Chapter 5
Port Security

Port security is a separate chapter because the subject material covers physical security plus the requirement to protect large, mobile, high-value targets, plus fixed-port facilities. Ports often have the added disadvantage of trying to eliminate threats while discriminating between a potential attacker and legitimate commercial vessels or civilian watercraft. Swimmers and submersibles can also pose threats to the port and the ships therein. Port security is different because the high-value targets are not continuously at the dock, but substantial damage to the loading and unloading facilities can impair the function of the operations that the dock supports. The level of security needs to increase with the arrival of ships and the likelihood of an attack, but a certain minimum standard of security needs to be maintained at all times.

Ranking Threats

The organization Maritime Security Outlook1 has suggested that the principal risks associated with a port include the following threats:

ThreatRank of threat 1–5, 5 being the most likely

Natural threats

  • Hurricane
  • Tornado
  • Flooding
  • Tsunami
  • Earthquake

Man-made/accidental threats

  • Hazardous material (HAZMAT) spill
  • Fire
  • Extended power outage
  • Transportation network loss
  • Operator error
  • Loss of data center/networks/IT infrastructure

Intentional acts—delivery vectors

  • Container
  • Boat
  • Cars/trucks
  • Swimmer
  • Military grade submarines
  • Small, radar-dodging, self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSSs)
  • Disgruntled individual authorized to be on the property
  • A criminal not authorized to be on property

Weapon threats

  • Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
  • Enhanced explosives/improvised explosive devices
  • Conventional weapons
  • Cyber attack

Levels of Port Security

The US Coast Guard (USCG) has studied the issue of port security and has classified the various levels of port security into three levels and has developed a set of minimum recommendations around those levels. The guidance document has been coordinated with the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These levels are as follows:

  • Level I—The degree of security precautions to take when the threat of an unlawful act against a vessel or terminal is, though possible, not likely
  • Level II—The degree of security precautions to take when the threat of an unlawful act against a vessel or terminal is possible and intelligence indicates that terrorists are likely to be active within a specific area or against a type of vessel or terminal
  • Level III—The degree of security precautions to take when the threat of an unlawful act against a vessel or terminal is probable or imminent and intelligence indicates that terrorists have chosen specific targets

These guidelines are intended for application to all US waterfront facilities. The guidelines and regulations for port security are described in detail in Chapter 33 of the US Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 125–128 and 154; NIVC 3–96, NVIC 1–97, and IMO Circular 443.

Security response plans

The foundation of all three levels of port security starts with a plan for security and response (S&R plan). The minimum elements of the S&R plan should include the following:

  • Identification procedures
  • Access control procedures
  • Internal security requirements
  • Designated restricted areas
  • Perimeter security plan
  • Security light and maintenance plan
  • Security alarms, video surveillance, and communications systems
  • A name designated security officer (with contact information)
  • Training program for the security force
  • Training for employee security awareness
  • Security communications, including prearranged agreements with the local police and fire
  • Set procedures for upgrading security to Level II and Level III

Recommended procedures

  • A set of detailed response procedures for the following scenarios:
    • Unauthorized personnel discovered at the facility
    • Unauthorized or illegally parked or abandoned vehicles in or near the facility
    • Unauthorized vessels moored along the waterfront property
    • Bomb threat
    • Suspicious persons or activity response
    • Mail handling
    • Unknown or suspicious package discovery and response

The USCG has developed guidance for scenario development for vessels based upon a threat matrix table as discussed in the previous chapters. This threat matrix is to be used to develop the vessel security plan. This threat matrix is documented in the USCG Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 10-2, entitled Security Measures for Vessels, dated October 21, 2002. The document is available on the Internet at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/nvic/pdf/2002/10-02.pdf (Appendix B). The minimum scenarios that the Coast Guard mandates for the vessel security plan include those types of attacks that could damage or destroy the vessel (either from contact or from a distance using standoff weapons), sabotage the vessel, control the vessel, create a pollution or toxic material incident under a variety of circumstances, or use the vessel for illegal transport of personnel or weapons.

The following is suggested by the USCG and IMO as being suitable at a minimum for a good security plan. The USCG also strongly suggests that the plan is addressed in the specified order.

Identification Procedures for Personnel Screening

All persons entering a facility should possess and show a valid photo ID card to gain facility access. Individuals arriving by motorcycle should remove helmets to assist in identification. Security personnel or competent authority should verify that ID card matches the person presenting it. While conducting roving patrols, security personnel or competent authority should challenge unknown or suspicious personnel to identify themselves with a photo ID card. At passenger terminals, security personnel or competent authority should refer to their terminal security plan for procedures for allowing personnel into the secure area of the passenger terminal. The following specifics apply.

Employees

All employees should be required to show an employee/union photo ID prior to entry. Facilities that do not use employee/union photo IDs should cross-reference employee’s identification with employer-supplied access lists. While on the facility, personnel should possess valid identification and present upon request by security/government representative. The facility should have a verification process to ensure employees entering have valid business.

Vendors/contractors/vessel pilots

All vendors/contractors/vessel pilots should be required to show a valid photo ID prior to entry. While on the facility, all vendors/contractors/vessel pilots should possess valid ID and present upon request by security/competent authority/government representative. Vendors, contractors, and pilots visits should be scheduled in advance. If the arrival of vendors, contractors, or pilots is not prearranged, entry should be prohibited until their need to enter is verified by proper authority (as identified in the facility security plan).

The facility should have a verification process to ensure vendors/contractors/vessel pilots entering have valid business. The use of access lists that preauthorize regular contractors, vendors, and pilots to enter the facility or board vessels moored at that facility is permitted in lieu of the daily schedule requirements.

Truck drivers/passengers

All truck drivers (for cargo) and passengers (when allowed by the facility) should be required to show a valid photo ID prior to entry. While on the facility, truck drivers/passengers should present this ID when requested by security/government representative. The facility should have a verification process to ensure drivers entering have valid business (e.g., checking booking numbers).

Visitors (all personnel not falling into other categories)

All visitors should be required to show a photo ID prior to entry. While on the facility, all visitors should be required to have photo ID and present it upon request by security government representative. Visitors should be scheduled in advance. If not, entry should be prohibited until proper authority authorizes visit (as identified in the facility security plan). The facility should have a verification process to ensure visitors entering have a valid purpose for their visit.

Government employees

Government agency representatives should be given access to complete official visits/inspections. Government agency representatives should present their valid government organization ID card to security personnel or competent authority prior to entry.

Granting government employees’ entrance to a facility does not alleviate them from following safety and security protocols. We know of one intrusive EPA inspector who decided that a particular installation was somehow fudging their emission data, and in her eagerness to inspect the incinerator site, she ignored safety and security protocols by refusing to sign in and demanding immediate and unaccompanied access to the site. As a result, she was banned from the site, and the enforcement of that ban was upheld because of her violation of security and safety protocols.

Access to the site is conditioned on observing and following appropriate security, safety, and other protocols.

Vessel personnel access through a facility

Vessel personnel (crewmembers, agents, contractors, vendors, and passengers on freight vessels) should not be permitted to depart or arrive by way of the facility unless their identification is provided in advance.

If not, entry through the facility should be prohibited until authorized by proper security personnel or competent authority in accordance with the facility security plan. All passengers and crew (on passenger ships) should be allowed to depart the vessel in accordance with INS rules. They should proceed directly to their place of work or out of the terminal.

Search requirements

All persons, packages, and vehicles entering or leaving the facility should be subject to search by security personnel or competent authority. Signs should be posted advising personnel of this requirement prior to entry. Random inspections should be conducted on at least 5% of those entering the facility while the facility is at security level I. This excludes containerized cargo.

Acceptable identification

ID cards should be a tamper-resistant and laminated photo identification card. Identification cards should show the relevant details of the holder, for example, name, description, or other pertinent data, and are to be issued by an appropriate control authority such as the Pacific Maritime Association, port authority, facility operator/owner, labor organization, or government agency. Acceptable identification includes:

State-issued driver’s license and other identification

  • ID card issued by a governmental agency
  • Passport
  • ID card issued by facility operator/owner
  • Labor organization ID card

Exceptions: Alternatives may be accepted when worked out by facility security personnel and may include an escort if no photo ID is available and employee background checks (reserved).

Access control

Armed guard/local police department response

The facility should have armed security personnel with the authority to prevent and/or respond to unlawful acts, detain trespassers, and protect the facility, or the facility (coordinates with the port authority) should establish a working arrangement with local law enforcement that should ensure a response time of 10 minutes or less.

Gates

All perimeter gates should be locked, secured, or guarded at all times.

Deliveries

Deliveries refer to supplies and services unless otherwise noted. All packages entering or leaving the facilities should be subject to search by security personnel or competent authority. Signs should be posted advising personnel of this requirement prior to entry. This does not include cargo containers. Arrival of deliveries should be scheduled in advance. Where not scheduled in advance, deliveries should be prohibited entry onto the facility until approved by competent authority. This does not include cargo containers. The facility operator should establish procedures to ensure the validity, safety, and security of all HAZMAT shipments prior to acceptance.

Vessel Arrival and Security Procedures While Moored

Facilities should not permit unscheduled tugs, barges, or other vessels to berth alongside without prior notification from the port authority or facility. Arriving vessel crews should be advised of a facility’s security level. Vessel crewmembers should not be permitted to depart or arrive by way of the facility unless their identification is provided and verified. Vessel agents should schedule vendors and vessel visitors in advance. The facility should provide a means for the vessel to contact facility security.

Internal Security

Vehicle control

Facility management should develop vehicle access controls. Where possible, establish designated parking areas away from restricted areas. Where practicable, establish exclusionary zones to protect buildings or other potential high-value targets. Fully describe the measures implemented and standards used in the facility security plan. The following guidelines apply:

Automobiles approved for entry onto marine facilities should be controlled regarding their destination and parking.

All vehicles entering or leaving the facilities should be subject to search by security personnel or competent authority. Signs should be posted advising personnel of this requirement prior to entry.

Parking within the facility should be tightly restricted and should be authorized by a strictly enforced gate pass and/or decal system.

Passes or decals should be color or otherwise coded to further restrict access to authorized times and locations.

Parking for employees, dockworkers, and visitors should be restricted to designated areas that are fenced and outside of the cargo handling and designated storage areas.

Parking for vehicles authorized on facility grounds should be restricted largely to port authority, carrier, maintenance, and commercial and government vehicles that are essential within the facility. Parking for these vehicles should be restricted or clearly marked designated parking areas within the perimeter of the facility.

Temporary permits or passes should be issued to vendors and visitors for parking in designated controlled areas.

Rail security

Rail gates that allow access to a terminal should remain locked at all times, unless open and manned for passage of rail cars.

Key/ID/access card control

Controls should be implemented for all keys, facility employee ID cards, cipher locks, and computer systems. Key/ID/access card controls should be implemented to delineate which personnel have access to specific areas. A master ledger should be maintained that records the legitimate holder of each key copy, issuance of which should be controlled by management or security personnel. Locks, locking devices, and key control systems should be inspected regularly and malfunctioning equipment repaired or replaced. Only case-hardened locks and chains should be used, with chains permanently attached to fence posts/gates.

Computer security

Formal guidelines for computer security should be in place for each facility. Computerized information access should be password controlled and should be restricted on a need-to-know basis, which would include dissemination of information no sooner than required. Facilities should take steps to prevent facility equipment from being accessed by nonauthorized personnel.

Security rounds

Security personnel should conduct roving safety and security patrols specific to a facility’s layout including the areas of waterside access.

Security personnel should conduct rounds at least once in a 4 hour period at varying times to prevent predictability. Adequate recordkeeping of the security rounds conducted should be available for inspection.

Perimeter Security and Restricted Areas

The facility should establish restricted areas that control and channel access, improve security, and increase efficiency. This should provide degrees of security that are compatible with the facility’s operational requirements. Examples include:

  • Alarm/surveillance system control
  • Power supply and lighting control systems
  • Computer servers and storage devices

Barriers

Perimeter areas should be cleared of vegetation and debris that could be used to breach fences. Natural barriers such as water, ravines, etc., can sometimes be effectively utilized as part of the control boundary rather than fences. If used, natural barriers may require supporting safeguards (i.e., security patrols, surveillance, anti-intrusion devices, lighting) especially during high-threat period (security levels II and III).

Fencing

Compliance with IMO Circular 443 or US Customs Regulations is considered equivalent. Fence perimeters should meet the following minimum:

  • Security fences and other barriers should be located and constructed so as to prevent the introduction of dangerous substances or devices. Fencing should be 8 ft high, 9 gauge galvanized steel, of 2 in. wide chain link construction topped with an additional 2 ft barbed wire outrigger consisting of three strands of 9 gauge galvanized barbed wire at a 45° outward angle above the fence.
  • The effectiveness of a security fence against penetration depends to a large extent on the type of construction employed in its building.
  • The bottom of the fence should be within 2 in. of the ground.
  • Security fence lines should be kept clear of all obstructions.

Lighting

Facilities should be illuminated at least to the level of twilight and should be provided sunset to sunrise. The minimum standard for illumination should be 1 ft candle at 1 m above the ground. Dock work areas; container unloading and loading areas; waterfront, perimeter, and restricted areas; and all access points should have 5 ft candle illumination.

Lighting should conform to federal regulations (e.g., OSHA) and comply with voluntary agreements such as the US Customs Sea Carrier or Super Carrier Initiatives (if applicable). Updated lighting technology should be used, such as high-pressure sodium, mercury vapor, or metal halide lighting. Lighting should be directed downward and away from guards or offices or navigable waterways and should produce high contrast with few shadows.

Security Alarms/Video Surveillance/Communications Systems

Alarms

Intrusion detection systems and alarm devices may be appropriate as a complement to guards and patrols during periods of increased threat. All control and switching systems for alarms and communications systems should be in a restricted access area. Alarms may be local, that is, at the site of the intrusion, provided at a central location or station, or a combination of both. The standard response time by facility personnel to alarms should be no more than 5 minutes.

Video surveillance

Closed-circuit television cameras can be used as a part of the facility security system. When used, cameras should be placed at main entrances and exits and in areas with high-risk and/or high-value cargo. Cameras should be able to record at relatively low levels of light and should have a remote control zoom lens capability when used for surveillance.

Cameras should have video tape recording capabilities and be capable of being monitored at the same time. Cameras should be positioned, with a recording mechanism to video record vehicles and pedestrians entering and exiting the facility.

Communications systems

Security and communications system should be tested once per shift, and a record of results maintained. A means of transmitting emergency signals by radio, direct-line facilities, or other similarly reliable means should be provided at each access point for use by the control and monitoring personnel to contact the police, security control, or an emergency operations center in the event assistance is required.

The facility should ensure adequate backup/emergency power supply in place to operate security and communications systems when the primary power is interrupted. The facility should further have dedicated emergency/security communications system in place. Each person on the security force should be issued equipment and trained on the system operation.

Training and Security Awareness

Security force personnel (whether permanent or contracted) should complete training and qualification programs established by the facility operator and described in the facility’s security plan that provides the knowledge and training to properly secure the facility.

The training program should be job specific for all personnel, both management and nonmanagement. The program should at a minimum include the following elements:

  • Law enforcement and security guidelines
  • Company policies including the security plan and response procedures
  • Prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal activities
  • Reporting of threats or actual criminal and terrorist activity
  • Communications and surveillance system operation
  • Procedures for notifying all facility personnel when higher security levels are imposed

Employees should be given an annual awareness training refresher to ensure that they have an up-to-date working knowledge of the facility’s emergency plan including security procedures and procedures for notifying law enforcement agencies. Training program should be reviewed and personnel qualifications certified annually.

Floating Barriers

There are several relatively new floating barrier systems that can be towed into place around the vessels to prevent the approach of excluded watercraft. Generally, these barriers contain highly visible floats that have submerged cables and/or nets. Any small vessel trying to penetrate the barrier will snag on the cables and either have its bottom ripped out or the propeller destroyed. The ASTM F-12 Committee has developed a set of criteria for exclusion barriers for small watercraft up to about 40 ft in length. The Bureau of Reclamation of the US Department of the Interior has developed contract language for certification of boat barriers (see note 2). This standard requires that an 8500 pound boat, traveling at 40 knots, be stopped within 10 m of the original position of the barrier. Because vessel exclusion barriers are costly, the decision to install a vessel barrier should be based on a site-specific risk assessment.2

Notes

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