Keywords

anti-radicalization; credible voices; online radicalization; preventing terrorism; social media; violent extremism

• Counter-terrorism

• Online radicalisation

• Counter-extremism

• Counter-terrorism strategy

• Anti-radicalization training

• Social media

• Community credible voices

Introduction

At 2:20 pm on May 22, 2013, British soldier Drummer Lee Rigby of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers was walking outside his barracks in Woolwich, southeast London [1]. As he made his way onto Artillery Place, a vehicle deliberately swerved from the road onto the pavement and struck him. Two occupants got out of the car and viciously attacked and killed him with a cleaver and a knife [2]. With no prior warning of the ambush, unarmed Drummer Rigby had little chance to defend himself or to make his escape. After the initial attack, his lifeless body was moved to the center of the road, where it was left while the two attackers, Michael Adebowale, 22, and Michael Adebolajo, 28, engaged in conversation with the public as they walked by, encouraging them to look at what had happened [3]. As armed police officers arrived at the scene of the incident, the attackers ran toward them, brandishing their weapons. Police officers shot and detained the two suspects, arresting them for the murder of the British soldier. The horrific public death of Drummer Lee Rigby on the streets of London was greeted with shock across the United Kingdom. The injuries inflicted upon the victim were so severe the 25-year-old had to be formally identified by a forensic dentist [4]. His brutal murder amplified the amorphous threat from non-hierarchical terrorist cells of radicalized individuals affiliated to al Qa’ida.

Citizens who witnessed the killing of Drummer Rigby served as freelance journalists and evidence gatherers, reporting images from the scene of the attack to television and social networks. They captured the terrorists’ justification and motivation for the murder of the British soldier on their smart mobile devices. Just moments following the attack, a frenzy of social media communications from online users provided commentary of the incident, condoning the senseless killing of a young man. The vast majority of citizen comments and media reporting was mature, balanced, and measured, given the terror that had taken place. The incident sparked online debate, but it was a conversation that was quickly joined by violent extremists from all sides of the political spectrum pushing their own rhetoric and ideologies. The posting of extreme and hard-line views did little to help the public’s understanding of the emerging terrorist incident.

While extremists used the attack to further promote their specific cause and draw attention to their particular grievances, other online users published comments that would have damaging consequences. One such online message was posted by Deyka Ayan Hassan, a 21-year-old English and politics undergraduate student of Kingston University [5]. Hassan contacted the police after receiving hundreds of tweets from people threatening to rape and kill her in the aftermath of Drummer Rigby’s murder. However, police officers later arrested Hassan as she admitted to sending a tweet, which she said was a joke, about the design of the clothing worn by Drummer Rigby that was mentioned in citizens’ reporting of the attack. At the time of his murder, Drummer Rigby was wearing a “Help the Heroes” T-shirt, which was given out by a charitable organization established to support the return home of armed forces personnel from theaters of conflict overseas. Hassan had posted a message on Twitter that said: "To be honest, if you wear a Help for Heroes t-shirt you deserve to be beheaded" [6]. The tweet received a furious backlash from British far-right organizations; there were threats so severe that Hassan feared for her safety, resulting in her reporting the matter to the police.

Appearing at Hendon Magistrates’ Court in London during June, 2013, Hassan was ordered to undertake 250 hours of community service after admitting the charge of sending a malicious electronic message. Magistrate Nigel Orton, chairman of the bench, said Hassan could have been jailed by the court for what she had done but the court had accepted her claim that, at the time she had posted the offending tweet, she did not know it was a soldier who had been killed. Mr Orton said: "The tragic events in Woolwich that day have created a context which made this tweet appear extreme. It had a huge impact and clearly caused offence and distress. We accept you didn’t intend to cause harm and you felt it was a joke. Your act was naive and foolish and without regard to the general public at a time of heightened sensitivity" [7]. The court also heard Hassan’s father was working for charities that combat extremism and had previously been an associate advisor for policing diversity to the Metropolitan Police Service [8].

In the aftermath of the terrorist murder in London, an online platform was created by extremist groups and individuals to espouse their harmful views. A battleground between the voices of good and evil had been established, and while some online voices could be heard to rebut the extremist protagonists, their collective voice was weak and lacked the volume and credibility to fight back against the online onslaught of extremists who supported the slaying of the British soldier. Extremists had hijacked appropriate and proportionate online discussions and debate. Those whose intentions served to divide communities rather than unite them during a time of crisis occupied the space provided by social media. The attack of a British soldier on home soil had provided an opportunity for cyber terrorist recruiters to reach out and radicalize the vulnerable members of the online community.

Online radicalization

The terrorist murder of Drummer Lee Rigby confirmed to security authorities across Europe what they already knew: that the threat from contemporary terrorism now emerges from numerous sources and is being imported into individual member states, as well as coming from within its own borders. The incubation of the home-grown threat had already been identified by many intelligence agencies within Europe, and the “neighbor terrorist”—drawn from the very communities the counter-terrorism apparatus of member states were attempting to protect—continued to flourish, despite the successful intervention of numerous terrorist plots and the concerted efforts of law enforcement agencies.

The primary challenge of tackling contemporary terrorism across Europe remains the increasing impact of the Internet upon terrorist recruitment, radicalization, and attack planning. The terrorist threat has become virtual, with terrorists being recruited, radicalized, trained, and tasked online with little deterrent or cyber presence from law enforcement. The policing of political violence—traditionally categorized as intelligence-led and politically sensitive—has historically generated structures that had been remote, secretive, and specialist. Yet the contemporary evolution of terrorism has spawned important new trends and demanded a new policing response. Contemporary terrorism now involves embedded citizens as much as foreign extremists [9]. The way in which members of communities across Europe are being influenced by the extreme single narrative of the religious ideology promoted by al Qa’ida remains a critical concern for the European Union. This single narrative, when combined with a complex malaise of social and economic factors, serves to manipulate individuals toward extremist perspectives, cultivating a home-grown terrorist threat. While security authorities across member states understand that terrorism comes in many forms, the primary threat continues to emerge from al Qa’ida, whose support and Islamist network is propagated online.

No community should consider themselves immune from the global reach and connectivity of Islamist groups following in the footsteps of al Qa’ida. Many member states across Europe share similar security challenges, including the identification of potential terrorist suspects operating within their communities and the need to understand the factors that lead to the development of extremist views.

In Germany, the case of Dennis Mamadou Cuspert brought home to security forces the reality of violent extremist online radicalization. Cuspert, who was born in 1975 in Berlin, in the borough of Kreuzberg, had a German mother. His father, who originated from Ghana, left the family shortly after Cuspert’s birth [10]. Cuspert had a troubled childhood and an argumentative relationship with his stepfather, a former member of the United States armed forces. At the age of only eight, Cuspert embarked upon his criminal career by stealing toy cars. As a teenager, he and his gang were involved in dealing drugs and committing armed robberies. After shooting a friend in the face with a gas pistol, Cuspert was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, during which time he decided to start a new career as a rap musician [11].

In 2002, upon his release from prison, Cuspert changed his name to Deso Dogg and became a successful “gangster rapper.” His new-found career lasted until 2009, and although he never reached the top rankings of fellow musical artists, he was well-known and respected among his peers and enjoyed a dedicated fan base. During his musical career he forged contacts with radical Islamist groups including the Turkish Kaplan Group, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the Tablighi-Jamaat [12]. In 2010, Cuspert announced his retirement from music in order to continue his work as an Islamic preacher. He again changed his name, this time calling himself Abu Maleeq. Leading salafist preachers in Germany, including Pierre Vogel, believed Cuspert provided a unique opportunity, given his fame as a musician, to promote their cause and engage in their missionary work. The salifist preachers expected that Cuspert’s former music fans would continue to follow him and convert to the salifist interpretation of Islam [13]. Guided by extremist preachers, Cuspert became increasingly radical and forged close associations with Abu Nagie, from the organization, “Wahre Religion” (true religion). He began to produce propaganda nasheeds (religious chants) to glorify jihad, which were broadcast on the Internet.

Now immersed within the Islamist ideology, Cuspert continued producing salafist online propaganda for the jihadist movement, extending his efforts to working for an organization called Millatu Ibrahim [14]. It was during this time that his activity came to the attention of the police. Following an incident in May, 2012 in Bonn, where a police officer was seriously injured by a knife wielded by an Islamist extremist during a clash with members of the right-wing party “pro Köln,” police conducted 80 raids of premises suspected to be occupied by members of the extreme salafist movement. In one of the raided flats, officers discovered a vest filled with explosives, which had been prepared by Cuspert. While forensic examinations revealed that the improvised device would not have detonated, it provided a clear signal to authorities that Cuspert was preparing to pursue his extremist believes through acts of violence [15].

In Germany, the public disorder between extreme salifists and right-wing groups brought about the ban of Millatu Ibrahim. Unfortunately for German authorities, Cuspert disappeared along with associates shortly after the raids and was suspected of making his way to Egypt [16].

In September, 2012, Cuspert published a video online in which he asked all Muslims in Germany to fight against the German government and threatening to bring jihad to Germany. Reflecting on Cuspert´s radicalization development process, authorities were concerned at the speed at which he had adopted such extreme views, most likely as a result of the high level of support and influence he received from leading Islamist preachers. His online nasheeds and propaganda videos would have damaging consequences, serving to radicalize others to the Islamist cause. In February, 2011, Arid Uka, 22, a Muslim ethnic Albanian who grew up in Germany, killed two United States soldiers at Frankfurt Airport [17]. At his trial, Uka revealed that he had been radicalized by jihadist propaganda videos he had watched online. As part of their investigations, German authorities examined his Facebook profile and found that, just days before the shooting, Uka had written alongside one of Cuspert´s videos, “I love you for Allah Abu Maleeq” [18]. Authorities could not deny the influence of Cuspert as an online terrorist recruiter and radicalizer, nor could they ignore the power of the Internet, which continues to transform the very nature of terrorism.

Collaboration in counter-terrorism

Understanding why citizens across Europe are moving toward extremist perspectives, and creating an alternative to allow them to resist such views, is a priority for the counter-terrorism apparatus of individual member states. The need for credible and actionable intelligence to monitor and prevent terrorism has come to the fore and has been added to the more traditional tactics of the pursuit of terrorists through criminal justice processes. The imperative to refocus and react to new trends is central to many member states’ counter-terrorism strategies across Europe, reflecting concerns for increased preventive activity. Bringing the prevention of terrorism to community-focused policing across Europe has produced palpable moves toward expansion and localism in the policing of political violence.

Preventing terrorism and violent extremism at a local and national level was recognized by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union who, in December, 2005, established the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The strategy was divided into four pillars—Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond, and was welcomed by the heads of member states and governments. This pan-European strategy sought to take the agenda of work that was set out at the March, 2004 European Council (constituting the European Union Action Plan on Terrorism) into the next phase. The strategy committed the European Union “to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice” [19].

Recognizing that international terrorism is a trans-national phenomenon by definition, the role of the European Commission is to facilitate and coordinate intensified cooperation between European Union member states. Efforts of the European Commission have included the orientation and facilitation of the emergence, identification, and exchange of good, local practices in countering terrorist radicalization. The role of the European Commission recognizes the need to protect citizens from new and emerging terrorist tactics but most importantly, it recognizes that all in authority require a united and combined response across the European Union, which has to be tough on terrorism and on the causes of terrorism. Though absolutely necessary for citizen safety, this level of protection continues to be an ambitious undertaking and one that serves to encourage the “mainstreaming” of counter-terrorist policy and action. Concepts such as community involvement, multi-agency working, and public assurance—now widely accepted and practiced in local policing across numerous member states—have migrated into the policing of political violence. All police officers, and not just those specialist counter-terrorism officers, now share in these tasks. Counter-terrorism policing has thus become a matter for all police departments, for all their strategic partners, and for all the public.

In order to tackle the phenomenon of online radicalization, especially the opportunity provided by social media following a terrorist event, five organizations across European member states have combined their efforts and are progressing research supported by the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Commission Directorate-General Home Affairs. Bringing their own expertise to bear in concert with one another, the North East Counter Terrorism Unit of West Yorkshire Police in the UK; the European Institute of Bulgaria; the Police and Border Guard of Estonia; the Ministry of Interior, Counter Terrorism Center in Hungary; and Fachbereich Polizei in Germany are working together to find innovative solutions to strengthen communities’ online resilience to harmful terrorist rhetoric. The strategic aim of their collaborative efforts is reflected in the title of the research project: Social Media Anti-Radicalization Training for Credible Voices (SMART-CV). The purpose of SMART-CV is to develop a table-top community consequence exercise. The exercise shall increase the awareness of the benefits of harnessing the power and influence of social media to prevent radicalization of individuals following a local, national, or global counter-terrorism-related incident. The aim of this research meets the Prevention of and Fight Against Crime Programme of the European Commission objectives by stimulating, promoting, and developing horizontal methods and tools necessary for strategically preventing and fighting terrorism. By providing a counter-narrative, members of communities who attend SMART-CV exercises will help to prevent online radicalization. While social media is abused by those who are recruiting individuals from our communities for terrorist activities, SMART-CV will utilize the same networks to address community tensions, provide public reassurance, and counter harmful single narratives.

Credible voices

Recognizing that members of local communities can play an important part in preventing the radicalization of individuals, SMART-CV’s essential elements are the identification, support, and training of “Credible Voices” within local communities. A Credible Voice is a person, a group, or an organization that is able to genuinely and openly represent a community, or part of community, by effectively communicating key positive messages. Credible Voices shall leverage the full potential of their reach, influence, position, and social standing to establish counter-narratives, thereby promoting and raising awareness of alternative perspectives and encouraging a positive discourse and exchange of information between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve. Examples of Credible Voices include local religious or faith leaders; local charitable organizations or groups whose work is recognized as contributing to local communities; local volunteers who may manage youth clubs or groups, or provide local services and support to communities; as well as professionals such as teachers, youth services workers, and health workers who work within a local area. While this is not an exhaustive range of example Credible Voices, this list provides a broad indication of just some of the individuals and groups that may be able to support the prevention of online radicalization. Credible Voices shall be able to provide unique local perspectives and positive support to counter potentially damaging online narratives as part of the broader community contingency response to a terrorist incident.

The outcomes from this collaborative research will serve to improve the positive impact of counter-terrorism measures and avoid the unnecessary escalation of extremist online rhetoric through the presence and amplification of online Credible Voices. Their efforts shall strengthen community cohesion and resilience to such extremist propaganda and provide a moderate and measured alternative narrative.

Conclusion

The approach to implement preventive counter-terrorism action by governments across European Union member states has by no means been welcomed and supported by all. In developing the preventive aspects of counter-terrorism policy at a local community level, governments have entered uncharted waters. Never before have national and central government counter-terrorism policies been directly linked to local community issues in this way. That being said, the notion that communities can defeat terrorism by refusing to accept extremist rhetoric is now understood by law enforcement agencies as a primary part of their counter-terrorism efforts—an approach that underpins the unique collaborative research methodology of SMART-CV.

While the free movement of citizens has accelerated the phenomenon of online radicalization across the European Union, it has also rapidly progressed as a direct result of the increasing use of new social media, which serves to erode traditional physical boundaries. At the same time, terrorist events and other contemporary crises no longer conform to geographical boundaries. As a direct result, European citizens now require a coordinated and consistent approach to the protection of their community, wherever their locality.

Collaboration in counter-terrorism provides the key to tackling online radicalization. No single law enforcement agency or government can protect its communities alone. All in authority must recognize the need to actively encourage increased collaborative efforts and support the engagement and participation in applied research that maximizes the opportunity for future citizen safety. Law enforcement practitioners are now tackling the phenomenon of online radicalization by working together and sharing challenges and approaches. But it is not law enforcement agencies that shall defeat terrorism; it is communities. Harnessing and supporting their efforts, while focusing on the development of online Credible Voices, shall serve to stop more members of our communities from choosing the destructive road of radicalization.

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