Introduction
It seems increasingly likely that efforts to slow the rate of greenhouse gas emissions will fail to prevent mean global warming in excess of 4ºC above pre-industrial levels by the end of this century (Anderson and Bows, 2008). When warming reaches 2ºC above pre-industrial levels, the security of supply of freshwater from many of the world’s major river basins will diminish, many coral reefs will bleach on an annual basis, crop productivity in lower latitudes will decline, the frequency and severity of coastal flooding will increase, extreme hydroclimatic events will increase in intensity, and the risk of infectious diseases will increase (IPCC, 2007). These changes in environmental conditions pose significant challenges to social systems.
Because the magnitude of change is unprecedented in the history of human civilization, climate change has been and is increasingly being identified as a risk to global, national, and human security. Intergovernmental organizations have identified climate change as a security issue, with the UN Secretary General arguing that climate change “can impact on security, namely by: increasing human vulnerability; retarding economic and social development; triggering responses that may increase risks of conflict, such as migration and resource competition; causing statelessness; and straining mechanisms of international cooperation” (UNGA, 2009: 8). Governments, including those in Europe (Beckett, 2007; Carius et al., 2008) and the United States (Blair, 2009), are also concerned about the security implications of climate change, and leaders of Pacific Island Countries have stated that “for Pacific Island states, climate change is the great challenge of our time. It threatens not only our livelihoods and living standards, but the very viability of some of our communities” (PIF 2009: 12). In addition, think tanks and consulting firms, non-governmental organizations, and numerous scholars have also picked up on the topic (for example: Christian Aid, 2006; Dupont and Pearman, 2006; CNA, 2007; CSIS, 2007; Gleditsch et al., 2007; Nordås and Gleditsch, 2007; Smith and Vivekananda, 2007; Busby, 2008; Scheffran, 2008).
Those familiar with earlier debates about environmental security identify parallels with recent concerns about climate change and security (Floyd, 2008; Dabelko, 2009). This is not surprising given that research on environmental security has noted the potential for climate change to cause “security” problems (or at least to be framed as a cause of security problems). As with environmental security, debates about climate change and security are characterized by concerns about the dangers of military appropriation of environmental issues, empirical uncertainties, conceptual ambiguities, and complex boundary politics (Barnett, 2009; Hartmann, this volume). Also similar to environmental security debates are the considerable differences in the way that the climate change and security nexus is interpreted. These stem from different interpretations of the concept of security; some see it as a broad multisectoral problem that concerns all levels of society, while others see it more narrowly as a matter of defending states against strategic (usually military) threats. Accordingly, in the literature on climate change and security some focus on relatively narrow strategic issues (Dupont, 2008), others focus on a broadly defined national security (Busby, 2007), while others focus on human security (Smith and Vivekananda, 2007).
Despite these differences, almost all discussions of climate change and security are concerned about the effects of climate change on human security, on migration, and on conflict. Indeed, these three issues define the core content of research and policy on climate change and security, and in this respect there appears to be greater agreement among those interested in climate change and security than there was (or is) among those concerned with the broader subject of environmental security. There is also growing attention to the interactions between these three processes. There is general agreement that there are causal relationships between climate change, human security, migration, and violent conflict. It is possible that if climate change stimulates negative change in one or more of these issues, then a process of mutually reinforcing increases in human insecurity, migration and conflict may ensue (Barnett and Adger, 2007). However, the evidence for most of the causal connections between these issues is sparse and unconvincing, and considerably more research is required before confident statements about causality can be made.
In this chapter, I briefly review the state of knowledge about climate change and each of the following, human security, migration, and violent conflict, arguing that while there is reason for concern, research results are inconclusive. I argue that while there is significant knowledge about the linkages between climate change and human insecurity, generalized conclusions still cannot be drawn. What can be concluded, however, is that policies and practices in response to climate change can significantly enhance security by focusing on needs, rights and values, taking into account the wellbeing of people; i.e., by prioritizing human security.
Climate change and human security
The concept of human security has been used in critical, normative, and applied ways. Its critical function is to highlight important human dimensions of well-being that national security practices typically fail to address, and indeed often undermine (e.g. Shaw, 1993). Its normative function is to articulate an alternative and more peaceful approach to security (e.g. Booth, 1991). Its applied function is to highlight dimensions of well being and processes that give rise to it that are typically not well recognized in development or security policy (e.g. UNDP, 1994).
This diversity of uses can also be found in the literature on climate change and security. O’Brien (2006) is perhaps the strongest advocate of the normative approach, using the concept to highlight the risks that climate change poses to important material and symbolic dimensions of well being. This powerful argument is substantiated through empirical research (e.g. Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008), and is bolstered by the work of the Global Environmental Change and Human Security project (see Matthew et al., 2009). It has driven the growing realization that climate change is a social problem with environmental characteristics. A recognition of the implications of climate change for human security has resulted in a chapter on human security in the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), due to be published in 2014.
Normative arguments such as those of O’Brien are also critical arguments. In this case a human security position is critical in three respects. First, it is used to critique the effects of national security practices on emissions of greenhouse gases and vulnerability to climate change (see Barnett 2003, 2006). Second, it is used to critically analyze the ways in which climate change research itself, which is excessively driven by models of environmental processes, tends to exclude recognition of people and the way climate change puts at risk their needs, rights, and values (O’Brien et al., 2010). Included here too is a critique of the assumption included in many climate impacts models that people will behave in predictable and rational ways, which is not justified by evidence of behavioral responses to environmental changes (Morgan and Dowlatabadi, 1996; Grothmann and Patt, 2005).
The third critical application of human security is to highlight the limits to current debates about the mitigation of greenhouse gases, which, it is argued, is excessively concerned with the distribution of the benefits and costs of decision making to economies, rather than to people’s needs, rights and values. It also argues that the decision-making institutions that have been used thus far do not give sufficient voice to local people (Adger et al., 2009). This gives rise to a critique of the logics and processes for deciding on and implementing adaptation, which, it is argued, are disproportionately focused on engineering and planning responses that seek to reduce the exposure of things to risk (such as moving people, and building things like sea-walls), which are themselves likely to impact on human security (Adger and Barnett, 2009; Barnett and O’Neill, 2010). A human security approach to adaptation would instead favor no-regrets strategies that seek to reduce sensitivity (such as changing design codes or better soil management) or increase adaptive capacity (such as improving access to health care, or the provision of microfinance).
A cross-cutting theme of these human-security based critiques of climate change research and policy is the recognition that not all people are equally at risk from climate change, nor are people equally responsible for its causes. People have different levels of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity, so some are far more at risk from climate change than others. It is argued therefore that the measure of the dangerous climate change that the UNFCCC is supposed to avoid should be the impacts on the most vulnerable people (Adger et al., 2006). In terms of responsibility, Baer (2006) shows that the wealthiest people in developed countries produce 155 times more greenhouse gases than the poorest people in developing countries.
Drawing on the experience of applied research and policy with respect to human security as understood in the field of international development, human security offers a guide to research on the human dimensions of climate change. So, for example, studies of famine and food security (Sen, 1981; Bohle et al., 1994), social vulnerability to disasters (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Mortimore, 1989; Adger, 1999), and sustainable livelihoods (Scoones, 1998; Bebbington, 1999) have all heavily informed understanding of the ways in which climate change poses risks to human security. These and other studies show that people and groups that are already insecure are the most at risk of harm from environmental change. The poor tend to be highly exposed to environmental risks, sensitive to damage from them, and have few assets with which to recover (Adger, 1999). Excessive dependence on natural resources is also associated with increased risk of damage or loss due to environmental change (Peluso et al., 1994). There is evidence to suggest that women tend to suffer more, and longer, during times of environmental change because they have lower incomes, and because of the gendered division of labor (Enarson and Morrow, 1998). Economically or politically marginalized groups, which tend to have low incomes and minimal access to social services, also seem to be more sensitive and less able to adapt to environmental changes (Narayan et al., 2000), as are people with insecure access to land (Liverman, 1990). Drawing on these insights, a strong finding of research on climate change and human security shows that poverty and hunger are most likely to arise when multiple stressors – such as trade liberalization or violent conflict – interact with climate change (Eakin, 2005; Leary et al., 2006; Lind and Eriksen, 2006; Ziervogel et al., 2006; Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008).
A focus on climate change as a human security issue suggests the need to screen climate change policies for their potential adverse social impacts. Policies on climate change mitigation and adaptation that seem likely to undermine people’s enjoyment of basic needs, human rights, and core values should be considered to be maladaptive, and avoided or amended. A human security approach suggests the need for adaptation policies that seek to sustain and enhance access to and enjoyment of needs, rights and core values in the face of climate risks, and these are likely to have numerous co-benefits and synergize well with approaches that promote both basic needs (such as water and sanitation) and human rights (such as the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and on Civil and Political rights).
Climate change and migration
There are clearly potential linkages between climate change and both human security and insecurity created through the process of migration. Increasing migration seems to be a likely outcome of climate change, as people may choose to move to minimize the impacts of climate change on their needs, rights and values. Whether or not these moves are an impact of environmental change (in the sense that it is a response to that migrants might rather have avoided) or an adaptation (in the sense that it is not necessarily an unwelcome response to avoid or adjust to an even more undesirable outcome), and a problem or a benefit to the places the migrants move to, depends very much on the degree to which adaptation policies accept and plan for migration as an adaptation strategy (Barnett and Webber, 2009).
Nevertheless, evidence about the influence of environmental change on migration is limited (Piguet, 2010). There is some consensus that sudden or slow onset changes in environmental conditions can be indirect factors in decisions to move, but that social processes that create poverty and marginality are more important factors than environmental changes per se (Hugo, 1996; Kireab, 1997; Lonergan, 1998; Black, 2001; Castles, 2002). It is also recognized that decisions to move in response to environmental change (real or perceived) are rarely entirely “forced” or “voluntary” (Hugo, 1996), and that the consequences of migration for migrants and the sustainability of the places they move between are highly dependent on the social and ecological contexts in each place (Black and Sessay, 1998; Jacobsen, 1997; Locke et al., 2000; Kliot, 2004; Unruh, 2004).
Still, there are estimates and projections of numbers of future migrants impelled by climate change, and these vary between 200 million and 1 billion people by 2050 (Myers, 2002; Christian Aid, 2007). These estimates are based on broad-scale assessments of exposure to risk, and not systematic evidence about the sensitivity of migration to environmental change, or the degree to which adaptation may minimize climate impacts (Brown, 2008; Kniveton et al., 2008; Barnett and Webber, 2009). These and other epistemological difficulties mean that attempts to quantify the flows of migrants impelled by climate change are unlikely to produce meaningful results. Nevertheless, there are many good reasons for concern about the effects of climate change on migration (Meze-Hausken, 2000; McLeman and Smit, 2006; Tacoli, 2007; Perch-Nielson et al., 2008; Piguet, 2008; Warner et al., 2008; ADB, 2009; Mortreux and Barnett, 2009).
Barnett and Webber (2009) suggest that in the coming decades, climate change is most likely to exacerbate existing migration patterns more than it will create entirely new flows. The barriers to migration are critical influences on these patterns. This means that where climate change exacerbates migration, it is likely to be predominantly internal migration away from rural areas within developing countries. It may be that a larger proportion of international migrants will not be the rural poor, as their ability to move to developed countries will be restricted by the financial costs of movement.
Migration is pursued by hundreds of millions of people around the world because it frequently improves the lives of migrants, their families, and the communities they move both from and to (De Haan, 1999; Skeldon, 2002; Ellis, 2003; De Haas, 2005). Migration is therefore a strategy that can help people, including the families and the communities that they move between, to adapt to climate change in ways that sustain human security (Agrawal, 2008; Barnett and Webber, 2009). There is a slowly emerging consensus in the international community that while migration in response to climate change poses risks to social stability, carefully considered policy measures can minimize these risks, and may indeed be harnessed to promote adaptation in places most at risk.
Climate change and violent conflict
The links between climate change, human insecurity, and violent conflict are tenuous. Much of what is known has come from research on the linkages between violent conflict and environmental change more broadly, about which the following findings are generally considered to be robust: environmental change is rarely even a proximate factor in conflict among states (Baechler, 1999; Homer-Dixon 1999); scarcity of resources (including water) is not a major driver of violent conflict (Liverman, 1994; Wolf, 1999; Theisen, 2008); economies dependent on lucrative natural resources are more at risk than others of violent conflict (Collier, 2000; de Soysa, 2000); absolute and relative poverty coupled with poor leadership increase the risk of violent conflict (David, 1997; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Goodhand, 2003); a recent history of violent conflict, or violent conflict in neighboring states, increases the risk of further conflict (Collier, 2000; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008); and weak states and those undergoing economic and political transitions are relatively more prone than others to internal violent conflict (Esty et al., 1999; Kahl, 2006). Yet this is an emerging field of study and more research is required to increase confidence in these findings (Levy, 1995; Conca, 2002).
More recent qualitative case studies conducted by geographers and anthropologists offer more nuanced insights into environmental problems and violence (Bobrow-Swain, 2001; Peluso and Harwell, 2001; Walton and Barnett, 2008). They stress the importance of actual or perceived unequal outcomes of environmental changes in stimulating conflict. This emphasis on perceptions contrasts with earlier studies that imply that material changes translate directly into social actions.
Drawing on insights from these earlier studies, research on climate change and violent conflict is producing tentative findings. Some of the likely outcomes of climate change, such as dwindling resource stocks, livelihood decline, decreasing state revenues, and increasing inequality, may create opportunities for elites to mobilize people to fight, and this is more likely when regimes are weakened by decreasing revenues from resource based rents or taxes (Kahl, 2006; Barnett and Adger, 2007). If climate change causes migration, this too may be a factor in violent conflict in certain circumstances (Gleditsch et al., 2007; Reuveny, 2007). Three studies find associations between decreases in rainfall and violent conflict (Miguel et al., 2004; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Meier et al., 2007). Rapid onset natural disasters also increase the risk of violent conflict (Nel and Ringharts, 2008). These findings are not robust, but they indicate that climate change may increase the risk of violent conflict under particular circumstances (Buhaug et al., 2008; Salehyan, 2008).
The state of knowledge about climate change and security can be summarized in four statements. First, there is a considerable if incomplete body of evidence to suggest that climate change poses risks to human security. Second, there is a modest body of evidence about climate change and migration, from which it may be inferred that changes in climate may indirectly increase migration. Third, there is inconclusive and contested evidence about the linkages between climate change and violent conflict, from which it may be inferred that climate change may increase some of the factors that increase the risk of violent conflict. Fourth, there is very little evidence about the mutual interactions between human security, migration, and violent conflict. Taken together, there is an abundance of concern, yet much that remains unknown about climate change and security. Hence, the report of the United Nations Secretary General on climate change and security states that: “the nature and full degree of the security implications of climate change are still largely untested” (UNGA, 2009: 4). There is therefore a need for more research and synthesis of findings. In the interim, statements about climate insecurity require careful qualification, and cautious policy responses that consider the needs, rights and values of people should be developed.
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