CHAPTER 6
Jerry Porras: Success Built to Last
Jerry Porras is the Lane Professor Emeritus of Organizational Behavior at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University. He is the author of Stream Analysis: A Powerful Way to Diagnose and Manage Organizational Change (1987) and co-author of two bestsellers: Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies (1994) and Success Built to Last: Creating a Life That Matters (2006).
What is the secret of companies that have achieved enduring success? Jerry Porras, together with Jim Collins, his friend and colleague at Stanford, spent six years, studying 18 “visionary companies,” and provided the answer in the bestselling business classic Built to Last.
Then how about individuals who have achieved enduring success? Porras and his two co-authors spent 10 years studying more than 200 people who had had a significant impact (and not necessarily in the business sphere) for at least 20 years, and revealed their secrets in another bestseller, Success Built to Last.
My conversation with Porras at his Stanford office in June 2008 went the other way round. We started at personal success and ended with organizational leadership.

Redefining Success

Liu: In Success Built to Last, you and your co-authors selected successful people to study. How would you define success in the first place?
 
Porras: That’s a good question because it was one of the early and most important findings in this research. If you look up “success” in Webster’s Dictionary, it is defined as “the achievement of wealth, fame, or power.” That’s the generally-accepted view of what success is. We found in the individuals we studied that success is not defined that way. It is defined more in terms of making a difference, making a significant contribution that is important to you and that is lasting.
So we were interested in finding people who made a difference in the world in various ways and at various levels. There are people who have made a difference at the world level and national level—people like, Nelson Mandela and Jimmy Carter, for example—but also people you’ve never heard of, who have made a difference at the community level or company level.
It was difficult to identify this group in any rigorous sort of way. So we relied on the varieties of lists of “The Most Important People,” leaders in industries, and so on. Then we just became opportunistic. One of the co-authors, Mark Thompson, was a very frequent attendant at the World Economic Forum. So he would interview people that went to that.
In deciding what kind of people to interview, our definition of success was based on the notion of having had an impact. It didn’t mean they were wealthy or necessarily famous. But they had had an impact for at least for 20 years.
 
Liu: Even a negative impact?
 
Porras: Well, we tended to shy away from the negative-impact individuals. You know Osama bin Laden has had an impact. We wouldn’t make an attempt to interview him.
 
Liu: Do you think he is successful?
 
Porras: In his own terms, I think he thinks he is successful. There certainly are a lot of people who think bin Laden has been very successful and who admire and respect him. I’m not in that camp. So here is where we started to move from purely objective research and scientific orientation to human nature and personal values and beliefs. We have to define and determine what success we are going to admire and what success we are not. That’s where our own personal values and our own personal views of the world begin to factor in.
 
Liu: The definition of success is very important for us. You can try to look at it in an objective way, but it’s a tricky concept, a bit like happiness. To the outsider, it may seem that a person is successful or happy, but the person himself may not feel that way.
 
Porras: Exactly.
 
Liu: You are talking about people who actually are on some important lists or at a very high position. Other people can see them and know about them. I just met a cleaner outside the building before I came in. He might say, “I feel I’m successful.” Would you agree with him?
 
Porras: Yes. I think the key difference in the way Webster’s defines success and the way the individuals we studied define success is that success is very much internally driven. So if the cleaner feels that he is accomplishing something that is important to him and that he thinks he makes a difference and makes an important contribution, and he feels he is doing really well, then he can define himself as successful and be absolutely correct, from our perspective.
 
Liu: But you are not going to interview him anyway. So there is still an external metric or a set of external metrics you use to judge success.
 
Porras: Yes, there’s no question about that. We did not interview the cleaner but the empirical question still is: if we did, would we find that the way he built his life was similar to the way these people built their lives? That’s the ultimate question and the answer we are suggesting is that it would be.
There are individuals we interviewed who are not really well known or who haven’t made a lot of money. But in fact they really had an impact in the universe in which they operated. I like to use the example of Norma Hotaling, a drug addict and prostitute in San Francisco. She got herself out of prostitution, stopped being an addict and then built a community organization that helps women like her get out of similar situations. At the time we interviewed her, she wasn’t famous. Most people in San Francisco didn’t know who she was. But people in the community that she was helping certainly knew. She had been making a big difference for at least 20 years, another of the criteria we used.1
 
Liu: I regularly facilitate a workshop for Chinese managers on the subject of how to manage and lead yourself. In that workshop I say, “Don’t pursue success. Pursue achievement.” And they ask, “What’s the difference?” I say that achievement is what you have done, and success is what the world . . .
 
Porras: . . . thinks you have done.
 
Liu: Right. You may or may not get fame, money, or position. But don’t worry about that.
 
Porras: In the language of this book, the way we would say it is “pursue your passion,” which is not quite “pursue achievement,” but involves achievement. In order for you to pursue your passion successfully, you have to achieve something. The key ingredient is that you are achieving in an area that is very important to you.
The example you gave earlier about people being very wealthy, very famous, yet very unhappy, I think is a product of what they have achieved or not achieved in their passion. If they are achieving their passion, I don’t think they are unhappy. That’s what the data seem to tell us.

The Road to Success

Liu: Actually, I was about to get on to the question of “passion.” I have borrowed some ideas and stories from your book in my workshop. For me, a very important message from the book is that passion should be the fundamental drive of our lives. Did this finding surprise you?
 
Porras: It did a bit. It surprised us because we were sort of embedded in the classical definition of success in which there is no mention of passion. That passion was such a powerful force and that it was the key determinant to whether people feel successful or not, that was a bit of surprise.
However, it wasn’t a total surprise, because the findings in Built to Last had already shown us that those companies that lived their values and pursued a fundamental purpose beyond maximizing profits wound up being more significant in the world. They wound up being more admired in the world. They wound up performing better economically too. That was a paradoxical finding. So the parallel at the individual level is that if you pursue your purpose, which one could say is parallel to passion, and you do it well, then you will be more successful in a lot of ways, even in the traditional ways, than if you pursue being successful in those traditional ways.
 
Liu: The book says that the intersection of three circles—meaning, thought and action, respectively—defines enduring success. What happens to people who only have two circles, say, only meaning and thought, or meaning and action, or thought and action?
 
Porras: Well, you get different types of results with those different combinations. So people who have meaning and thought would be passionate about something. They would think about it in ways that could supposedly satisfy their passion, but they would take no action.
 
Liu: They’re always talking.
 
Porras: You’re exactly right. But without the action, it’s just talk. So those individuals will probably wind up being frustrated in never having achieved anything tangible. They will be like dreamers. They’ll be dreaming about “I’ll do this,” “I’ll do that,” but never actually doing it.
If we have people who have meaning and action, their outcome is a bit different. They are achieving things but they’ll probably have difficulty achieving those things more because they don’t have the mental set necessary to really continue to achieve. For example, learning from mistakes is a thought style. If they don’t have that capacity, they will make mistakes and keep making the same mistakes over and over again. So the level of accomplishment of whatever passion they are trying to fulfill will probably be lower. But they will be getting things done, whereas the first group will not.
Now, to have thought and action, and not meaning, is to be all over the place. You take this action, get something done and maybe feel good about it but it won’t have a lasting effect because it isn’t fulfilling any passion. Some other opportunities, some other challenges will come up and you will jump in. So what we will probably see is a life in which a person has done a lot of different things but never really made substantial, meaningful, enduring contributions because they are all over the map.
 
Liu: So the circle of meaning is pretty much the circle of passion.
 
Porras: Right. What your passion is about, what the most important thing is in your life, what you would do without getting paid for it, what makes you get excited when you get other people to follow you in accomplishing; that’s what meaning is all about.
 
Liu: I also use three circles in my workshop, which are a little different from yours. I got this from Jim Collins, and it is parallel to the hedgehog concept in Good to Great.2
Porras: His three circles are what your passion is about, what you can be world class at, and what drives your economic engine.
 
Liu: And mine are passion, strength, and opportunity.
 
Porras: What Jim found in Good to Great was a way of converting the concept of “big hairy audacious goals” into a concrete reality. His three circles are a way of operationalizing those goals, which was what we discovered in the Built to Last study.

Learning from Failure

Liu: The next question is about learning from failure, or learning from mistakes, which you just touched on earlier. In Success Built to Last you say that “builders,” or enduringly successful people, learn from failure. It’s not a big secret that people should learn from their failure. So why don’t people do that? Do you have advice on how to learn from failure?
 
Porras: To answer the first part of your question—why people don’t learn from their failure—I think there is an incredible amount of defensiveness in most people and the defensiveness revolves around learning to maintain a certain image, a certain stature with your peers and everybody around you. So if you fail at something, it is negative information about your confidence, your judgment, your intelligence, or whatever. People feel they need to protect their self-image. As a result they are defensive about the failure. How they handle it is typically to try to, as we say in the US government, put a spin on the failure so that it doesn’t look like a failure. Or they try to cover it up, which is another thing we see a lot in government and business.
So the more people lack confidence in themselves, the more likely they are to be defensive. If they have more confidence in themselves and their abilities, the less likely they are to be defensive and the more able to analyze and assess the failure and move from there to learning from it. Now what can be done? There are in my mind two ways of thinking about that question. One is the individual in isolation and the second is the individual in an organization.
 
Liu: Could you explain?
 
Porras: Let me first talk about the second, the individual in the organization. The organization can create an environment in which a failure is punished or judged or there is some negative reaction to it. In that circumstance, no matter how strong their ego or self-confidence, people are likely to try to hide failures.
In contrast, an organization can be one that values failures, like 3M. 3M makes it possible for people to publicly describe and detail their failures. In our research for Built to Last, I talked to the inventor of Post-It notes and he described in detail what had happened. It was a really powerful example of an individual who had failed in accomplishing a particular project to create a kind of glue, but who could openly talk about it in a public setting.
When I teach this in executive programs, I ask the executives, “How many of you have had the opportunity to stand in front of 30 or 40 of your peers and spend an hour going into minute detail describing a failure you are responsible for?” Your culture may be different, but in the United States, in Western cultures, almost nobody raises their hand. In fact, they laugh about it.
 
Liu: It’s probably the same in China.
 
Porras: So you don’t talk about failures openly. At 3M the organization is structured and procedures are put in place to make these discussions happen so that someone else may learn something from it. The Post-It is a great example of someone sitting in the audience, hearing this, and figuring out there might be another application of the failed glue. And that failure became the most successful product 3M ever had.
So, organizations can create cultures, systems, procedures, and policies that reinforce open discussion and learning from failures. Even people who might be defensive about their failures are overpowered by an environment in which it’s OK to talk about it. So the environment can make a very substantial difference in the behavior of the individual. If one is thinking about enhancing the learning from failures, I think the very first place to focus on is the organization in which the person is supposed to be learning from failures.
Now if we think about individuals, independent of organizations—which is harder to do because most of the things people do are in the context of an organization—part of the process is a mind game that the person has to play with himself or herself about a failure. Part of the mind game is asking and exploring questions within yourself, such as, “What is the worst thing that could happen if I talk about this failure, if I don’t hide it, if I don’t react like it didn’t happen?” When you look at that, often the worst thing that could happen is not very scary. It’s not clarifying the worst thing that’s scary. It’s the ambiguity that’s scary. So one way that people could start to manage themselves out of that is through asking themselves those sorts of questions.
A second way to think about it is delivering the idea in educational experiences like the one you are offering, promoting failures as opportunities for learning. Most of us don’t grow up with that idea. Most of us grow up with the idea that failures are bad. So there is a self-analysis and self-managing process, but also an external educational process. The education can also involve real examples like the Post-It of how a failure was learned from and created great success.

Two Types of Leader

Liu: In an interview, you once said that before you and Jim Collins did research for Built to Last, you both had the idea that it took a great leader to create and lead a great company. How did the research change that idea?
 
Porras: Basically, it changed our view of what a great leader is.
Before we started the research, Jim and I were having lots of conversations about organizations. I was saying what really guides an organization is purpose. He was saying what really guides an organization is mission. So we were back and forth. Are they the same? Are they different? This slowly evolved into thinking about doing some research together and we thought it would be good to learn more about great organizations and how they got to be great.
We then had a very simple model: we said it takes great leaders to build great organizations. It’s not an outrageous statement, I think. Then we asked ourselves what makes a great leader. We were having this discussion in the late 1980s, when much management thinking in the US about leadership revolved around leaders having to be visionary.
 
Liu: That was when Iacocca was an icon.
 
Porras: Exactly. He was considered a visionary leader and he was the ideal model. He was the poster child at that time. Everybody said, “This is a great leader and he is very visionary.”
When we looked for the definition and description of a visionary leader, one of the words that showed up in almost every account was “charismatic.” In order to be a great leader, you had to be charismatic, brilliant, insightful, committed, focused, risk-taking . . . It took all those things to be visionary.
We then said, if it takes a great leader to build a great organization, and a great leader is a visionary leader, and a visionary leader is charismatic, who are the great charismatic leaders of organizations that we think are great? The first organization that popped into our minds was 3M. But when we began to explore a little bit, we couldn’t find a leader at 3M, from the founders forward, who met that description of a visionary leader. We could find no one who was that charismatic. We found very successful, effective leaders but none of them could be typified as “charismatic.”
Because our little theory had broken down, we decided that maybe we had put the spotlight on the wrong entity and that, instead, we ought to focus on the great organizations, rather than on visionary leaders, and ask how they were built.
It turned out when we studied these organizations, they had great leaders but the great leaders were defined in a different way. It turned out that style was not the important characteristic. Whether you are charismatic or not isn’t important, because virtually none of the great leaders in visionary companies was charismatic.
What we found was that the great leaders in the visionary companies focused on building great organizations. The great leaders in the comparison companies, who by and large were generally charismatic, focused on leading their organizations, which means that they created companies that depended heavily on them to be successful. They depended on their brilliance as technologists, as strategists, as advertisers, as product developers, as financial geniuses, and so on.
 
Liu: In Built to Last, there is a beautiful metaphor for this: time-tellers as opposed to clock-builders.
 
Porras: That’s exactly right. Those who focused on leading the organization were the time-tellers, while those who focused on building a great organization were the clock-builders. That was the most significant difference between the two sets of leaders. If you want to build an enduringly great organization, you have to focus on just that. If you want to build an organization that is just successful when you are there, you don’t care very much about what it’s like after you are gone, then you build an organization that is dependent on you. If you are brilliant enough, it will be very successful. And these comparison organizations were very successful while the great leaders were there. After the great leaders left, these great organizations didn’t die, but they never achieved the same levels of success.
 
Liu: What did those leaders focus on to build the clock?
 
Porras: This wasn’t something they learned externally, because most of the organizations we studied were founded in the 1930s or earlier. There wasn’t a lot of information being exchanged at that time. There weren’t a lot of books being written about management. They were following these paths intuitively and what we found was that across 18 of these companies, there were some similar activities being pursued. I likened it to 18 people who were all inventing the wheel independently of each other. They all invented pretty much the same wheel.
That wheel is what we call a “visionary organization.” It needs to have a core ideology; it needs to have a passion for change; it needs to have processes that preserve the core ideology and that stimulate change. And we describe the six common mechanisms for preserving the core and stimulating change. So if you build an organization, you would be asking yourself, “Does my organization have these characteristics?”
 
Liu: These are actually the core findings of the Built to Last research.
 
Porras: Let me add in some dimensions to make it more concrete. We say we build an organization that has these mechanisms and these characteristics. But how do we convert that to the very concrete working organization? So here is where some other work I have been doing starts to fit in and give some answers. The answers lie in thinking about what it is in the organization that affects behavior. To have an effective organization, we have to have effective behavior on the part of the people that work in the organization. There is a social cognitive theory which basically says that there are factors in the environment that drive behavior and will mostly explain behavior. If we are going to understand why people behave the way they do in a work setting, we need to understand the environment they are in.
So the environment has to be conceptualized. The concept that I have used is that there are four main arenas in the work environment. The first is what I call the organizing arrangements—the structure, the policies and procedures, the formal systems that exist. The second category is what I call social factors, and here we have the culture of the organization, the informal networks of communication and influence, the leadership style, and so on. The third dimension is what I call the technology, and here we have the machinery and equipment people work with, the designs of the jobs, the technical systems such as scheduling systems and the exchange of technical information, and so on. The final dimension is the physical setting. Whether we have offices with long halls and closed doors, whether we have open bullpens, whether we have a factory that’s dirty or dark or clean, and so on.
So those four arenas send signals to people about behavior. Now these ideas and the Built to Last ideas merged in that we want to design those arenas in such a way that they are consistent with the core ideology and they continue to stimulate change. So if we design a structure, is that structure consistent with the ideology? If we have a reward system within that formal structure, is that reward system consistent with the value system? Do they serve the purpose? If we ask that question about each of the four arenas, we can then begin to build an environment that is aligned to deliver signals that are consistent around behaviors that we want. Built to Last is a photograph of an ideal organization. How do we translate that photograph into much more concrete reality? I would suggest that it is by recognizing these four arenas and asking the question: what should they look like to be consistent with this picture?

Organizational Architect

Liu: People like you usually have their favorite name for their favorite type of leader. Jim Collins, for example, has Level 5 Leaders; or Bill George has Authentic Leaders. Do you have a name for your favorite type of leader?
 
Porras: Yes. I call them “Organizational Architects.”
 
Liu: Could you explain that a little?
 
Porras: What I just described for you are, in essence, the components of the architecture of an organization. The idea is that a leader needs to consciously build the organization in such a way that it promotes the behaviors of the people in the organization that make the organization successful, but also the behaviors that help the individual to develop and grow. So it’s a dual bottom line.
We want to have a more successful organization, and we also want to have more developed people. If the two happen, then you can get long-term organizational success and an enduring organization. If you only get organizational success but you don’t get the individual development, that success will be temporary. If you get just individual development but not organizational performance, that development will also be temporary. So having both guarantees the long-term, enduring nature of the organization. Just like an architect builds a building, an organizational architect builds an organization.
 
Liu: You were highlighting the vitality of developing people. I would like to talk a little more about it. In management theory, people have been viewed differently over time: as costs, as human resources, as human capital. What’s your view about that?
 
Porras: The evolving view of people reflects the evolving view of how societies conceptualize people. As societies become more humane, our views of individuals in organizations have also become more humane: so people have moved from being just tools of production to being more fully human. We are not totally there yet when there are still a lot of organizations that view people as tools for production.
I think one thing that is universal is that people like to feel they are contributing something that’s important—important to them, important to the company, important to the country, and important to the society. I believe also that people intrinsically like to do a good job. I think that you have to be psychologically ill to have the perspective that you are going to work today and mess up, create problems, fail, and do a bad job.
 
Liu: You think people go to work and want to do a good job?
 
Porras: I think in most cases people just go to work. They don’t think so much about the job they are going to do because the organization continues to not value the job that they do or the contribution they make. But I think given a free choice, people would rather go to work, contribute something that’s important, feel that they are contributing something that’s important, and get feedback and rewards that tell them that what they contributed is important. I think almost everybody would rather exist in such a situation, rather than one in which they are looked upon as a cost, as being lazy, as a failure, or as incompetent.
So, if we believe in that assumption we need to change the focus of what the organization does in relation to people. This is where the idea of development begins to fit in. If you believe people want to do a good job, then why not try to create an organization to make it possible? If all that becomes possible and people behave accordingly, then you tend to have a much higher-performing organization.
In our evolution in how we see people, we get closer and closer to seeing them in this humane way. But we are not there yet. I don’t know enough about organizations in China, but my speculation is that a substantial number of organizations, especially in the production facilities, still view people as milk cows and wheels and they are to be told what to do.
 
Liu: I agree with you that we are not there yet. Because whether you treat people like costs, or resources, or capital, you still don’t treat people as people.
 
Porras: Exactly. That’s very well put. If you don’t treat people as people, they don’t act like people.
 
Liu: My colleagues and I are writing a book with the working title “Treating Employees as People.” Not as capital or resources, but as people.
 
Porras: That’s right. You make decisions about them that do not enhance their willingness to work hard and produce. So, if they are part of capital or resources, you feel free to reduce them and kick them out. So United Airlines kicked out thousands of people. What about the 200,000 that are left? Many of them are afraid they might be next. Many more would behave in ways just to protect their jobs and not necessarily think about doing a good job for the company. There’s an old saying here in the US, pay me now or pay me later.
 
Liu: What does that mean, exactly?
 
Porras: It means sooner or later you have got to pay. You will not be able to avoid paying a price to get out of a difficulty. You can choose to pay that price now or later, but the price has to be paid.

Purpose Beyond Profit

Liu: I would like to move on to some questions about purpose. There has long been a debate over the purpose of a company. I think most business people, whether in the US or China, still are not convinced that a company should have a purpose beyond profit. Does this disappoint you?
 
Porras: No. I think it’s a reality. I think what we have to do is distinguish between making a reasonable profit and maximizing profits. You’ve got to make a profit otherwise you don’t survive. That’s just the reality. Being unprofitable is not a feasible option. The choice is between making a reasonable profit and maximizing profits.
Now the economist’s view of the world is that organizations exist to maximize shareholders’ wealth, which means maximizing profits. That’s been the heritage of thinking in the economic world. So it’s no wonder that that’s how most managers think.
Our findings in Built to Last were very profound in this regard, in that they show that those companies that focused on maximizing profits over a 70-year period performed better than the market by a factor of 3:1. But, in comparison, those companies that focused on pursuing their purpose performed better than the market by 15:1. I updated the data to year 2000, 10 years later, and found that the visionary companies had performed better than the market by 16:1. The others also went up, to 4:1, but the visionary companies are still continuing to improve.
The data are pretty powerful but people just refuse to accept them. They somehow continue to claim that there is something wrong with the analyses or that it’s just a freak aberration or whatever. They don’t want to let go of the idea that the only way to make a lot of money is to focus on maximizing profits. I think people don’t want to let it go because it’s easier not to.
It’s easier to focus on that. It’s clear. Everybody knows about it. You are not getting many complaints about it. People aren’t going to criticize you for it because it’s well accepted. But to say, “Our focus is to make the contribution that’s implied in our purpose and if we do that really well, we are going to make a lot of money. We are not going to focus on making a lot of money. We are going to focus on serving our purpose,” takes more courage and is a harder sell than to say we are going to focus on maximizing shareholders’ wealth.

A More Complex View of Vision

Liu: You mentioned earlier that you and Jim Collins had some debate over whether it was purpose or mission that drives a company. Could you differentiate between purpose and mission?
 
Porras: “Purpose” is not commonly used, but “mission,” “vision” and “values” are. My perspective from the research is that these terms are often used in multiple ways.
Mission is sometimes used to describe a contribution you want to make. If you use it that way, it’s more like purpose. But sometimes mission is used to describe what you are doing: “Our mission is to provide health care to the Northern California community.” That’s a description of what you are doing. Sometimes mission is the responsibility that you have. For instance, the military might say, “Our mission is to protect the northern sector.” And sometimes mission, is a big goal you want to achieve. “Our mission is to land a man on the moon and get back by the end of the decade.” The word can be used in those four contexts, so when you use the word “mission,” I don’t know which meaning you intend until I listen more and find out.
Purpose has a much more definite, narrow meaning—it relates to why you exist and the fundamental contribution you make. That’s why we used “purpose” rather than “mission.”
When we were starting our discussions, we weren’t very clear about those differences. We were also coming from working with different groups. Jim had been working with management teams from small companies, for whom mission was much more a major goal. I had been working with larger organizations as a whole. Jim was a consultant, and I was thinking theoretically. I was trying to figure out the glue that holds organizations together; what defines what the structure looks like, the culture, and all that. I was thinking of the word “purpose” as being the glue that holds things together because if everybody understands the purpose, then you design the structure in a culture, technology and physical setting to be consistent with the purpose to help you achieve the purpose. So we were coming from very different places in the way we were thinking about the words we were using. And that’s the reason we had a disagreement. But out of discussions we began to understand each other better.
 
Liu: How about values and vision?
 
Porras: When people talk about values, they can be core values, which were the ones we discovered in our research. They are unchanging, small in number—maybe three to five—very fundamental. You live them no matter what happens. They are different from the other values in the organization, which I now describe as strategic values—the values the organization adopts in order to implement its strategy. The key thing is if you change the strategy, you should change the values. The reality is that you change the strategy and often the values don’t change. That blocks you and your achievement in the new strategy. One of the problems with change is how you change those values. But core values and strategic values are two different types of values that exist in the organization. Core values do not change; strategic values are dynamic and they should change.
Vision is thought about most commonly as a view of the future, or a dream that you have about what the future should be like. If you ask yourself, “What is vision supposed to do for an organization?” and are really serious about this, you could come up with a pretty long list of requirements. Vision is supposed to motivate people, to inspire them, to focus them, to guide behavior, to limit activities, and so on.
I asked executives in executive programs to tell me what they thought vision should do for their company, and we came up with a list of up to 20 items. Then I asked them, “Does your company have a vision?” And they all raised their hands. Then I asked them, “Among all these items written on the board, how many of them are satisfied by your company’s vision?” Usually the answer was three to five; which means 15 to 17 items were not satisfied by their company’s vision.
So what’s wrong? It is that the traditional view of vision is not complex enough. That’s where we came up with the description of vision in Built to Last, which is that vision is more complicated than just a dream of the future. So if you want to satisfy all those 20 items, you have to be much more complex.
If you look at what the visionary companies are doing to satisfy all of the 20 items, first of all, they have a purpose that satisfies some of the items; then they have core values that satisfy another set of items; and they also have a big hairy audacious goal that satisfies the remaining items. These three things together will satisfy all those 20 items. So vision is these three things. Plus, you have to communicate it. If you’ve got them, then you’ve got vision.

Endnotes

1 Norma Hotaling died of pancreatic cancer on December 16, 2008, at the age of 57.
2 Jim Collins uses “the hedgehog concept” to advocate that a company should focus, rather than diversify, as the contrast between the hedgehog and the fox (see “The Fox and the Hedgehog” box in Chapter 2). In his book Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap . . . and Others Don’t (Harper Collins, 2001), Collins argues that a company, in order to leap from good to great, is required to have a deep understanding of the intersection of three circles: what it is deeply passionate about, what it can be the best in the world at, and what drives its economic engine. The good-to-great companies translate the understanding into a simple, crystalline concept—the hedgehog concept—and stick to it.
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