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In the Name of Civilization

Development of the mass media in China

China's 'material civilization' corresponds to economic development, of course, and in the 1980s there was no material device that symbolized prosperity more than television. Even the most disaffected Chinese people admit that their ability to buy new television sets is real testimony to the improved living standard that took place during the modernization period. The maturation of China's material civilization is not only symbolized by television, it depends on it. Commercial TV advertising is used by the government to provide information about products and to provoke con sumer interest and activity. But the official functions of television are not limited to its economic representations and capabilities.

Television is also expected to help cultivate a 'spiritual civilization' fit for the times by providing mass recreational activity, supplying entertain ment that is in 'good taste,' and reinforcing state ideology and morality (Ming, 1987). Any attempt to promote education, art, literature, language instruction, even practical training in areas such as home and child care is designed to advance the spiritual civilization. In general, the concept refers to whatever the government thinks the people should know in order to evolve satisfactorily along the ideological and cultural planes of the socialist trajectory. Consequently, a steady stream of suggestions, directives, and announcements is issued not only from television and the other modern mass media, but from neighborhood posters, billboards, even public blackboards. There may be no more blatantly prescriptive society in the world than China.

The government's plan for development of a new material and spiritual civilization has led to reform in the mass media too, although the economic decline and political turmoil of the late 1980s drastically set progress back. Overall, however, more information has been made available to the public and the number of 'internal' (confidential) channels was reduced during the 1980s (Wang, 1988b). Chinese people believed by the end of the last decade that their mass media were becoming more diverse, artistically intriguing, and open. And they were. Several trends were evident. The number of operating media of all types increased. Content became less politically direct. Journalists, broadcasters, and filmmakers developed more sophisticated and professional work styles, enjoyed more autonomy and critical freedom, and created far more intriguing and relevant products than ever before. All in all, China appeared to be evolving toward a 'multi culture structure' stimulated by diversification of the mass media and the formation of specific audiences (Ming, 1987).

Development of the Mass Media in Socialist China

In 1949, the revolutionary Chinese government inherited less than 400 functioning newspapers and only 49 radio stations throughout the country (Womack, 1986). Television did not yet exist in China. Since then, the mass media have been central to the implementation of socialism under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party. Electronic media have been particularly effective tools of communication especially because the literacy rate in rural China, although greatly increased since 1949, remains low. This, taken together with problems of distribution of newspapers in rural areas, makes the electronic media attractive to the government for their ability to reach people directly.

Newspapers

The number of newspapers and their circulation have fluctuated greatly since 1949. The ups and downs of newspaper publication can be charted in accord with variation in China's political and economic climate. The Anti-Rightist movement of 1957, the economic depression of the early 1960s, and especially the Cultural Revolution were periods when the fewest newspapers were published. The Communist Party also asserts its authority much more forcefully during stressful times. The party controlled 84 percent of China's newspapers during the Cultural Revolution, for instance, an increase of 23 percent from the years just prior to the disruption (Ming, 1987). Newspaper offices were occupied by the military during the martial law period in 1989 too.

The greatest surge in the number of newspaper titles, circulation, and readership took place in the few years that followed the onset of the modernization period. By 1986 nearly 2,200 newspapers were being published in China. Circulation of the national and provincial press now is more than 200 million, meaning that there is a copy of a newspaper for about every five Chinese citizens, more than a three-fold increase from 1978. More diverse types of newspapers are published now too, including the popular television program guides.

Radio

China's introduction to radio (and seemingly to everything from the West, good and bad) came from foreigners living in Shanghai. The Radio Cor poration of China was formed in Shanghai in 1922 under the supervision of an American engineer as a ploy to sell radio receivers to the world's biggest potential market (Guo, 1986). Until 1949, nearly every radio station in Shanghai was privately-owned and transmitted light entertainment pro gramming. Shanghai's economy was far more able than the rest of the country to support commercial radio. The city's leadership in economic and cultural matters is a longstanding Chinese tradition.

But the Shanghai case is not typical of what happened with radio in China. In his analysis of the growth of Chinese media industries, Brantly Womack (1986) describes 'three waves of development' in the broadcast media since 1949. The first two waves involve radio, originally considered by the founders of the new government to be the most viable means for reaching the rural areas where the vast majority of the Chinese population lives. A national radio network was established after the communist revolution composed of the existing Guomindang stations and, within a few years, of the commercial stations in Shanghai too. But because most peasants did not have radios in their homes, the government's broadcast authority — the Central People's Broadcasting Station (CPBS) — constructed a national rebroadcast system. Radio signals from Beijing were transmitted to people throughout China via a series of repeater stations that fed the signals to loudspeakers that were hung in central locations of villages so that everyone could hear the new government's voice. The years 1949-57 represent by far the most growthful period in the development of the radio broadcast system with an increase in the number of 'wired' installations at the county level expanding from 11 in 1949 to nearly 1,700 by 1957. Communication by radio, however, was inhibited not only by the lack of receivers in people's homes, but also by language problems. The language of the national radio network, Mandarin with a distinct Beijing accent, was not understood in many parts of the country. The ability of national radio to serve a unifying ideological purpose, therefore, was limited in part by language — a difficulty that would later confront television programmers as well.

The 'second wave' of electronic media development took place in the 1970s with the distribution of personal radios to be used in homes. Still, by 1978 less than 8 percent of Chinese homes had a radio, and even by 1982 the figure was but 18.2 percent (although penetration in the cities was 32.3 percent, revealing a discrepancy in media experience between the rural and urban areas that later became true of television too: see Womack, 1986, for detailed statistics). Today, virtually every urban home has a radio. There are more than 800 FM and AM radio broadcasting stations in China now, and more than 624 shortwave stations, including three channels that cover the entire country (Wang, 1988b). The number of hours of daily radio programming is steadily increasing and citizens listen regularly. Beijing residents in the early 1980s reported that radio was the mass medium with which they were most likely to have daily contact (97 percent of the respondents to a Chinese survey summarized by Rogers et. ai., 1985).

Television

Experimentation with television in China began in 1956 and by 1960 stations in a dozen cities were sporadically transmitting programs that they traded among themselves. In these early years, however, almost no one had a television set with which to view the shows. Progress in the development of television hardware and software was slow. There was, first of all, a devastating break in relations with the Soviet Union, the supplier of parts and expertise, in 1960. China's economic crisis in the following years and the Cultural Revolution after that further curtailed development of the country's television system, although a few thousand sets were produced domestically and sold from 1967 to 1970. By 1978 roughly half a million sets were sold per year — a tiny figure in such a large country.

The most dramatic jump in sale of TV sets took place in 1979 when nearly two million sets were sold. The 1980s represent what Womack calls the 'third wave' of electronic media development in China — a period when nearly every family bought a TV set — a phenomenon that is similar to what happened in the United States in the 1950s. The growth curve

2 Domestic TV sets have been produced in abundance during the last decade.

reflecting sales of domestically-produced and imported television sets has increased steadily in China since 1979. The price of TV sets had been out of the reach of most Chinese families until the economic breakthrough of the modernization period. Until then even poor-quality, domestically-produced, small screen, black-and-white models were very expensive. The price of one of these sets could equal a year's wage for workers.¹ And, at first, televisions were not readily available outside the big cities even for families who could afford them. For example, families we talked to in Xian, a city that is relatively small and out of the way, complained that TV sets were in short supply there for years after people in Beijing and Shanghai could easily buy one. And when sets were available, persons with 'connections' were more likely to get them than families without special privileges. Even today television sets are used for barter and political influence. China Daily reported that as late as 1987 more than a million sets, half of them color, are used this wav each year.

China's major cities developed their own regional stations in the early days of television. Beijing Television and Shanghai Television went on the air in 1958 and Guangzhou Television followed the next year. From the very beginning, the regional stations developed programming specific to their geographic areas. Videotaped presentations of Chinese operas featuring traditional local stories that are spoken and sung in the regional dialects, for instance, were main staples of programming.

Beijing Television began color telecasting in 1973 and went fully color four years later. Province stations also transmitted in color by the late 1970s, just in time for the explosion in sale of television sets in the 1980s (though nearly all families first bought the less expensive black-and-white sets). During the period of economic growth since 1978, more and more programming has been produced and transmitted as China has made a major commitment to the development of its television system on the road to becoming an 'information-intensive society' (Sun, 1987: 22).

A major step in this direction was taken in the mid 1970s with the gradual formation of the national network, Central China Television iCCTV), which was designed to unify the country through presentation of official news and information, culturally-appropriate entertainment, and use of the official dialect — puonyantin Mandarin — which is promoted as the national language. CCTV was formed as an administrative outgrowth of the original Beijing television station.

Major television stations throughout China, whose operations had been severely disrupted during the Cultural Revolution, resumed regular programming in the late 1970s. Many more stations signed on the air. The most popular early programs were news, dramas, and movies, many of them imported from Eastern Europe, Britain, and the United States.

Beginning in 1984 a sizeable jump in the purchase of television sets by farm families took place, reflecting profits from incentives paid within the economic reform of the nation's agricultural system. At the same time urban families were trading in their black-and-white sets for color models. Just before the Spring Festival of 1986, Hu Yaobang, then chairman of the CCP, publicly encouraged people to buy color sets, a policy recommendation that was criticized in some quarters for pushing people beyond their living standard.

The price of domestic TV sets was decreasing at the time because of improvements that had been made in the manufacture of integrated circuits. But despite the advances in Chinese television technology, the more expensive imported Japanese sets were clearly preferred to the domestic models. Chinese families are no different from people anywhere else in the world when it comes to television. They want to own good television sets. So, while most families originally bought Chinese-made black-and-white television sets, they were anxious to trade them in for a Japanese color model. Many of our narrators told us that Chinese sets are of far lesser quality. The importation of Japanese television sets was permitted by the Chinese government as a way to boost the image of the modernization. But it was an economic decision that backfired in several ways. Consumer demand for television sets — generally considered to be an indication of economic growth — in this case led to dissatisfaction on the part of many people with Chinese television set manufacturing, and, by implication, with China's ability to produce sophisticated consumer products generally. The

3 Transporting a new TV set home.

economic potential of the Chinese electronics industry was undercut in the process too. Furthermore, many families were frustrated by their inability to afford a Japanese TV set. When I visited China in 1989, a 28-inch, Toshiba color model was being sold for 8,200 yuan, roughly $2,500 US, in a country where most workers make about $350 US a year. Smaller sets are cheaper but are still priced out of the range of most families. Many Chinese families have relied on their overseas relatives to bring them a Japanese TV.

The number of TV stations, their coverage areas, and the amount and quality of programs transmitted by the network and the regional stations have all increased simultaneously with the production and consumption of television receivers. By 1990 Chinese families owned some 150 million television sets — about one set for every eight people nationwide and one set for every three or four people in the cities. There is a home viewership now of more than 600 million in China. With the introduction of telecommunications satellites, more than three-fourths of China's total population can see at least CCTV's first channel which is transmitted via repeater/booster stations to many remote areas. The cities are saturated with television. Ninety-five percent of all urban families owned at least one television set as early as 1986, according to Xinhua, the New China News Agency. More than two-thirds of the sets now being produced are color models and the yearly domestic production of TV receivers is about 20 million sets (Sun, 1987). More than 400 television stations broadcast throughout the country, of which about 100 produce original programming, and there are an additional 3,500 telecommunications relay installations that are used mainly for military purposes and for communication with the outlying regions.²

A tremendous improvement was made at CCTV in 1987 when a massive new building that houses 20 studios and hundreds of offices, editing booths, and technical gear was opened, replacing what had been an antiquated facility. More than $10 million US was spent on equipment alone, nearly all of which bears labels such as Toshiba, Canon, Ampex, and Wang. In February of the same year, the network initiated a second channel of national service which is now carried by nearly 300 stations throughout the country and in all the cities. A third CCTV channel serves Beijing only.

Structure of the Chinese television system

Three basic types of television stations operate in China. The national network channels can be seen throughout the country on hundreds of stations that receive signals from Beijing via satellite links and retransmission facilities. The majority of the repeater stations do not originate their own programming. Others do. Among these are 30 province-level (regional) stations, and more than 200 city-level stations (though some, like the station in Shanghai, have province-level authority). Stations in these categories produce programs locally and/or receive programming from other sources. To make it even more complex, some of the stations transmit on more than one channel (Shanghai and Guangzhou, for example) while in other cities (such as Nanking) two separate stations one at the province level, the other at the city level - each produce and air programs.

Since 1982, television stations fall under the administrative umbrella of the Ministry of Radio and Television in Beijing with CCTV assuming practical authority for much decision-making related to the development of the system. The creation of this ministry was part of a bureaucratic reorganization that signalled the rising importance of telecommunications in the 1980s. Prior to that time, administrative authority for television was spread out over several agencies, making effective coordination nearly impossible. Of course the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Secretariat, and Propaganda Bureau ultimately determine policy and play the role of censor for all Chinese mass media (Womack, 1986). Local media, including the television stations, are also responsible to local party and government authorities. But CCTV is, in practice, the first-line administrator of television in China.

4 The new China Central TV facility completed in 1987 (photo courtesy of CCTV).

Broadcasting officials told me in 1986 and again in 1989 that under normal circumstances the regional stations exercise a great degree of autonomy from the Ministry of Radio and Television and from CCTV in their day-to-day operations. This arrangement has not been destroyed by the alarming events in 1989. Stations still regularly develop programs without having to clear the ideas or the finished products with the authorities in Beijing. Regional stations also routinely sign contracts to import foreign shows and need not observe the more strict standards that CCTV uses to evaluate imported programming. When I returned to Beijing in 1989, for instance, the American action series, Hunter, was being aired by the Beijing regional television station. CCTV officials said this program would not have been acceptable at the network level. Much of the more adventure some domestic and foreign programming is transmitted by the regional stations and is sometimes picked up by CCTV later.

This does not mean that the regional stations operate independent from the central system. In fact, there are firm national guidelines regarding the purposes and standards of telecasting that are well understood by the regional and local leaders and, as we have recently seen, ailegiance to the political authority is absolute during peak periods of a national crisis. Officials at the regional stations are quick to point out that under normal circumstances, however, Beijing issues only informal directives and that a kind of implicit understanding determines what is appropriate and what is not. One regional television executive said that the relationship between his station and CCTV is like that of brothers. Another said that the relationship is more competitive than it is subservient (a 'little competition, not big competition' according to him). Province stations often compete with CCTV in news programming by presenting more newscasts than the network and by featuring local stories. Regional stations also adjust their program schedules after CCTV announces its lineup in order to compete effectively for viewers — a tactic known as 'counterprogramming' in American commercial television. In cases where the regional station also controls retransmission of CCTV, there may even be some shifting of network program schedules (by taping the shows and playing them back at less desirable times, for instance). A longstanding competition exists between CCTV and the local Beijing television station, a problem that is exacer bated by the fact that CCTV's formation superseded the operation and facilities of the Beijing Station, creating some professional jealousies and in-fighting among the staffs (Howkins, 1982).

Television programming

The trend is for all television outlets to increase the number of hours they transmit programs. Most stations sign on late in the morning and broadcast (sometimes with an hour or two of 'dead air' in the afternoon) until late at night, totalling an average of at least 12 hours daily. The content of Chinese television is a topic that is treated in detail throughout this book. With some important exceptions to be taken up later, programming reflects the emphasis on propaganda, instruction, education, and national culture. Among the programs being transmitted on CCTV in late 1989, for instance, were Lecture on Computers, Beautiful China, Science Film: Windsurfing, A Variery Show: Ode to the Motherland, Learning Japanese, Economic Events, Beijing Opera, TV Serial: China's Older Generation of Revolutionaries, People's Army and the Motherland, and TV Drama: Happiness and Bitterness of a Woman Bureau Leader. You get the idea. While these are not the only kinds of programs on the air in China, they set the tone for how shows are perceived by viewers. As we shall see later, many of the more popular offerings are foreign series and films, a category of programs that cannot exceed 8 percent of the total airtime.

Telecommunications satellites

China launched its first telecommunications satellite in 1970, developed its first land station in 1972, and joined the International Telecommunication Satellite consortium (INTELSAT) in 1977. Television broadcasting was not the first priority in the development of the system. The main purposes were point-to-point communication, telex, facsimile, and related high-tech information capabilities. The efficiency of satellite communication is well aligned with China's plan for technological modernization.

But modernizing telecommunications in China is no easy task. Like most developing nations, China does not have a good telephone system. The situation in China is, in fact, much worse than many other poor countries. Only about 1 percent of the residential dwellings has a telephone. Most existing phones are used by government officials in their offices. Even by the year 2000, China expects to equip but 3 percent of its residences with telephones, although the rate in the cities will be considerably higher at 25-30 percent (Sun, 1987). The technical development of television has advanced more rapidly than that of the telephone.

According to Chinese information systems specialist Lin Sun, the current idea is to transform television broadcasting from the 'present combination of microwave and satellites to one based entirely on satellites' (Sun, 1987: 20). Satellites have proven to be especially effective for transmitting CCTV programming throughout the country. The network programs are sent from production headquarters in Beijing directly to INTELSA T's geostationary Indian Ocean Satellite, and then beamed earthward to even the most remote parts of the country — Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Guizhou, and Shaanxi — where they are retransmitted. The land stations are also used to pick up satellite transmissions of international news from various sources, which are then recorded and replayed as part of the newscasts with Chinese language narration added.

China is trying to even further expand its involvement with satellite based telecommunications in the 1990s. The country now offers satellite launching services and has entered into various international high-tech business relationships, including a joint venture with Brazil — the China—Brazil Earth Resources Satellite — which uses remote-sensing devices to gather information about the planet that is sold to other nations. China's plans along these lines hit a serious snag following Tiananmen Square, however, as export of necessary satellite equipment from American aerospace companies was temporarily banned as part of the United States' congressional trade sanctions against the Chinese government.

Videocassette recorders

VCRs and videotapes are very expensive in China so few families have them, though, following the example of countries throughout the world, the machines are likely to be in wide demand when economic conditions permit. Ownership of a VCR has become a status symbol even more impressive than owning a Japanese color television set. Like the expensive TVs, families who own VCRs often have been given the machines by overseas relatives. In other cases, families who have private businesses have been able to purchase a VCR — another material indication of the difference in earning power between state and private employment.

Families that own VCRs seldom use them to tape programs off-the-air in order to 'time shift' or to create video libraries, with the rare exception of some sports and movies. Instead, families that can afford VCRs exchange copies of films, many of them imported from Hong Kong and the West. Video 'pirates' are at work in China now too, making illicit copies of videos for profit. Although the vast majority of these trades and sales involve general entertainment movies, a highly-publicized police action in Beijing was brought against an exchange ring that dealt in pornographic videotapes, and similar cases have been reported in other cities. One of our young narrators in Beijing (the son of a high-ranking Communist Party official) admitted that this practice continues among people he knows.

The use of TV sets by adolescents for viewing pornographic videos surely was not part of the government's plan to develop a new spiritual civilization in China, but it reflects one theme that permeates this book —the inability of the government to predict the consequences of the medium. Television is user friendly. Although the government has always considered the medium to be, above all else, technology that efficiently disseminates information from official sources to a mass audience, the implications of television's widespread presence in Chinese homes are far more complex and subversive than could have possibly been imagined in 1978.