Surveys and Assessments

The evaluation of a company’s protective systems involves a survey, an assessment of resources, planning, and a lot of work and imagination. The first item is the survey. The survey starts with a detailed mapping. In the event that it is a new facility, one needs to incorporate safety, security, and environmental response to catastrophes into the designs. Failure to plan for the worst will lead to the worst happening, and it never occurs at a convenient time.

There are several considerations that can be key to security. Site layout and physical arrangement are probably the most important consideration. That includes natural and artificial barriers (which may make defense a bit easier), physical intrusion barriers such as fencing, protective systems, and alarms. Physical arrangement of the plant and its environs can also be key in mitigating natural disasters such as hurricanes, tsunamis, tornadoes, and other extreme weather events, including extreme precipitation.

Another security consideration is logistical and supply chain operations, which include shipping, receiving, and such items as supply lines, and remote locations such as pumping stations. The assessment of this element should also consider the security of the sources of supply as well as the security of the transportation to the plant. One often-overlooked critical need for a plant is the knowledge of the security, source, and location of the cooling water supply, whether it be from the ground or from river, the sea, desalinated water, or even treated and recycled wastewater.

Emergency planning is also a part of plant security. While emergency planning response is often thought of as a part of contingency planning, security has a special role to play in emergency situations, including restricting unauthorized personnel, permitting emergency and service personnel, traffic control, and communications and notification of potentially affected employees.

Site Security Assessments

Some of the previously mentioned concerns are self-evident. If the site is located on a peninsula or has a substantial water frontage for shipping, the security of the waterfront and the shipping will depend upon the type of operations, and the amount of investment in security, both manpower and facilities.

Lighting

Critical to security is lighting. Perhaps two of the best guides to facility lighting are the Outdoor Lighting Code Handbook by the International Dark-Sky Association (http://www.darkskysociety.org/handouts/idacodehandbook.pdf) and the more general International Commission on Illumination (CIE) Technical Report Road Transport Lighting for Developing Countries, which is found at http://files.cie.co.at/180.pdf. Some of the material in both guides is duplicates, but the CIE has a more thorough discussion of transportation issues and illumination. The Dark-Sky Association (DSA) handbook may be more useful in industrial applications. The US Navy also has an excellent manual on lighting.

Some of the common recommendations and observations from both include a discussion on the appropriate lighting levels for visibility. The DSA and CIE define various levels of lighting as the following:

• Zone E l: Areas with intrinsically dark landscapes. Examples are national parks, areas of outstanding natural beauty, areas surrounding major astronomical observatories (but outside Zone E1A—see below), or residential areas where inhabitants have expressed a strong desire that all light trespass be strictly limited.
• Zone E 2: Areas of low ambient brightness. These are suburban and rural residential areas.
• Zone E 3: Areas of medium ambient brightness. These will generally be urban residential areas.
• Zone E 4: Areas of high ambient brightness. Normally, these are urban areas that have both residential and commercial use and experience high levels of nighttime activity.
• Zone E lA: Dark-Sky Preserves.

For most applications in industry, nighttime illumination will fall somewhere in the Zone 3 or Zone 4 categories. Illumination around the perimeter for control should be at least a Zone 3 area, and areas around checkpoints should be Zone 4. All external illumination should be directed outward and downward at a 45° angle so as to be in the eyes of any intruder or anyone approaching the facility.

Table 4.1 is taken from the US Army Field Manual for lighting and has been condensed for clarity.

Lighting should be limited to those areas that need it or should be protective. For example, glare lighting for approaching a guard location is designed to conceal the actions and location of the guards, while fence lighting should be in relatively narrow strips to focus on intrusion detection while providing dark areas for patrols.

Additional lighting guidance is provided by the UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure:

• Lighting can be an important security measure but may in fact assist an intruder if used incorrectly.
• The purpose of a lighting system should include the following: (i) deter intrusion, (ii) reduce intruder’s freedom of action, (iii) assist in the detection of intruders either by direct observation or by closed-circuit television (CCTV), and (iv) provide concealment for guards and patrols.
• It is often difficult to arrange lighting so that it achieves the desired ends, and compromise is often required to balance those needs.
• Lighting should be coordinated with the CCTV requirements to create a lighting environment that does not illuminate guards or patrols and that will support them.
• The illumination should be balanced so that there are gradual increases between brightly illuminated areas such as roads, and less well lit areas such as parts of the tank farm or remote areas such as in the rail yard. The purpose is to prevent dark spots where an intruder can find concealment.
• Lighting columns should not provide the intruder with an aid to scaling the fence.
• Floodlighting should be used to illuminate building exteriors and entranceways to silhouette the intruder, and that should be coupled with CCTV so that the intruder is easily identified and is not in shadow. It is equally important to provide shielded lighting that will illuminate the intruder’s face as well as his/her profile. Normally, lights are mounted out of intruder’s reach, but in the area around entrances, judicious use of CCTV should be coupled with face lighting.
• In some cases, this may require positioning of minicameras at heights that will enable facial recognition. These minicams are rugged, are weatherproof, and have been installed in a number of banks at teller windows. They are coupled to the area CCTV system and enable facial recognition.
• Lighting at gatehouses and perimeter entrances should be bright enough to reveal approaching vehicles and pedestrians and allow guards to identify them, verify passes, carry out vehicle searches, and conceal guards within the gatehouse while allowing them to see out.

Perimeter Barriers: Design Notes and Comments

The perimeter barrier has been partially addressed in some of the material earlier. This chapter will provide some reasons for the various recommendations as well as practical guidance on setting up perimeter barriers. There are a number of opinions as to the correct height for a perimeter barrier, and those numbers range from about 2 to 5 m. Regardless of the height, the perimeter barrier should be difficult to scale with a ladder or climbing tools, and it should be topped with barbed wire and at least one coil of razor wire (barbed tape) as shown in the following.

If space permits, dual fencing should be used. There should be a clear zone of at least 6 m outside the outer fence and at least 6 m between the inner and outer fences and preferably another 6 m between the inner fence and any buildings. This area must be cleared and maintained so that concealment in any of the zones is not possible. The fencing must be designed so that it is not convenient to place a ladder or scaling device close to the barrier. Some fencing systems use several coils of razor wire on the outside of the fence at its base to discourage climbing.

Additional security can be gained by using various types of thorny bushes or trees. These include barberry, holly, hawthorn, pyracantha, locust, quince, wild rose, blackberry, and cholla. There is an excellent brief discussion on barrier plants on the Internet at http://thesustainablelife.tumblr.com/post/5864752175/home-security-the-way-nature-intended.

Fence posts should be a minimum of 3″ (7.5 cm) diameter and preferably 4″ (10 cm) diameter where there is the slightest possibility of vehicle impact. The fence itself should have two layers of steel cables run through the fence, and the spacing between the fencing should be supported with diagonal guys on turnbuckles. The fencing should be imbedded in concrete, and that will be illustrated in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.

If the fencing is to provide privacy as well, it should have metal slats inserted through the fence openings. The use of the metal slats will provide some protection from prying eyes, but the slats act as a wind barrier and that will dramatically increase the wind loading on the fencing, and if there is a sensor on the fencing to measure vibration, it will be virtually useless in almost any wind greater than about 5 m/s (18 km/h or 11 miles/h).

It is also important that the fencing withstand the force of the strongest wind without damage and still be able to act as a potential barricade against vehicle intrusion. The vehicle intrusion depends upon the force and height of the vehicle and the bracing of the fence. The following calculations will be of some help in determining wind loadings and should be applicable to vehicle impact loading as well.

For routine wind loading, there are two essential components, a moment (M) (bending force on the fence post where it meets the foundation) and a horizontal force (F) in shear against the footings for the fence. There is also another factor known as porosity of the fence (h), which is the porosity of the fence ((total area of fence − cross-sectional area of the wire, bars, posts, and any slats inserted)/(total area of fence)).¹

The two formulas are

where h is the porosity of the fence, U is the wind speed in meters/second, h is the height of the fence in meters, and ρ is the density of the air. From this equation, the engineering department can calculate the reactions on the foundations for the posts and decide how deep and how large to make them. Note that this does not guarantee that the fencing can withstand or stop a vehicle ramming the fence, but it will slow it down.

An alternative design method is supplied by the Allan Block Company. In their alternative design, they relate wind speed and pressure and then combine that with exposure conditions to determine the pressure on the fence. The pressure graphs are shown in Figure 4.4.

For reference purposes, 1 km/h is equivalent to 0.62121 miles/h and 1.0 kPa is equivalent to 0.04788 lb/ft². Table 4.2 is further modified by factors that depend upon exposure and height, as shown below.

The pressure diagram for computation of the fencing overturning moment is triangular with the highest forces at the top of the fence or wall.²

Depending upon the location and the design of the fence, it may be necessary to embed the bottom of the fence below ground or at least provide secure anchors so that it cannot be easily lifted for an intruder to slide under. Optionally, the fence should be equipped with fence shaker detectors; there are several manufacturers of this type of detector available, and the usual design is to install a shaker sensor every 3 m. On windy nights, however, the shaker detector can generate false positives unless the sensor system is calibrated to the natural frequency of the fence/wind speed combination.

Another type of sensor to be used in the area between the primary and secondary fences is an induction sensor. The sensor relies upon a magnetic field set up by two buried wires about 2 m apart. Anything crossing between those two wires will change the electromagnetic (EM) signature of the wires, and the voltage will change. The change in the EM profile of the wires will help to locate an intruder, by defining the distance along the sensor net.

Additional security can be had when radar (or a microwave detection system) or other trip light detection system is installed. Some of the detectors use lasers and the ranging on the target can be quite accurate. Other detectors include UV or infrared (IR) light beams to be interrupted to form or create an alarm signal. These line-of-sight detection systems will require the pathways to be kept clear. Depending upon the type of sensor, it may be able to range the exact location of the intruder from the source. Some of the detector beams have difficulty with flying birds and crawling insects blocking the light paths, causing false alarm signals. Multiple redundant paths can minimize this problem, and even with lasers, that can include beam splitting so that both light paths have to be interrupted before an alarm signal is generated. Concealment or camouflage of the transmitter and receivers is also necessary for effective security.

CCTV

CCTV can be a vital part of any security system. In order for it to be effective, especially on perimeter systems, it must have a clear line of sight and should include thermal image detection as well as visible light detection. Recent advances in CCTV imaging now permit high-definition images to be captured. There are a number of very good guides to the selection of CCTV on the Internet. A few of those include:

• http://www.boschsecurity.us/NR/rdonlyres/1A4F9B44-0376-4FC8-A735-151F02021082/0/SelectingtheRightCCTVCamera.pdf by Bosch. The guide is excellent and raises several very good points about the range of the camera and the lenses.
• http://www.inter-pacific.com/documents/education/Inter-Pacific_Camera_Selection_Guide.pdf is from Inter-Pacific. The guide is also excellent, but does not provide as much information and detail as the Bosch guide.
• http://www.iviewcameras.co.uk/pdf/cctv_buying_guide.pdf is a compact and simple guide for introduction to CCTV. It does not provide as much information as either guide listed above.
• http://promaxusa.com/cctv-lens-chart.html provides graphical illustrations of the resolution and color for various types of camera lenses.

The principal considerations in the selection of a CCTV service relate to resolutions (no. of lines per centimeter or inch) where a higher number is better; the responsiveness of the system to varying light levels, which can be up to 107,000 lx in bright sunlight and 0.001 lx on an overcast night; the responsiveness of the camera to IR light or ability to “see” at night; whether or not the camera is to be using color imaging; the ability of the camera/lens system to compensate for backlight; the focal length of the lens in the camera and lens aperture system (lower numbers are better than high numbers); the field of view of the camera; the ability to zoom to focus on distant or nearby objects; the camera enclosure; the ability of the camera system to scan an area; and the signal-to-noise ratio for the camera (signal-to-noise ratio should be at least 40 dB or about 100:1 or better for clear pictures). Higher ratios provide better pictures.

Black-and-white video costs less than color, but each has their advantages. For night work, IR-capable cameras work better with black-and-white video systems and black-and-white systems are cheaper than color systems. The video system should be coordinated with the perimeter and other lighting in the facility. Especially for perimeter lighting, some type of remote control to increase lighting levels if an alarm is triggered may be warranted.

The physical layout of the plant and its perimeter will, to an extent, influence the type of security system you are going to use. If you are concerned only with the perimeter, some type of pole-mounted cameras that show the perimeter areas probably will suffice, but there are considerations about the cabling for the CCTV system. Coaxial cabling tends to be significantly more expensive than twisted pair cabling, and the coaxial cabling does not allow for sound. If the distance between the cameras and the receiving station is great, consider either a microwave system or plan on installing signal boosters in the lines. Cameras should have highest resolution possible, should compensate for backlight, glare, and should have a sampling rate and shutters fast enough to read license plates on moving objects. Power is a consideration as well. The cameras should be supplied with standby power, and that will be either 24 or 12 V, and the power supply should be large enough to provide for the camera motors so that the scanning and autofocus features are not interrupted.

For long transmission distances, repeaters or signal amplifiers may be required, and these can represent a potential nuisance or vulnerability if they are not properly protected and the junction box housing designed to be tamper and weatherproof. If microwave transmission is used, the frequencies should be 5.6 GHz, and if possible, frequency hopping and signal encryption should be employed.

It is vital that a second central dispatch center, probably at some distance from the front gate, should be established and that the CCTV signals should be routed to the backup facility as well as to the primary facility. In the event that either guard dispatch or control center is taken out in an attack or an accident, a fully functioning backup system should be available to respond to emergencies.

Windows and Doors

Perimeter windows and doors should be alarmed, depending upon the contents of the building, the use of the doors, and the occupancy of the building. Thus, a building on the perimeter should have easily accessible doors that face the perimeter alarmed with coded entry pads.

Doors on the lower floors should have dead bolt locks and metal frames. Door hinges should be accessible only from inside, and a minimum of three hinges are recommended. Doors should be heavy gauge metal, and the locks should be dead bolt locks wherever possible. Fire doors that have panic hardware for quick release should be equipped with an alarm.

Windows facing the perimeter or where there is a possibility of forced entry should have metal frames that are integral with the wall and tied into the building wall structural materials. Windows in facilities where there is the slightest possibility of an explosion or overpressure should be coated with a fragment retention window film that is bonded to the window frame. These films are made by a number of manufacturers including 3M. The lower floor windows should have alarms and bars on the windows sufficient to prevent forced entry. Those windows should open inward rather than outward.