CHAPTER 3
THE BIRTH OF CONTEMPORARY HOMELAND SECURITY
The National Response to 9/11 and Its Aftermath

America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.

President George W. Bush, January 29, 2002

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Every sector of American society was affected in some manner by the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Offensive and defensive strategies were created to meet future threats. Many of the initiatives, in both the public and private sectors, challenged traditional approaches taken by the United States to ensure domestic security. These changes featured aggressive new U.S. foreign and military policies and efforts to cooperate with other countries in the war on terror. On the home front, they included reforming the intelligence community, refocusing the FBI and other federal agencies, enacting sweeping legislation to strengthen law enforcement, and concluding the most far-reaching reorganization of the federal government in more than 50 years. These vast changes also extended to state and local governments and the private sector. Even after the first wave of reform, transformation continued for years after 9/11, stimulated in part by widespread dissatisfaction with the national response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, as well as renewed concerns over immigration and border security.

This chapter describes how the United States responded to the challenges laid out by President Bush in the quote above. It outlines both the initiatives undertaken by the federal government and the controversies and concerns that emerged.

CHAPTER LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter, you should be able to

1. Explain how the federal government was reorganized to focus on homeland security.

2. Describe the major tenets of homeland security.

3. Define the changes in the U.S. approach to domestic counterterrorism after 9/11.

4. Identify major homeland security challenges faced by state and local governments and the private sector.

5. Describe the subsequent major reforms after Congress established the Department of Homeland Security.

THE RESPONSE TO CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM

As exhausted rescue workers dug through the smoking remains of the World Trade Center and a large American flag billowed over the hole torn in the Pentagon’s side, the Bush administration mapped out its response to twenty-first-century terrorism.¹ Some of the early steps were defensive: continuing the grounding of civilian aircraft, closing key government offices and monuments, providing fighter jet cover over major cities, and launching a dragnet for “special interest” aliens and others suspected of terrorist links. But the first major strategic change centered on taking the battle to the enemy by invading Afghanistan and crippling foreign terrorist organizations with international ties.

Taking the Offensive

The president announced an unprecedented campaign against global terrorism in a speech to Congress on September 20, 2001. The address singled out three global threats that required a concerted response: terrorist organizations with global reach, weak states that harbored transnational terrorist groups, and “rogue” states that might aid terrorists or undertake terrorist acts themselves. During the speech, President Bush declared, “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” In his speech the president added that “[f]rom this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” The declarations in this speech are commonly referred to as the Bush Doctrine.²

Preemption

The avowal that nations supporting terrorism were to be considered hostile regimes was significant in light of the U.S. National Security Strategy published by the administration the following September. The strategy is a document required by law that outlines the overall ends, ways, and means of ensuring national security. The 2002 strategy reaffirmed the nation’s right of preemption, which allows countries to defend themselves against an imminent threat before they are actually attacked. The strategy broadly interpreted the United States’ right to forestall or prevent terrorist acts, particularly when the threat of weapons of mass destruction might be involved.³

Opposition to the Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine proved highly controversial, particularly as its tenets were put into practice. There were two main objections to declaring war on terrorism. First, as discussed earlier, there is no universal definition of terrorism, and thus no strictly defined enemy. Second, combating terrorists, whoever they are, is not solely or even primarily a military operation over the long term, but in many respects a matter of law enforcement and social, cultural, and economic conflict. It is not “traditional” war, as one U.S. defense analyst declared, in the sense understood by military professionals. Wars, he argued, are supposed to have “clear beginnings and ends … [and] clear standards for measuring success in the form of territory gained and enemy forces destroyed.”⁴ In short, critics of the Bush Doctrine declared the global war on terrorism was inappropriate because its goals were open-ended, unbounded, and unlikely to achieve decisive results. At the same time, critics suggested many around the world would interpret U.S. efforts as “empire building,” efforts to expand American power rather than enhance global security.

Support for the Bush Doctrine

In contrast, proponents of the president’s strategy concluded the United States had few practical alternatives. U.S. counterterrorism efforts had been insufficient to stem the growth of transnational terrorist networks, and al-Qaida had publicly committed itself to the destruction of the United States.⁵ In addition, they argued the means used to defend the nation during the Cold War would be inadequate to deal with the security threats of the twenty-first century. Cold War strategy relied on deterrence (the threat of nuclear war) and containment, the use of military, political, diplomatic, and economic power to limit the spread of communism. It would be difficult to apply deterrence and containment as practiced against the Soviet Union to disparate transnational groups and determined rogue states.⁶ The only solution was to go after the terrorists, while remaining prepared to thwart or respond to attacks that would inevitably ensue. This included plans to eliminate the political breeding grounds of terrorists in the Middle East, which President Bush later called the “forward strategy of freedom,” a doctrine that would grow to include the liberation of Iraq.

On October 7, 2001, following repeated refusals by the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan to expel Usama bin Ladin, the United States and an antiterrorist coalition of countries began military operations to root out both the Taliban and al-Qaida. Under attack by U.S. airpower and anti-Taliban ground forces, organized opposition disintegrated rapidly, and Kabul, the Afghan capital, fell on November 13, 2001. Many key senior Taliban and al-Qaida leaders, including bin Ladin, escaped capture. The war against Taliban and al-Qaida insurgents would continue for years in Afghanistan and enemy sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan, even after the 2011 killing of bin Ladin by U.S. troops in Pakistan.

The Long War

Operations in Afghanistan proved to be the first of many global activities that came to be called the “global war on terrorism” or more simply “the Long War.” In 2002 the U.S. government established a detention facility for “high value” enemy combatants at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At its height the facility held approximately 775 detainees. From the onset, the treatment and interrogation of detainees and their legal status have been issue of significant controversy.

Equally controversial was rendition, also described as “extraordinary rendition” or “irregular rendition,” which comprised covert operations by the CIA to detain, transfer, and interrogate terrorist suspects. By some reports as many as 3,000 individuals were transported under this program. Allegations of abuses of the program included the use of torture by U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies and law enforcement. Some CIA interrogations included so-called enhanced interrogation techniques, including the use of waterboarding (simulated drowning), declared legal by the Bush Administration but condemned as torture by critics.

On March 20, 2003, the United States and other coalition forces invaded Iraq. Code-named Operation Iraqi Freedom and also referred to as the Second Gulf War, it resulted in a quick military victory followed by a prolonged and bloody occupation. Among the many insurgent groups that dispatched “foreign fighters” to Iraq, al-Qaida declared the country a major front in its campaign against the United States. The conduct of the occupation and primary rationale for the war (that the regime in Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction) proved intensely controversial.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

While U.S. military power proved instrumental in dismantling terrorist sanctuaries, American combat operations alone were insufficient to take the offensive in the war on terror. The United States also required international cooperation both to pursue terrorists and to enhance homeland security. Effective cooperation had to expand beyond military means, including areas such as covert operations, intelligence sharing, law enforcement, and trade and travel security. After 9/11 over 100 nations offered the United States some form of assistance or support, perhaps most prominently America’s traditional military ally Great Britain. The United States discovered that in the war against global terrorism, a class of states that could be termed the “new allies” was also vital. These were states that had ambivalent relations with the United States in the past but now found themselves in a situation where their internal security concerns and regional objectives coincided with U.S. interests in fighting global terrorism. They provided basing and overflight rights, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism support for attacking al-Qaida sanctuaries overseas. In Asia the rapidly expanding joint effort by the United States and Kazakhstan offered one example of a new alliance at work.⁷

Support also came from organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), originally formed to defend the West against the Soviet Union and America’s only multinational military alliance of major consequence. After the attacks of September 11, the Alliance invoked Article 5 of its charter (the provision for collective self-defense) for the first time in its history. This was a powerful statement of solidarity and a positive sign for future cooperation. NATO also provided assistance in postwar Afghanistan. On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which called for criminalizing terrorist activities, denying funds and safe havens, and establishing a committee to monitor implementation.⁸ Other international organizations also had a part to play, including the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (as the only pan-European body), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. The United States and the EU, for example, enacted new joint measures to freeze terrorist assets and share intelligence.

Additionally, a long list of organizations, such as Interpol, contributed to combating transnational threats. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also assumed important functions in homeland security and counterterrorism. For example, after 9/11 the International Maritime Organization set stricter standards for the security of ports and international shipping. Nevertheless, harmonizing the efforts of these organizations with U.S. security remained a complicated process. In some cases, NGO activities proved detrimental and were even accused of being fronts for transnational crime and terrorist activities. One charitable group, the Holy Land Foundation, for example, is alleged to have funneled over $150 million to the terrorist group Hamas.

Cooperation between the United States and other countries, multinational organizations, and nongovernment groups took many forms, from public diplomacy to covert operations. One important avenue of international cooperation was a crackdown on monetary instruments used to finance terrorist attacks, such as the hawala, a short-term, discountable, negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange used widely in the Islamic world. While not limited to Muslim countries, the hawala has come to be identified with Islamic banking. It was alleged that billions of dollars were transferred through these exchanges and that some hawala dealers had ties to terrorists.⁹ After 9/11 a concerted effort to combat money laundering, including the use of the hawala, was directed at terrorist financial networks. In the year after 9/11, the White House reported that $113.5 million in terrorist assets had been frozen worldwide: $35.3 million in the United States and $78.2 million overseas.¹⁰

DEFENSIVE EFFORTS

On the home front, the Bush administration set out to enhance inter-agency and intergovernmental cooperation, which had been lacking prior to 9/11. These goals were pursued by new legal initiatives, creation of the White House Office of Homeland Security, the drafting of a national homeland security strategy, plans to create a separate regional military command for the defense of North America, and a proposal for a federal Homeland Security Department. Improving airline safety and heightening security awareness for other critical infrastructure systems were also focal points. For example, the government recruited, trained, and deployed 45,000 federal security screeners to airports across the nation. At the same time, the anthrax attacks of fall 2001 galvanized support for increased defensive measures against WMD.

The PATRIOT Act and Other Congressional Initiatives

In response to the September 11 attack, Congress passed a number of significant pieces of legislation. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established a federal agency to supervise the security of commercial aviation. The Maritime Transportation Security Act generated new requirements for the security of ports and shipping. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act significantly expanded the information to be collected on visitors to the United States. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act mandated additional measures for protecting the food and drug supply.

Perhaps the most significant and controversial of the new laws passed by Congress was the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act. The act defined terrorism and created new crimes, penalties, and procedural efficiencies for use against domestic and international terrorists. Although it was not without safeguards, critics contended some of its provisions went too far. Others were concerned that, although it granted many of the enhancements sought by the Department of Justice, it did not go far enough. Despite these controversies, in 2011 central provisions of the act were extended for four years.

Several provisions of the act are key for promoting appropriate sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement investigators and providing counterterrorism investigators with tools that law enforcement agents already used to investigate other crimes.

Prior to passage of the PATRIOT Act, law enforcement officials were generally restricted from sharing information provided to a grand jury with members of the intelligence community. The act permitted the sharing of matters involving foreign intelligence uncovered during a grand jury with counterterrorism law enforcement investigators. Another section of the PATRIOT Act amends the National Security Act to permit the Justice Department to disclose to the CIA foreign intelligence acquired in the course of a criminal investigation. The PATRIOT Act also modified the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which established special groups of judges to supervise law enforcement investigations involving classified subjects and material. While the passage of the PATRIOT Act has engendered much controversy and concern over potential abuses of civil liberties, virtually all the investigative tools provided by the act have already been used for many years to prosecute other criminal acts and have been upheld as legitimate by the courts.

The PATRIOT Act improved U.S. counterterrorism in four critical areas. First, it promoted the sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement investigations—tearing down the “wall” that hampered investigations before 9/11. Second, the act authorized additional law enforcement tools for pursuing terrorists, tools that were already available for investigating other serious crimes, such as drug smuggling. Third, it facilitated surveillance of terrorists using new technologies such as cell phones and the Internet. Fourth, the act provided for judicial and congressional oversight of the new authorities granted in the legislation.¹¹

Reorganization in the White House

One of the first post-9/11 initiatives in the executive branch was the establishment of an Office of Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President in October 2001. Headed by the assistant to the president for homeland security, former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, the mission of the office was to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national homeland security strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats. The presidential executive order that established the office also created the Homeland Security Council of cabinet- and subcabinet-level officers to coordinate federal activities.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security

The Office of Homeland Security released its national strategy in July 2002, defining homeland security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”

Against this threat the strategy established three strategic objectives: (1) preventing attack, (2) reducing vulnerabilities, and (3) minimizing damage. It organized activities into six mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response.¹³

Changes in the Department of Defense

The first major reorganization of federal agencies after 9/11 was the Department of Defense’s establishment of a new military command, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), on October 1, 2002. Before 9/11 no single military command was responsible for the defense of the United States. NORTHCOM was tasked with the land, aerospace, and maritime defense of the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, parts of the Caribbean, and the contiguous waters of the Atlantic and Pacific (out to 500 miles). NORTHCOM also offered military assistance to civilian authorities under the lead of other federal agencies.

Establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Despite initial misgivings inside and out of the Bush administration about potential cost and bureaucratic delays, the administration recommended the creation of a new federal department responsible for homeland security. Passed on November 25, 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 merged over 22 federal entities and 180,000 employees into a single department. These included many government agencies that had performed homeland security–related activities over the course of the nation’s history, including Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Coast Guard, Border Patrol, Secret Service, and FEMA.

DHS also assumed control of the Transportation Security Administration. The TSA had been established after 9/11 to screen commercial airline passengers and cargo and to oversee aviation security in general, as well as to oversee security practices for other forms of transportation, including rail and public transit systems.

The Bush administration chose not to fold the FBI—the lead law enforcement agency for combating terrorism—into DHS; it was a decision that sparked controversy, as did the administration’s rejection of calls to create a dedicated domestic intelligence agency. Other critical homeland security missions also remained outside DHS, including many activities involving bioterrorism, which came under the Department of Health and Human Services and its subordinate organizations. Furthermore, the Department of Defense retained its traditional missions of protecting the United States from military attack and providing support to civil authorities in the advent of disasters.¹⁴

Intelligence and Law Enforcement Reforms

Other significant federal initiatives involved changes in the strategy, resources, priorities, and organizations used to conduct domestic counterterrorism operations. Prior to 9/11, domestic counterterrorism was largely considered a law enforcement matter, with more emphasis on prosecuting terrorists than preemptively destroying terrorist networks. After the attacks, priorities changed. The FBI dedicated itself to preventing terrorism. On May 29, 2002, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller announced a restructuring of the agency, including establishing a national network of regional joint interagency terrorism task forces. He also declared that combating terrorism would become the bureau’s primary mission.¹⁵

Other significant efforts were initiatives to increase the exchange of information among federal agencies and the sharing of intelligence with state and local law enforcement. In this regard, the administration created two new organizations for improving the current system. The first was the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC), established in May 2003. The TTIC was designed to be a central location where all terrorist-related intelligence, both foreign and domestic, could be gathered, coordinated, and assessed. Composed of elements of the FBI, CIA, DHS, Defense and State departments, and other intelligence agencies, it was placed under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.¹⁶

The second new organization created was the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), formed as an interagency group under the FBI to consolidate all terrorist watch lists into a single resource and provide around-the-clock access to local, state, and federal authorities. The TSC was charged with bringing together databases that included the State Department’s TIPOFF database, the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Offender’s File, and DHS’s many transportation security lists.¹⁷

State and Local Governments

A central lesson of September 11 was the reminder of the critical role state and local governments play in homeland security, brought home by the deaths of hundreds of first responders in New York City and the key role of local agencies in responding to the Pentagon crash site. Americans are governed by a collection of many thousands of state and local jurisdictions. It is these jurisdictions that create and execute most emergency plans and control the police, firefighters, National Guard troops, and others on the frontline of homeland security. However, the capabilities of these governments to contribute to homeland security and the initiatives they undertook after 9/11 varied greatly. Before September 11, communities invested most of their efforts toward improving physical security through law enforcement. In addition, there was a spate of focus on information security initiatives, centered primarily on preparations for Y2K, a hugely expensive effort to ensure computer systems would not fail while changing dates in the year 2000.¹⁸

Consequence management efforts had also long been a concern for local authorities, but the emphasis was on responding to natural disasters and conventional human-made calamities such as arson and accidental chemical spills. After 9/11 there were halting and tentative movements to create a more holistic and integrated approach to homeland security, but results were mixed. States like New Jersey, for example, created their own counterterrorism offices. Every state appointed a homeland security adviser. The governor of New York proposed expanding the state’s investigative services for counter-terrorism, amounting to about half the proposed budget of the state police.¹⁹ In total, at least 1,200 state and local legislative acts were passed in the wake of September 11.²⁰

Still, response to 9/11 was uneven. Complicating the response was the fact that communities had different needs and priorities. The security requirements for large urban and industrial centers, agricultural regions, and communities surrounding defense installations are all different. Further exacerbating the challenge was a lack of national preparedness standards establishing the services and capacity that should be provided by federal, state, and local agencies.²¹ In addition, state and local authorities complained that bureaucratic rivalries and security regulations prevented federal officials from sharing critical intelligence with them. Finally, the fiscal burdens of providing homeland security loomed large for many state and local governments. By July 2002, state governments were projecting budget gaps totaling $58 billion. By some estimates additional spending on homeland security by states and major cities after 9/11 topped $6.6 billion.²² New York City alone reported spending more than $200 million a year on counterterrorism programs.²³ The federal government responded by providing billions of dollars in grants to state and local homeland security agencies, but even this assistance was decried as slow and inadequate.

Private Sector

After the September 11 attacks, there was widespread recognition that the private sector—which controls an estimated 85 percent of America’s critical infrastructures—had a central role to play in protecting the homeland. There was, however, little consensus on how best to coordinate their efforts, and, in fact, it was difficult to assess the full scope of preparations and vulnerabilities in the private sector. Much of the reported data was accumulated from voluntary surveys, and many companies withhold proprietary information. Still, one estimate concluded that spending on physical and information security by the commercial sector in the United States after the terrorist attacks quickly exceeded $30 billion per year.²⁴

Much of this investment was an extension of already existing programs designed to protect assets and ensure continued productivity in the event of natural or human-made calamity. Even before 9/11, commercial disaster recovery and continuity services were a growing business concern. One survey listed over 100 alternative work sites and business recovery and data storage centers in the United States operated by commercial vendors.²⁵ Events such as the bombing of the Murrah office building and the run-up to Y2K created a small industry specializing in disaster management and offering training, support, and products to federal, state, and local governments. Despite efforts by the federal government to encourage information sharing in the private sector, there remained great uncertainty over how much additional effort was needed. For example, many industries were unsure how to respond to official terrorist warnings and what liability they might incur if they failed to take additional security measures. Many executives also failed to see a strong business case for increased investments in security, causing outside critics to push for stronger government regulations.

The American Public

The 9/11 attacks roused the citizenry of the United States as few events before. From the volunteers who responded to Ground Zero to the many Americans who donated blood or money to the victims, the American people rushed to contribute after the attack. The public also contributed to homeland security by providing information to the authorities and in cases such as the apprehension of the Shoe Bomber aboard a commercial flight, directly prevented acts of terrorism. However, the proposed Operation TIPS (Terrorism Information and Prevention System), a plan to encourage everyone from postal workers to truck drivers to report suspicious activity, generated significant opposition from civil libertarians. The Bush administration also moved to mobilize the public in less controversial ways by creating the USA Freedom Corps, which enlisted citizens in various volunteer activities. DHS also sought to enhance preparedness through the Ready Campaign. The government estimated that 113 million Americans saw or read about the campaign and that many responded by stocking emergency supplies or taking other actions. However, certain government recommendations—such as the advice to purchase duct tape as part of a shelter-in-place strategy—became the butt of jokes. Subsequent polling also indicated most Americans remained unaware of preparedness plans for their communities, schools, and workplaces.

KATRINA AND WHAT FOLLOWED

On August 29, 2005, an event occurred that affected attitudes and perceptions toward the nation’s evolving homeland security enterprise as dramatically as the September 11 attacks. At 6:10 a.m. Hurricane Katrina made second landfall on the coast of Louisiana.

A Case Study in Catastrophe

Hurricane Katrina was the largest physical disaster this nation has suffered in modern history. No other event could be used as a comparable standard for measuring the efficacy of the response. Past great disasters, such as the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992, paled in comparison. Even the September 11 attacks offer no appreciation for the scale of Hurricane Katrina. The attack on the World Trade Center, for example, was narrow in its geographic scope and centered on a single jurisdiction. Damage to infrastructure was localized, and the immediately affected population ranged in the tens of thousands.

In contrast, Katrina affected an area of over 90,000 square miles, covered three states, disrupted the lives of millions, and destroyed or degraded most of the region’s infrastructure. The response to Katrina involved numerous federal agencies; the state governments of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; numerous local communities, including the city of New Orleans and other cities, parishes, and counties; nongovernmental organizations; private sector companies; and efforts by many individual citizens. The scope of the disaster represented an unprecedented challenge to emergency responders. As one veteran responder put it, getting massive aid into flooded New Orleans and other devastated areas was a logistical problem like “landing an army at Normandy with a little less shooting.” Transportation networks, power, and communications, all essential to speeding aid, were wiped out.

Without question the most devastating effects of the storm occurred in New Orleans, at the mouth of the Mississippi River. The hurricane dumped a 17-foot surge of water into nearby Lake Pontchartrain. In turn, the tidal surge overwhelmed the levee system protecting the city. The flood wiped out public services, including electricity, water, telephone, and cellular service. Tens of thousands were immediately made homeless. Many who had not evacuated the city before the storm took shelter at the Superdome stadium and the downtown Morial Convention Center. Others were stranded, trapped by the rising water. Many thousands more who had fled the city were told they could not return for the foreseeable future.

Katrina was also a different kind of disaster. In “normal” disasters, whether terrorist strikes like 9/11 or a natural disaster such as a flood or snowstorm, a tiered response is employed. When their resources are exhausted, local leaders turn to the state. In turn, states turn to Washington when their means are exceeded. Both local and state leaders play a critical role in effectively communicating their requirements to federal officials and managing the response. In most disasters local resources handle the first hours and days until national resources can be requested, marshaled, and rushed to the scene. That usually takes days. With the exception of a few federal assets such as the Coast Guard and Urban Search and Rescue, national teams do not roll in until well after the response is under way.

In contrast, Katrina was a “catastrophic” disaster. In catastrophic disasters, tens or hundreds of thousands of lives are immediately at risk. State and local resources may well be exhausted from the onset, and government leaders become unable to determine or communicate their priority needs. Unlike New York after 9/11, there were few communities around New Orleans and the other hardest hit areas to provide immediate “mutual aid.” After 9/11, towns and cities surrounding New York quickly pitched in, supplying personnel and needed supplies over intact bridges, roads, and waterways. In contrast, after Katrina, the small communities around cities like New Orleans, Biloxi, and Baton Rouge, which had little extra capacity before the storm, were coping with their own problems after the hurricane slammed the area. National resources were desperately needed in hours, not days, in unprecedented amounts, regardless of the difficulties. That proved a very different requirement for mounting a national response to normal disasters.

Grading Governments

In the days following the flooding of New Orleans and parts of Louisiana and Mississippi, city, state, and federal officials all came under intense criticism, particularly for not rapidly evacuating those stranded at the Convention Center and the Superdome. One particularly biting (albeit debatable) criticism was that in the wake of 9/11 the Department of Homeland Security had focused on terrorism threats and neglected its role in preparing for natural disasters. President Bush later acknowledged that the federal response was “inadequate.” Both Congress and the White House conducted extensive investigations into the response and produced detailed recommendations for improvements.

Often missed in the lessons of Katrina is that while the national response proved inadequate to meet the challenges of catastrophic disaster, responders from across the country performed admirably. Several hundred thousand residents were successfully evacuated before the storm. If they had not been, the death toll would have been unimaginable. Tens of thousands of citizens were rescued during and after the storm under harrowing conditions, including over 33,000 by the Coast Guard. Tens of thousands more, including those at the Superdome and Convention Center, were evacuated before they succumbed to dehydration, hunger, exposure, or disease. Many hundreds of thousands were safely quartered by communities around the country until they could return home or find permanent housing elsewhere.

Grassroots Response

Also less appreciated and discussed in the aftermath of the disaster was the important role played by volunteer groups, the private sector, and faith-based organizations. The efficacy of the grassroots response was demonstrated in the wake of Katrina. National-level organizations, including the federal government and nongovernmental agencies such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, were unable to mobilize an effective response during the first 72 hours. They lacked adequate situational awareness of local needs and the means to deploy the right resources to the right place at the right time to do the right thing. In contrast, local communities provided immediate and effective relief efforts.

Many of the grassroots efforts were remarkable. One district in Louisiana had 40 operating shelters in the immediate aftermath of the storm, with fewer than 10 being Red Cross shelters. Tens of thousands of people were sheltered and fed by local efforts. Indeed, argued Representative Jim McCrery (R-LA), the best job was done by “ordinary people who came out of their homes and bought diapers and pillows and blankets and food and stayed at the high school gymnasium or wherever, the civic center in some small town and cooked for the people who were there, who gave them rides to the Social Security office to make sure they got their checks.” Additionally, local faith-based organizations responded quickly and effectively by providing facilities and resources and by mobilizing volunteers. Affected Louisiana residents generally rated the assistance provided by private sources such as nonprofit, community, and faith-based organizations substantially higher than assistance from federal, state, and local governments and national organizations like the Red Cross. Such views are not exceptional. Traditionally, local churches provide immediate assistance to a stricken area, the American Red Cross takes the lead in providing emergency relief a few days later, and other charities (many from the affected community itself) then focus on long-term recovery.

In the aftermath of Katrina, the grassroots response proved especially important. Overwhelmed American Red Cross personnel required an exceptionally long time to service many of the smaller, often rural Gulf Coast communities and declined to operate in some locations when they feared for the safety of their volunteers and the victims (for example, because of strong winds or unsanitary conditions). Government agencies also found it difficult to provide timely assistance to all residents of the many devastated areas. Private civic efforts (often local churches) filled many of these gaps through countless, if often unrecorded, acts of generosity. In cooperation with neighbors, friends, and fellow sufferers, victims also organized to help themselves, a step that mental health professionals consider essential to overcoming feelings of powerlessness and trauma.

A Lesson Like 9/11

Despite such important and valuable efforts, the shortfalls of the national response to the disaster were troubling. Katrina offered a lesson equal to 9/11. Massive catastrophic disasters tax the resources of the nation. In many respects, other disasters that might befall the nation could dwarf Katrina. For example, few issues require more attention than public health and safety. Katrina did not provide a “catastrophic stress” in medical response, since the lives of hundreds of thousands were saved by the actions of responders before and after the storm. The outcome could be far more grim in other scenarios, such as a pandemic or WMD attack.

BACK TO THE BORDER

Immigration and border security proved another issue that significantly affected the evolution of the post–9/11 conception of homeland security. In part, this renewed attention emanated from the dramatic increase in the power and violence of criminal cartels based in Mexico. These groups were involved in a wide range of criminal activities, including smuggling of drugs, arms, money, and people throughout Latin America, the United States, Europe, and North Africa. They used both violence and corruption to expand their influence. As the Mexican government increased efforts to combat the cartels, hostility escalated, including kidnapping, beheadings, shootings, and bombings. These attacks were aimed at rival cartels fighting over control of smuggling corridors into the United States, as well as local, regional, and national officials and law enforcement. Fears of terrorist travel and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction into the United States also persisted after 9/11.

The issue of immigration became intertwined with homeland security, in part because the missions of enforcing immigration and border security, as well as providing immigration and naturalization services, had been transferred to DHS. In addition, an estimated 500,000 individuals entering the United States annually between U.S. ports of entry strained federal, state, and local enforcement, diverting their assets from more prominent national security and transnational criminal risks. The government had hoped that the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act would stem the growth of the unlawful population in the United States, but by 2007 the number of illegal aliens in the United States had grown to an estimated 13 million. The government proposed a new comprehensive reform bill, Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Reform Act of 2007, which offered a formula similar to the 1986 bill. It included amnesty for those present, plus measures to create temporary worker programs and increase border security and immigration and workplace enforcement. The bill failed to pass.

While a major overhaul of the immigration system did not occur, the administration and Congress dedicated substantial additional resources to border security, including deploying troops from the National Guard, doubling the size of the Border Patrol, and placing additional obstacles on the border. Congress, for example, authorized funds to build hundreds of miles of fences to serve as pedestrian and vehicle boundaries. DHS also announced the establishment of the Secure Border Initiative (also called SBI Net), which would provide technologies to act as a “virtual border fence” (a program that was only partially implemented after severe management problems.). Furthermore, the government undertook the “Merida Initiative” to help the Mexican government increase its capacity to combat the drug cartels.

By 2010 the unlawful population had begun to decline, though experts debated whether this was the result of enforcement and border security or the U.S. economic recession. Meanwhile, cartel violence in Mexico continued to escalate, and little progress had been made on overall immigration reform.

HOMELAND SECURITY’S EVOLVING ENTERPRISE

Even before the “shock” to the system provided by Katrina, homeland security continued to evolve. In 2004 Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This law instituted the most sweeping changes in the structure of the U.S. intelligence system since the National Security Act of 1947, which established the CIA. It reorganized the intelligence community (the 16 federal government agencies that conduct intelligence activities) under the newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The National Counterterrorism Center replaced the TTIC and was placed under the authority of the DNI.

After Michael Chertoff, a former Justice Department official and federal judge, replaced Tom Ridge as secretary of homeland security in February 2005, he undertook a sweeping review of the department. The result was a major reorganization that structured the department around its main “operating” agencies. These included the Coast Guard, Secret Service, FEMA, TSA, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. These agencies would operate under a secretariat that provided overall supervision and support for the department’s activities.

Congress imposed other significant changes that affected homeland security. In 2007 President Bush signed the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act. This legislation purported to codify the findings made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Before leaving office, President Bush also revised the national strategy, placing more emphasis on the role of homeland security in preparing for and responding to “all hazards,” including natural disasters.

When Barack Obama assumed the presidency in 2009, he continued to modify the homeland security enterprise. From the outset, the president signaled that he intended to downplay the offensive emphasis of Bush’s counterterrorism strategy. Obama pointedly discontinued the use of the term “global war on terrorism,” which had been a signature component of the Bush Doctrine. Obama also discontinued the use of the Homeland Security Council and integrated the council’s staff with the National Security Council’s staff.

While there were changes in the presidential transition, there were also continuities. For example, the Obama administration supported the renewal of investigative authorities in the USA PATRIOT Act that were due to sunset (expire unless reauthorized) by Congress and (principally due to the insistence of Congress) maintained detention facilities for enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay. It also significantly increased drone attacks against al-Qaida leaders in Pakistan and elsewhere.

TWILIGHT OF THE LONG WAR?

By 2011 the inertia behind the initial creation of the national homeland security enterprise appeared to be on the wane as the collective memory of the last major terrorist attack faded and the public grew weary of U.S. combat operations. Operations in Iraq were winding down as American combat forces departed. The United States, in coordination with NATO forces, had also established a strategy to transfer governance and security to local police and security forces in Afghanistan. On May 2, 2011, following extensive intelligence efforts, U.S. troops killed al-Qaida chief Usama bin Ladin in a raid on a compound in Pakistan, adding to the roster of senior al-Qaida personnel eliminated by American operations.

At home, public criticism of intrusive security measures by the TSA continued to grow and budget pressures impacted federal, state, and local agencies tasked with homeland security, along with the Department of Defense and intelligence community.

Yet the threat of terrorism remained, along with the ever-present specter of natural disasters, pandemics, and other catastrophic events.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The dramatic changes following the 9/11 attacks created a new concept of homeland security, in many cases reversing regulations, policies, and assumptions that had been in force for decades. The federal government possessed the will, traditions, and money to reorganize itself and change many of its operating procedures. But the process of change was more complex for state and local governments and the private sector, which often lacked resources and clear priorities. These key players would continue to struggle to define their roles and responsibilities for responding to the dangers of terrorism and natural and man-made disasters.

CHAPTER QUIZ

1. What are the major tenets of the Bush Doctrine?

2. What are major controversies that emerged in combating global terrorism?

3. Which major organizations with homeland security missions were not included in the new Department of Homeland Security? Why?

4. What obstacles exist to state and local governments playing a greater role in providing homeland security?

5. What major changes occurred to the homeland security enterprise after 9/11 and why?

NOTES

1. The administration had actually begun to develop a more comprehensive strategy to eliminate the al-Qaida network in the spring and summer of 2001. Prepared Statement of Condoleezza Rice before the National Commission on Terrorist Attack upon the United States (April 8, 2004), 3, www.9–11commission.gov/hearings/hearing9/rice_statement.pdf.

2. For the text of the speech, see www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09.

3. The National Security Strategy of the United States, Executive Office of the President United States (September 2002), 15.

4. Jeffrey Record, “Bounding the Global War on Terrorism,” U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (December 2003), 4. See also Michael Vlahos, “Terror’s Mask: Insurgency within Islam,” Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory (May 2002), 2.

5. See, for example, Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Ladin: How Bill Clinton’s Failures Unleashed Global Terror (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003); David Frum and Richard Pearle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2003).

6. For further discussion, see Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component of the War on al-Qaida (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002).

7. See, for example, Joint press conference of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Minister of Defense Mukhtar Altynbayev at the Presidential Administration Building, Astana, Kazakhstan (April 28, 2002), news transcript, www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04282002_t0428kzk.html.

8. As of January 22, 2002, 32 countries reported to the committee on their activities to fight terrorism and cut off support for terrorist groups, www.un.org/Docs/committees/1373/1373/reportsEng.htm.

9. Samir Abid Shiak, “Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions: A Survey,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 27/1 (1997): 118–19.

10. New initiatives were based on the authority granted by the USA PATRIOT Act, which requires the secretary of the treasury to establish a system in which banks can identify account holders and match them to a list of suspected terrorists. See the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Public Law 107–56, October 26, 2001.

11. Charles Doyle, “The USA Patriot Act: A Sketch,” Congressional Research Service (April 18, 2002), 1–5; Rosemary Jenks, “The USA Patriot Act of 2001: A Summary of the Anti-Terrorism Law’s Immigration-Related Provisions,” Center for Immigration Studies (December 2001), 1–3.

12. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, (White House) Office of Homeland Security (July 2002), 2.

13. Ibid., vii-x.

14. James Jay Carafano, “Prospects for the Homeland Security Department: The 1947 Analogy,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, Backgrounder (September 12, 2002): 15.

15. Remarks prepared for delivery by Robert S. Mueller III, director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, at a press availability on the FBI’s reorganization, Washington, DC (May 29, 2002), www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech052902.htm; FBI Strategic Focus (May 29, 2002), www.fbi.gov/page2/52902.htm; U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attack upon the United States: The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001 (April 14, 2004), www.fbi.gov/publications/commission/9–11commissionrep.pdf.

16. U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, “Fact Sheet: Bush to Create Terrorist Threat Integration Center” (January 28, 2003), usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/03012806.htm.

17. James Jay Carafano and Ha Nguyen, “Better Intelligence Sharing for Visa Issuance and Monitoring: An Imperative for Homeland Security,” Heritage Backgrounder, 1669 (October 27, 2003), www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/BG1699.cfm#pgfId–1078078.

18. The spending estimate is based on National Communications System, Report 99–62, www.ncs.gov/n5_hp/Customer_Service/XAffairs/NewService/NCS9962.htm. For an overview of Y2K lessons learned, see David Mussington, Concepts for Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Protection: Relating Y2K to CIP Research and Development (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 11–18.

19. Various state and local initiatives are listed on the National Governors Association Center for Best Practices website, www.nga.org/center.

20. National Conference of State Legislatures, “Protecting Democracy: America’s Legislatures Respond,” www.ncsl.org/programs/press/responsebook2002. For an overview of state programs and initiatives, see Office of Homeland Security, State and Local Actions for Homeland Security (July 2002); National Emergency Management Association, State Organizational Structures for Homeland Security (2002), www.nemaweb.org/News/NEMA_Homeland_Security_Report.pdf.

21. For example, an assessment of the requirements of major cities is provided in the United States Conference of Mayors, “A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America’s Cities” (December 2001), www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/press_releases/documents/ActionPlan_121101.pdf.

22. At one point, the National Governors Association estimated that homeland security spending could top $4 billion per year. The National Conference of Mayors estimated that in total the 200 largest cities would spend an additional $2.6 billion.

23. Written testimony of Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner of the City of New York, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (May 18, 2004).

24. Bill Zalud, “Post-Sept. 11th, Security Re-evaluates; Expects Impact through 2002,” Security, http://www.secmag.com/CDA/ArticleInformation/features/BNP_Features_Item/0,5411,69674,00.html.

25. “Alternative Site Survey,” Disaster Recovery Journal (Summer 2002): 84–93.