Identify hazards

Safety begins with an engineer’s ability to anticipate the consequences of actions (or inaction). Foresight, the ability to predict many possible futures, is a vital attribute in all aspects of engineering (see the Professional Engineering Capability Framework, especially Sections 4a, 12, and 16). It takes time to develop comprehensive foresight—do not hesitate to ask others with more experience than you to check your predictions and spot omissions.

When thinking about safety, it is helpful to think of ways that an apparently safe environment could actually be hazardous, meaning that threats to health and safety are present or dangerous, and there is a significant likelihood of harm. A footpath beside a road with fast-moving traffic is a hazardous location. The road itself is an extremely dangerous location—an important distinction in thinking about safety.

Health and safety checklists are available online. Use them to create a hazards checklist for your workplace. You may need to ask others if any of the following are present:

• fast-moving objects;

• potentially harmful chemicals;

• pressurised gases, flammable dust, gases, liquids or solids, explosives;

• high-voltage or high-power electrical equipment (greater than standard mains voltage, or exposed connections with more than 50 Volts);

• harmful radiation;

• high-pressure liquid (greater than 20 bar); and

• noise greater than 80 dB (install a noise measurement app on your phone).

Obtain the materials safety data sheet (MSDS) for all chemicals or hazardous fluids in the workplace—for example, flammable gases. Read these and learn about containment and separation precautions that keep people from being exposed (Figure 13.1).

One of the greatest safety hazards is complacency, particularly among senior people in the organisation. This may not be difficult to assess. Ask when there was last a discussion on safety or a practice evacuation fire drill. Find out if harmful chemicals are properly labelled. Ask about advice on the health risks from using computers. Ask about the procedure to report a safety incident. Observe instances of corrosion or peeling paint that reveal a lack of attention to maintenance. Observe whether personal protective equipment (PPE) is worn in hazardous areas, particularly by senior staff. If safety issues are not regularly raised, it is possible that senior people may not be paying attention to safety; others follow their example, and the resulting behaviour can lead to accidents or health problems. In an organisation with a strong safety culture, you can expect your attention to be on safety issues every day.

Identify hazardous events

A hazardous event is a foreseeable yet unpredictable event that is likely to have harmful consequences. For example, the entry of fast-moving flood water carrying floating debris can damage equipment, enabling poisonous chemicals to leak into the immediate environment. Another example: a truck driver who has lost his way drives unknowingly into a hazardous site because it is well-illuminated at night. He accidentally reverses the truck and damages valves on a high-pressure gas pipeline, releasing gas, which results in a fire or explosion. There are many possible hazardous events, and it is necessary to anticipate as many as possible. While all these events are foreseeable, their occurrence is unpredictable. In practice, most hazardous events result from human error and interpretation differences, while relatively few result from natural causes.

It is also helpful to ask lay people, not just technically knowledgeable engineers and technicians, about possible events and hazards. Cleaning staff, for example, will often notice things that others have missed.

Identify likelihood, consequences, and risks

When analysing safety hazards, it is necessary to identify the qualitative likelihood of each hazardous event. Select from about five possibilities, ranging from ‘extremely unlikely’ to ‘frequently happens’.

In the same way, identify the consequences of each event, again using about five possibilities ranging from ‘minor: possibility of injuries but none requiring medical attention’ to ‘catastrophic: many people killed or severe and permanent environmental damage’.

Then, each event is then given a ‘risk rating’ that combines the likelihood and consequences, again using about five possibilities from ‘negligible risk’ to ‘catastrophic risk’. Engineers often use a risk matrix: a lookup table that assigns a risk rating to each combination of likelihood and consequences.

Risk control measures

Control measures are needed for all events, except for inconsequential risks. Events with the highest risk rating are considered first. A control, in this context, is some action that either reduces the likelihood of a hazardous event or reduces the consequences. For example, PPE usually reduces the consequences (personal injuries) following a hazardous event.

Engineers draw on their experience in assessing risks and devising controls, and often they will discuss the findings as a group. It might seem surprising that most of the time, only fuzzy qualitative descriptions are used rather than quantitative likelihood and numerical consequence scores.

This hierarchy shows the preferred control measures, with 1 being the first preference:

• 1  Eliminate hazard—as Trevor Kletz said, “Something you don’t have can’t leak”;

• 2  Substitute hazard with something less dangerous;

• 3  Implement ‘engineering controls’ that reduce likelihood or consequences or both, e.g., shielding;

• 4  Administrative controls—procedures that reduce likelihood or consequences or both, e.g., rules, training, certification; and finally,

• 5  Personal protective equipment—eliminating or reducing harm to people.

Many control measures will be specified in regulations. Obtain the local occupational health and safety regulations. You should be able to demonstrate that you are familiar with relevant regulations for your industry and workplaces. If there are none, or if the local regulations are incomplete or only partly developed, consider downloading or studying regulations from an advanced country (e.g., UK guides and regulations at http://www.hse.gov.uk/, Australia guides and regulations at https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/).

It is important to distinguish ‘physical controls’ (1, 2, 3 above) from ‘administrative or procedural controls’ (4, 5). An example of a physical control for a chemical is a secure container that will not break if dropped on the floor. Another might be arranging for all harmful chemicals to be contained inside sealed vessels and pipework. These are measures that keep people and harmful chemicals physically separated. Administrative controls include labelling the chemical containers, hazardous chemical signs on storage facilities and where the chemicals are used, procedures for handling chemicals, training for staff to follow these procedures, and record-keeping. Administrative controls are also measures that keep people and harmful chemicals separated, but rely on people to observe signs, follow procedures, and obey rules.

In practice, especially with very harmful chemicals and other extreme hazards such as high-voltage connections, physical and administrative controls are both used in combination. For example, in situations where floors can be wet, electrical equipment should either be eliminated or protected with residual current devices (RCDs). While an RCD is a physical control, it might need to be connected to the electrical power outlet by a user. Administrative controls, therefore, could include regular random checks by supervisors to ensure that RCDs are being used properly and informative notices explaining how to use them in appropriate languages.

Using the risk matrix approach outlined above has sometimes encouraged engineers to consider extremely unlikely events as insignificant risks and therefore defer implementing control measures. Less serious safety risks that are more likely to occur were given higher priority. Now, in Australia and other advanced countries, control measures are needed for every event with major consequences, no matter how unlikely they seem to be. The reason for this change is that time and again engineers have disregarded the possibility of extremely unlikely events actually happening. Most people, not just engineers, underestimate the probability of low-frequency (unlikely) events. Tightened rules represent lessons learned from major incidents, such as the Piper Alpha oil platform fire in 1988.

Keeping detailed records is an essential administrative control. History shows that major accidents are almost always preceded by minor incidents or near misses. Making it safe and easy to report incidents and near misses can provide data that suggests more effective control measures that can prevent a major catastrophe.

First steps

Learn to anticipate the foreseeable but unexpected.

Learn about safely using computers and about mental health in the workplace.

Enrol in a first aid course and, unless training has already been provided, learn how to safely lift heavy objects. You never know when you may have to help lift some heavy equipment.

Take advantage of opportunities to attend courses on electrical, chemical, and other relevant safety practices. If your enterprise demands that people work in extreme conditions—heat, cold, at heights, underground, even shift work—learn how these environmental conditions affect health and behaviour.

Cultural influences

Safety culture, habitual ways of thinking, and acting on health and safety hazards, has a pronounced effect on practice. For example, it is not uncommon to hear influential oil and gas business leaders explain that “there has to be a balance between safety and production.” This is used to justify limiting spending on safety precautions. Companies with leaders espousing similar attitudes have tended to experience major disasters: BP is one such company. They seem to forget something that is particularly true in that industry: production is only possible with safety. Disasters, when they do occur, usually stop production completely and often bring very large claims for compensation. The reputation of even a large and well-known company can be lost or badly damaged. BP was close to bankruptcy after the Gulf of Mexico Macondo well blowout disaster in 2010. This was because many suppliers started demanding payment in advance before delivering goods and services; they were scared that BP might go bankrupt and, as a result, BP almost ran out of cash.

Many countries have cultural attitudes that can conflict with a strong safety culture. For example, in some Muslim countries, many people subscribe to a belief that Allah (God) will determine their last day; they believe that no person can change that, so safety precautions are of limited value. In many developing countries, there is a perception that ‘labour is cheap’ and easily replaceable, so spending money on safety precautions is not needed beyond the minimum regulatory requirements, which can seem lax by advanced country standards.

As a young engineer in these situations, it can be challenging to promote safety in the prevailing culture. However, there are very good reasons for doing so, quite apart from one’s conscience and moral duty to care for all people.

The first reason is your personal safety: if the organisation cannot maintain a reasonable safety culture, there is a greater risk to your personal health and safety.

The second reason is economic. Even in low-income countries, labour is not cheap (explained in Chapter 17). Production usually depends on competent, highly paid supervisors who must be continuously present and visible. In typical engineering enterprises, the largest costs are materials, energy, and fixed costs, such as machinery and land. Losing an experienced worker due to an accident can significantly reduce utilisation and cause material wastage, adding considerable extra costs.

The third reason is that culture can nurture misunderstandings. Like all other major religious texts, the Qur’an, accepted by Muslims as the literal words of God, instructs believers to receive wisdom and also to respect the sanctity of life. Believers, therefore, have an obligation to learn how to avoid harming themselves and others.

The fourth reason is reputation. Most international supply chains are now audited for ethical and sustainable practices. A good safety record can make a crucial difference in winning orders from major customers, and also for securing finance for working capital to handle large production contracts. It can also reduce the cost of insurance.

Human behaviour

No matter how well physical control measures have been designed and built, safety relies on human behaviour above all else. Even the best physical controls must be disabled from time to time for maintenance or modifications.

Understand that people do not necessarily follow the rules created for their own safety without visible and continuous enforcement. Signs warning of hazards, particularly when seen repeatedly day after day, eventually fade from consciousness. Workers will violate strict safety procedures. As time passes after a major incident or safety drill, complacency will inevitably arise.

As an engineer, you must anticipate that people will sometimes engage in risky behaviour or will sometimes be intoxicated by alcohol or other drugs.

It will be your job, more than most other people, to do your best to keep people safe from harm, despite their behaviour. As an engineer, you may be designing administrative controls: rules and procedures for people to follow.

Careful observation of human behaviour can be one of the best ways to maintain safety. Workers who consistently decline to use PPE, such as safety goggles, may indeed be smart. Poorly designed PPE can interfere with vision and hearing or increase discomfort and fatigue, raising the chances of accidents. Procedures that are too complex or onerous will be bypassed. If you notice this behaviour, take the time to gain the confidence of workers and listen carefully to their explanations before making changes. Supervisors and shift leaders can be the most helpful, as they are much more likely to be able to influence the behaviour of workers than you can.

Ensuring reasonable safety may demand a large proportion of your time and attention. Furthermore, you may find opposition from within your own company. Attention to detail, knowing regulations, understanding business economics, appreciating reputation factors, and persistence will often pay off in the end.

Sometimes, however, the risk to your own health and well-being may tip the balance in favour of looking for alternative employment opportunities. In the meantime, while you’re looking, tackling difficult safety issues will provide invaluable experience for your future career.

References and Further Reading

1. Bea, R., & Deep Water Horizon Study Group. (2011). Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout. Retrieved from: https://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/DHSGFinalReport-March2011-tag.pdf.

2. Chernobyl disaster: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster.

3. Kletz, T. (1991). An Engineer’s View of Human Error (2nd ed.). London: Institution of Chemical Engineers, VCH Publishers.

4. Levy, M., & Salvadori, M. (1992). Why Buildings Fall Down. New York: W. W. Norton.

5. Petroski, H. (1985). To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design. New York: St Martin’s Press.

6. Petroski, H. (1994). Design Paradigms: Case Histories of Error and Judgment in Engineering. New York: Cambridge University Press.

7. Reason, J., & Hobbs, A. (2003). Managing Maintenance Error. London: Ashgate.

8. Standards Australia. (1999). Australian and New Zealand Standard 4360:1999 Risk Management. Retrieved from saiglobal.com March 2013.

9. Waring, A., & Glendon, I. A. (2000). Managing Risk: Critical Issues for Survival and Success in the 21st Century. London: International Thompson Business Press.

10. Warren Centre for Advanced Engineering. (2009). Professional Performance, Innovation and Risk in Australian Engineering Practice (PPIR). Retrieved from Sydney: https://thewarrencentre.org.au/project/professional-performance-innovation-and-risk/;