these rules in 1969, Congress confirmed the government's contention that income for a particular activity can be taxed as unrelated business income even where the activity is an integral part of a larger activity that is in furtherance of an exempt purpose. This provision is directed at, but is not confined to, activities of soliciting, selling, and publishing commercial advertising, even where the advertising is published in an exempt organization publication that contains editorial matter related to the exempt purposes of the organization. With this authority, the IRS is empowered to fragment an exempt organization's operation, run as an integrated whole, into its component parts in search of an unrelated trade or business.

This expansive definition of the term trade or business embraces nearly every activity of a tax-exempt organization. In this sense, every tax-exempt organization is viewed as a bundle of activities, each of which is a trade or business. (This definition has nothing to do with whether a particular activity is related or unrelated; there are related businesses and unrelated businesses.) Thus, the IRS is authorized to examine each of the activities in the bundle of activities constituting an exempt organization, in search of unrelated business. Each activity in the bundle can be examined as though it existed wholly independently of the others; an unrelated activity cannot, as a matter of law, be hidden from scrutiny by tucking it in among a host of related activities. This rule is known as the fragmentation rule.

Nothing in the statutory definition of the term trade or business requires the tax-exempt organization to engage in the activity with a profit motive. The courts, however, are grafting the profit motive requirement onto the definition, as the result of a 1987 Supreme Court decision.279 Thus, for example, the U.S. Tax Court held, in a case involving an activity of a trade association that consistently produced losses, that the ongoing losses are evidence that the activity was not engaged in with the requisite profit motive and therefore is not a business.280

Not every activity of an exempt organization that generates a financial return is a trade or business for purposes of the unrelated income tax rules. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed: the “narrow category of trade or business” is a “concept which falls far short of reaching every income or profit-making activity.”281

Likewise, it is clear that the management of an investment portfolio composed wholly of the manager's own securities does not constitute the carrying on of a trade or business. For example, the Supreme Court held that the mere keeping of records and collection of interest and dividends from securities through managerial attention to the investments is not the operation of a business.282 On that occasion, the Court sustained the government's position that “mere personal investment activities never constitute carrying on a trade or business.”283 Subsequently, the Supreme Court stated that “investing is not a trade or business.”284 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that “the mere management of investments … is insufficient to constitute the carrying on of a trade or business.”285

It is also clear that investment activities do not constitute the carrying on of a trade or business in this context. Thus, the IRS ruled that the receipt of income by an exempt employee's trust from installment notes purchased from the employer-settlor is not income derived from the operation of an unrelated trade or business.286 The IRS noted that the trust “merely keeps the records and receives the periodic payments of principal and interest collected for it by the employer.” Consequently, it is clear that mere record-keeping and income collection for a person's own investments do not constitute the carrying on of a trade or business.

Therefore, income that is passive income is generally not taxed, on the ground that it is not income derived from the active conduct of a trade or business. This exception, contained in the modifications discussed below, generally extends to forms of income such as dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, rents, and capital gain. Also, as discussed as follows, certain other items of income and activities are specifically exempted from the unrelated income tax.

(iv) Regularly Carried On Law.   In determining whether a trade or business from which a particular amount of gross income is derived is regularly carried on, within the meaning of the unrelated trade or business rules, regard must be given to the frequency and continuity with which the activities productive of the income are conducted and the manner in which they are pursued. (It is in this context that the statutory law comes the closest to using a general doctrine of commerciality.) This requirement must be applied in light of the purpose of the unrelated business income tax, which is to place exempt organization business activities on the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which they compete. Hence, for example, specific business activities of an exempt organization will ordinarily be deemed to be regularly carried on if they manifest a frequency and continuity, and are pursued in a manner generally similar to comparable commercial activities of nonexempt organizations.287

Where income-producing activities are of a kind normally conducted by nonexempt commercial organizations on a year-round basis, the conduct of the activities by an exempt organization over a period of only a few weeks does not constitute the regular carrying on of a trade or business. For example, the operation of a sandwich stand by a hospital auxiliary for only two weeks at a state fair would not be the regular conduct of a trade or business. Similarly, if a charitable organization holds an occasional dance to which the public is admitted for a charge, hiring an orchestra and entertainers for the purpose, such an activity would not be a trade or business regularly carried on.288 The conduct of year-round business activities for one day each week, however, would constitute the regular carrying on of a trade or business. Thus, the operation of a commercial parking lot on one day of each week would be the regular conduct of a trade or business. Where income-producing activities are of a kind normally undertaken by nonexempt commercial organizations only on a seasonal basis, the conduct of such activities by an exempt organization during a significant portion of the season ordinarily constitutes the regular conduct of a trade or business. For example, the operation of a track for horse racing for several weeks of a year would be considered the regular conduct of a trade or business because it is usual to carry on this type of trade or business only during a particular season.289

In determining whether intermittently conducted activities are regularly carried on, the manner of conduct of the activities must be compared with the manner in which commercial activities are normally pursued by nonexempt organizations. In general, exempt organization business activities that are engaged in only discontinuously or periodically will not be considered regularly carried on if they are conducted without the competitive and promotional efforts typical of commercial endeavors. For example, the publication of advertising in programs for sports events or music or drama performances will not ordinarily be deemed to be the regular carrying on of business; however, where the nonqualifying sales are not merely casual but are systematically and consistently promoted and carried on by the organization, they meet the requirement of regularity.290

Certain intermittent income-producing activities occur so infrequently that neither their recurrence nor the manner of their conduct will cause them to be regarded as trade or business regularly carried on. For example, income-producing or fundraising activities lasting only a short period will not ordinarily be treated as regularly carried on if they recur only occasionally or sporadically. Furthermore, these activities will not be regarded as regularly carried on merely because they are conducted on an annually recurrent basis. Accordingly, income derived from the conduct of an annual dance or similar fundraising event for charity would not be income from a trade or business regularly carried on.291

(v) Substantially Related.   Gross income derives from unrelated trade or business within the meaning of these rules if the conduct of the trade or business that produces the income is not substantially related (other than through the production of funds) to the purposes for which exemption is granted. The presence of this requirement necessitates an examination of the relationship between the business activities that generate the particular income in question—the activities, that is, of producing or distributing the goods or performing the services involved—and the accomplishment of the organization's exempt purposes.292

Trade or business is related to exempt purposes in the relevant sense only where the conduct of the business activity has a causal relationship to the achievement of an exempt purpose (other than through the production of income) and it is substantially related only if the causal relationship is a substantial one. Thus, for the conduct of trade or business from which a particular amount of gross income is derived to be substantially related to the purposes for which exemption is granted, the production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of those purposes.293 Where the production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services does not contribute importantly to the accomplishment of the exempt purposes of an organization, the income from the sale of the goods or the performance of the service does not derive from the conduct of related trade or business. Whether activities productive of gross income contribute importantly to the accomplishment of any purpose for which an organization is granted exemption depends in each case on the facts and circumstances involved.294

In determining whether activities contribute importantly to the accomplishment of an exempt purpose, the size and extent of the activities involved must be considered in relation to the nature and extent of the exempt function that they purport to serve. Thus, where income is realized by an exempt organization from activities that are in part related to the performance of its exempt functions, but which are conducted on a larger scale than is reasonably necessary for performance of these functions, the gross income attributable to that portion of the activities in excess of the needs of exempt functions constitutes gross income from the conduct of unrelated trade or business.295

Gross income derived from charges for the performance of exempt functions does not constitute gross income from the conduct of unrelated trade or business. This principle encompasses income generated by functions such as performances by students enrolled in a school for training children in the performing arts, the conduct of refresher courses to improve the trade skills of members of a trade union, and the presentation of a trade show (at which sales do not occur) for exhibiting industry products by a trade association to stimulate demand for the products.296

Ordinarily, gross income from the sale of products that result from the performance of exempt functions does not constitute gross income from the conduct of unrelated trade or business if the products are sold in substantially the same state they are in upon completion of the exempt functions. Thus, in the case of a tax-exempt organization engaged in a program of rehabilitation of handicapped persons, income from sales of articles made by these persons as a part of their rehabilitation training would not be gross income from conduct of unrelated trade or business. The income in this case would be from the sale of products whose production contributed importantly to the accomplishment of purposes for which exemption is granted the organization—namely, rehabilitation of the handicapped. Conversely, if a product resulting from an exempt function is utilized or exploited in further business endeavors beyond those reasonably appropriate or necessary for disposition in the state it is in upon completion of exempt functions, the gross income derived therefrom would be from the conduct of unrelated trade or business. Thus, in the case of an experimental dairy herd maintained for scientific purposes by a tax-exempt organization, income from the sale of milk and cream produced in the ordinary course of operation of the project would not be gross income from conduct of unrelated trade or business. If the organization were to utilize the milk and cream in the further manufacture of food items such as ice cream and pastries, however, the gross income from the sale of the products would be from the conduct of unrelated trade or business unless the manufacturing activities themselves contribute importantly to the accomplishment of an exempt purpose of the organization.297

An asset or facility necessary to the conduct of exempt functions may also be employed in a commercial endeavor. In these cases, the mere fact of the use of the asset or facility in exempt functions does not, by itself, make the income from the commercial endeavor gross income from related trade or business. The test, instead, is whether the activities productive of the income in question contribute importantly to the accomplishment of exempt purposes. Assume, for example, that a tax-exempt museum has a theater auditorium that is specially designed and equipped for showing educational films in connection with its program of public education in the arts and sciences. The theater is a principal feature of the museum and is in continuous operation during the hours the museum is open to the public. If the organization were to operate the theater as an ordinary motion picture theater for public entertainment during the evening hours when the museum was closed, gross income from the operation would be gross income from conduct of unrelated trade or business.298

Activities carried on by an organization in the performance of exempt functions may generate goodwill or other intangibles that are capable of being exploited in commercial endeavors. Where an organization exploits such an intangible in commercial activities, the mere fact that the resultant income depends in part on an exempt function of the organization does not make it gross income from related trade or business. In these cases, unless the commercial activities themselves contribute importantly to accomplishing an exempt purpose, the income they produce is gross income from the conduct of unrelated trade or business.299

The law is replete with court cases and IRS rulings providing illustrations of related and unrelated activities. Colleges and universities can operate dormitories, cafeterias, and bookstores as related activities but can be taxable on travel tours and sports camps. Hospitals may operate gift shops, snack bars, and parking lots as related activities but may be taxable on sales of pharmaceuticals to the general public and on the sale of laboratory testing services to physicians. Museums may, without taxation, sell items reflective of their collections but be taxable on the sale of souvenirs. Trade associations may find themselves taxable on sales of items and particular services to members, while dues and subscription revenue are nontaxable. Fundraising events may be characterized as unrelated activities, particularly when compensation is paid or when the activity is regularly carried on.

(vi) Exceptions.   Exempt from the scope of unrelated trade or business is a business in which substantially all of the work in carrying on the business is performed for the organization without compensation.300 An example involving this exception is an exempt orphanage operating a secondhand clothing store and selling to the general public, where substantially all of the work in running the store is performed by volunteers.301 As to the scope of this exception, Congress intended to provide an exclusion from the definition of unrelated trade or business only for those unrelated business activities in which the performance of services is a material income-producing factor in carrying on the business, and substantially all such services are performed without compensation.302 Likewise, workers who conducted activities in a building rented by an exempt organization were held to be compensated by the organization where the rental payments included payments for “all labor for the supervision and handling of [each activity] upon the premises.”303

Payments by third parties can constitute the requisite compensation, where the tax-exempt organization involved transferred funds to the third party. For example, where security guards were present at and integral to gaming operations conducted by an exempt organization,304 the compensation of the guards by a company through a contract with the organization was held to be the type of compensation that defeated the exception for volunteer-conducted businesses.305

Also excluded is a business, in the case of a charitable organization or a state college or university, which is carried on by the organization primarily for the convenience of its members, students, patients, officers, or employees.306 An example involving this exception is a laundry operated by a college for the purpose of laundering dormitory linens and the clothing of students.307 Further, unrelated trade or business does not include a business that is the selling of merchandise, substantially all of which has been received by the organization as gifts or contributions.308 This last exception is available for thrift shops that sell donated clothes and books to the general public.309

Payments to a tax-exempt organization for lending securities to a broker and the return of identical securities are not items of unrelated business taxable income.310 For this nontaxation treatment to apply, the security loans must be fully collateralized and must be terminable on five business days' notice by the lending organization. Further, an agreement between the parties must provide for reasonable procedures to implement the obligation of the borrower to furnish collateral to the lender with a fair market value on each business day the loan is outstanding, in an amount at least equal to the fair market value of the security at the close of business on the preceding day.

There are additional exceptions, including the conduct of entertainment at fairs and expositions and of trade shows by exempt organizations, the performance of certain services by hospitals for small hospitals, the conduct of certain bingo games, the sale of low-cost articles, and the rental of mailing lists under certain circumstances. Each of these exceptions is discussed next.

The rule with respect to entertainment at fairs and expositions311 applies to charitable, social welfare, labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations that regularly conduct, as a substantial exempt purpose, an agricultural and educational fair or exposition.312

The term unrelated trade or business does not include qualified public entertainment activities of an eligible organization.313 This term is defined to mean “any entertainment or recreational activity of a kind traditionally conducted at fairs or expositions promoting agricultural and educational purposes, including but not limited to, an activity one of the purposes of which is to attract the public to fairs or expositions or to promote the breeding of animals or the development of products or equipment.”314

No unrelated income taxation is to occur with respect to the operation of a qualified public entertainment activity that meets one of the following conditions: the public entertainment activity is conducted (1) in conjunction with an international, national, state, regional, or local fair or exposition, (2) in accordance with state law, which permits that activity to be conducted solely by an eligible type of exempt organization or by a governmental entity, or (3) in accordance with state law, which permits that activity to be conducted under license for not more than 20 days in any year and which permits the organization to pay a lower percentage of the revenue from this activity than the state requires from other organizations.315

The rule with respect to trade show activities316 applies to labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations, and business leagues, which regularly conduct, as a substantial exempt purpose, shows that stimulate interest in and demand for the products of a particular industry or segment of it.

As respects the third of these items, the IRS maintains that income derived by a tax-exempt hospital from providing services to other exempt hospitals constitutes unrelated business income to the hospital providing the services, on the theory that the providing of services to other hospitals is not an activity that is substantially related to the tax-exempt purpose of the hospital providing the services.317 Congress acted to reverse this position in the case of small hospitals.

Where a tax-exempt hospital provides certain services318 only to other tax-exempt hospitals, there will not be an unrelated business as long as each of the recipient hospitals has facilities to serve not more than 100 inpatients and the services would be consistent with the recipient hospitals' exempt purposes if performed by them on their own behalf.319

Bingo game income realized by most tax-exempt organizations is not subject to the unrelated business income tax.320 This exclusion applies where the bingo game is not conducted on a commercial basis and where the games do not violate state or local laws.

For a charitable, veterans', or other organization, to which contributions are deductible, the term unrelated business does not include activities relating to the distribution of low-cost articles if the distribution of the articles is incidental to the solicitation of charitable contributions.321 A low-cost article is one that has a cost, not in excess of $5 (indexed for inflation),322 to the organization that distributes the item or has the item distributed for it.323 A distribution qualifies under this rule if it is not made at the request of the distributee, it is made without the express consent of the distributee, and the articles that are distributed are accompanied by a request for a charitable contribution from the distributee to the organization and a statement that the distributee may retain the article whether or not a contribution is made.324

Also, for a charitable, veterans', or other, organization, to which contributions are deductible, the concept of a business does not include exchanging with another similar organization the names and addresses of donors to or members of the organization, or the renting of these lists to another similar organization.325

(vii) Modifications.   In determining unrelated business taxable income, both gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business and business deductions are computed by taking into account certain modifications.326

Passive income—namely dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans, annuities, royalties, certain rents (generally of real estate), and gain from the disposition of property—is generally excluded from unrelated business taxable income, along with directly connected deductions.327

The legislative history of these provisions indicates that Congress believed that passive income should not be taxed under these rules “where it is used for exempt purposes because investments producing incomes of these types have long been recognized as proper for educational and charitable organizations.”328 The strict definitional classifications of the types of passive income are not dispositive of the question as to their treatment in relation to the modification rules. Rather, “[w]hether a particular item of income falls within any of the modifications … shall be determined by all of the facts and circumstances of each case.”329

The legislative history of the unrelated business income tax provisions is amply clear on the point that Congress, in enacting these modifications, did not intend and has not authorized taxation of the passive receipt of income by exempt organizations, and that a technical satisfaction of the definitional requirements of the terms used in the statute is not required. Thus, the Senate Finance Committee observed in 1950 that the unrelated income tax was to apply to “so much of … [organizations'] income as rises from active business enterprises which are unrelated to the exempt purposes of the organizations.”330 The Committee added: “The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is primarily that of unfair competition.”331 Speaking of the exclusion for passive sources of income, the Committee stated:

Dividends, interest, royalties, most rents, capital gains and losses and similar items are excluded from the base of the tax on unrelated income because your committee believes that they are “passive” in character and are not likely to result in serious competition for taxable business having similar income. Moreover, investment-producing incomes of these types have long been recognized as a proper source of revenue for educational and charitable organizations and trusts.332

It seems unmistakable that passive income, regardless of type, is properly includable within the exclusions provided by the modifications.333 (As discussed below, however, there is a recent line of thinking that asserts, at least as to the exclusion for royalties, that the exclusion may be available irrespective of whether the income is passive in nature.)334

The exclusion relating to gains and losses from the disposition of property does not extend to dispositions of inventory or property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.335

There are, however, important exceptions to this general exemption for passive income: (1) income in the form of rent, royalties, and the like from an active business is taxable; that is, merely labeling an item of income as rent, royalty, or the like does not make it tax-free;336 (2) the unrelated debt-financed income rules337 override the general exemption for passive income; and (3) interest, annuities, rents, and royalties (but not dividends) from a controlled corporation may be taxable.338

Income derived from research for government is excluded, as is income derived from research for anyone in the case of a college, university, or hospital and of fundamental research units.339 According to the legislative history, research includes “not only fundamental research but also applied research such as testing and experimental construction and production.”340 As respects the separate exemption for college, university, or hospital research, it is clear that “funds received for research by other institutions [do not] necessarily represent unrelated business income,” such as a grant by a corporation to a foundation to finance scientific research if the results of the research were to be made freely available to the public.341

A specific deduction of $1,000 makes the first $1,000 of unrelated business income automatically nontaxable.342 The purpose of this deduction is to eliminate the need for payments of small amounts of tax.

(viii) Partnership Law.   Generally, a trade or business regularly carried on by a partnership of which an exempt organization is a member is an unrelated trade or business with respect to the organization. In computing its unrelated business taxable income, the organization must (subject to the modifications rules) include its share (whether or not distributed) of the gross income of the partnership from the unrelated trade or business and its share of the partnership deductions directly connected with this gross income.343

(ix) Bucketing Law.   In an instance of a tax-exempt organization with two or more unrelated businesses, unrelated business taxable income must first be computed separately with respect to each business.344 The organization's unrelated business taxable income for a year is the sum of the amounts (not less than zero) computed for each separate unrelated business, less the specific deduction.345 A net operating loss deduction is allowed only with respect to a business from which the loss arose.346

The result of this body of law is that a deduction from one unrelated business for a tax year may not be used by a tax-exempt organization to offset income from another unrelated business for the same tax year. This law generally does not, however, prevent an exempt organization from using a deduction from one tax year to offset income from the same unrelated business in another tax year, where appropriate.

Statutory law does not provide criteria for determining whether a tax-exempt organization has more than one unrelated business or how to identify separate unrelated businesses for purposes of calculating unrelated business taxable income. Generally, an exempt organization identifies each of its separate unrelated businesses using the first two digits of the North American Industry Classification System code that most accurately describes the unrelated business.347 (The NAICS is an industry classification system utilized to collect, analyze, and publish statistical data related to the U.S. business economy.) The NAICS two-digit code must identify the unrelated business in which the exempt organization engages directly or indirectly, and not activities the conduct of which are substantially related to the exercise or performance by the organization of its exempt purpose or function.348

An organization's activities in the nature of investments that give rise to unrelated business income may be treated collectively as a separate unrelated business for bucketing rule purposes.349 Generally, an organization's investment activities are limited to its qualifying partnership interests, qualifying S corporation interests, and debt-financed property or properties.350 Qualifying partnership interests do not include interests in a general partnership but may include interests in limited partnerships.

(x) Tax Structure.   The federal tax law imposes a tax on unrelated business taxable income.351 The unrelated business income tax rate payable by most tax-exempt organizations is the flat 21 percent corporate rate.352 Some organizations, such as trusts, are subject to the individual income tax rates.353

Tax-exempt organizations must make quarterly estimated payments of the tax on unrelated business taxable income, under the same rules that require quarterly estimated payments of corporate income taxes.354 Revenue and expenses associated with unrelated business activity are reported to the IRS on a tax return (Form 990-T).355

(b) Unrelated Income Law as Applied to Fundraising

It is a substantial understatement to say that charitable organizations do not normally regard their fundraising activities as unrelated business endeavors. Yet, unknown to many in the philanthropic community, fundraising practices and the unrelated business rules have been enduring a precarious relationship for years.

Historically, the IRS refrained from applying the unrelated income rules to charitable gift solicitation efforts. In recent years, however, this restraint has been abandoned, with the IRS utilizing the unrelated income rules to characterize the receipts from certain fundraising activities as taxable income. As noted, this use of these rules is one of the means by which the IRS is embarking on regulation of fundraising for charity.

(i) Fundraising as Business.   Many fundraising practices possess the technical characteristics of an unrelated trade or business. Reviewing the criteria for unrelated income taxation summarized earlier, some fundraising activities are trades or businesses, regularly carried on, and not efforts that are substantially related to the performance of tax-exempt functions. Further, applying the tests often used by the IRS and the courts, some fundraising endeavors have a commercial counterpart and are being conducted in competition with that counterpart, and are being undertaken with the objective of realizing a profit.356 Treatment of a fundraising effort as an unrelated business may appear to be a rather strained result, and certainly is not consistent with the intent of Congress when it enacted the unrelated income rules in 1950, but nonetheless can be a logical and technically accurate application of the rules.

Until recently, the IRS avoided application of the unrelated income rules to charitable organizations' fundraising endeavors. Even if the matter was given much thought, the rationale seems to have been that either the fundraising activity was not a trade or business or was not regularly carried on.

The rationale that fundraising activities are not businesses was expressed by the Senate Committee on Finance in 1969, when it stated that “where an activity does not possess the characteristics of a trade or business within the meaning of IRC [§] 162, such as when an organization sends out low-cost articles incidental to the solicitation of charitable contributions, the unrelated business income tax does not apply since the organization is not in competition with taxable organizations.”357 An examination of this rationale, however, reveals two elements that substantially undermine its widespread application: the funds received by the organization were in the form of gifts, not payments for the articles or services provided, and the activity was not in competition with commercial endeavors. Either or both of these two elements may be absent in a charitable fundraising endeavor.

Thus, a tax-exempt organization may engage in fundraising efforts that have their commercial counterparts. Some of these activities are sheltered by law from consideration as businesses, such as a business (1) in which substantially all of the work is performed for the organization by volunteers,358 (2) that is carried on primarily for the convenience of the organization's members, students, patients, officers, or employees,359 or (3) which consists of the sale of merchandise, substantially all of which has been received by the organization as gifts.360 Also, a statute exempts from unrelated business income taxation the receipts from certain types of bingo games.361

Perhaps the beginning of serious regard of fundraising activities as businesses can be traced to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, where Congress authorized the taxation of revenue from the acquisition and publication of advertising in the magazines of tax-exempt organizations. To accomplish this result, Congress codified two rules previously contained in the income tax regulations: it enacted laws that state: (1) the term trade or business includes any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of services, and (2) an activity of producing or distributing goods or performing services from which gross income is derived does not lose identity as a trade or business merely because it is carried on within a larger aggregate of similar activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors that may or may not be related to the exempt purposes of the organization.362

Needless to say, this definition of the term trade or business is encompassing. In addition to the breadth of this definition, the IRS is, as noted, authorized by statute to examine an exempt organization's activities one by one (rather than as a single bundle of activities) and fragment its operations in search of unrelated business endeavors.363 As a result of both of these rules, the fundraising practices of charitable organizations are now, more than ever, exposed and thus more vulnerable to the charge that they are unrelated businesses.364

The IRS has not been reticent, in recent years, to apply these rules in an expansionist manner. For example, the IRS sought (unsuccessfully) to characterize as an unrelated business the selling by universities of the televising and broadcasting rights in connection with the institutions' athletic events.365 Also, the IRS attempted (again unsuccessfully, because of overriding action by Congress) to narrowly interpret the rules (discussed previously) portraying certain forms of income as passive income to contend that income from the writing of options366 and from the lending of securities367 by exempt organizations is taxable as unrelated business income.

More directly, the IRS held that the regular sales of membership mailing lists by an exempt educational organization to colleges and business firms for the production of income is an unrelated trade or business.368 Furthermore, the IRS369 and the courts370 have regarded the regular conduct of bingo games by exempt organizations to be unrelated activities. As noted, Congress subsequently developed partial exemptions for these types of activities,371 but the point is that the IRS advanced the positions. Other illustrations of fundraising that have been considered by the IRS to be unrelated business are special events such as concerts372 and golf tournaments and charity balls.373

A federal court of appeals held that a solicitation of charitable contributions by means of the mailing of greeting cards to potential contributors did not constitute the conduct of an unrelated trade or business.374 The case concerned a school that unsuccessfully attempted to raise funds from private foundations and other organizations, so it turned to a program of mailing packages of greeting cards to prospective donors, with information about the school and a request for contributions. An outside firm printed, packaged, and mailed the greeting cards and the accompanying solicitation letter. The court rejected the government's contention that the solicitation was a trade or business, finding that the greeting cards were not being sold but were distributed incidentally to the solicitation of charitable contributions. As noted, the income tax regulations provide that an “activity does not possess the characteristics of a trade or business … when an organization sends out low-cost articles incidental to the solicitation of charitable contributions.”375 The government argued that this rule was inapplicable in this case because the funds involved were not gifts, but the court said that to read the law in that narrow manner would “completely emasculate” the exception.376 The court held that the case turned on the fact that the unrelated income rules were designed to prevent nonprofit organizations from unfairly competing with for-profit companies, and that the school's fundraising program did not give it an “unfair competitive advantage over taxpaying greeting card businesses.”377

While the decision is undoubtedly a correct one, three troublesome facts should be considered: the IRS pursued the issue in the first instance, even into litigation; the trial court agreed with the IRS position; and the IRS at trial secured a verdict by jury.

The U.S. Court of Claims (now the U.S. Court of Federal Claims) subsequently examined application of the unrelated business rules as they relate to certain fundraising efforts of a national veterans' organization.378 The case focused on two fundraising practices of the organization. The first was its practice of offering items (premiums) to potential donors as part of its semiannual direct mail solicitation. The premiums, offered in exchange for contributions of $2.00, $3.00, or $5.00, were maps, charts, calendars, and books. The rationale for this use of premiums was that it gained the attention of the recipients so that more initial responses were obtained or, in instances involving prior donors, the level of contributions was upgraded. The second practice was the rental of names on the organization's mailing list to both tax-exempt and commercial organizations. The court found that certain of the organization's solicitation activities using premiums constituted a trade or business because they were conducted in a competitive and commercial manner. In making the differentiation, the court ruled that “if the contribution required for any one premium was set at an amount greatly in excess of the retail value of the premiums concerned, a competitive situation would not be present.”379 Because the $2.00 premium items were valued at $0.85 to $1.00 and the $3.00 items were valued at $1.50, the court concluded that there was not any unrelated business activity. But, because the $5.00 premium items were valued at $2.95 to $5.45, the court found the requisite trade or business, noting that the sending of a $5.00 contribution “may well have formed a contract binding … [the organization] to furnish the premium item.”380 Also finding that the solicitation was regularly carried on, because of “sufficient similarity to a commercial endeavor,”381 and was not an activity related to the organization's tax-exempt purposes (notwithstanding the utility of the premiums as attention-getting devices), the court declared the presence of an unrelated business. The court also determined that the rental of the organization's donor list is a trade or business that is regularly carried on and that is not substantially related to the accomplishment of its tax-exempt purposes.382

It is clear from these two court cases that the use of premiums as part of a fundraising activity is much less likely to be considered an unrelated trade or business if the items are mailed with the solicitation. That is, where the recipients are informed that the premiums can be retained without any obligation to make a contribution, the activity is not conducted in a competitive manner and hence presumably is not a trade or business. But, as the Court of Claims observed, “[w]hen premiums are advertised and offered only in exchange for prior contributions in stated amounts, the activity takes on much more of a commercial nature.”383

Subsequently, the full Court of Claims adopted the trial judge's report, with some modifications but none concerning the substantive unrelated business issues. Thus, the position of the entire court in the case was that the amounts received by the veterans' organization from a semiannual solicitations program utilizing premium items constituted unrelated business income and that the amounts received by the organization from the rental of its mailing list also constituted unrelated business income. Consequently, the emerging law appears to be that “when premiums are advertised and offered only in exchange for prior contributions in stated amounts,”384 the activity becomes a commercial one. If the organization, however, “had mailed the premiums with its solicitations and had informed the recipients that the premiums could be retained without any obligation arising to make a contribution,”385 the activity would not be a business because it is not a competitive practice.386

Armed with this victory out of the Court of Claims, the IRS is applying the rule concerning premium items to situations where organizations distribute greeting cards for the purpose of raising funds. Some charitable groups have engrafted onto their greeting card distribution program some elements that go beyond the mere sending of cards in the hope that a contribution will result. Some of these factors include “suggesting” a minimum contribution, which is equivalent to the retail value of the cards, and invoicing the recipient of the cards for the amount requested. In one instance, an organization entered into a contract with an independent card distributor, which distributed cards to the organization's members. A minimum contribution was requested per box of cards, and follow-up notices were sent to nonresponsive recipients requesting either payment for the cards or their return. The distributor was paid a fixed amount for each box of cards mailed. In another instance, an organization solicited orders for cards at the time it mailed its newsletter. In some years, a commercial supplier processed the orders; in other years, the organization fulfilled the requests. In all instances, a “minimum price” was suggested. Individuals who returned money that was less than the suggested price were invoiced for the difference.

In the first instance, the IRS held that the program involved sale of the cards.387 The IRS noted that commercial practices were being employed, namely, payment for or return of the cards, and the sending of follow-up notices. Because of these practices, the IRS concluded that the payments were not gifts because they were not “voluntary” and because the amount paid exceeded the fair market value of the cards. The receipts were thus characterized as a sale of the cards at their fair market value in a competitive manner. In the second instance, the IRS stressed the same factors. Again, the program was said to be “indistinguishable from normal commercial operations.”388 Therefore, it is clear that the IRS will treat a greeting card distribution program as an unrelated business where there is a “suggested” price equivalent to the retail value of the cards and where the recipients are invoiced for the payment. Where the cards are distributed without any obligation to the recipient and where there is no subsequent invoicing, however, the better view is that the activity is not an unrelated business and any support provided in response to the appeal is a deductible charitable contribution.389

This matter developed further when the IRS embarked on litigation characterizing card distribution programs of tax-exempt veterans' organizations as unrelated businesses, in the face of the contention that the programs constitute forms of fundraising. Although the government lost the first case in this series,390 the U.S. Tax Court subsequently ruled that the revenue derived by a veterans' organization from the distribution of Christmas cards to its members constitutes unrelated business income.391 While recipients of the boxes of cards were not under any legal obligation to pay for them, the literature was written to convey the impression that the cards cannot be considered unsolicited. This card program involved the organization for about one week of time per month from September through February of each year. The program produced substantial profits, being the second-largest revenue source for the organization (behind dues). The veterans' organization contended that the boxes of cards were gifts to its members (in the nature of premiums) and that the monies sent to it from the members also were gifts. It rejected the thought that it was selling the cards and thus that a business was involved. The organization also contended that the activity was not regularly carried on (and therefore not taxable) and that the card dissemination was a related activity in that it promoted comradeship among its members. In finding the activity to be a business, the court concluded that the organization had a profit motive and that the card program constituted the “sale of goods,” noting that 85 to 90 percent of those who paid for the cards paid precisely the amount requested ($2.00 or $3.00, depending on the year involved). It further found that the exception in the tax regulations for low-cost articles392 was inapplicable, in part because of its rejection of the thought that there was any solicitation of contributions. The card program was held to be regularly carried on because of its extent on a seasonal basis and taxable because it was not related to the advancement of the organization's purposes.

Thus, since the raising of funds by a charitable organization is not in itself an exempt function, many types of fundraising activities are vulnerable to the claim that they are unrelated trades or businesses.

(ii) Regularly Carried On Law.   In many instances, the only rationale that precludes taxation of the net income derived from a fundraising effort is the fact that the fundraising is not regularly carried on.

The rationale that fundraising activities are not taxable businesses because they are not regularly carried on finds support in the early IRS literature. The basic position of the IRS is that exempt organization business activities which are engaged in only discontinuously or periodically will not be considered regularly carried on if they are conducted without the competitive and promotional efforts typical of commercial endeavors. As noted, the operation of a sandwich stand by a hospital auxiliary for two weeks at a state fair is not the regular conduct of a trade or business,393 while the operation of a parking lot for commercial purposes one day each week on a year-round basis is the regular conduct of a trade or business.394 Thus, an annually recurrent dance or similar fundraising event for charity would not be regular since it occurs so infrequently.395

In one case, the U.S. Tax Court concluded that the annual fundraising activity of a charitable organization, consisting of the presentation and sponsoring of a professional vaudeville show one weekend per year, was not regularly carried on.396 The court observed: “The fact that an organization seeks to insure the success of its fundraising venture by beginning to plan and prepare for it earlier should not adversely affect the tax treatment of the income derived from the venture.”397 Indeed, the court went on to note that the IRS “apparently believes that all fundraisers of exempt organizations are conducted by amateurs in an amateurish manner. We do not believe that this is, nor should be, the case. It is entirely reasonable for an exempt organization to hire professionals in an effort to insure the success of a fundraiser.…”398

Just as many fundraising practices are technically trades or businesses, however, so are many regularly carried on. Inasmuch as other rationales for avoiding unrelated income taxation (principally, the contention that the activity is substantially related or that the income is passive) are unlikely to apply in the fundraising context, it is today quite possible for a fundraising activity to be deemed a trade or business that is regularly carried on and an undertaking that is not substantially related to the exercise of a charitable organization's exempt purposes.

There are several instances of the assumption by the IRS of this position, and they are multiplying. One is a 1979 private letter ruling, concerning a case involving a religious organization that conducted, as its principal fundraising activity, bingo games and related concessions.399 Players were charged a fixed amount for the use of bingo cards, the games were held on three nights each week, and the receipts from and expenses of the games were substantial. The IRS concluded that the “bingo games constitute a trade or business with the general public, the conduct of which is not substantially related to the exercise or the performance by the organization of the purpose for which it was organized other than the use it makes of the profits derived from the games.”400

The IRS is giving an expansive reading to the rules concerning activities that are regularly carried on, no longer confining the analysis to the period of time the event actually took place. The IRS also takes into account the amount of time the organization prepared for the activity (preparatory time) and the time following the activity and still associated with it (winding-down time). An activity may be found to be regularly carried on when preparatory time and winding-down time are considered, but not when only the time of the event is evaluated. One court has rejected the view that preparatory time is to be regarded for this purpose.401 The IRS remains in disagreement with these holdings and is continuing to litigate the issue.402

IRS ruled, without discussion of the matter of preparatory time, that an annual golf tournament and annual charity ball were not taxable as unrelated businesses because they were not regularly carried on.403 The preparatory time rule only goes to whether an activity is regularly carried on; it does not always mean that the activity is unrelated. Thus, the IRS held that a literacy event, held eight weekends annually but also entailing “extensive planning,” was regularly carried on and was a related activity.404

(iii) Private Benefit.   It is common for a charitable organization to provide information to prospective donors about the tax and other financial implications of a contribution. This is particularly the case in the context of planned giving.405 Yet, case law suggests that the provision of services of this nature rises to the level of impermissible private benefit, which would endanger the tax-exempt status of the organization.

A fundamental precept of the federal tax law concerning charitable organizations is that they may not, without imperiling their tax-exempt status, be operated in a manner that causes persons to derive a private benefit from their operations.406 Yet the offering of services that amount to personal financial and tax planning—an essential element of the appreciated property and planned gift techniques—may not be considered exempt activities but rather the provision of private benefit. While it would seem nearly inconceivable to contend that, when a charitable organization works with a donor to effect a major gift that will generate significant tax savings for the donor by reason of a charitable contribution deduction, the organization is jeopardizing its tax-exempt status because it is providing a private benefit, this conclusion was the import of the following court decision.

The case concerned the tax status of an organization that engaged in financial counseling by providing tax planning services (including charitable giving considerations) to wealthy individuals referred to it by subscribing religious organizations. The counseling given by the organization consisted of advice on how a contributor might increase current or planned gifts to religious organizations, including the development of a financial plan that, among other objectives, resulted in a reduction of federal income and estate taxes.

The position of the IRS was that this organization could not qualify for federal income tax exemption because it served the private interests of individuals by enabling them to reduce their tax burden. The organization's position was that it was merely engaging in activities that tax-exempt organizations may themselves undertake without loss of their tax exemption. The court agreed with the government, finding that the organization's “sole financial planning activity, albeit an exempt purpose furthering … [exempt] fundraising efforts, has a nonexempt purpose of offering advice to individuals on tax matters that reduces an individual's personal and estate tax liabilities.”407 As the court dryly stated, “We do not find within the scope of the word charity that the financial planning for wealthy individuals described in this case is a charitable purpose.”408

In this opinion, the court singled out the planned giving techniques for portrayal as methods that give rise to unwarranted private benefit. Thus, the court observed:

For example, when petitioner advises a contributor to establish a charitable unitrust gift, the contributor ultimately forfeits the remainder. Nevertheless, this loss is voluntarily exchanged for considerable lifetime advantages. Unitrusts generate substantial income and estate and gift tax benefits, such as retained income for life, reduced capital gains tax, if any, on the exchange of appreciated investments, favorable tax rates for part or all of the income payments on certain investments, and lower probate costs. Consequently, there are real and substantial benefits inuring to the contributors by the petitioner's activities.409

Concluded the court: “We think the tax benefits inuring to the contributors are … substantial enough to deny exemption.”410

Subsequently, the Tax Court issued an opinion that raised anew questions about the imposition of the unrelated income tax in the fundraising context.411 At issue was the tax status of a membership organization for citizens' band radio operators that used insurance, travel, and discount plans to attract new members. The organization contended that it was only doing what many tax-exempt organizations do to raise contributions, analogizing these activities to fundraising events such as rallies and dinners. The court rejected this argument, defining a “fundraising event” as a “single occurrence that may occur on limited occasions during a given year and its purpose is to further the exempt activities of the organization,” contrasting these events with endeavors that “are continuous or continual activities which are certainly more pervasive a part of the organization than a sporadic event and [that are] … an end in themselves.”412 A wide variety of fundraising methods other than special events are “continuous” and “pervasive,” and are intended “to further the exempt activities of the organization.” Also, no legitimate fundraising activity is an end in itself, yet many tax-exempt organizations and institutions have major, ongoing fundraising and development programs that are permanent fixtures among the totality of the entities' activities. This decision, then, is another in a series of cases that is forming the foundation for the contention that certain types of fundraising endeavors are unrelated businesses.

In a 1983 case, the Tax Court concluded that a novel “fundraising” scheme was an unrelated trade or business. A nonprofit school consulted with a tax-shelter investments firm in search of fundraising methods, with the result being a program in which individuals purchased various real properties from the school, which the school simultaneously purchased from third parties; both the sellers and the buyers were clients of the investments firm. There were about 22 of these transactions during the years at issue, from which the school received income reflecting the difference between the sales prices and the purchase prices. Finding the “simultaneous purchase and sale of real estate … not substantially related to the exercise or performance of [the school's] … exempt function,” the court held that the net income from the transactions was unrelated business taxable income.413

In another case that same year, the Tax Court held that an admittedly religious organization was not tax-exempt because it engaged in a substantial nonexempt purpose, which was the counseling of individuals on the purported tax benefits accruing to those who become ministers of the organization.414 The court found the organization, which went by the name of The Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am, akin to a “commercial tax service, albeit within a narrower field (i.e., tax benefits to ministers and churches) and a narrower class of customers (i.e., petitioner's ministers),” and thus said that it served private purposes.415 The many detailed discussions in the organization's literature of ways to maximize tax benefits led the court to observe that “although petitioner may well advocate belief in the God of Am, it also advocates belief in the God of Tax Avoidance.”416 In words that have considerable implications for fundraising for charitable purposes generally, the court wrote that a “substantial nonexempt purpose does not become an exempt purpose simply because it promotes the organization in some way.”417 The court somewhat recognized the larger meaning of its opinion and attempted to narrow its scope by noting that “[w]e are not holding today that any group which discusses the tax consequences of donations to and/or expenditures of its organization is in danger of losing or not acquiring tax-exempt status.”418

The Tax Court revisited this topic early in 1984, holding that an organization, the membership of which is religious missions, was not entitled to tax-exempt status as a religious organization because it engaged in the substantial nonexempt purpose of providing financial and tax advice.419 Once again, the court was heavily influenced by the recent rush of cases before it, concerning, in the words of the court, “efforts of taxpayers to hide behind the cover of purported tax-exempt religious organizations for significant tax avoidance purposes.”420 As the court saw the facts of the case, each member “mission” was the result of individuals attempting to create churches involving only their families to “convert after-tax personal and family expenses into tax deductible charitable contributions”;421 the central organization provided sample incorporation papers, tax seminars, and other forms of tax advice and assistance to those creating the missions. Consequently, the court was persuaded that the “pattern of tax avoidance activities which appears to be present at the membership level, combined with … [the organization's] admitted role as a tax advisor to its members,” justified the conclusion that the organization was ineligible for tax exemption.422

(iv) Fundraising and Program Activities.   Part of the dilemma in this area stems from functional accounting, a process adopted by the IRS several years ago and imposed on charitable organizations as part of the annual information return preparation and filing process. This method of accounting separates a charitable organization's functions into three categories: program, administration, and fundraising.423 The dilemma exists because many individuals—including some in law and fundraising—continue to regard fundraising as part of program because its purpose is to promote the organization's activities in some fashion. This misunderstanding is in part fueled by the distinctions in law—accounting notwithstanding—simply between exempt functions and nonexempt functions. Because it is inconceivable that fundraising is a nonexempt function, it must be an exempt function—so the reasoning goes. From that position, it is an easy jump in logic to the conclusion that fundraising is the same as program (as neither is a nonexempt function), but such a conclusion is erroneous.

From this perspective, the tax consequences where a small charity holds an annual car wash, a symphony hosts an annual theater party, a hospital sponsors an annual ball, or a university maintains a planned-giving program are unclear. In each of these cases, functional accounting dictates that the expenses associated with those activities be allocated to fundraising. But do these activities constitute program or are they nonexempt functions? In the four illustrations, the activities are not programs. They are nonexempt functions, and as to the latter they are insubstantial activities. In many cases, then, the tax aspects of fundraising come down to this: Is the fundraising activity substantial (in relation to the organization's other and overall activities) or is it a business? Special-event fundraising is likely to be the prime candidate for classification as a business, particularly where the event has a commercial counterpart. Some examples of this include car washes, bake sales, games, theater parties, dinner parties, and dances. As noted, it is the fact that these events are not regularly carried on that usually spares them taxation.424

Consequently, most fundraising efforts by charitable organizations will escape unrelated income taxation. Those that are taxed are held frequently, are operated in a commercial manner, and utilize paid assistance. Nonetheless, this still leaves the fact that fundraising is not program and is a nonexempt function. Two other principles of tax law apply in this setting. One is that the existence of a single nonexempt purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy a tax exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly exempt purposes.425 The other is that a tax-exempt organization must serve public purposes and will lose its exemption if it serves private purposes.426 An illustration of the latter principle in the fundraising context is discussed above.427

Thus, the IRS may regulate charitable fundraising by characterizing it as unrelated business and the courts are trending toward a line of thinking that equates charitable giving and associated tax planning with private benefit, thereby causing denial or loss of tax exemption. Either way, the basic rules governing federal income tax exemption and unrelated business activity are being applied in relation to fundraising endeavors, so that fundraising charitable groups are facing a new wave of regulation, with their exempt status or unrelated income taxation as the government's leverage.

The foregoing analysis notwithstanding, the U.S. Claims Court became the first court to squarely face and analyze the difference, for tax purposes, between a fundraising activity and a business activity. The specific issue before this court was whether income, received by a charitable organization as the result of assignments to it of dividends paid in connection with insurance policies purchased by members of a related professional association at group rates, was to be taxed as unrelated income. The court ruled that the program constituted fundraising, not a commercial venture.428 While, as discussed,429 this holding was subsequently overturned, the opportunity was presented to develop a contrast between fundraising efforts and business undertakings.

At the outset, the court wrote that where the tax-exempt organization involved in an unrelated income tax case is a charitable one, the “court must distinguish between those activities that constitute a trade or business and those that are merely fundraising.”430 Admittedly, said the court, this distinction is not always readily apparent, as “[c]haritable activities are sometimes so similar to commercial transactions that it becomes very difficult to determine whether the organization is raising money ‘from the sale of goods or the performance of services’ [the statutory definition of a business activity]431 or whether the goods or services are provided merely as an incident to a fundraising activity.”432 Nonetheless, the court held that the test is whether the activity in question is “operated in a competitive, commercial manner,” which is a “question of fact and turns upon the circumstances of each case.”433 “At bottom,” the court wrote, “the inquiry is whether the actions of the participants conform with normal assumptions about how people behave in a commercial context” and “[i]f they do not, it may be because the participants are engaged in a charitable fundraising activity.”434

In the specific case and in application of these rules, the court stressed five elements: (1) the activity under examination was a pioneering idea at its inception, (2) the activity was originally devised as a fundraising effort and has been so presented since then, (3) the “staggering amount of money” and “astounding profitability” that are generated by the activity,435 (4) the degree of the organization's candor toward its members and the public concerning the operation and revenue of the program, and (5) the fact that the activity is operated with the consent and approval of the association's membership. Concerning the third element, substantial profits and consistently high profit margins are usually cited as reasons for determining that the activity involved is a business. In this case, however, the amounts of money involved were so great that they could not be rationalized in conventional business analysis terms; the only explanation that was suitable to the court was that the funds were the result of successful charitable fundraising.

Despite the findings of the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the provision of group insurance policies, underwritten by major insurance companies, by the American Bar Endowment (ABE), a charitable organization, to its members constituted the carrying on of an unrelated trade or business.436 The Court noted that the organization negotiated premium rates with insurers, selected the insurers that provided the coverage, solicited its membership, collected the premiums, transmitted the premiums to the insurer, maintained files on each policyholder, answered members' questions concerning insurance policies, and screened claims for benefits. In finding the activity to be a business, the Court observed that the ABE “prices its insurance to remain competitive with the rest of the market,” the Court “can easily view this case as a standard example of monopoly pricing,” and the case “presents an example of precisely the sort of unfair competition that Congress intended to prevent.”437 The Court concluded that the “only valid argument in ABE's favor, therefore, is that the insurance program is billed as a fundraising effort.”438 But the Court summarily rejected this contention with a rather peculiar observation: “That fact, standing alone, cannot be determinative, or any exempt organization could engage in a tax-free business by ‘giving away’ its product in return for a ‘contribution’ equal to the market value of the product.”439 That, however, is not the state of the law.440 The dissent concluded that the provision of insurance to the ABE members was not competitive with commercial enterprises and that the program was “operated as a charitable fundraising endeavor.”441

As contemporary fundraising techniques have become more intricate and creative, so too have applications of the unrelated business income rules in this setting. This has been in part due to the increasing activism of the IRS in the charitable fundraising context, as illustrated by the intense scrutiny now being accorded by the IRS to the field of special events and corporate sponsorships.442 This field, however, is only one of many in the realm of charitable fundraising concerning the IRS and the courts.

The IRS held that an event, where vendors offer arts and crafts, a farmers' market, entertainment, and refreshment booths to the public, sponsored by a tax-exempt alumni association operating to provide financial and civic support to a public college, is an unrelated business.443 The association funds a scholarship program and provides financial support for maintenance of certain college facilities, including a computer room in the library and maintenance of the football field. It publishes an alumni newsletter and conducts annual ceremonies and social events involving graduates, faculty, and staff of the college, as well as community leaders. The IRS's lawyers rejected the alumni association's contentions that the event is a substantially related activity because it has the potential for student recruitment, generating donors, and endearing the college's alumni to that institution,444 and it lessens the burdens of government and relieves the distress of the elderly (the majority of the attendees of the event are over age 55).

(v) Principal–Agent Relationships.   Some charitable organizations, in an attempt to minimize their exposure to the unrelated business income tax, contract with independent companies for services pertaining to fundraising that might be considered unrelated activities if the organizations were to conduct the activities themselves. Often, this approach is successful, but it can backfire if the company is regarded as an agent of the charity. (The functions of an agent are regarded in the law as those of the principal.) In this instance, the activities of the agent are attributed to the charitable organization (the principal) for the purpose of calculating the extent of the total activities to, in turn, determine whether the bundle of activities constitutes a business that has been regularly carried on. One court adopted this position of the IRS, concluding that a publishing company operated as an agent of a charitable organization, so that the agent's advertising solicitation services were deemed to be activities of the charity.445

(vi) Royalty Exception.   Another current creative undertaking by fundraising charitable organizations is to attempt to structure an activity so that the income generated by the activity can be considered a tax-free royalty.446 Because the term royalty is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code or the tax regulations, the scope of the term has been the subject of considerable litigation. There are essentially three ways to define the boundaries of what is a royalty, which basically is a payment for the right to use an item of intangible property: (1) as only a payment that is a form of investment income, when no services may be provided by the royalty recipient; (2) as only a payment that is a form of passive income, when an insubstantial amount of services may be provided by the royalty recipient; or (3) as any payment that constitutes a royalty irrespective of the extent of services the recipient of the royalty may provide.

The position of the IRS was, for some time, that a royalty is excluded from unrelated business income taxation only when it satisfies the first of these definitions, that is, is investment income. Thus, the IRS asserted that if a charitable or other type of tax-exempt organization is actively participating in the undertaking that generates the income (such as promoting a product or service to its membership or making public endorsements), the organization is part of a joint venture and the exclusion for royalties is unavailable. This view has been dramatically rejected by the U.S. Tax Court, which has held that, to be excludable from taxation, the income need only be a payment for the use of one or more valuable intangible property rights.447 In one instance, that court held that revenue from the rental of mailing lists (where the statutory exception was unavailable)448 was properly treated as a royalty.449 In another, that court extended this analysis to income received from an affinity card program.450

The core of this interpretation of the royalty exception by the Tax Court is that, although Congress may have believed that royalties and similar types of excluded income are passive,451 that does not necessarily mean that they must always, in fact, be passive.452 Stated in the reverse, this view holds that a statutorily classified item of income excludable from tax remains excludable irrespective of whether the income is derived from an investment, is passive, or is generated from the active conduct of a trade or business.

As the consequence of an appeal of the Tax Court's findings, an opinion issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in mid-1996 represents the most authoritative court analysis of this issue. Reviewing dictionary definitions of the term royalty, this appellate court concluded that a royalty is a payment for the right to use intangible property. In a sharp departure from the Tax Court approach, however, the court added that a royalty “cannot include compensation for services rendered by the owner of the property.”453 Thus, the Ninth Circuit adopted the second of the definitions as to the scope of the royalty exception.454

This definition is a compromise between the position taken by tax-exempt organizations and that of the IRS. The court of appeals wrote that, to the extent the Service “claims that a tax-exempt organization can do nothing to acquire such fees,” the agency is “incorrect.”455 Yet, “to the extent that … [an exempt organization] appears to argue that a ‘royalty’ is any payment for the use of a property right—such as a copyright—regardless of any additional services that are performed in addition to the owner simply permitting another to use the right at issue, we disagree.”456

The Ninth Circuit's reading of the facts concerning the mailing list rentals favored the exempt organization in the litigation, which had contracted out many of the services involved in marketing and renting its lists. The court found that the organization “did nothing more than collect a fee” for these rentals.457 The income received by the organization from the list rentals was held to be royalty income and not payment for services.458 The circumstances concerning the affinity card program were afforded far different treatment. The appellate court disapproved of the way in which the Tax Court had resolved certain factual issues, namely, in favor of the exempt organization involved. This court also strongly suggested that the affinity card program fees were not excludable royalties, because of the extent of services provided.459

The Tax Court decided the affinity card program case in mid-1999.460 This case, therefore, turned on whether the exempt organization involved was rendering services in connection with the program. The organization, of course, had argued that its name, logo, and mailing list are intangible assets, and that pursuant to the agreement with the card services company it had licensed those properties to the company in exchange for payments that constitute royalties. The IRS asserted that the organization, in this connection, was in a business involving “marketing,” “sponsoring,” “promoting,” and/or “endorsing” the credit card program. The government contended that the contracts entered into by the exempt organization were for services only and that the resulting income was not royalty income because the organization was being paid for these services.

The Tax Court focused on the agreement between the organization and the card company. The provisions regulating the company's use of the exempt organization's name and marks were seen as being in the contract to preserve the organization's property interests in those items. The right to advise and consent with regard to the marketing material prepared by the company was viewed as a right intended to safeguard the organization's name, marks, logo, and other intangibles used in the marketing. Thus, the financial consideration the organization received under this agreement was held to be, at least in part, consideration for the use of valuable intangible property, and as such constituted royalties.

The government asserted that the exempt organization provided seven types of services, all as part of the contention that it was in the business of marketing the credit card program to its members. None of these assertions was successful. One of these sets of asserted services was the organization's control over the marketing materials by way of its power to negate. Also, the organization was provided monthly accountings by the card company. Nonetheless, the court was moved by the fact that the organization did not receive a fee for any marketing activities and did not share in any economics realized by the company in its expenditures made in carrying out its marketing responsibilities.

The court expressly held that the exempt organization's rights in this regard were not inconsistent with a royalty arrangement. These rights were characterized as only evidencing the organization's concern with “protecting the worth of its property interest in its good name and marks.”461 It was held not to be an indirect method of putting the organization in the business of marketing.

The court rejected the idea that the credit card was being offered by the organization as a member service. The bank involved was the financial institution that extended credit to the members, and it was the card company's marketing efforts that brought the possibility of the credit card and certain other services to the attention of the members. Mere endorsement of the program was held not to be a service provided by the organization.

Although the card company advertised in the exempt organization's publications, it was not given any financial preferences. The company used the organization's nonprofit mail permit on one occasion; the court was convinced that was a mistake. The license agreement, requiring the organization to “cooperate” with the company, was found by the court to “not [be] an agreement to endorse or promote the credit card program beyond the endorsement that necessarily results from [the organization's] license of its logo, name, and the other intangibles here in question.”462

In short, none of the receipts of this exempt organization were in consideration for services provided by the organization as part of the credit card program. All of the receipts were found to be in consideration for the use of the organization's valuable intangible property and, as such, constituted tax-excludable royalties.

There is a vagary in the Ninth Circuit's opinion as to the range of the gap between merely collecting a fee (with no activities) and the amount of tolerable activity the court seemingly contemplates within the boundaries as to what constitutes an excludable royalty. In the context of mailing list rentals, two examples were offered: provision of a rate sheet listing the fee charged for use of each copyrighted design, and retention of the right to approve how the design is used and marketed. Activities that are problematic in this area in general are endorsements, use of the tax-exempt organization's postal permit to send solicitation materials, publishing of paid advertising, the right of the exempt organization to advise with respect to marketing materials, sorting mailing lists, provision of list information on magnetic tape or labels, and provision of other clerical, telephone, and administrative services.463

During the pendency of this litigation, the IRS held to its views in its rulings. For example, the IRS ruled that payments by a commercial enterprise for use of the name and logo of a charitable organization are taxable as unrelated business income (and are not excludable royalties) because the charity also provided endorsements of the business's services.464

The denouement of the government's stance came when two other appellate court cases on the subject of the exclusion for royalty income were decided in favor of the tax-exempt organizations.465 By this point, the IRS realized that this series of defeats was insurmountable—that the courts were not accepting its interpretation of the scope of the tax-excludable royalty. The IRS National Office, late in 1999, communicated with its exempt organizations specialists in the field, essentially capitulating on the point; a memorandum distributed to them stated bluntly that “[c]ases should be resolved in a manner consistent with the existing court cases.”466 This memorandum added that “it is now clear that courts will continue to find the income [generated by activities such as mailing list rentals and affinity card programs] to be excluded royalty income unless the factual record clearly reflects more than unsubstantial services being provided.” Two factors were highlighted by the IRS as establishing nontaxable royalty income: where the involvement of the exempt organization is “relatively minimal” and where the exempt organization “hired outside contractors to perform most services associated with the exploitation of the use of intangible property.”

The matter of income from the exchange of mailing lists continues to fester. The statutory exception for this type of exchange is only applicable when the parties to the exchange are charitable entities.467 The position of the IRS has consistently been that the exchange of mailing lists by a tax-exempt organization with similar exempt organizations does not create unrelated business income (namely, barter income of an amount equal to the value of the lists received).468 The rationale is that the activity is not a business because it is not carried on for profit but rather to obtain the names of potential donors. The IRS is also of the view that this type of exchange is a business that is substantially related to the organization's exempt function as being a “generally accepted method used by publicly supported organizations to assist them in maintaining and enhancing their active donor files.”469 Where a tax-exempt organization exchanges mailing lists to produce income, however, it is the view of the IRS that the transaction is economically the same as a rental and thus is an unrelated trade or business.470 The IRS rejects the argument that an exchange of mailing lists creates capital gain that is excluded from taxation.471 It also does not accept the contention that the exchange is a tax-free like-kind exchange of property472 because title to the property does not pass and the exchange is only a one-time (rather than permanent) transaction. The IRS, however, will not rule on how this form of income is to be calculated, including the deductions that may be available, stating that this is to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis.473

One of the arguments persistently advanced by the IRS is that the statutory exception protecting certain mailing list transactions from taxation is to be read as permitting (perhaps requiring) taxation of these transactions in situations where the exception is not available. This contention is equally persistently rejected in the courts.474 The legislative history of the provision is to the contrary of the IRS position. One element of this history states as follows: “No inference is intended as to whether or not revenues from mailing list activities other than those described in the provision, or from mailing list activities described in the provision, but occurring prior to the effective date, constitute unrelated business income.”475 This point was also reflected in the House debate on the legislation, in remarks offered by the then-Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means: this provision “carries no inference whatever that mailing list revenues beyond its scope or prior to its effective date should be considered taxable to an exempt organization.”476

(vii) Sale-of-Gift-Items Exception.   As noted, a business constituting the sale of merchandise, substantially all of which has been received by the organization as contributions, is not an unrelated business.477 Although this exception is principally utilized by thrift shops,478 it is available in other contexts, such as fundraising programs involving gifts of automobiles, boats, and airplanes.

The IRS, however, revoked the tax-exempt status of an organization claiming to be operating an automobile donation program to fund its charitable grantmaking.479 Apparently, this organization's operations were too closely related, from the IRS's perspective, to those of a used-car dealership. The formal reasons for the revocation appear to be the organization's lack of adequate records480 and violation of the doctrine of private benefit.481

Another charitable organization had its exemption revoked, in part because of the nature of its fundraising program. This entity solicits contributions of real estate timeshares and sells them. The IRS, ignoring this exception to the unrelated business rules, wrote that the primary purpose of the organization is “attracting customers who would otherwise have gone elsewhere to sell their timeshares.”482 That could be said of any charity soliciting noncash gifts, including real estate. The owners of property always have the option to sell it or contribute it to any charity. The IRS, for purpose of its faulty analysis, turned this type of transaction inside out.

(viii) Commercial Coventures.   The IRS has assumed a generous stance concerning charitable sales promotions or commercial coventures, where a charitable organization consents to be a donee under circumstances in which a commercial business agrees to make a gift to the charity, with that agreement advertised to the public, and where the amount of the gift is predicated on the extent of products sold or services provided by the business to the public during a particular time period.483 The IRS agrees with the charitable community that these payments are contributions, deductible as such; in practice, these payments are often deducted as business expenses.

(ix) Cause-Related Marketing.   The position of the IRS as to cause-related marketing is different. In these circumstances, the charitable organization is marketing a product or service to the public, or similarly using its resources. These efforts are analyzed by the IRS, applying traditional unrelated business income analysis. Often, the activity is considered a business that is regularly carried on, albeit a related (and thus nontaxable) one.484 The activity can also be regarded as an unrelated business, however, particularly where the marketing is considered to be commercial in nature.485

(x) Corporate Services.   It has become increasingly common for a charitable or other tax-exempt organization to provide services to another charitable or other tax-exempt organization, in circumstances where the services are not inherently exempt functions. These services are management, other administrative, or fundraising services; they have come to be known as corporate services.

Traditionally, the provision of corporate services was considered by the IRS to be the conduct of unrelated business. In recent years, however, the IRS reviewed the tax aspects of joint operating agreements, which are contracts by which a number of health care providers and associated entities function on an interrelated basis, resulting in health care provider networks.486 Within these networks is the provision of corporate services by some of these organizations, for compensation.

Were this compensation taxable as unrelated business income, these networks would not be workable. Resolving this issue, the IRS, on the basis of law developed in another context,487 concluded that the income flows arising from the provision of these corporate services should be regarded as a matter of accounting, which means that the income is disregarded for unrelated business income purposes. To have this result, however, the IRS ruled that the relationship between the organizations must either be that of parent and subsidiary or be analogous to that of parent and subsidiary.

This development was transformative for many other types of tax-exempt organizations because the tax law rationale underlying these agreements could not be confined to the context of joint operating agreements. It meant that any situation in which one tax-exempt organization has a parent–subsidiary relationship with another exempt organization (such as an exempt organization with a related fundraising foundation) could be protected by this rationale. It also meant that the matter-of-accounting rationale could be extended to any arrangement where the relationship between two tax-exempt organizations is analogous to that of parent and subsidiary.

Some time passed before this rationale was extended outside the realm of joint operating agreements. The first occasion where this happened involved a tax-exempt social welfare organization, which provided corporate services to its related foundation.488 There, a parent–subsidiary relationship was found. Thereafter, the IRS began issuing rulings on the matter of what it means to have a relationship that is analogous to that of parent and subsidiary.489

These developments make it clear that a tax-exempt organization can provide corporate services to another tax-exempt organization, without engaging in unrelated business activity, as long as the relationship is at least analogous to that of parent and subsidiary. These activities may include fundraising services.

§ 5.9 COMMENSURATE TEST

The IRS, late in 1990, revoked the tax-exempt status of a charitable organization essentially on the ground that its fundraising costs were too high. The position of the IRS in this regard is contained in a technical advice memorandum (TAM).490 The organization subsequently prevailed in litigation as to its tax-exempt status, although the litigation did not involve the fundraising cost issue.491

The IRS's lawyers initially based their conclusions on three grounds: (1) the organization failed to carry on a charitable program commensurate in scope with its financial resources; (2) the organization was operated for the private interest of the direct mail fundraiser involved rather than for a public interest; and (3) the organization was operated for the substantial nonexempt purpose of operating direct mail fundraising.

The IRS was also displeased with the charitable organization's method of allocating expenses between public education and fundraising. Finding the educational portion of the mailings to be insignificant, the IRS concluded that there should not be any allocation of expenses to program activities.

(a) Facts of the TAM

The organization was established to combat cancer. It was formed to promote and encourage research, engage in public and professional education and direct service, and coordinate the efforts of member agencies. In the early 1980s, the organization concluded it could no longer subsist wholly on membership dues and, in 1984, contracted with a direct mail fundraising firm.

The fundraising firm charged the charity 5 cents per piece for donor acquisition mailings and 10 cents per piece for donor renewal mailings. Additional fees were levied for postage, design and production of mailings, mailing and handling, receipt and accounting of donations, and the like. As these charges were to be paid from gross receipts of the mailings, the charity was able to launch this fundraising effort at no initial cost to itself.

The fundraising firm would create a mailing package and secure approval of it from the charity; a test mailing was then run. On the basis of the results, the mailing was printed. An independent list management firm prepared the mailings and delivered them to the postal service.

The principal method of fundraising was use of a variety of sweepstakes programs and similar prize offerings. The IRS found these fundraising offerings to be “often misleading.” The IRS wrote of recipients who believed they had been “victimized”; the result was a battery of lawsuits by state attorneys general against the charity and the fundraiser. The IRS concluded that these activities were “neither necessary nor valuable in achieving … [the charity's] educational or health goals, except to obtain money.” The IRS further observed that the charity and the fundraiser “selected the recipients of the letters based on sweepstakes/fundraising decisions rather than any need of the recipients for educational information.”

According to the IRS, in 1986, the charity expended $315, 577 for charitable purposes, out of $7.88 million (4.1 percent). The figures for 1987 were $398,557 out of $10.41 million (3.8 percent). (As discussed later, these figures do not include the amount spent for “public education” as asserted by the charity.) The organization expended about 2.5 percent on management expenses. The rest of the money was paid to the fundraiser.

When the charitable organization filed its annual information return (Form 990) with the IRS, it allocated expenses for numerous mailings to either public education or fundraising. It did not allocate expenses to what it regarded as “generic” information (such as language that described the organization, sweepstakes rules, and entry tickets, coupons, and envelopes). The allocation was based on a line count of the various mailings.

The charitable organization's ascertainment of its exempt and fundraising expenses was as follows. For 1986, its donor acquisition costs were 45 percent and its exempt function expenditures were 55 percent of total outlays. The comparables for 1987 were 43 percent for program and 57 percent for fundraising. For 1986 and 1987, the organization's donor renewal costs were 51 percent and its exempt function expenditures were 49 percent.

Much of the organization's “public education” content was basic information in very small print. Often, this information was located on the reverse side of sweepstakes tickets that had to be returned for entry; therefore, these items could not be kept for future information purposes by the recipient.

The IRS followed the charitable organization's allocation approach, except that it factored in the generic material as noneducational material. It concluded that less than 10 percent of the mailings' content was educational.

In the face of many lawsuits and negative publicity, the charity terminated its contract with the fundraiser. It contracted with another fundraiser that did not use these tactics; its gift receipts were insufficient. It filed for bankruptcy in mid-1990.

(b) Law and Analysis in the TAM

(i) Allocations.   The TAM stated that the “Service recognizes that many educational and religious organizations … carry out their exempt functions through directly mailing educational or religious material that also contain elements of fundraising.” The IRS continued: “In fact fundraising letters are sometimes the principal means by which the general public is made aware of the exempt purposes and programs of an organization.” Consequently, the IRS, in this TAM, concluded that “reasonable allocations of mixed programs are allowed.”

But then the IRS's lawyers concluded that the “extent that an allocation may be taken between fundraising and program-related activities depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” In this case, the IRS concluded that the “vast bulk of … [the charity's] fundraising mail-outs had very little content that could be described as having educational value ….” The IRS concluded that the educational content in the fundraising material was thus “insubstantial.”

The IRS found that the “thrust of … [the charity's] fundraising literature is the solicitation of readers to participate in a sweepstakes in an effort to raise funds rather than to educate the public.” The IRS added that the “appeal to fund research and find a cure for … [the disease involved] is secondary in the letters to an appeal to acquire wealth through gambling.”

Using both linear and square-inch methods, the IRS measured sample mailings and concluded that over 90 percent of the content of the mailings was not educational. In so doing, the IRS, as noted, included generic material.

(ii) Commensurate Test.   An important aspect of this TAM is its analysis of the commensurate test. This test, established by the IRS in 1964,492 endeavors to determine whether a charitable organization is carrying on charitable works commensurate in scope with its financial resources. In the particular facts underlying the ruling, the charity derived most of its income from rents, yet preserved its tax exemption because it satisfied the commensurate test.

The test was applied in 1967,493 then went unused until 1990, when the IRS launched the second phase of its Special Emphasis Program concerning charitable solicitations. The commensurate test was resurrected and made a part of federal fundraising regulation by its inclusion in the 82-question “Exempt Organizations Charitable Solicitations Compliance Improvement Program Study Checksheet.”494

According to the TAM, the commensurate test, when applied in the fundraising context, means that an “organization whose principal activity consists of the raising of funds must carry on a charitable program commensurate in scope with its financial resources in order to qualify for section 501(c)(3) exemption.”

Wrote the IRS:

The “commensurate test” does not lend itself to a rigid numerical distribution formula—there is no fixed percentage of income that an organization must pay out for charitable purposes. The financial resources of any organization may be affected by such factors as start-up costs, overhead, scale of operations, whether labor is volunteer or salaried, phone or postal costs, etc. In each case, therefore, the particular facts and circumstances of the organization must be considered. Accordingly, a specific payout percentage does not automatically mandate the conclusion that the organization under consideration has a primary purpose that is not charitable. In each case, it should be ascertained whether the failure to make real and substantial contributions for charitable purposes is due to reasonable cause.…

While there is no specified payout percentage, and while special facts and circumstances may control the conclusion, distribution levels that are low invite close scrutiny. The “commensurate test” requires that organizations have a charitable program that is both real and, taking the organization's circumstances and financial resources into account, substantial. Therefore, an organization that raises funds for charitable purposes but consistently uses virtually all its income for administrative and promotional expenses with little or no direct charitable accomplishments cannot reasonably argue that its charitable program is commensurate with its financial resources and capabilities.

The IRS found that, during the two years under review, the organization expended 3.9 percent of its revenues for charitable programs. The IRS's lawyers characterized that as a “truly insignificant figure compared to all the time and treasure involved.” Under all of the facts and circumstances discovered, the IRS decided that the organization did not carry on a charitable program commensurate in scope with its financial resources. Consequently, it was recommended that the organization's exemption be revoked as of the date the organization entered into the contract with the fundraising firm.

(iii) Private Benefit Standard.   The IRS also proposed revocation of this exemption on the ground that the charity had been operated for the private interest of the fundraiser rather than the public interest.

This is an application of the private benefit doctrine so dramatically expanded by the Tax Court in 1989.495 The doctrine allows an exemption to be revoked where there is private benefit, even though there is no violation of the statutory prohibition on private inurement.

The private inurement doctrine requires an insider; the private benefit rule does not.496 The IRS conceded that the fundraiser did not control the charity in this case, but it found the relationship to be “symbiotic.”

(iv) Substantial Nonexempt Purpose Test.   Another basis for revocation of the exemption was application of the substantial nonexempt purpose test. The IRS held that “engaging in wide-scale sweepstakes activities with often misleading contest representations [was] neither necessary nor valuable in achieving … [the organization's] educational or health goals, except to obtain money.” The IRS found that the organization's “gambling devices” were essentially indistinguishable from devices used by commercial entities such as Reader's Digest and Publishers Clearinghouse. The organization's fundraising activities were characterized by the IRS as being “indistinguishable from ordinary commercial activities.”

(c) Perspective

This TAM is an extraordinary document. It represents one of the most recent efforts by the IRS to step up overall regulation of the charitable fundraising process. The law has evolved considerably from the days when the IRS was concerned only about disclosure to donors of transfers, or portions of transfers, that are not gifts.497 The two phases of the Special Emphasis Program, followed by the checksheet, were the next steps.498 Increased audit activity and self-audit through expanded annual information returns (Forms 990) followed.499 Then came this application of the commensurate test, which reflects a belief within the IRS that the agency has the authority to cause an organization's tax exemption to depend solely on the extent of its fundraising costs.

This doctrine has been invented by individuals other than legislators. There is no specific statutory authority for the commensurate test. Indeed, there is little judicial authority either. The IRS cited one case in support of its position.500 In that case, the U.S. Tax Court held that an organization that had made “almost imperceptible progress toward achieving its charitable goals” did not qualify for tax-exempt status.501 The court did not use the words commensurate test, but the IRS claims that is the test that the court applied. The commensurate test was thus given new life.

The IRS position on allocations is also important. The IRS in this TAM said that it is “sensitive” to external allocation guidelines such as those promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Nonetheless, the IRS will not be allowing allocations at all where there is “very little” program activity or content.

By injecting application of the private benefit doctrine into the fundraising context, this TAM appears to signal extensive government use of the private benefit doctrine. Finally, the IRS used the commerciality doctrine.

Thus, with one document, the IRS took another giant step into the realm of charitable fundraising regulation. Now, in addition to all of the other regulation burdening the fundraising community, it must be concerned with future applications of the commensurate test, the private benefit standard, and the commerciality doctrine.

Thereafter, the IRS concluded that an organization did not qualify for tax exemption as a charitable entity and revoked its exempt status, principally on the ground that its outlays for program were “minimal” in relation to its “substantial” payments to four for-profit fundraising companies.502 In the two years under audit, according to the IRS, the amounts expended for fundraising, which were held to constitute forms of private benefit, were 94.81 percent and 94.96 percent.503

§ 5.10 APPRAISAL LAW

As referenced in the summary of the federal tax law concerning the substantiation requirements for deductible charitable gifts of property other than money where the value of the property is in excess of $5,000, the donor is required to obtain an appraisal of the property.504

(a) Overview

Congress introduced an appraisal requirement in 1984, when it directed the IRS to promulgate regulations requiring that, in order to claim an income tax charitable contribution deduction in connection with property of this value, a donor must obtain a qualified appraisal of the gift property, attach an appraisal summary to the tax return involved, and include in the return certain additional information.505

In 2004, statutory reporting and substantiation requirements relating to deductions for noncash charitable contributions were enacted.506 Statutory definitions of the terms qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser, also added to the federal tax law in 2004,507 were amended in 2006.508 For appraisals prepared with respect to returns filed on or before August 17, 2006, preexisting regulations provided definitions of these two terms.509 For appraisals prepared with respect to returns filed after August 17, 2006, the statutory definitions that were revised in 2006 apply.510

(b) Definition of Qualified Appraisal

A qualified appraisal is a document that constitutes an appraisal of property that is prepared by a qualified appraiser in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards and applicable tax regulations.511 The phrase generally accepted appraisal standards means the substance and principles of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, as developed by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation.512

A qualified appraisal, as defined in this context, must consist of certain information about the contributed property, including (1) a description of the property in sufficient detail under the circumstances (taking into account the value of the property) for an individual who is not generally familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the appraised property is the contributed property, (2) the condition of the property (in the case of real or tangible personal property), (3) the valuation effective date, and (4) the fair market value513 of the contributed property on the valuation effective date.514 The valuation effective date is the date to which the value opinion applies.515

A line of case law makes it clear (as is obvious) that a qualified appraisal must be an appraisal of the property that was actually contributed. As the U.S. Tax Court proclaimed, “[i]n order for the qualified appraisal to help the IRS ‘deal more effectively with the prevalent use of overvaluations,’ the appraised property must be the same property that was donated and that gave rise to the claimed deduction.”516 Likewise, two appraisals were held to not be qualified ones, in part because they did not appraise the correct asset; the appraisals valued the assets of a corporation when they should have valued the shares of stock of the corporation that were the subject of the gift.517 In another case, a charitable contribution deduction for a gift of fractional interests in a family limited partnership was disallowed in part because the subject of the appraisal was the partnership's sole asset.518 A charitable deduction was disallowed because the appraiser valued a parcel of real property rather than an easement, the subject of the gift, placed on it.519 In perhaps the best of these illustrations, a charitable deduction for a gift of a set of new designer eyeglass frames was denied because the appraisal involved was of an entire collection of these frames, of which the donated set was only one of 50.520

To be qualified, an appraisal must also state the terms of any agreement or understanding by or on behalf of the donor and donee that relates to the use, sale, or other disposition of the contributed property, such as (1) a temporary or permanent restriction on the donee's right to use or dispose of the contributed property, (2) a reservation as to the right to the income from the property (other than in connection with the donee or an organization participating with the donee in cooperative fundraising) or to possession of the property (including the right to vote contributed securities, acquire the property by purchase or otherwise, or designate the person having income or possession rights or a right to acquire), or (3) an earmarking of the property for a particular use.521 The appraisal must further indicate the date, or expected date, of the contribution.522

The qualified appraisal must state certain information about the qualified appraiser, namely, (1) the appraiser's name, address, and taxpayer identification number; (2) the appraiser's qualifications to value the type of property being valued, including the appraiser's education and experience; and (3) if the appraiser is acting in his or her capacity as a partner in a partnership, an employee of any person (whether an individual, corporation, or partnership), or an independent contractor engaged by a person other than the donor, the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the partnership or the person who employs or engages the appraiser.523

In addition, the appraisal must reflect the signature of the appraiser and the date the appraiser signed it (the appraisal report date).524 It must contain the requisite declaration by the appraiser.525 The appraisal must include a statement that it was prepared for income tax purposes.526 It must state the method of valuation used to determine the fair market value, such as the income approach, the market-data approach, or the replacement-cost-less-depreciation approach.527 Another methodology is the before-and-after method, which approximates an easement's fair market value by measuring the difference between the fair market value of the property without regard to the easement (the before value) and the fair market value of the property encumbered by the easement (the after value).528

The appraisal must state the specific basis for the valuation, such as specific comparable sales transactions or statistical sampling, including a justification for using sampling and an explanation of the sampling procedure employed.529

A qualified appraisal must be signed and dated by the qualified appraiser no earlier than 60 days before the date of the contribution and no later than (1) the due date (including extensions) of the return on which the deduction for the contribution is first claimed; (2) in the case of a donor that is a partnership or S corporation, the due date (including extensions) of the return on which the deduction for the contribution is first reported; or (3) in the case of a deduction first claimed on an amended return, the date on which the amended return is filed.530

For an appraisal report dated before the date of the contribution, the valuation effective date must be no earlier than 60 days before the date of the contribution and no later than the date of the contribution. For an appraisal report dated on or after the date of the contribution, the valuation effective date must be the date of the contribution.531

An appraisal is not a qualified appraisal for a particular contribution, even if these requirements are satisfied, if the donor either failed to disclose or misrepresented facts, and a reasonable person would expect that this failure or misrepresentation would cause the appraiser to misstate the value of the contributed property.532

A donor must obtain a separate qualified appraisal for each item of property for which an appraisal is required and that is not included in a group of similar items of property.533 The phrase similar items of property means property of the same generic category or type, including stamp collections, coin collections, lithographs, paintings, photographs, books, non–publicly traded stock, other non–publicly traded securities, land, buildings, clothing, jewelry, furniture, electronic equipment, household appliances, toys, everyday kitchenware, china, crystal, or silver.534 Only one qualified appraisal is required for a group of similar items of property contributed in the same tax year, as long as the appraisal includes all the required information for each item.535 The appraiser may select any items the aggregate value of which is appraised at $100 or less, for which a group description (rather than a specific description of each item) is adequate.536

The qualified appraisal must be received by the donor before the due date (including extensions) of the return on which a charitable deduction is first claimed, or reported in the case of a donor that is a partnership or S corporation, or, in the case of a deduction first claimed or reported on an amended return, the date on which the return is filed.537

The fee for a qualified appraisal cannot be based, to any extent, on the appraised value of the property. For example, a fee for an appraisal is treated as based on the appraised value of the property if any part of the fee is dependent on the amount of the appraised value that is allowed by the IRS after an examination.538 If the contributed property is a partial interest,539 the appraisal must be of the partial interest.540 The donor must retain the qualified appraisal “for so long as it may be relevant in the administration of any internal revenue law.”541

If an appraisal is disregarded,542 it has no probative effect as to the value of the appraised property and does not satisfy the appraisal requirements, unless the appraisal and the Form 8283 include the appraiser's signature, the date signed by the appraiser, and the requisite appraiser declaration,543 and the donor did not have knowledge that the signature, date, or declaration was false when the appraisal and the Form 8283 were signed by the appraiser.544

(c) Definition of Qualified Appraiser

The term qualified appraiser means an individual who has earned an appraisal designation from a recognized professional appraiser organization or has otherwise met minimum education and experience requirements, regularly performs appraisals for compensation, and meets other requirements as may be prescribed by the IRS.545

For these purposes, a qualified appraiser is an individual with verifiable education and experience in valuing the type of property for which the appraisal is performed.546

An individual is treated as having the requisite education and experience if, as of the date the individual signs the appraisal document, he or she has (1) successfully completed (such as by receiving a passing grade on a final examination) professional or college-level coursework in valuing the relevant type of property and has two or more years of experience in valuing the relevant type of property or (2) earned a recognized appraisal designation for the relevant type of property.547

This coursework must be obtained from a professional or college-level educational institution, a generally recognized professional trade or appraisal organization that regularly offers educational programs in valuing the type of property, or an employer as part of an employee apprenticeship or educational program substantially similar to the preceding two types of educational programs.548 A recognized appraisal designation is a designation awarded by a recognized professional appraiser organization on the basis of demonstrated competency.549

The type of property means the category of property customary in the appraisal field for an appraiser to value.550

Education and experience in valuing the relevant type of property are verifiable if the appraiser specifies in the appraisal the appraiser's education and experience in valuing the type of property, and the appraiser makes a declaration in the appraisal that, because of the appraiser's education and experience, the appraiser is qualified to make appraisals of the relevant type of property being valued.551

The following individuals are not qualified appraisers for the appraised property: (1) an individual who receives a prohibited fee;552 (2) the donor of the property; (3) a party to the transaction in which the donor acquired the property (such as the individual who sold, exchanged, or gave the property to the donor, or an individual who acted as an agent for the transaction or for the donor for the sale, exchange, or gift) unless the property is contributed within two months of the date of acquisition and its appraised value is not in excess of the acquisition price; (4) the donee of the property; (5) an individual who is (a) related553 to or an employee of any of the foregoing three categories of individuals or married to an individual who is related to any of the foregoing individuals or (b) an independent contractor who is regularly used as an appraiser by any of the foregoing three categories of individuals and who does not perform a majority of his or her appraisals for others during the tax year; and (6) an individual who has been prohibited from practicing before the IRS at any time during the three-year period ending on the date the appraisal is signed by the individual.554

The practice of representation of persons before the U.S. Department of the Treasury is regulated.555 Following notice and hearing, an individual may be suspended or disbarred from practice before the Treasury Department, including the IRS, if the individual is incompetent, is disreputable, has violated the rules regulating practice before the Department, or (with intent to defraud) willfully and knowingly misled or threatened the person being represented (or a person who may be represented).

The Secretary of the Treasury Department also has been authorized to bar from appearing before the Department, including the IRS, for the purpose of offering opinion evidence on the value of property, any individual against whom a civil penalty for aiding and abetting the understatement of tax has been assessed. An appraiser may be disciplined after notice and hearing (that is, there is no requirement that the civil penalty for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax be first assessed). Disciplinary action may include suspending or barring an appraiser from preparing or presenting appraisals on the value of property to the Department, including the IRS; appearing before the Department for the purpose of offering opinion evidence on the value of property; and providing that the appraisals of an appraiser who has been disciplined have no probative effect in any proceeding before the Department, including the IRS.

(d) Substantial Compliance Doctrine

In the first court case involving the rules in place before their revisions in 2006,556 the U.S. Tax Court held that a charitable contribution deduction was available even though the donors failed to attach a copy of the qualified appraisal of the donated property to their income tax return, where the deduction was claimed.557 The court held that these requirements were not mandatory but merely directory, so that only substantial compliance was required.558

In this case, a married couple contributed two thermal airships (blimps) to a charitable foundation. They obtained the services of a qualified appraiser, who timely determined the value of the properties. The appraiser completed the appraisal summary, prepared the requisite certification, and signed the appraisal summary form. The donors claimed a charitable deduction for the appraised amount and attached a copy of the appraisal summary form to their return. On audit, the IRS disallowed the deduction because the donors did not attach to their tax return a copy of the qualified appraisal of the blimps. The donors, before the court, in effect pleaded for some equity, arguing that they had substantially complied with the substantiation requirements and thus remained entitled to the charitable contribution deduction. The court, following a review of the law embodied in the doctrine of substantial compliance, agreed with the donors.

In applying this doctrine, courts look at whether the government's requirements relate to the substance or essence of the statute. If so, strict adherence to all statutory and regulatory requirements is necessary. Otherwise, when the requirements are procedural or directory, the law may be satisfied by substantial compliance. The court held that the substantiation requirements “do not relate to the substance or essence of whether or not a charitable contribution was actually made.”559 Thus, it found that the requirement that certain documentation be attached to the return was directory and not mandatory.

The court noted that the gift was indeed made, there was an appraisal by a qualified appraiser, and the charitable donee was a qualified one. All of this information appeared in the appraisal summary form (except for the qualifications of the appraiser, which were supplied by letter during the audit). Therefore, the court concluded that the donors “met all of the elements required to establish the substance or essence of a charitable contribution, but merely failed to obtain and attach to their return a separate written appraisal containing the information specified in [the tax] regulations even though substantially all of the specified information except for the qualifications of the appraiser appeared in the [appraisal summary] attached to the return.”560 The court added: “The denial of a charitable deduction under these circumstances would constitute a sanction which is not warranted or justified.”561

A subsequent opinion also followed the doctrine of substantial compliance in the charitable giving/substantiation context. In this case, the donors failed to maintain adequate records as to the cost basis of the donated property. The court found, however, that there was reasonable cause for this failure, the information was irrelevant to the calculation of the charitable contribution deduction, and thus the substantiation requirements were substantially complied with.562 Likewise, in a case involving the charitable deduction associated with a bargain sale, the appraisal submitted by the donor was said by the government to be untimely and lacking the required information; the court, however, decided that the donor substantially complied with the rules, in that the government was provided with “nearly all” of the requisite information.563

Nonetheless, this doctrine is inapplicable where the donor did not substantially comply with the requirements.564 There are five categories of situations, what a court has characterized as “fatal mistakes,”565 that preclude application of the substantial compliance doctrine. The first of these categories is, of course, failure on the part of a donor to obtain an appraisal.566 The second category is failure to properly prepare the appraisal summary (Form 8283, section B).567 The third category is an appraisal being completed by someone without the requisite expertise.568 The fourth category is the situation where the appraisal was not timely prepared.569 The last of these categories is the situation where insufficient information or inappropriate information is in an appraisal or appraisal summary. As to this last category, a donor relied on an appraisal that did not contain the requisite description of the valuation methodology used to value property contributed to charity subject to a facade easement; the court wrote that the “lack of a recognized methodology or specific basis for the calculated after-donation value [in this case] is too significant for us to ignore under the guise of substantial compliance.”570

In one case, the doctrine of substantial compliance was not applied where the donors did not attach the requisite appraisal reports, the donors failed to provide an adequate description of the property and its condition, the documents failed to indicate the valuation method used, the appraisals were untimely, the written acknowledgments for the contributions were not obtained, and there were other deficiencies in meeting the substantiation requirements.571 In another case, in which charitable deductions for gifts of real property valued at about $20 million were denied, the court concluded its opinion with this: “We recognize that this result is harsh—a complete denial of charitable deductions to a couple that did not overvalue, and may well have undervalued, their contributions—all reported on forms that even to the Court's eyes seemed likely to mislead someone who didn't read the instructions. But the problems of misvalued property are so great that Congress was quite specific about what the charitably inclined have to do to defend their deductions, and we cannot in a single sympathetic case undermine those rules.”572

The substantial compliance doctrine, having been rejected in the foregoing and other cases, appeared to have lost significance. Then, the U.S. Tax Court in 2016 revisited the doctrine, having observed that the “border between substantial compliance and lack of substantial compliance is a contested and unclear one.”573 The court opened its analysis in this case by stating that it has “always hesitated in substantial compliance cases to push too hard against the regulatory language—it's not the job of a court to rewrite regulations, especially when Congress so clearly states its intent for an area of tax law to be governed by them.”574 The court continued: “This has meant that taxpayers have had great difficulty in meeting the substantial compliance standard because we've held that compliance isn't substantial if an appraisal fails to meet the essential requirements of the governing statute.”575 The court considered five flaws in the appraisal involved as identified by the IRS, concluding that the donor company “complied either strictly or substantially with each of the requirements for a qualified appraiser report.”576 The court rejected the government's argument that the donor “orchestrated a voluntary, open-market sale transaction to appear as if it was a bargain sale to enable its partners to entirely offset their significant capital gain with a charitable contribution deduction.”577

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit posited a conflict in the courts as to the substantial compliance standard when applied in the context of the appraisal reporting requirements. The U.S. Tax Court formulated its test for substantial compliance in this setting as “whether the donor provided sufficient information to permit the [IRS] to evaluate the reported contributions, as intended by Congress.”578 The appellate court stated that it advocates a “significantly more stringent test,” pursuant to which “anything short of complete compliance is excused” only if “(1) [the taxpayer] had a good excuse for failing to comply with the regulation and (2) the regulation's requirement is unimportant, unclear, or confusingly stated in the regulations or statute.”579 The appellate court added that the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have adopted this formulation of the substantial compliance standard, albeit for other federal tax law provisions.580 The D.C. Circuit declined to choose between these standards because the donor in the case “failed substantially to comply.”581

§ 5.11 REPORTING LAW

(a) Annual Information Returns

One of the most important aspects of federal regulation of the charitable solicitation process is accomplished by means of the annual reporting obligations imposed on most charitable and other tax-exempt organizations. That is, with some exceptions, a charitable organization must annually file an information return582 with the IRS. These returns are filed with the IRS Service Center in Ogden, Utah.583

(b) Reporting Law Concerning Property Dispositions

Federal law requires the filing of an information return by certain charitable donees that make certain dispositions of contributed property (charitable deduction property).584 This type of property means any property (other than publicly traded securities) contributed in circumstances where a federal income tax charitable contribution deduction was claimed if the asserted value of the property (plus the claimed value of all similar items of property donated by the donor to one or more donees) is in excess of $5,000.585

A charitable donee that sells, exchanges, consumes, or otherwise disposes of gift property within two years after the date of the donor's contribution of the property must file an information return (Form 8282) with the IRS. A copy of the donee information return must be provided to the donor and retained by the donee.

This information return must contain the following:

  • The name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the donor
  • A sufficient description of the property
  • The date of the contribution
  • The amount received on the disposition
  • The date of the disposition

This reporting obligation is not required with respect to an item of charitable deduction property disposed of by sale, if the appraisal summary signed by the donee with respect to the item contains, at the time of the donee's signature, a statement signed by the donor that the appraised value of the item does not exceed $500. For these purposes, items that form a set (e.g., a collection of books written by the same author, components of a stereo system, or a group of place settings of a pattern of silverware) are considered one item. Also, all nonpublicly traded stock is considered one item, as are all nonpublicly traded securities other than nonpublicly traded stock.

This exception is designed to embrace the situation where a donor contributes to a charity items of property that, taken together, are worth more than $5,000 (thereby triggering the appraisal and appraisal summary requirements) and where the charity (within the two-year period) sells one of these items which, at the time the charity signed the appraisal summary, had a value of no more than $500. For example, if an individual donated the entire contents of a house to a charity, an appraisal summary may be done with respect to all of the items as a group, and the charity may thereafter sell some of the items individually. To the extent that each item had a value that is less than $500, the charity would not have to file the information return with respect to the sale(s).

One of the vague aspects of this rule is the underlying assumption of application of the aggregation rule. For example, to build on the previous illustration, the contents of the house consisted of furniture valued at $5,000, jewelry valued at $5,000, clothing valued at $5,000, and art works valued at $5,000. While the safe approach may be to secure an appraisal for all of the $20,000 in property, an appraisal (and an appraisal summary) may not be required in the first instance because the properties are not similar. If that is the case, the property is not charitable deduction property to begin with.

This reporting obligation also does not apply to a situation where the charitable donee consumes or distributes, without consideration, the property in the course of performing an exempt function.

Moreover, each charitable donee with respect to a qualified intellectual property contribution586 is required to prepare and file a return pertaining to each specified tax year of the donee showing:

  • The name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the donor
  • A description of the qualified intellectual property contributed
  • The date of the contribution
  • The amount of net income of the donee for the tax year that is properly allocable to the qualified intellectual property, taking into account certain modifications587

This donee information return must be filed within 125 days of the disposition of the charitable deduction property.

A successor donee may be required to file this information return if this donee disposes of charitable deduction property within two years after the date of the donor's contribution to the original donee. A successor donee is any donee of charitable contribution property other than the original donee.588

In the case of an individual, partnership, or corporation, a federal income tax charitable deduction for a contribution of property for which a deduction of more than $500 is claimed is not allowed, unless the donor satisfies certain requirements.589 One requirement is that the donor must include a description of the property with the tax return on which the deduction is claimed.590 Additional rules apply where the claimed deduction is more than $5,000, and other rules apply where the claimed deduction is more than $500,000.591

§ 5.12 FEDERAL TAX PENALTIES

The federal tax law contains a variety of penalties that can be imposed for violation of various aspects of the law of charitable giving.

(a) Accuracy-Related Penalties

Accuracy-related penalties are imposed on taxpayers in connection with certain underpayments of tax. Under one of these penalties, the amount of the penalty is an addition to tax in the amount equal to 20 percent of the underpayment.592 This penalty is applied to the portion of a tax underpayment attributable to, inter alia, one or more of the following: negligence or disregard of tax law, a substantial understatement of income tax, and/or a substantial valuation misstatement.593

In this context, the term negligence includes a failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the tax law.594 The term disregard includes a careless, reckless, or intentional disregard.595

The term understatement means the excess of (1) the amount of tax required to be shown on the tax return for the tax year involved, over (2) the amount of tax imposed that is shown on the return, reduced by any rebate.596 The amount of an understatement is, however, reduced by the portion of the understatement that is attributable to (1) the tax treatment of an item by the taxpayer if there is or was substantial authority for the treatment or (2) any item if (a) the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment are adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the return and (b) there is a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of the item by the taxpayer.597

There is a substantial understatement of income tax for a tax year if the amount of the understatement exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the year or $5,000.598 In the case of a corporation, other than an S corporation or a personal holding company, there is a substantial underpayment of income tax for a tax year if the amount of the understatement exceeds the lesser of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the year (or, if greater, $10,000) or $10 million.599

The general rule is that there is a substantial valuation misstatement if the value of a property (or the adjusted basis of any property) claimed on a tax return is 150 percent or more of the amount determined to be the correct amount of the valuation (or adjusted basis).600

To the extent that a portion of an underpayment is attributable to one or more gross valuation misstatements, the amount of the penalty is equal to 40 percent of the underpayment.601 A gross valuation misstatement occurs where the claimed value of the contributed property involved is 200 percent or more of the amount determined to be the correct value.602

The determination as to whether there is a substantial or gross valuation misstatement on a return is made on a property-by-property basis.603 In one instance, a donor contributed two conservation easements, triggering a gross valuation misstatement in both instances; one easement was valued by the donor at 852 percent of its correct value, the other at 1,031 percent of the correct value.604

A court held that a married couple was not entitled to a charitable contribution deduction for transfers to a donor-advised fund605 because they retained control over the property, in that the husband retained “dominion” over the property as evidenced by the “predominant” use of the funds in the account for loans to their children who were students and the sponsoring organization's “perfunctory acquiescence” in the making of the loans.606 The accuracy-related penalty was imposed because the donors were negligent, inasmuch as they “failed to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a deduction which would seem to a reasonable or prudent person to be ‘too good to be true’ under the circumstances,” in that a “reasonable or prudent person would have perceived as ‘too good to be true’ a deduction for a supposed charitable contribution where the amounts deducted could be used to fund student loans for his own children.”607

An accuracy-related penalty of 20 percent is imposed in connection with a portion of an underpayment that is attributable to a substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement.608 This type of valuation understatement occurs where the value of a property claimed on a return is 65 percent or less of the amount determined to be the correct amount of the valuation.609 This penalty is inapplicable, however, where the underpayment portion is $5,000 or less.610 The penalty increases to 40 percent where the substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement attributable to valuation of a property that is 40 percent or less of the amount determined to be the correct amount.611

These penalties are generally inapplicable with respect to any portion of an underpayment where it is shown that there was reasonable cause for the portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to the portion.612 This reasonable cause exception, however, is unavailable with respect to any portion of an underpayment that is attributable to one or more transactions lacking economic substance613 or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.614

The decision as to whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all of the pertinent facts and circumstances, including the taxpayer's experience, knowledge, and education.615 Generally, the most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess his or her proper tax liability.616 The fact that a tax law issue is novel is not a stand-alone defense to imposition of these penalties.617 Reliance on professional advice may constitute reasonable cause and good faith but only if, under the circumstances, the reliance was reasonable.618 Reasonable cause exists where a taxpayer relies in good faith on the advice of a qualified tax advisor where the advisor was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the advisor, and the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the advisor's judgment.619 Taxpayers cannot rely on professional advice as a defense if they knew or should have known that the advisor had a conflict of interest; an advisor in this circumstance is not independent.620 An independent advisor follows his or her regular course of professional conduct in rendering advice, does not give unsolicited advice, and does not have a stake in the transaction other than the usual hourly rate.621

This exception may apply in the income tax charitable contribution context. In one instance, a court found that a group of donors, all of whom were well educated, did not act in good faith and were imprudent in accepting an excessive valuation of donated stock; a request by a lawyer to withhold relevant information from their tax advisors was considered notice to the donors as to the inaccuracy of the claimed deductions.622 The court wrote that a donor “cannot blindly rely” on advice or an appraisal to avoid the penalty623 and will be faulted for not seeking advice from an advisor “who is truly independent of the planned transaction.”624 By contrast, a court did not sustain imposition of the penalty where a donor of a facade easement to a public charity relied on the advice of an accountant who admitted to the donor that he was not familiar with this area of the law and whose subsequent sole knowledge of this type of giving was derived from attendance at a seminar conducted by the prospective donee.625 In another instance, the court concluded that the accuracy-related penalties were inapplicable because the donors acted with reasonable cause: they worked with the charitable donee to formulate a plan in connection with the gifted property, the charity's employees were qualified to make the assessments they made, and, by attaching the appraisals to their tax returns, the donors demonstrated good faith reliance on the appraisals.626

More pertinently, in the case of an underpayment attributable to a gross valuation overstatement with respect to charitable deduction property,627 this exception does not apply.628 This exception is not available in the case of a substantial valuation overstatement, unless (1) the claimed value of the property was based on a qualified appraisal629 made by a qualified appraiser,630 and (2) the taxpayer made a good faith investigation of the value of the contributed property.631

The import of this good faith investigation requirement was illustrated in a case involving a gift of a historic preservation easement on their home (which proved to lack value) by married donors who, in the words of an appellate court, are “highly intelligent” and “very well-educated.”632 The appraiser they used was recommended by the charitable donee; the couple was not disturbed by the fact that this appraiser had previously appraised facade easements on only nine occasions, all of them involving the same donee. The donors had signed a letter that included a statement that the restrictions imposed by the easement agreement were the same as those already in place on the residence by virtue of zoning restrictions; one donor testified that he “didn't notice” the sentence, while the other stated she “probably didn't focus on” it.633 The court of appeals said that the appraiser's “assumptions and methodology were questionable at best”; his explanation as to why the easement had value was characterized as “vague, nonspecific, and not entirely logical.”634 A representative of the donee observed in an email to one of these donors that the property owners in the community are not allowed to alter the facade of their historic buildings, “whether there is an easement or not.” This representative added that, “therefore, properties with an easement are not at a market value disadvantage when compared to the other properties in the same neighborhood.”635 For ignoring these and other “red flags” (the court's term), an accuracy-related penalty was upheld on the ground that the donors did not make the requisite good faith investigation into the value of the easement.636

A court held that the IRS's determination of 40 percent gross valuation misstatement penalties against donors to charity was proper because the agency's examination report, where this position was cast as an alternative in relation to the 20 percent accuracy-related penalties, constituted the requisite initial determination.637

(b) Aiding and Abetting Penalty

A penalty is imposed on a person who (1) aids or assists in, procures, or advises with respect to preparation of a tax return or other document; (2) knows (or has reason to believe) that the document will be used in connection with a material tax matter; and (3) knows that this would result in an understatement of the tax owed by another person.638 In general, the amount of this penalty is $1,000.639 If the document relates to the tax return of a corporation, the amount of the penalty is $10,000.640

For this purpose, the term procures includes (1) ordering (or otherwise causing) a subordinate to do an act and (2) knowing of, and not attempting to prevent, participation by a subordinate in an act.641 A subordinate is another person (whether or not a director, officer, employee, or agent of the taxpayer involved) over whose activities the person has direction, supervision, or control.642

This penalty may be applied whether or not the understatement is with the knowledge or consent of the persons authorized or required to present the return, affidavit, claim, or other document.643 A person furnishing typing, reproduction, or other mechanical assistance with respect to a document is not treated as having aided or assisted in the preparation of the document by reason of this type of assistance.644

(c) Penalty Attributable to Incorrect Appraisals

A penalty is imposed where (1) a person prepares an appraisal of the value of property; (2) the person knows, or reasonably should have known, that the appraisal would be used in connection with a tax return or a claim for refund; and (3) the claimed value of the property on a tax return or claim for refund that is based on the appraisal results in a substantial valuation misstatement,645 a substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement,646 or a gross valuation misstatement,647 with respect to the property.648

The amount of this penalty on a person with respect to an appraisal is equal to the lesser of (1) the greater of (a) 10 percent of the amount of the underpayment649 attributable to the misstatement or (b) $1,000, or (2) 125 percent of the gross income received by the person from preparation of the appraisal.650

This penalty is inapplicable if the person establishes to the satisfaction of the IRS that the value established in the appraisal was “more likely than not” the proper value.651

(d) Abusive Tax Shelter Promotion Penalty

An abusive tax shelter promotion penalty has two principal elements with respect to a person involved in a tax shelter promotion.652 One, the penalty pertains to a person who (1) organizes (or assists in the organization of) a partnership or other entity, an investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, or (2) participates, directly or indirectly, in the sale of any interest in such an entity, plan, or arrangement.653 Two, the penalty pertains to a person who also makes or furnishes or causes another person to make or furnish (in connection with such an organization or sale) (1) a statement with respect to the allowability of any deduction or credit, the excludability of any income, or the securing of any other tax benefit by reason of holding an interest in the entity or participating in the plan or arrangement, which the person knows or has reason to know as false or fraudulent as to any material matter, or (2) a gross valuation overstatement as to any material matter.654

A person meeting the foregoing criteria must pay, with respect to each tax shelter promotion activity, a penalty equal to $1,000 or, if the person establishes that it is lesser, 100 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) by such person from such activity.655 Each entity or arrangement is considered a separate activity, as is participation in each sale.656 Nonetheless, if an activity with respect to which a penalty is imposed involves an above-referenced statement, the amount of the penalty is equal to 50 percent of the gross income derived (or to be derived) from the activity by the person on which the penalty is imposed.657

(e) Fraud Penalty

There is a fraud penalty, which is an addition to the tax of an amount equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment that is attributable to fraud.658 If the IRS establishes that any portion of an underpayment is attributable to fraud, the entire underpayment is treated as attributable to fraud, except with respect to any portion of the underpayment that the taxpayer can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, is not attributable to fraud.659

To prove that an underpayment of tax is due to fraud, the IRS must show that the taxpayer intended to evade a tax known to be due by engaging in conduct designed to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent collection of the tax by the IRS.660 The existence of fraudulent intent is a factual question to be decided on the basis of the examination of the entire record.661 Fraud may never be presumed but must be established by affirmative evidence.662 Because direct proof of a taxpayer's intent is rarely available, however, fraud may be established by circumstantial evidence.663 For each tax year, fraud must be established by independent evidence.664

Once the IRS has established by clear and convincing evidence that any portion of an underpayment is due to fraud, the entire underpayment is to be treated as attributable to fraud, except with respect to any portion of the underpayment that the taxpayer establishes (by a preponderance of the evidence) is not attributable to fraud.665 Courts have developed several indicia or “badges” of fraud.666

In the charitable giving context, courts will, in determining the existence of tax fraud, take into account the state of the law at the time, whether this law was “well established,” the level of intelligence and professional training of the donor, the extent of relevant information readily accessible to the donor, and whether the donor consulted a lawyer or accountant on the point.667 In one instance, a federal district court looked to state law to find fraud when a married couple joined the tax protest movement, created a personal church, conveyed their personal residence to the church, and stopped paying federal income taxes on the ground that one of the spouses was an ordained minister; the court found the conveyance to be intentionally fraudulent (and ordered the property sold to pay the taxes due).668 An ostensible donor (an experienced tax compliance officer employed by the IRS) was unable to substantiate nearly all her claimed charitable deductions; she was found liable for the civil fraud penalty.669

(f) Additional Penalties

Still other pertinent penalties are those imposed for failure to file a tax return,670 failure to timely pay the amount of tax shown on a return (or return substitute),671 failure to file a correct information return,672 failure to furnish a correct payee statement,673 or failure to comply with other information-reporting requirements.674

It may appear unlikely or even far-fetched to think that a donor or someone serving on behalf of a charitable organization—or a charitable organization itself—could reasonably be subjected to one or more of these penalties. They have been so applied by the courts in that context, however. There have been several court opinions concerning the application of these penalties in the charitable giving setting under pre-1990 law.675 These include:

  • Application of an underpayment penalty when a lawyer intentionally disregarded the tax regulations in claiming a charitable contribution deduction for gifts of legal services676
  • Application of penalties when the claimed values were based on “financial fantasies”677
  • Application of a penalty when the gift property was valued at $45,600 and the court found the value to be $4,211678
  • Application of penalties when the value of the gift property was deliberately inflated and the transactions were tax-motivated679
  • Application of the negligence penalty when the parties participated in a circular flow-of-funds arrangement, including charitable gifts, designed for tax avoidance680
  • Application of the penalty for substantial underpayment of federal income tax when a charitable gift of gravesites was made as part of a tax avoidance promotion program681
  • Application of the valuation overstatement penalty in a case involving a charitable contribution of wild game trophy mounts.682

There is a penalty for violation of the rules concerning disclosures to donors in the case of quid pro quo contributions.683 Penalties of $10 per contribution, capped at $5,000 per particular fundraising event or mailing, may be imposed on charitable organizations that fail to make the required disclosure, unless the failure was due to reasonable cause. The penalty applies if an organization either fails to make any disclosure in connection with a quid pro quo contribution or makes a disclosure that is incomplete or inaccurate (such as an estimate not determined in good faith of the value of goods or services furnished to the donor).684

The IRS analyzed the application of this quid pro quo contribution penalty in the context of “disguised” tuition payments. Under review was a practice of a church, where a member (or family including a member) makes a contribution in an amount equal to or exceeding the amount of a child's tuition at a school that is unrelated to the church. The school bills the church for the tuition, and the church pays for it. The church retains the funds from contributions of each of its members separately; each member is required to contribute to the church an amount at least equal to each child's tuition, plus the member's “regular” contribution to the church's general fund. At the end of a year, the church provides a statement to the member reflecting the total contributions for the year without any reduction for tuition that the church has paid. This document states that the donor did not receive anything in exchange for the contributions (other than intangible religious benefits). The IRS concluded that, if the church conducted a fundraising event or mailing involving this program, the $5,000 maximum penalty would apply.685 Conversely, the penalty limitation would not be applicable where participants in such a program hear about it by word of mouth or participate in it without mailings or other forms of fundraising.686

A penalty is applicable for the furnishing of a false or fraudulent acknowledgment, or an untimely or incomplete acknowledgment, by a charitable organization donee to a donor of a qualified vehicle.687 If the vehicle is sold without any significant intervening use or material improvement by the donee, the penalty is the greater of (1) the product of the highest rate of income tax and the sales price stated in the acknowledgment or (2) the gross proceeds from the sale of the vehicle. In the case of an acknowledgment pertaining to any other qualified vehicle, the penalty is the greater of (1) the product of the highest rate of income tax and the claimed value of the vehicle or (2) $5,000.688

A penalty of $10,000 is applicable to a person who identifies applicable property as having a use that is related to an exempt purpose or function constituting the basis for the donee's tax exemption while knowing that it is not intended for such a use.689

Penalties may be imposed for failure to file a return (or for failure to include any required information or to show the correct information) on behalf of a split-interest trust.690

A penalty may be imposed if a taxpayer has instituted or maintained proceedings before the U.S. Tax Court primarily for delay or the taxpayer's position in the proceeding is frivolous or groundless.691

NOTES

  1. 1.  See § 8.2 for a summary of efforts over the years to enact a federal charitable fundraising regulation law.
  2. 2.  Prior to the 1980s, the IRS was reticent about its involvement in the field of regulation of fundraising by charitable organizations. For example, in 1974, the then-Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated: “The IRS has little power to do much about the few charitable organizations which seem to be forever skating on thin ice in their fund-raising activities” (remarks by Donald Alexander, National Association of Attorneys General Committee on the Office of Attorney General, Regulation of Charitable Trust and Solicitations Summary of the Special Meeting of the Subcommittee on Charitable Trusts and Solicitations 60 (1974)). Since then, however, the IRS has amassed considerable power in the area, some of it accorded by Congress, and now uses it with exuberance. E.g., Hopkins, “IRS Now Regulating Fundraising for Charity,” 2 J. Tax'n Exempt Org. 4 (Summer 1990).
  3. 3.  This law is discussed in §§ 5.2–5.4.
  4. 4.  See § 5.6.
  5. 5.  H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1607–1608 (1988).
  6. 6.  Id. at 1607.
  7. 7.  Id. at 1607–1608.
  8. 8.  Id. at 1608.
  9. 9.  Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
  10. 10. As discussed (§§ 5.2, 5.4), this position is now largely memorialized in statutory law.
  11. 11. It is impossible to know how widespread this practice was and, for that matter, is. The most pleasant and optimistic view of all of this is that this treatment of payments as gifts was done in ignorance and out of naivete. An example of the problem, however, is provided infra note 56. Irrespective of the scope of these misdeeds, it is remarkable that it spawned the rules discussed in §§ 5.4, 5.5.
  12. 12. The law as to what is a gift in this setting is summarized in Charitable Giving, § 2.1.
  13. 13. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116–117 (1986) (emphasis added).
  14. 14. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 692 (1989).
  15. 15. See VI Nonprofit Couns. (No. 2) 7 (1989).
  16. 16. “IRS' Hard Look at ‘Special Event’ Fundraising,” XXI Phil. Monthly (No. 9) 5 (1988).
  17. 17. In general, “IRS Is Going to ‘Evaluate the Overall State of Fund Raising,’” XXIII Phil. Monthly (No. 1) 10 (1990).
  18. 18. Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. (Pt. 1) 186.
  19. 19. See § 5.9.
  20. 20. This matter of charitable organizations conducting travel tours became such a major issue that it evolved into a regulation project, with final regulations issued (T.D. 8874) in 2000 (Reg. § 1.513-7).
  21. 21. IRC § 513(f). See § 5.8(a)(vi).
  22. 22. Form 990-T.
  23. 23. Form 1099-MISC.
  24. 24. Form W2-G.
  25. 25. IRC § 6651(a)(1).
  26. 26. IRC § 6651(a)(2).
  27. 27. IRC § 6652(c)(1)(A)(ii).
  28. 28. IRC § 6661.
  29. 29. IRC § 6700.
  30. 30. IRC § 6701.
  31. 31. IRC § 6721.
  32. 32. IRC § 6722.
  33. 33. IRC § 6723.
  34. 34. Internal Revenue Manual Transmittal 7(10)00–164 (Feb. 23, 1990), transmitting Manual Supplement 7(10) G-59, § 11.02.
  35. 35Id. § 11.09.
  36. 36Id. § 11.03.
  37. 37Id. § 11.02.
  38. 38. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
  39. 39. IRS Publication 1391.
  40. 40Id.
  41. 41. IRC § 162.
  42. 42. E.g., Veterans of Foreign Wars, Department of Michigan v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 7 (1987); Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Department of Missouri, Inc. v. United States, 85-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9605 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
  43. 43. See § 9.8.
  44. 44. IRS Private Letter Ruling (Priv. Ltr. Rul.) 8832003.
  45. 45. See supra notes 25–33.
  46. 46. See § 5.8.
  47. 47. Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, as amplified by Rev. Proc. 92-49, 1992-1 C.B. 987, and modified by Rev. Proc. 92-102, 1992-2 C.B. 579.
  48. 48. IRC § 513(h)(2).
  49. 49. See § 5.4.
  50. 50. See § 5.5.
  51. 51. “Technical Explanation of the Finance Committee Amendment” (Technical Explanation), at 586. The Technical Explanation was not formally printed; it was, however, reproduced in the Congressional Record (138 Cong. Rec. (No. 112) S11246 (Aug. 3, 1992)).
  52. 52. IRC § 170(f)(17).
  53. 53. See § 5.4.
  54. 54. See § 5.10.
  55. 55. IRC § 170(f)(8)(A). Also Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(1). The following is an excellent example of the type of practice Congress hoped will be eradicated by these substantiation rules: A taxpayer had “canceled checks showing $500 to $1,000 weekly payments to his church. During an audit, an IRS agent checked with the minister to verify that the money had actually been given to the church. Indeed it had, but the minister added a critical piece of information: The taxpayer was a coin collector who bought the change that worshippers dropped in the collection plate each week” (48 Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine (No. 5) 140 (May 1994)).
  56. 56. IRC § 170(f)(17).
  57. 57. IRC § 170(f)(8)(B); Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(2).
  58. 58. IRC § 170(f)(8)(B), last sentence. Various forms of intangible religious benefits were enumerated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in Hernandez v. United States, 490 U.S. 680, 707-711 (1989).
  59. 59. IRC § 170(f)(8)(C); Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(3).
  60. 60. H. Rep. 103-213, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 565, note 29 (1993). In the case of credit card rebate plans (the details of which are the subject of § 3.1(h)), in an instance of a lump-sum payment of $250 or more by the sponsoring company to a charitable organization, the cardholder must obtain the requisite substantiation of the gift from the charity for the gift to be deductible (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9623035). The company thus must supply donee organizations with the amounts of cardholders' contributions, as well as the names and addresses of the cardholders, to enable the charities to provide the required contemporaneous written acknowledgment.
  61. 61. H. Rep. 103-213, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., note 32 (1993). A charitable organization that knowingly provides a false written substantiation to a donor may be subject to the penalty for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax liability (IRC § 6701).
  62. 62Charitable Contributions—Substantiation and Disclosure Requirements (IRS Pub. 1771 (rev. Sept. 2011)); IRS Notice 2002-25, 2002-15 I.R.B. 743.
  63. 63. Simmons v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. 211, 215 (2009), aff'd, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
  64. 64. Schrimsher v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. 1329 (2011).
  65. 65. 310 Retail, LLC v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.M. 228, 232 (2017).
  66. 66. Schrimsher v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. 1329, 1331 (2011).
  67. 67Id.
  68. 68. Averyt v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. 65 (2012).
  69. 69Id. at 68.
  70. 70. 310 Retail, LLC v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.M. 228, 232 (2017).
  71. 71Id.
  72. 72. Averyt v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. 65, 68 (2012).
  73. 73. RP Golf, LLC v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. 413 (2012).
  74. 74Id. at 416.
  75. 75Id.
  76. 76Id.
  77. 77Id.
  78. 78. 310 Retail, LLC v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.M. 228, 231 (2017).
  79. 79Id. at 232.
  80. 80Id.
  81. 81Id.
  82. 82. Big River Development, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.M. 239 (2017).
  83. 83Id. at 242.
  84. 84Id.
  85. 85Id.
  86. 86Id.
  87. 87Id.
  88. 88Id.
  89. 89Id.
  90. 90. French v. Commissioner, 111 T.C.M. 1241 (2016).
  91. 91. See Charitable Giving § 7.18.
  92. 92. Irby v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 371 (2012).
  93. 93. Crimi v. Commissioner, 105 T.C.M. 1330 (2013).
  94. 94. DiDonato v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. 173 (2011).
  95. 95. E.g., Boone Operations Co., LLC v. Commissioner, 105 T.C.M. 1610 (2013).
  96. 96. See Charitable Giving § 19.8(d).
  97. 97. One of the authors received an ostensible substantiation document from a major university (that presumably has a phalanx of lawyers at its disposal) that stated the “[f]ederal tax law requires us to inform you that no goods, services or privileges were provided in exchange for this donation.” The federal tax law does no such thing.
  98. 98. IRC § 170(f)(11)(A)(i); Reg.170A-13(b)(3).
  99. 99. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c). See § 5.10.
  100. 100.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(11)(i).
  101. 101.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(11)(ii).
  102. 102.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(12).
  103. 103.  Id.
  104. 104.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(7). The phrase goods or services means money, property, services, benefits, and privileges (Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(5)).
  105. 105.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(6).
  106. 106.  This rule relates to a subject that torments the fundraising professional: What to do about the situation in which a charitable organization decides, months after contributions have been made, to honor a class of donors by providing them a tangible benefit, such as a thank-you dinner? The event or other benefit may be provided in a subsequent year. Does the fair market value of this benefit have to be subtracted from the amount of the gift for deduction purposes? The answer generally is no. This is affirmed by these regulations, which require that the goods or services be provided “at the time” the payment is made, when the donor receives or expects to receive a benefit. In this instance, the donors did not receive or expect to receive a dinner or anything else at the time of their gifts. But suppose a charitable organization develops a regular pattern of providing these after-the-fact benefits. At what point do expectations arise? This is probably not something the regulations can further address; it may have to be left to a facts-and-circumstances analysis. The regulations observe, however, that the benefit can arise in a year other than (usually, subsequent to) the year of the gift.
  107. 107.  Addis v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 528 (2002), aff'd, 374 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. den., 543 U.S. 1151 (2005).
  108. 108.  Id., 374 F.3d at 535.
  109. 109.  A commentary on this case appears in § 10.12.
  110. 110.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(A).
  111. 111.  IRC § 513(h)(2); Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(A).
  112. 112.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(B)(1).
  113. 113.  IRC § 170(1); Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(14).
  114. 114.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(B)(2).
  115. 115.  IRC § 513(h)(2).
  116. 116.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(9)(i). An acknowledgment in a program at a charity-sponsored event identifying a person as a donor to the charity also is an inconsequential benefit with no significant value; “[s]uch privileges as being associated with or being known as a benefactor of the [charitable] organization are not significant return benefits that have monetary value” (Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104).
  117. 117.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(8)(ii), Example 1.
  118. 118.  Id., Example 3.
  119. 119.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(9)(ii).
  120. 120.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(10).
  121. 121.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(13).
  122. 122.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(15). If a person purchases an annuity from a charitable organization and claims a charitable contribution deduction of $250 or more for the excess of the amount paid over the value of the annuity, the contemporaneous written acknowledgment must state whether any goods or services in addition to the annuity were provided to the person (Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(16)). The contemporaneous written acknowledgment need not include a good-faith estimate of the value of the annuity (id.).
  123. 123.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(f)(17). An idea for simplified compliance by donors and donees with the charitable gift substantiation rules is the subject of discussion in the charitable community (e.g., 69 Tax Notes 793 (Nov. 6, 1995)). The thought advanced is that the contributor has a rubber stamp made, by which the following is printed on the back of the contribution check: “The negotiation of this check constitutes an acknowledgment that the amount thereof was received by the payee as a charitable contribution and that no goods or services were provided in consideration thereof.” The Department of the Treasury has never addressed the efficacy of this approach.
  124. 124.  See § 5.10.
  125. 125.  IRC § 170(f)(12).
  126. 126.  See Charitable Giving § 21.4; Tax-Exempt Organizations § 11.8.
  127. 127.  See Tax-Exempt Organizations § 19.11(a).
  128. 128.  Id. § 19.4(a).
  129. 129.  Id. § 19.6.
  130. 130.  A Type III supporting organization is described in IRC § 4943(f)(5)(A); a functionally integrated Type III supporting organization is described in IRC § 4945(f)(5)(B). See § 6.4.
  131. 131.  This acknowledgment must be similar to the acknowledgment referenced in § 5.4(a).
  132. 132.  IRC § 170(f)(18). This statement of the law was further emphasized when a court dismissed a litigation challenge to operations of the Schwab Charitable Fund on the ground that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing to sue, with the absence of standing based on the fact that, as the court stated, the plaintiff “gave up title to and control of his donation in exchange for an immediate tax deduction,” as the “statutory framework for donor-advised funds provides” (citing IRC § 170(f)(18)(B)) (Pinkert v. Schwab Charitable Fund, Case No. 20-cv-07657-LB (N.D. Cal. 2021)).
  133. 133.  IRC § 6115(b).
  134. 134.  Id. See § 5.3, text accompanied by supra note 59.
  135. 135.  IRC §§ 6115(a), 170(c)(1).
  136. 136.  IRC § 6115(a). For contributions that have a value of $75 or less, the body of law described in § 5.2 continues to apply.
  137. 137.  H. Rep. 103-213, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 566, note 35 (1993).
  138. 138.  See text accompanied by supra notes 111–112.
  139. 139.  H. Rep. 103-213, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 566 (1993). The IRS issued temporary regulations (T.D. 8544) and proposed regulations (IA-74-93) to accompany these rules. A hearing on them was held on November 10, 1995, at which time witnesses from the charitable sector expressed dismay at the prospect of having to value benefits, particularly intangible ones, provided in exchange for charitable contributions. A summary of this hearing is at 2 Fund-Raising Regulation Report (No. 1) 1 (Jan./Feb. 1995). There is little in the final regulations to assuage their concerns.
  140. 140.  “Technical Explanation of the Finance Committee Amendment” (“Technical Explanation”), at 586. The Technical Explanation was not formally printed; it is, however, reproduced in the Congressional Record (138 Cong. Rec. (No. 112) S11246 (Aug. 3, 1992)).
  141. 141.  IRC § 6714. This requirement is separate from the substantiality rules (see § 5.4). An organization may be able to meet both sets of requirements with the same written document. An organization in this position, however, should be careful to satisfy the quid pro quo contribution rules in a timely manner because of this penalty.
  142. 142.  Reg. § 1.6115-1(a)(1).
  143. 143.  Reg. § 1.6115-1(a)(2).
  144. 144.  Reg. § 1.6115-1(a)(3), Example 1.
  145. 145.  Reg. § 1.6115-1(a)(3), Example 2.
  146. 146.  Reg. § 1.6115-1(a)(3), Example 3.
  147. 147.  The regulation suggests, however, that if the celebrity does what he or she is celebrated for (e.g., a singer or a comedian who performs as such), the value of that performance—being a service available on a commercial basis—should be taken into account in valuing the event.
  148. 148.  See § 5.3, text accompanied by supra notes 111–112.
  149. 149.  Id., text accompanied by supra note 120.
  150. 150.  Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1).
  151. 151.  A payment made to a charitable organization in excess of an item's fair market value is not necessarily the consequence of donative intent. In the case of an auction, for example, the patron (successful bidder) may just intensely want the item, or be motivated by peer pressure or extensive access to an open bar; charity may be the farthest thing from the patron's mind.
  152. 152.  IRC § 6113. The IRS published rules to accompany this law as IRS Notice 88-120, 1988-2 C.B. 454.
  153. 153.  That is, this law does not apply to organizations described in IRC § 501(c)(3).
  154. 154.  Extension of this type of law in fact occurred (see §§ 5.3, 5.4).
  155. 155.  That is, organizations that are described in IRC § 501(c)(4) and that are tax-exempt under IRC § 501(a).
  156. 156.  IRC § 6113(b)(2)(A). In determining this threshold, the same principles that obtain in ascertaining the annual information return (Form 990) $25,000 filing threshold apply (Rev. Proc. 82-23, 1983-1 C.B. 687). In general, these rules utilize a three-year average. The organization must include the required disclosure statement on all solicitations made more than 30 days after reaching $300,000 in gross receipts for the three-year period of the calculation (IRS Notice 88-120, 1988-2 C.B. 454).

    A local, regional, or state chapter of an organization with gross receipts under $100,000 must include the disclosure statement in its solicitations if at least 25 percent of the money solicited will go to the national, or other, unit of the organization that has annual gross receipts over $100,000, because the solicitation is considered as being, in part, on behalf of the unit. Also, if a trade association or labor union with over $100,000 in annual gross receipts solicits funds that will pass through to a political action committee with less than $100,000 in annual gross receipts, the solicitation must include the required disclosure statement.

  157. 157.  IRS Notice 88-120, 1988-2 C.B. 454.
  158. 158.  That is, is described in IRC § 501(a) and IRC § 501(c) (other than, as noted supra note 117, IRC § 501(c)(3)).
  159. 159.  That is, is described in IRC § 527.
  160. 160.  IRC § 6113(b)(1). For this purpose, a fraternal organization (one described in IRC § 170(c)(4)) is treated as a charitable organization only with respect to solicitations for contributions that are to be used exclusively for purposes referred to in IRC § 170(c)(4) (IRC § 6113(b)(3)).
  161. 161.  IRC § 6113(b)(2)(B).
  162. 162.  IRC § 6113(a).
  163. 163.  IRC § 6113(c).
  164. 164.  IRC § 6710.
  165. 165.  IRS Notice 88-120, 1988-2 C.B. 454.
  166. 166.  That is, is an organization described in IRC § 501(c)(6) and is tax-exempt under IRC § 501(a).
  167. 167.  That is, is an organization described in IRC § 501(c)(5) and is tax-exempt under IRC § 501(a).
  168. 168.  In one instance, a political organization that conducted fundraising by means of telemarketing and direct mail was found to be in violation of these rules: a notice of nondeductibility of contributions was not included in its telephone solicitations or pledge statements, and the print used in some of its written notices was too small (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9315001).
  169. 169.  IRC § 4958.
  170. 170.  This reference is to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which enacted law defining public charities and private foundations (see § 6.4), expanded the charitable giving rules (see § 6.7), and codified the law as to planned giving (id.).
  171. 171.  That is, the intermediate sanctions rules did not replace the private inurement doctrine (see Tax-Exempt Organizations §§ 20.1–20.5). See § 5.7.
  172. 172.  See § 6.4.
  173. 173.  That is, organizations described in IRC § 501(c)(4). In general, Tax-Exempt Organizations, Chapter 13.
  174. 174.  That is, organizations described in IRC § 501(c)(29). In general, Tax-Exempt Organizations § 19.18.
  175. 175.  IRC § 4958(e)(1).
  176. 176.  IRC § 4958(e)(2).
  177. 177.  IRC § 4958(c)(1)(A); Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(1).
  178. 178.  IRC § 4958(c)(1)(B). An illustration of these rules arose in the private inurement setting. The IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of a charitable foundation because it was operated for the private benefit of its founder and that individual's telemarketing business (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201541013). Apparently, the charity was paying the salary, bonuses, and benefits of an employee of the company, with the foundation charged again for her services on monthly invoices.
  179. 179.  Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B).
  180. 180.  IRC § 4958(c)(1)(A).
  181. 181.  H. Rep. 104-156, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1996).
  182. 182.  Id. at 56, note 3; Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(2).
  183. 183.  IRC § 162.
  184. 184.  These standards traditionally have been a battery of factors looked to by the courts and the IRS; this approach is known as the multifactor test. In the for-profit setting, however, some courts use an alternative standard, known as the independent investor test.
  185. 185.  H. Rep. 104-156, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, note 5 (1996).
  186. 186.  Caracci v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 379, 415 (2002), rev'd on unrelated grounds, 456 F. 3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006).
  187. 187.  IRC § 4958(c)(1)(A); Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(1).
  188. 188.  IRC § 4958(c)(2).
  189. 189.  As to the final regulations, the matter was reserved (Reg. § 53.4958-5).
  190. 190.  This was the standard under the proposed regulations (Prop. Reg. § 53.4958-6(d)(1)(iii)).
  191. 191.  This rebuttable presumption was created, not by statute, but by language in the House Report. It is reflected in the regulations (Reg. § 53.4958-6).
  192. 192.  IRC § 4958(f)(1)(A); Reg. § 53.4958-3(a)(1).
  193. 193.  IRC § 4958(f)(1)(B), (C).
  194. 194.  Reg. § 53.4958-3(c).
  195. 195.  Reg. § 53.4958-3(d).
  196. 196.  Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(2).
  197. 197.  Reg. § 53.4953-3(a)(3).
  198. 198.  IRC § 4958(f)(2).
  199. 199.  IRC § 4958(f)(4).
  200. 200.  Reg. § 53.4958-4(3)(ii).
  201. 201.  IRC § 4958(a)(1).
  202. 202.  IRC § 4958(b).
  203. 203.  IRC § 4958(a)(2). The maximum amount of this tax, with respect to an excess benefit transaction, is $20,000 (IRC § 4958(d)(2)).
  204. 204.  IRC §§ 4961, 4962.
  205. 205.  IRC § 4958(f)(6).
  206. 206.  Reg. § 53.4958-7(c).
  207. 207.  Form 990, Part IV, lines 25a, b.
  208. 208.  H. Rep. 104-156, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1996).
  209. 209.  Id., note 15.
  210. 210.  In the first of the intermediate sanctions cases, the court upheld imposition of the tax penalties on disqualified persons but declined to permit revocation of the tax-exempt status of the charitable organizations that participated in the excess benefit transactions (Caracci v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 379 (2002), rev'd on unrelated grounds, 456 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006)).
  211. 211.  IRC § 6684.
  212. 212.  Tech. Adv. Mem. 200243057.
  213. 213.  H. Rep. No. 104-506, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. 59 (1996).
  214. 214.  The tax regulations essentially state the matter this way: The intermediate sanctions law does not affect the substantive standards for tax exemption for applicable tax-exempt organizations: these entities qualify for exemption only if no part of their net earnings inures to the benefit of insiders (Reg. § 53.4958-8(a); also, Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(i)).
  215. 215.  H. Rep. No. 104-506, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, note 15 (1996). In one instance, the IRS's lawyers concluded that, although the intermediate sanctions rules should be applied, revocation of tax exemption on the grounds of private inurement was “not appropriate” (Tech. Adv. Mem. 200437040).
  216. 216.  Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(ii).
  217. 217.  Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(iii). In general, Tax-Exempt Organizations § 21.16.
  218. 218.  This use of the term foundation means an entity that is a public charity, rather than a private foundation (see § 6.4), and thus is an applicable tax-exempt organization.
  219. 219.  Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(1).
  220. 220.  Reg. § 53.4958-3(g), Example 5.
  221. 221.  Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(ii).
  222. 222.  Tech. Adv. Mem. 200243057.
  223. 223.  Tech. Adv. Mem. 200244028.
  224. 224.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 202001023. Indeed, the IRS concluded that this “skimming” of the contributions was so “significant,” “multiple,” and “repeated” (applying the regulations summarized in § 5.7(a)(xii)) that the organization's tax-exempt status should be revoked on private inurement and private benefit grounds.
  225. 225.  The initial contract exception—known informally as the first bite rule—has a curious genesis. It originated in the realm of the law of fundraising. The exception was stimulated by a controversial decision by a federal court of appeals, which held that a fundraising company was not an insider (see § 6.6) with respect to a public charity, even though the trial court found that the company had taken control of the charity and manipulated its assets for the company's private ends (United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999), reversing and remanding 109 T.C. 326 (1997)). In its preamble to the temporary regulations, the IRS wrote that this appellate court held that private inurement “cannot result from a contractual relationship negotiated at arm's length with a party having no prior relationship with the organization, regardless of the relative bargaining strength of the parties or resultant control over the tax-exempt organization created by the terms of the contract.” One will search the pages of the United Cancer Council opinion in vain for such a holding; it is not there. The court said nothing on the matter of “no prior relationship” and found that “the party” did not control the charity to begin with. Although the initial contract exception can be inferred from the court's holding, it is at best a shaky foundation on which to build this rule of law.
  226. 226.  See § 5.7.
  227. 227.  IRC § 6501(a).
  228. 228.  IRC § 6501(b)(1), (4).
  229. 229.  United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964). As one federal appellate court remarked: “This isn't much of a hurdle” (2121 Arlington Heights Corp. v. IRS, 109 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1997)).
  230. 230.  Lintzenich v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 2d 972 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
  231. 231.  In general, see Tax-Exempt Organizations, Chapters 24 and 25.
  232. 232.  IRC § 501(b).
  233. 233.  IRC § 511(a)(1).
  234. 234.  IRC § 11.
  235. 235.  IRC § 511(b).
  236. 236.  IRC § 1(d).
  237. 237.  Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1). There is, however, authority for the proposition that a charitable organization can operate a significant extent of unrelated business and not thereby endanger its tax-exempt status when the purpose for engaging in the unrelated activity is furtherance of exempt purposes (Tech. Adv. Mem. 200021056). Yet, the IRS's lawyers decided that “substantially all” of an exempt organization's revenue was derived from unrelated business, with nothing written as to the resulting state of the entity's tax-exempt status (Tech. Adv. Mem. 201544025).
  238. 238.  E.g., Rev. Rul. 66-221, 1966-2 C.B. 220.
  239. 239.  See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 4.5.
  240. 240.  See id. § 4.3(a).
  241. 241.  IRC § 511(a)(2)(A).
  242. 242.  These organizations are encompassed by IRC § 501(c)(3).
  243. 243.  IRC § 511(a)(2)(B).
  244. 244.  IRC § 501(c)(4). See Tax-Exempt Organizations, Chapter 13.
  245. 245.  IRC § 501(c)(5) organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 16.1.
  246. 246.  IRC § 501(c)(6) organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, Chapter 14.
  247. 247.  IRC §§ 501(c)(8) and (10) organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 19.4.
  248. 248.  IRC § 501(c)(19) organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 19.11.
  249. 249.  See Tax-Exempt Organizations, §§ 15.5, 25.3.
  250. 250.  IRC § 501(c)(7) organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, Chapter 15.
  251. 251.  IRC § 528 organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 19.14.
  252. 252.  IRC § 527 organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, Chapter 17.
  253. 253.  IRC § 501(c)(1) organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 19.1.
  254. 254.  IRC § 501(d) organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 10.7.
  255. 255.  IRC § 521 organizations. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 19.12.
  256. 256.  IRC § 526. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 19.13.
  257. 257.  IRC §§ 501(c)(2) and 501(c)(25). See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 19.2.
  258. 258.  See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 12.4(c).
  259. 259.  IRC § 501(c)(2) (last sentence) and (c)(25)(G).
  260. 260.  Reg. § 1.513-1(b).
  261. 261.  H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950). Also S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1950).
  262. 262.  S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 601 (1976).
  263. 263.  Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217 v. United States, 580 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 1040 (1978). Cf. IRC § 513(f) (see text accompanied by infra note 318).
  264. 264.  IRC § 513(a).
  265. 265.  Reg. § 1.513-1(a).
  266. 266.  United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 838 (1986).
  267. 267.  This doctrine emerged in the Internal Revenue Code when Congress developed the concept of commercial-type insurance (IRC § 501(m)). See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 27.12(b).
  268. 268.  IRC § 512(a)(1).
  269. 269.  Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(a).
  270. 270.  E.g., IRC §§ 162, 167; Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(b).
  271. 271.  Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(c). In Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'g 79 T.C. 967 (1982), the court approved a more liberal test based on the reasonableness of expenses.
  272. 272.  Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(d).
  273. 273.  IRC § 512(b)(10).
  274. 274.  IRC § 172.
  275. 275.  IRC § 512(b)(6).
  276. 276.  IRC § 1.512(a)-1(d).
  277. 277.  Id.
  278. 278.  Id.
  279. 279.  Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
  280. 280.  National Water Well Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 75 (1989). An interesting question is whether that is the outcome where the losses pertaining to the unrelated activity are merely paper losses, such as net operating losses, as opposed to operational losses; on the one occasion when the Tax Court had that question before it, the court ignored the distinction (Losantiville Country Club v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.M. 198 (2017), aff'd, 906 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2018)).
  281. 281.  Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 197, 201 (1963). Also Blake Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 572 F.2d 820 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Monfore v. United States, 77-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9528 (Ct. Cl. 1977); McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. den., 368 U.S. 919 (1961).

    Cases hold that an activity conducted by a tax-exempt organization does not rise to the level of a business: E.g., American Academy of Family Physicians v. United States, 91 F.3d 1155 (8th Cir. 1996) (activity not sufficiently extensive over a substantial period of time to be considered a business); Laborer's International Union of North America v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. 158 (2001) (activity in question did not compete with taxable entities); Vigilant Hose Company of Emmitsburg v. United States, 2001 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50, 458 (D. Md. 2001) (gambling held as an economic activity not rising to the level of a business).

  282. 282.  Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941).
  283. 283.  Id. at 215.
  284. 284.  Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963).
  285. 285.  Continental Trading, Inc. v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 40, 43 (9th Cir. 1959), cert den., 361 U.S. 827 (1959). Also Van Wart v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 112, 115 (1935); Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (concurring opinion); Commissioner v. Burnett, 118 F.2d 659, 660-661 (5th Cir. 1941); Rev. Rul. 56-511, 1956-2 C.B. 170.
  286. 286.  Rev. Rul. 69-574, 1969-2 C.B. 130.
  287. 287.  Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1).
  288. 288.  S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 106-107 (1950).
  289. 289.  Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i).
  290. 290.  Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii).
  291. 291.  Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii). E.g., Orange County Builders Association, Inc. v. United States, 65-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9679 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
  292. 292.  Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1).
  293. 293.  E.g., Rev. Rul. 75-472, 1975-2 C.B. 208.
  294. 294.  Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2). E.g., Huron Clinic Foundation v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 847 (D.S. Dak. 1962).
  295. 295.  Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3).
  296. 296.  Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(i).
  297. 297.  Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(ii). As another example, a charitable organization that operated a salmon hatchery as an exempt function was advised by the IRS that it could sell a portion of its harvested salmon stock in an unprocessed condition to fish processors in an untaxed business, although conversion of the fish into and the sale of them as salmon nuggets (fish that was seasoned, formed into nugget shape, breaded, and fried) would create unrelated business (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9320042).
  298. 298.  Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iii).
  299. 299.  Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv).
  300. 300.  IRC § 513(a)(1).
  301. 301.  S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1950). Also Greene County Medical Society Foundation v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Rev. Rul. 56-152, 1956-1 C.B. 56.
  302. 302.  H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1950), and S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 107-108 (1950). E.g., Rev. Rul. 78-144, 1978-1 C.B. 168.
  303. 303.  Piety, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 193, 194 (1984).
  304. 304.  These gaming operations were not exempt from the definition of unrelated business (see text accompanied by infra note 320).
  305. 305.  South Community Association v. Commissioner, 90 T.C.M. 568 (2005).
  306. 306.  IRC § 513(a)(2). E.g., Rev. Rul. 69-268, 1969-1 C.B. 160; Rev. Rul. 55-676, 1955-2 C.B. 266.
  307. 307.  S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1950).
  308. 308.  IRC § 513(a)(3). E.g., Disabled Veterans Service Foundation v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. 202 (1970).
  309. 309.  Rev. Rul. 71-581, 1971-2 C.B. 236.
  310. 310.  IRC § 512(a)(5).
  311. 311.  IRC § 513(d)(1) and (2).
  312. 312.  IRC § 513(d)(2)(C).
  313. 313.  IRC § 513(d)(1).
  314. 314.  IRC § 513(d)(2)(A).
  315. 315.  IRC § 513(d)(2)(B).
  316. 316.  IRC § 513(d)(1) and (3).
  317. 317.  Rev. Rul. 69-633, 1969-2 C.B. 121.
  318. 318.  Those described in IRC § 501(e)(1)(A).
  319. 319.  IRC § 513(e).
  320. 320.  IRC § 513(f).
  321. 321.  IRC § 513(h)(1)(A).
  322. 322.  See § 5.4, supra note 112.
  323. 323.  IRC § 513(h)(2).
  324. 324.  IRC § 513(h)(3). The IRS is of the view that this exception is not available where the solicitation is in competition with for-profit vendors or where the solicitation is illegal (Tech. Adv. Mem. 9652004).
  325. 325.  IRC § 513(h)(1)(B).
  326. 326.  IRC § 512(b).
  327. 327.  IRC § 512(b)(1), (2), (3), and (5); Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(a)–(d).
  328. 328.  H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1950). Also S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1950).
  329. 329.  Reg. § 1.512(b)-1.
  330. 330.  S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1950) (emphasis supplied).
  331. 331.  Id. at 28.
  332. 332.  Id. at 30–31 (emphasis supplied).
  333. 333.  Also see H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-38 (1950).
  334. 334.  See § 5.8(b)(vi).
  335. 335.  IRC § 512(b)(5); Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(d).
  336. 336.  For the exclusion for rental income to apply, it is necessary that the underlying document be a lease rather than a license (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9740032).
  337. 337.  IRC § 514.
  338. 338.  IRC § 512(b)(13).
  339. 339.  IRC § 512(b)(7), (8), and (9); Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(f).
  340. 340.  H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1950).
  341. 341.  S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1950).
  342. 342.  IRC § 512(b)(12).
  343. 343.  IRC § 512(c)(1); Reg. § 1.512(c)-1.
  344. 344.  IRC § 512(a)(6), added by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017) § 13702(a); Reg. § 512(a)-6(a). This computation does not use the specific deduction (see § 5.8(a)(ii), text accompanied by supra notes 274, 275). This law is generally effective for tax years beginning after 2017 (Act § 13702(b)).
  345. 345.  See § 5.8(a)(vii), text accompanied by supra note 340.
  346. 346.  See § 5.8(a)(ii), text accompanied by supra note 275.
  347. 347.  Reg. § 1.512(a)-6(b)(1).
  348. 348.  Reg. § 1.512(a)-6(b)(2).
  349. 349.  Reg. § 1.512(a)-6(c)(1).
  350. 350.  Reg. § 1.512(a)-6(c)(1). An interest in a partnership is a qualifying partnership interest if the exempt organization holds a direct interest in the partnership, where that interest meets the requirements of a de minimis test or a participation test (Reg. § 1.512(a)-6(c)(2)).
  351. 351.  IRC § 512(a)(1).
  352. 352.  IRC § 11(b). This rate reduction, effective for tax years beginning after 2017, was enacted as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017) § 13001(a).
  353. 353.  IRC § 1(E).
  354. 354.  IRC § 6655(a)–(d).
  355. 355.  IRC § 6012(a)(2), (4).
  356. 356.  The fact that the “profits” of an activity are destined for use in furtherance of exempt functions cannot be considered in assessing whether an activity is an unrelated one (IRC § 513(a)). One court, addressing an analogous circumstance (application of the “feeder organization” rules of IRC § 502), said of an organization: “That it gave all its profits to an educational institution availeth it nothing in the mundane field of taxation, however much the children in our schools have profited from its beneficence” (SICO Foundation v. United States, 295 F.2d 924, 925 (Ct. Cl. 1961), reh'g denied, 297 F.2d 557 (Ct. Cl. 1962)).
  357. 357.  S. Rep. No. 91-522, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1969); Reg. § 1.513-1(b).
  358. 358.  IRC § 513(a)(1).
  359. 359.  IRC § 513(a)(2).
  360. 360.  IRC § 513(a)(3). E.g., Rev. Rul. 71-581, 1971-2 C.B. 236.
  361. 361.  IRC § 513(f).
  362. 362.  IRC § 513(c); Reg. § 1.513-1(b).
  363. 363.  See text accompanied by supra note 272.
  364. 364.  An activity may begin as a fundraising effort and grow into a commercial business; that business may be an unrelated business or a primary business activity causing loss of tax-exempt status (e.g., as to the latter, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201630016 (involving a primary activity that evolved into a “popular and lucrative” business)).
  365. 365.  See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 24.5(a).
  366. 366.  See id. at 937.
  367. 367.  See id. at 937–942, 955, 969.
  368. 368.  Rev. Rul. 72-431, 1972-2 C.B. 281.
  369. 369.  Rev. Rul. 59-330, 1959-2 C.B. 153; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201825032.
  370. 370.  Clarence La Belle Post No. 217 v. United States, 580 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 1040 (1978).
  371. 371.  See text accompanied by supra notes 318 and 323.
  372. 372.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9712001.
  373. 373.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200128059.
  374. 374.  The Hope School v. United States, 612 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1980).
  375. 375.  See text accompanied by supra note 355.
  376. 376.  The Hope School v. United States, 612 F. 2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1980).
  377. 377.  Id. at 304. Also Veterans of Foreign Wars, Department of Missouri, Inc. v. United States, 85-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9605 (W.D. Mo. 1984). An appeal of this decision was not authorized, with the IRS believing a preferential vehicle on the issue was Veterans of Foreign Wars, Department of Michigan v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 7 (1987), which turned out to be accurate.
  378. 378.  Disabled American Veterans v. United States, 80-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9568 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
  379. 379.  Id. at 84, 855.
  380. 380.  Id.
  381. 381.  Id. at 84, 856.
  382. 382.  This determination upholds the IRS position on the point as stated in Rev. Rul. 72-431, 1972-2 C.B. 281.
  383. 383.  Disabled American Veterans v. United States, 80-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9568, at 84, 855 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
  384. 384.  Disabled American Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1187 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
  385. 385.  Id. at 1186.
  386. 386.  Also The Hope School v. United States, 612 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1980).
  387. 387.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8203134.
  388. 388.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8232011.
  389. 389.  For an unrelated business to create taxable income, the business must, as noted, be regularly carried on. In both of the two instances discussed, the cards distributed were Christmas cards; the IRS determined that the period within which to measure regularity is the “Christmas season” rather than the full year. Also, in both instances, the organization attempted to cast the greeting card program as a related activity. One organization placed its logo on the cards; the other mailed literature about its programs with the cards. The IRS was not persuaded that either exercise made the card-distribution program a related activity.
  390. 390.  Veterans of Foreign Wars, Department of Missouri, Inc. v. United States, 85-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9605 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
  391. 391.  Veterans of Foreign Wars, Department of Michigan v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 7 (1987).
  392. 392.  See § 5.8(a)(vi), text accompanied by supra note 320.
  393. 393.  See § 5.8(a)(iv), text accompanied by supra note 289.
  394. 394.  Id., text accompanied by supra note 290.
  395. 395.  A charity may be found to be engaged in an unrelated business for conducting this type of fundraising event, however, where it is done for the benefit of another charity (Rev. Rul. 75-201, 1975-1 C.B. 164). Cf. § 6.17.
  396. 396.  Suffolk County Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1314 (1981).
  397. 397.  Id. at 1324.
  398. 398.  Id. at 1323.
  399. 399.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7946001. Also, KJ's Fund Raisers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. 669 (1997); P.L.L. Scholarship Fund v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 196 (1984); Piety, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 193 (1984).
  400. 400.  The organization was unable to utilize the exemption from unrelated income taxation afforded by IRC § 513(f) because, under the law of the state in which it is organized (Texas), the bingo games constituted, at that time, an illegal lottery. This quote does not include the finding of the IRS that this gambling activity was also regularly carried on. In a subsequent case, on similar facts, the IRS and the charitable organization stipulated that the gambling operations, conducted in the name of fundraising, were regularly carried on for purposes of unrelated income taxation (Executive Network Club v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. 1680 (1995)).
  401. 401.  National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990). The view was also dismissed in Suffolk County Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1314 (1981).
  402. 402.  Action on Decision No. 1991-015; Tech. Adv. Mem. 9509002 and 9147007. In one of these instances, a tax-exempt organization sponsored a concert series open to the public occupying two weekends each year, one in the spring and one in the fall. The preparation and ticket solicitation for each of the concerts usually occupies up to six months. Taking into account the preparatory time involved, the IRS concluded that the concerts were unrelated business activities that were regularly carried on (Tech. Adv. Mem. 9712001).
  403. 403.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200128059.
  404. 404.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201251059.
  405. 405.  The concepts of these and other aspects of planned giving are discussed in Charitable Giving, Part Three.
  406. 406.  Reg. §§ 1.501(a)-1(c) and 1.501(c) (3)-1(c)(2).
  407. 407.  Christian Stewardship Assistance, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1037, 1940 (1978).
  408. 408.  Id. at 1043.
  409. 409.  Id. at 1044.
  410. 410.  Id.
  411. 411.  U.S. CB Radio Association, No. 1, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1441 (1981).
  412. 412.  Id.
  413. 413.  Parklane Residential School, Inc. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. 988 (1983).
  414. 414.  The Ecclesiastical Order of Ism of Am, Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 833 (1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 471 U.S. 1015 (1985).
  415. 415.  Id. 80 T.C. at 839. (Also Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 87-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9617 (Ct. Cl. 1987).)
  416. 416.  Id. at 840.
  417. 417.  Id. at 841.
  418. 418.  Id. at 842.
  419. 419.  National Association of American Churches v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 18 (1984).
  420. 420.  Id. at 29–30.
  421. 421.  Id. at 31.
  422. 422.  Id. at 32.
  423. 423.  This three-part classification of functions of charitable organizations is reflected on the annual information return nearly all of them must file (see § 5.11(a)).
  424. 424.  See § 5.8(b)(ii).
  425. 425.  See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 4.6.
  426. 426.  Id., Chapter 19.
  427. 427.  See text accompanied by supra note 407.
  428. 428.  American Bar Endowment v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9204 (Cl. Ct. 1984).
  429. 429.  See text accompanying infra notes 436–441.
  430. 430.  American Bar Endowment v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9204, at 83, 350 (Cl. Ct. 1984).
  431. 431.  IRC § 513(c).
  432. 432.  American Bar Endowment v. United States, 84–1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9204, at 83, 350 (Cl. Ct. 1984). Indeed, the court observed that, “[o]ver the years, charities have adopted fund-raising schemes that are increasingly complex and sophisticated, relying on many business techniques” (id.).
  433. 433.  Id. at 83, 351. Also Disabled American Veterans v. United States, 80-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9568 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
  434. 434.  Id.
  435. 435.  Id. at 83, 351–83, 352.
  436. 436.  United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
  437. 437.  Id. at 112–114.
  438. 438.  Id. at 115.
  439. 439.  Id.
  440. 440.  Disabled American Veterans v. United States, 80-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9568 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
  441. 441.  United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 125 (1986). Subsequent revisions in this program led the IRS to conclude that it was no longer an unrelated business (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8725056).
  442. 442.  See § 6.8.
  443. 443.  Tech. Adv. Mem. 201544025. This case was docketed in the U.S. Tax Court (College of the Desert Alumni Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, petition filed on Feb. 8, 2017), then settled.
  444. 444.  This rationale for exemption is quite close to the one utilized by Congress in rationalizing the exempt status of college and university athletic programs. See Tax-Exempt Organizations § 4.5(a), text accompanied by notes 313–319.
  445. 445.  National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 456 (1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990).
  446. 446.  See text accompanied by supra notes 327–334.
  447. 447.  Disabled American Veterans v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 60 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991).
  448. 448.  See text accompanied by supra notes 320 and 325.
  449. 449.  Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. 2582 (1993).
  450. 450.  Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 307 (1994). Also Oregon State University Alumni Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. 1935 (1996); Alumni Ass'n of the University of Oregon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. 2093 (1996); Mississippi State University Alumni, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. 458 (1997). The initial view of the IRS was that affinity card program revenues are not taxable because they are passive royalty income (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8747066), but that determination was withdrawn (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8823109).
  451. 451.  See quotation accompanied by supra note 332.
  452. 452.  This view is based on additional language in the committee reports indicating that the exception for dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, and the like “applies not only to investment income [a concept broader than passive income], but also to such items as business interest on overdue open accounts receivable” (S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1950); H.R. Rep. No. 2139, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 110 (1950)).
  453. 453.  Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526, 1532 (9th Cir. 1996). This element of the definition of a royalty is consistent with the long-time stance of the IRS that “royalties do not include payments for personal services” (Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135) (other than incidental amounts).
  454. 454.  There is precedent for this approach (Disabled American Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Fraternal Order of Police, Illinois State Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. Commissioner, 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987); Disabled American Veterans v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991); Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 53 F.3d 120 (5th Cir. 1995).
  455. 455.  Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526, 1535 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original).
  456. 456.  Id.
  457. 457.  Id. at 1536.
  458. 458.  Consequently, Sierra Club v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. 2582 (1993), was affirmed, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996).
  459. 459.  Consequently, Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 307 (1994), was reversed, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996), and the case remanded so that the Tax Court could once again make findings of fact and conclusions of law, this time following a trial rather than by grant of summary judgment.
  460. 460.  Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. 1569 (1999).
  461. 461.  Id. at 1577.
  462. 462.  Id. at 1578.
  463. 463.  In the aftermath of the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Tax Court ruled that payments received by a tax-exempt organization for the use of its mailing list are not subject to unrelated business income taxation because they constitute royalties (Common Cause v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 332 (1999)). The rental lists are stored at a computer service business and the exempt organization retains the services of a list manager and list broker. Payments from mailers are remitted by the list manager to the organization, less the manager's and broker's commissions and payments to the computer house. With one exception, all of the activities of the parties were deemed to be royalty-related, that is, designed to exploit or protect the exempt organization's intangible property. Certain activities provided solely to mailers by list brokers were found not to be royalty-related. The court also concluded that none of these parties were functioning as agents of the exempt organization, so none of the activities and payments were attributable to the exempt organization. Also Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. 2227 (1999); Mississippi State University Alumni, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. 458 (1999).
  464. 464.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9450028. In subsequent rulings, the IRS has found a royalty to be present (Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 9816027, 9709029, and 9703025) and not present (Tech. Adv. Mem. 9723001; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9810030).
  465. 465.  Oregon State University Alumni Association, Inc. v. Commissioner; Alumni Association of the University of Oregon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), aff'g, 71 T.C.M. 1935 (1996), 71 T.C.M. 2093 (1996).
  466. 466.  Memorandum from Jay H. Rotz, IRS Exempt Organizations Division, National Office, dated December 16, 1999.
  467. 467.  IRC § 513(h)(1)(B)(i).
  468. 468.  E.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8127019.
  469. 469.  Id.
  470. 470.  E.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9502009; Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 9250001 and 8127019.
  471. 471.  See text accompanied by supra note 327.
  472. 472.  IRC § 1031(a).
  473. 473.  Tech. Adv. Mem. 9502009.
  474. 474.  E.g., Common Cause v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 332 (1999).
  475. 475.  Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 1325 (J. Comm. Print 1987).
  476. 476.  132 Cong. Rec. 26208 (Sept. 25, 1986).
  477. 477.  See text accompanied by supra note 308.
  478. 478.  See text accompanied by supra note 309.
  479. 479.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201635006.
  480. 480.  IRC § 6001. See Tax-Exempt Organizations § 28.20.
  481. 481.  See text accompanied by supra notes 405–422.
  482. 482.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201734009.
  483. 483.  See §§ 3.8 and 8.4.
  484. 484.  E.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200722028.
  485. 485.  E.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 201633032.
  486. 486.  See Hyatt and Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Healthcare Organizations, Fourth Edition (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), §§ 21.5, 24.15.
  487. 487.  Rev. Rul. 77-72, 1977-1 C.B. 157.
  488. 488.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200022056.
  489. 489.  The first of these appears to be Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200108045.
  490. 490.  This TAM is reproduced at 4 Exempt Org. Tax Review (No. 5) 726 (July 1991).
  491. 491.  See § 5.7, supra note 226.
  492. 492.  Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. (Pt. 1) 186.
  493. 493.  Rev. Rul. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B. 121.
  494. 494.  See § 5.1(c)
  495. 495.  American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
  496. 496.  See Tax-Exempt Organizations, particularly § 20.3.
  497. 497.  See § 5.1.
  498. 498.  Id.
  499. 499.  See § 5.11.
  500. 500.  Make a Joyful Noise, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. 1003 (1989).
  501. 501.  Id. at 1006.
  502. 502.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200634046.
  503. 503.  The IRS in effect applied the commensurate test in connection with the fundraising activities of an ostensible fraternal organization, revoking the entity's tax exemption (pursuant to IRC § 501(c)(8)) in part for having a relationship with a fundraising company where the company has “substantial control” over the organization's fundraising activities, finding that the fundraising company is being benefited in a “substantial manner” (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201332015). The government was displeased that about 90 percent of the proceeds of fundraising campaigns was received by the company; “most” of the money was found to be compensation to the company. The IRS revoked the tax exemption of a charitable entity because its activities consist of the conduct of bingo games, the sale of pull tabs and scratch games, and operating properties to support these activities and those of an exempt fraternal society; the organization's charitable activities were found to be “insubstantial and incidental” in comparison to its gaming activities and its activities in support of the fraternal entity (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201603039).
  504. 504.  See § 5.4(d), text accompanied by supra note 100.
  505. 505.  Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (155(a)(1), (2)), Pub. L. 98-369 (98 Stat. 691). The legislative history of and rationale for this body of law is discussed in RERI Holdings I, LLC v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 1 (2017).
  506. 506.  Id.
  507. 507.  IRC § 170(f)(11)(E).
  508. 508.  Pension Protection Act of 2006 (§ 1219), Pub. L. 109-280 (120 Stat. 780).
  509. 509.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(c). This body of law is summarized in § 21.2 of the third edition of this book.
  510. 510.  These rules are the subject of Reg. § 1.170A-17.
  511. 511.  IRC § 170(f)(11)(E)(i); Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(1).
  512. 512.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(2).
  513. 513.  That is, the value as defined in Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2). See Charitable Giving § 23.1.
  514. 514.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(i).
  515. 515.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(5)(i).
  516. 516.  Alli v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1082, 1089 (2014).
  517. 517.  Estate of Evenchik v. Commissioner, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1231 (2013).
  518. 518.  Smith v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.M. ___ (2007), aff'd, 364 F. Appx 317 (9th Cir. 2009).
  519. 519.  Costello v. Commissioner, 109 T.C.M. 1441 (2015).
  520. 520.  Campbell v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.M. 1266 (2020).
  521. 521.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(ii).
  522. 522.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(iii).
  523. 523.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(iv).
  524. 524.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(v).
  525. 525.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(vi). This declaration reads as follows: “I understand that my appraisal will be used in connection with a return or claim for refund. I also understand that, if there is a substantial or gross valuation misstatement of the value of the property claimed on the return or claim for refund that is based on my appraisal, I may be subject to a penalty under section 6695A of the Internal Revenue Code [see § 5.12], as well as other applicable penalties. I affirm that I have not been at any time in the three-year period ending on the date of the appraisal barred from presenting evidence or testimony before the Department of the Treasury or the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 31 U.S.C. section 330(c).”
  526. 526.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(vii).
  527. 527.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(viii). A valuation method was found to be unpersuasive in, e.g., Foster v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-90 (2012).
  528. 528.  E.g., Hilborn v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 677, 688 (1985).
  529. 529.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(3)(ix).
  530. 530.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(4).
  531. 531.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(5)(ii). The valuation effective date is the date to which the value opinion applies (Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(5)(i)).
  532. 532.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(6).
  533. 533.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(7).
  534. 534.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(iii). A court faulted a donor for making, in a year, charitable contributions of clothing valued in excess of $34,000 and failing to obtain a qualified appraisal (Grainger v. Commissioner, 116 T.C.M. 107 (2018)).
  535. 535.  Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(iv)(A).
  536. 536.  Id.
  537. 537.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(8).
  538. 538.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(9).
  539. 539.  See Charitable Giving § 9.2.
  540. 540.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(12).
  541. 541.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(10).
  542. 542.  31 U.S.C. § 330(c).
  543. 543.  See text accompanied by supra note 525.
  544. 544.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(11). A case is pending in the U.S. Tax Court as to whether a valuation report concerning shares of stock purchased by an acquiring company can constitute a qualified appraisal by donors who contributed the same stock to a charitable organization (Chrem v. Commissioner, 116 T.C.M. 347 (2018), denying motions for summary judgment). In one case, a donor failed these rules, in that he sought to introduce into evidence purported appraisals by a qualified appraiser, but the court did not admit them because the appraiser denied having prepared them (Isaacs v. Commissioner, 109 T.C.M. 1624 (2015)).
  545. 545.  IRC § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii).
  546. 546.  IRC § 170(f)(11)(E)(iii)(I); Reg. § 1.170A-17(b)(1).
  547. 547.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(b)(2)(i).
  548. 548.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(b)(2)(ii).
  549. 549.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(b)(2)(iii).
  550. 550.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(b)(3)(i).
  551. 551.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(b)(4).
  552. 552.  See text accompanied by supra note 538.
  553. 553.  See IRC § 267(b).
  554. 554.  Reg. § 1.170A-17(b)(5).
  555. 555.  31 U.S.C. § 330.
  556. 556.  See Charitable Giving § 19.8(a), text accompanied by supra notes 193–195.
  557. 557.  Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32 (1993). Also Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1990).
  558. 558.  Now that much more of this body of law has been relegated to statute, the donors' defense of the substantial compliance doctrine is likely to be less frequently accepted (e.g., Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 201014056).
  559. 559.  Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32, 41 (1993).
  560. 560.  Id., at 42.
  561. 561.  Id.
  562. 562.  Fair v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. 460 (1993).
  563. 563.  Consolidated Investors Group v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. 51 (2009).
  564. 564.  Estate of Clause v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 115 (2004). E.g., Bruzewicz v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1205 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (the court held that the donor “totally failed” to comply with the written acknowledgment requirement); Hewitt v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 258, 264 (1997), aff'd without pub. op., 166 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1998) (the court found that the donors furnished “practically none” of the required information); D'Arcangelo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. 1223 (1994) (the donor failed to obtain a qualified appraisal, used a nonqualified appraiser, and did not submit a fully completed appraisal summary). Cf. Simmons v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. 211, 219 (2009) (where the donor was said to have “included all of the required information in the appraisals attached to her returns or on the face of the returns”). The substantial compliance document was applied favorably to a donor in a case involving the record-keeping rules involving the deductibility of volunteers' unreimbursed expenditures (see Charitable Giving § 7.15) (Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 515 (2011)).
  565. 565.  Mohamed v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. 1814, 1819 (2012).
  566. 566.  E.g., Todd v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 334 (2002); Hewitt v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 258 (1997), aff'd without pub. op., 166 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1998); Jorgenson v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1444 (2000).
  567. 567.  E.g., Mohamed v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. 1814 (2012); Hewitt v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 258 (1997), aff'd without pub. op., 166 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.M. 574 (2007), aff'd, 364 Fed. Appx. 317 (9th Cir. 2009).
  568. 568.  E.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.M. 574 (2007), aff'd, 364 Fed. Appx. 317 (9th Cir. 2009) (a certified public accountant was not a licensed appraiser); D'Arcangelo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1223 (1994) (a high school principal was held to not be qualified to appraise art supplies). Related to this category is the situation where the appraiser is not otherwise qualified (e.g., Mohamed v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. 1814 (2012) (where the appraiser was the donor); D'Arcangelo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. 1223 (1994) (where the ostensible appraiser was an employee of the donee).
  569. 569.  E.g., Mohamed v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. 1814 (2012); Friedman v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 175 (2010); Jorgenson v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. 1444 (2000); D'Arcangelo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. 1223 (1994); Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'g, 58 T.C. 174 (1972).
  570. 570.  Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. 24, ___ (2010), rem'd, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012). Likewise, Friedberg v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.M. 356 (2011). The Tax Court observed, “In view of cases such as Scheidelman and Friedberg, the prevailing view is that where the appraisal contained sufficient information to allow the Commissioner to evaluate the contribution and unconditionally included the valuation method and specific basis for the valuation the taxpayer's substantial compliance will adequately serve the purpose Congress intended” (Rothman v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. 126, ___ (2012)). In another case, the court wrote that an appraisal of partnership shares was “terse,” observing that the appraisal was of assets held by the partnership, not the shares (Smith v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.M. 574, ___ (2007), aff'd, 364 Fed. Appx. 317 (9th Cir. 2009)).
  571. 571.  Friedman v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M. 1175 (2010).
  572. 572.  Mohamed v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. 1814, ___ (2012).
  573. 573.  Cave Buttes, LLC v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. 338, 349 (2016).
  574. 574.  Id. at 350.
  575. 575.  Id.
  576. 576.  Id. at 357.
  577. 577.  Id. at 369. The Tax Court subsequently applied the substantial compliance doctrine, upholding charitable deductions where the only flaws in two appraisals were that they did not include a statement that they were prepared for tax purposes and did not state the expected date of the contributions (Emanouil v. Commissioner, ___ T.C.M. ___ (2020)).
  578. 578.  RERI Holdings I, LLC v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 1, 16 (2017).
  579. 579.  Sub nom. Blau v. Commissioner, 924 F.3d 1261, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2019), aff'g, RERI Holdings I, LLC v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 1 (2017).
  580. 580.  Volvo Trucks of North America, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 204, 210 (4th Cir. 2004); McAlpine v. Commissioner, 968 F.2d 459, 462 (5th Cir. 1992); Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir. 1990).
  581. 581.  Sub nom. Blau v. Commissioner, 924 F.3d 1261, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The failure to comply was the failure to disclose the donor's basis in the contributed property.
  582. 582.  Principally, Form 990. Private foundations, a form of charitable organization (see infra § 11) that rarely engages in fundraising, file Form 990-PF. Political organizations file Form 990-POL; black lung benefit trusts file Form 990-BL; religious or apostolic organizations file Form 1065.
  583. 583.  See Chapter 7.
  584. 584.  IRC § 6050L.
  585. 585.  IRC § 6050L(a)(2).
  586. 586.  See § 6.7(i).
  587. 587.  IRC § 6050L(b).
  588. 588.  Ann. 88-120, 1988-38 I.R.B. 27.
  589. 589.  IRC § 170(f)(11)(A)(i). For purposes of determining this threshold, property and all similar items of property (see § 5.10(b), text accompanied by supra note 532) donated to one or more charitable organizations is treated as one property (IRC § 170(f)(11)(F)). This denial-of-deduction rule does not apply, however, if it is shown that the failure to meet the requirements is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect (IRC § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II)). In the case of a partnership or S corporation, the rule is applied at the entity level, with the deduction denied at the partner or shareholder level (IRC § 170(f)(11)(G)).
  590. 590.  IRC § 170(f)(11)(B). This rule does not apply, however, to a C corporation that is not a personal service corporation or a closely held C corporation (id.).
  591. 591.  See §§ 5.10, text accompanied by supra note 502, and 5.4, text accompanied by supra note 125.
  592. 592.  IRC § 6662(a).
  593. 593.  RC §6662(b). Instances of imposition of this penalty in the charitable giving context are in Bergquist v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 8 (2008); Murphy v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. 496 (2010); and Cohan v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. 1037 (2012).
  594. 594.  IRC §6662(c). The tax regulations state that negligence is strongly indicated where a taxpayer “fails to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a deduction, credit or exclusion on a return which would seem to a reasonable and prudent person to be ‘too good to be true’ under the circumstances” (Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1)(ii)). A court observed that “[n]egligence is a lack of due care or failure to do what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstance” (Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 887 (1987), quoting from Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'g on this issue 43 T.C. 168 (1964) and 23 T.C.M. 1847 (1964), aff'd, 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)).
  595. 595.  Id.
  596. 596.  IRC §6662(d)(2)(A). In this context, a rebate is an abatement, credit, refund, or like payment made on the ground that the tax imposed was less than the tax deficiency initially determined (IRC § 6211(b)(2)).
  597. 597.  IRC § 6662(d)(2)(B).
  598. 598.  IRC § 6662(d)(1)(A).
  599. 599.  IRC § 6662(d)(1)(B).
  600. 600.  IRC § 6662(e)(1)(A). A court upheld the penalty for a substantial valuation misstatement in a case involving a syndicated conservation easement promotion (see § 8.14(c)) because the easement was knowingly overvalued by the appraisers to “achieve the tax savings goals of the easement transaction” (Glade Creek Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 120 T.C.M. 285, 298 (2020)).
  601. 601.  IRC § 6662(h)(1).
  602. 602.  IRC § 6662(h)(2)(A)(i). When the correct value of contributed property is zero and the value claimed is greater than zero, a gross valuation misstatement is deemed to exist (Reg. § 1.6662-5(g)) (e.g., Fakiris v. Commissioner, 120 T.C.M. 344 (2020)).

    It has been held that, even if a notice of deficiency referenced only the 20 percent penalty, the IRS has the authority to assert the 40 percent penalty in litigation (in an answer), so that although the 20 percent penalty rules were inapplicable, the 40 percent penalty was applicable with respect to the tax overpayments (Roth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.M. 649 (2017), aff'd, 922 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2019)).

  603. 603.  Reg. § 1.6662-5(f)(1).
  604. 604.  Plateau Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.M. 1619 (2020).
  605. 605.  See Tax-Exempt Organizations § 11.8.
  606. 606.  Viralam v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 151, 165 (2011).
  607. 607.  Id. at 174.
  608. 608.  IRC § 6662(b)(5).
  609. 609.  IRC § 6662(g)(1).
  610. 610.  IRC § 6662(g)(2).
  611. 611.  IRC § 6662(h)(2)(C).
  612. 612.  IRC § 6664(c)(1). E.g., Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43 (2000), aff'd, 299 F.3d 221 (3rd Cir. 2002).
  613. 613.  The economic substance doctrine is summarized in Tax-Exempt Organizations § 28A.2(b) (2022 cum. supp.).
  614. 614.  IRC §§ 6662(b)(6), 6664(c)(2). As a court of appeals stated the matter, the prohibition in the law “prohibit[ing] a taxpayer from avoiding tax liability by means of a sham transaction is a rule almost as old as the federal tax system” (Estate of Kechijian v. Commissioner, 962 F.3d 800 (4th Cir. 2020)), citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468-470 (1935).
  615. 615.  Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).
  616. 616.  Id.
  617. 617.  E.g., Baxter v. Commissioner, 910 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2018); Estate of Kechijian v. Commissioner, 962 F.3d 800 (4th Cir. 2020).
  618. 618.  Id. E.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849 (1987), aff'd on another issue, 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), Heasley v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1990). This reliance has been deemed sufficient to avoid the penalty where the advisor's advice proves to be erroneous (e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Commissioner, 398 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1968)). This standard has been applied in the tax-exempt organizations context (e.g., Waco Lodge No. 166, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1202 (1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 696 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1983), citing Coldwater Seafood Corp. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 966 (1978); West Coast Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 345 (1968)).
  619. 619.  E.g., Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43 (2000), aff'd, 299 F.3d 221 (3rd Cir. 2002); Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.M. 5435 (2009). Also United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985); Mortensen v. Commissioner, 440 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2006).
  620. 620.  E.g., Mortensen v. Commissioner, 440 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2006); Paschall v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 8 (2011).
  621. 621.  106 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 67 (2011), aff'd, 684 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
  622. 622.  Bergquist v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 8 (2008).
  623. 623.  Id., citing Kellahan v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. 2329 (1999), Estate of Goldman v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. 1896 (1996).
  624. 624.  Bergquist v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 8 (2008).
  625. 625.  Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. 24 (2010). Indeed, this tax law advisor thereafter engaged in “some additional research” and informed his client that the “facade easement contribution deduction did exist under the Internal Revenue Code.” See Charitable Giving § 7.6. Moreover, this accountant relied on the services of a qualified appraiser who tendered an appraisal that was held to not be a qualified one (see § 19.7). In Estate of Robinson v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. 82 (2010), the court held that an accuracy-related penalty tax should not be imposed, despite charitable contribution deductions wrongly claimed by an estate, because of good faith reliance placed by the executor of an estate on a tax advisor, even though that individual was an enrolled agent who was not competent in the areas of estate planning and estate tax return preparation. Likewise, this court held that an accuracy-related penalty tax should not be imposed, despite the disallowance of a charitable deduction due to a faulty appraisal, because of good faith reliance on the appraisal reports of two other appraisals (Evans v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. 275 (2010)).

    If, however, there is a separate, independent ground for disallowing a deduction, an overvaluation penalty cannot be imposed (e.g., Gainer v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1990)). An illustration of this point in the charitable giving context is in Derby v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. 1177 (2008).

    The IRS announced that it will not follow Patel v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 395 (2012) insofar as the decision holds that the uncertain state of the law, without a finding regarding a taxpayer's efforts to determine the state of the law, is a factor in determining whether a taxpayer has demonstrated reasonable cause and good faith for purposes of avoiding the accuracy-related penalties (Action on Decision 2012-5).

  626. 626.  Atkinson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C.M. (CCH) 550 (2015).
  627. 627.  Charitable deduction property generally is property contributed for which a charitable contribution deduction is claimed (IRC § 6664(c)(4)(A)).
  628. 628.  IRC § 6664(c)(3), first sentence.
  629. 629.  See § 5.10(b).
  630. 630.  Id.
  631. 631.  IRC § 6664(c)(3), second sentence. This elimination of the reasonable cause exception for underpayments attributable to gross valuation overstatements of charitable deduction property applies to returns filed after July 25, 2006. Thus, a charitable gift made in 2004 that caused carryover deductions for 2005 and 2006 gave rise to a penalty with respect to the 2006 charitable deduction that did not apply to the 2004 and 2005 deductions (Reisner v. Commissioner, 108 T.C.M. 518 (2014)).
  632. 632.  Kaufman v. Commissioner, 784 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2015), aff'g 107 T.C.M. 1262 (2014).
  633. 633.  Kaufman v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d. at 60.
  634. 634.  Id.
  635. 635.  Id. at 62.
  636. 636.  Id. at 66.
  637. 637.  Legg v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 344 (2015). The initial determination rule is the subject of IRC § 6751(b).
  638. 638.  IRC § 6701(a).
  639. 639.  IRC § 6701(b)(1).
  640. 640.  IRC § 6701(b)(2).
  641. 641.  IRC § 6701(c)(1).
  642. 642.  IRC § 6701(c)(2).
  643. 643.  IRC § 6701(d).
  644. 644.  IRC § 6701(e).
  645. 645.  IRC § 6662(e).
  646. 646.  IRC § 6662(g).
  647. 647.  IRC § 6662(h).
  648. 648.  IRC § 6695A(a).
  649. 649.  IRC § 6664(a).
  650. 650.  IRC § 6695A(b).
  651. 651.  IRC § 6695A(c).
  652. 652.  In general, see Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 28A.3(h) (2022 cum. supp.).
  653. 653.  IRC § 6700(a)(1).
  654. 654.  IRC § 6700(a)(2).
  655. 655.  IRC § 6700(a).
  656. 656.  Id.
  657. 657.  Id. The rules relating to the penalty for gross valuation overstatements are the subject of IRC § 6700(b).
  658. 658.  IRC § 6663(a).
  659. 659.  IRC § 6663(b). Quinn v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. 1945 (2012).
  660. 660.  E.g., Patton v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'g 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1068 (1985); Stephenson v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'g, 79 T.C. 995 (1982); Recklitis v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874 (1988).
  661. 661.  E.g., Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111 (1983); Recklitis v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874, 909 (1988); Grosshandler v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1 (1980).
  662. 662.  E.g., Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85 (1970).
  663. 663.  E.g., Grosshandler v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1, 19(1980); Gajewski v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 181 (1976), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1978); Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213 (1971).
  664. 664.  E.g., Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202 (1992); Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661 (1989); Daoud v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. 570 (2010).
  665. 665.  E.g., Foxworthy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. 177 (2009).
  666. 666.  E.g., Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
  667. 667.  E.g., Braswell v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. 627 (1993); Mobley v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. 1939 (1993).
  668. 668.  United States v. Freeman, 93-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,296 (D.N.J. 1993).
  669. 669.  Quinn v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. 1945 (2012). The procedures for determining applicability of this penalty against a partnership, subject to the centralized partnership audit regime, that participated in syndicated conservation easement transactions (see § 8.14(c)) are the same as those for establishing civil fraud against such a partnership generally, that is, through all facts and circumstances that establish the willful intent to evade tax at the partnership level (Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 202044009).
  670. 670.  IRC § 6651(a)(1).
  671. 671.  IRC § 6651(a)(2).
  672. 672.  IRC § 6721.
  673. 673.  IRC § 6722.
  674. 674.  IRC § 6723.
  675. 675.  IRC § 6662 took effect with respect to returns due after 1989.
  676. 676.  Grant v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 809 (1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1986).
  677. 677.  Snyder v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 567 (1986). Also Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547 (1986).
  678. 678.  Tallal v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. 1017 (1986).
  679. 679.  Angell v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. 939 (1986).
  680. 680.  Allen v. Commissioner, 91-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,080 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'g 92 T.C. 1 (1989).
  681. 681.  Klavan v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 68 (1993); Weiss v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. 2768 (1993).
  682. 682.  Engel v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 378 (1993).
  683. 683.  IRC § 6714. These contributions are the subject of § 5.5.
  684. 684.  H. Rep. No. 103-213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 566 (1993).
  685. 685.  Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200623063.
  686. 686.  As noted, this penalty is not to be imposed in instances entailing reasonable cause. In connection with this advice, the IRS's lawyers wrote that an “honest and reasonable misunderstanding of fact or law might sometimes support a finding of reasonable cause.” They were, however, quick to add: “A disguised tuition payment program so plainly violates the provisions giving rise to the quid pro quo penalty that we find it difficult to imagine a scenario in which a church could establish reasonable cause based on a misunderstanding of law or fact.”
  687. 687.  IRC § 6720. See § 6.7(j).
  688. 688.  The aiding and abetting penalty (see § 5.12(b)) was assessed against an individual who had a practice of providing donors of used vehicles with documentation supporting a charitable deduction based on full fair market value when he knew that many of the donated vehicles could only be sold for salvage or scrap (Tech. Adv. Mem. 200243057).
  689. 689.  IRC § 6720B. See § 6.7(e).
  690. 690.  IRC § 6652(c)(1).
  691. 691.  IRC § 6673(a)(1). A taxpayer's position is frivolous “if it is contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law” (Goff v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 231, 237 (2010)). The purpose of this penalty “is to compel taxpayers to think and to conform their conduct to settled principles [of law] before they file returns and litigate” (Takaba v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 285, 295 (2002)). The court may on its initiative require a taxpayer to pay this penalty (e.g., Hamilton v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 496 (2009); Lloyd v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2020–92).
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