12
Digital Forensic Process and Model in the Cloud

Nhien‐An Le‐Khac1, James Plunkett1, M‐Tahar Kechadi1, and Lei Chen2

1University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

2Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA, USA

12.1 Introduction

Cloud computing is a new approach to delivering information communications technology (ICT) to organizations. Cloud computing is built on the premise that organizations do not need to invest in buying hardware, software, and network infrastructures to support business‐critical applications. Utilizing a cloud‐based infrastructure, organizations can increase ICT capacity or add ICT capabilities without investing in new infrastructure, training new personnel, or licensing new software. Cloud computing encompasses any subscription‐based or pay‐per‐use service that, in real time over the internet, extends organizations' existing ICT capabilities.

The advent of cloud computing is forcing a change from traditional software and hardware models to ICT being delivered over the internet or through private networks located in shared data centers (public cloud) or within private data centers (private cloud). As global markets change, organizations must also change to meet consumer demands. Organizations require flexible structures; and to complement this flexibility, they require the ability to provide new applications, hardware, and network infrastructures quickly, thus supporting changing market environments and enabling the organization to sustain a competitive advantage. A recent study by IDC, “Quantitative Estimates of the Demand for Cloud Computing in Europe and the Likely Barriers to Take‐up 24,” illustrates that the adoption of cloud computing is on the rise. Information Week has conducted a survey annually illustrating that organizations are increasingly implementing cloud‐based solutions, and these adoption rates have risen from 16% in 2008 to 33% in 2012 (Emison 2013).

On the other hand, the increased adoption rates of cloud computing solutions are also an opportunity for criminals to store information within cloud‐based environments. Criminals are aggressively expanding the use of digital technology for illegal activities. Crimes committed in cyberspace, such as data theft, internet fraud, business espionage, pornography, online child exploitation, and cyberterrorism are on the rise (Kolenbrander et al. 2016).

Law enforcement agencies are increasingly faced with cloud computing solutions being used by companies and individuals who engage in illegal activities. Over the past 20 years, digital forensic techniques have become a vital tool employed by law enforcement agencies in combating criminal activity. The evolution of computer forensics has advanced at a rapid pace due to the rise in computer‐related crime. Computer forensics, which is a branch of digital forensics, is the science of acquiring, retrieving, preserving, and presenting data that has been processed electronically and stored on computer media (Hayes 2014).

The rise of cloud computing not only exacerbates the problem of scale for digital forensic practitioners, but also creates a new forum for cybercrime, with associated challenges (Ruan et al. 2011). Law enforcement agencies can no longer rely on traditional digital forensics techniques during investigations that involve cloud computing platforms. The discovery and acquisition of digital evidence from remote, elastic, provider‐controlled cloud platforms differs considerably from the discovery and acquisition of digital evidence from local suspect devices such as laptops, PCs and servers. Acquiring data from cloud‐based environments requires different tools, techniques, and approaches. It is necessary to develop new processes and techniques to retrieve evidence from cloud‐based environments (Lessing and Von Solms 2008; Faheem et al. 2015).

In this chapter, first we review and discuss digital forensic processes and models in the cloud computing platform. Next, we present a new digital forensics process within cloud‐based environments. This approach will draw on various aspects of digital forensics, such as analysis and acquisition methods. To support this approach, a digital forensic framework model will be developed during live investigations. This new approach will focus on the identification and acquisition of data within cloud‐based environments during the execution of search warrants by law enforcement agencies. The object of this approach is to meet the many challenges of conducting investigations in which evidential material is located within the Cloud. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We start in Section 12.2 by presenting digital forensics models and discussing the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) investigative model. We then focus on cloud forensics processes and models in Section 12.3. Finally, in Section 12.4, we discuss new and future cloud forensic models, taking into account what has been developed in this forensic area. We give a constructive analysis before concluding the chapter.

12.2 Digital Forensics Models

In this section, we describe and discuss different digital forensic models proposed in the literature, to see their impact on the current cloud forensic models.

12.2.1 Digital Forensic Framework Model Development

The digital forensic investigative model is vital to the outcome of any digital crime investigation. Overlooking one procedural step may lead to incomplete or inconclusive interpretations and conclusions; hence, incorrect procedures during digital forensic investigations may lead to evidence being inadmissible in court.

The need for a standard framework has been understood by many international law enforcement agencies, and many researchers have proposed frameworks and models to meet the changing requirements of digital forensic investigations. Throughout the rise of computer forensics, various digital forensic models have been developed and can be divided into three categories defined throughout the evolution of ICT:

  • The ad hoc phase: The stage when law enforcement officers identified that there was a need for the development of a framework that could be applied to formal investigation processes when investigating computer‐related crimes. However, there was a lack of structure, clear goals, adequate tools, and processes to develop such a framework. There were also many legal issues surrounding the gathering and handling of digital evidence that hindered the framework’s development (Ryder and Le‐Khac 2016).
  • The structured phase: Characterized by the development of a more complex solution for computer forensics. This development included accepted procedures, frameworks, and tools that were developed specifically to solve computer forensic‐related problems. This phase also led to the development of legislation to support the use of digital evidence during criminal and civil trials. The structured phase appeared the mid‐1980s when the Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) and other entities were authorized to handle various types of computer‐related criminal activity.
  • The enterprise phase: The current state of computer forensics, and the most advanced phase. At this level, computer forensics is a mature science and involves the real‐time collection of evidence, the development of effective tools and processes, and the use of structured protocols and procedures.

Various diverse digital forensic models and frameworks support digital forensic investigations. Since 1984, when a formalized digital forensic investigative model was introduced, a number of further models have been developed. For the purposes of this chapter, we have selected the principal models and documented them in chronological order to illustrate the history of their development, because they are a vital component when conducting digital forensic investigations.

(Pollitt 1995) proposed a methodology known as the Computer Forensic Investigative Process. This model was developed to support digital forensic investigations. The main objective of Pollitt's model was to ensure that all digital evidence could be scientifically relied upon and would be acceptable to the courts.

12.2.2 Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) Investigative Model (2001)

DFRWS is a nonprofit organization dedicated to sharing knowledge and concepts regarding digital forensic research. During the first DFRWS workshop in 2001, researchers identified the need to develop a more comprehensive framework than Pollitt's. DFRWS developed a new digital forensic investigative model to support digital forensic investigations. This model was developed as a result of the complex and diverse nature of digital investigations and how these investigations were evolving with advancements in ICT. The framework introduces digital investigation action classes: these classes are defined by the framework, which categorizes the activities of a digital forensic investigation into groups.

The framework does not dictate what particular actions must be followed. Instead, it provides a list of candidate techniques, some of which are required. The specifics of the framework need to be redefined and tailored to meet the needs of each investigation and law enforcement agency.

12.2.3 Abstract Digital Forensic Model (ADFM) (2002)

(Reith et al. 2002) proposed a model inspired by the DFRWS investigative model. This model suggests a standardized digital forensics process with the addition of three extra phases, thus expanding the original DRFWS model to nine phases and strengthening it. For instance, in the preparation phase, particular significance is given to the preparation and testing of digital forensic tools, which is a vital component of the admissibility of evidence in court. The nine phases are as follows. The first phase, identification, is tasked with recognizing and determining the computer crime or incident. Once this is ascertained, the preparation phase identifies the tools and techniques required to conduct the investigation. The approach phase focuses on developing a strategy to maximize the collection of evidence. The preservation phase focuses on the isolation of suspect media, ensuring it is correctly secured and isolated. The chain of custody of evidence is an essential component of this phase. During the collection phase, digital evidential material is collected and duplicated. The identification of relevant evidence from the collection phase is conducted in the following examination phase. Determining significance and drawing conclusions based on the evidence found is carried out during the analysis phase. The presentation phase focuses on the presentation and reporting of the relevant evidence. The final stage, return of evidence, ensures that seized evidence is returned to the owner.

12.2.4 Integrated Digital Investigation Process (IDIP) (2003)

(Carrier and Spafford 2003) combined the available investigative framework models into one integrated model. The authors presented a new concept known as the digital crime scene. This refers to the virtual environment created by software and hardware, where digital evidence of a crime may exist. The model consists of five phases: readiness, deployment, physical scene investigation, digital crime scene, and review. The model uses the concept that a computer is itself a crime scene, and thus the investigation theory for a physical crime scene is applied to a digital investigation. The digital crime scene investigation is integrated with the physical crime scene so that physical evidence can be collected. The object to connect a suspect to certain digital activity.

12.2.5 Enhanced Integrated Digital Investigation Process (EIDIP) (2004)

The Enhanced Integrated Digital Investigation Process model (Baryamureeba and Tushabe 2004) redefines the forensic process and its progression through various stages. The authors suggested a variant of Carrier and Spafford's IDIP. In the EIDIP model, the authors add two extra phases: traceback and dynamite. These additional phases separate an investigation into a primary crime scene, traceback (the computing device); and a secondary crime scene, dynamite (the physical crime scene). The objective of these additional steps is to reconstruct two crime scenes with the objective of avoiding inconsistencies. A key component of this model is that it addresses data‐protection issues and also highlights the reconstruction of the events that led to a particular incident.

12.2.6 Discussion

In order for digital evidence to be accepted in court, it must be precise and accurate (Schut et al. 2015). Its integrity should not be compromised by negligence due to poor procedures. The primary function of digital forensic models is to assist digital forensic practitioners in following a predefined set of steps during investigations. These models are required due to the complexity and various facets of digital forensic investigation. The frameworks ensure that safeguards are in place to enable digital evidence to be easily elucidated, examined, and processed. The digital forensics framework models described in this section lack the identification of data that may be stored in cloud‐based environments. However, fundamental steps can be drawn from these models and utilized in our approach as well as future approaches.

12.3 Cloud Forensics Process and Model

Cloud computing brings fundamental changes to the way organizations manage their computing needs by enabling them to harness the flexibility of the Cloud while reducing overall ICT running costs. (Ruan et al. 2011) stated that cloud computing has the potential to become one of the most transformative computing technologies, following in the footsteps of mainframes, tablet computers, personal computers, the World Wide Web, and smartphones.

With increasing adoption rates and access to a wide variety of cloud solutions, cloud computing is greatly impacting the way digital forensic investigations are conducted. (Ruan et al. 2011) recognize that cloud computing operates in a computing environment that is different from traditional on‐site client application environments. The additional complexity for digital forensic investigations in cloud‐based environments arises from the various types of cloud models that exist, such as Software‐as‐a‐Service (SaaS), Infrastructure‐as‐a‐Service (IaaS), and Platform‐as‐a‐Service (PaaS). Despite significant research in the field of digital forensics, little has been written about how digital forensics processes can be applied to a cloud‐based environment. Performing investigations within a cloud‐based environment has gained momentum in the digital forensic community during the past couple of years. The majority of research concerning cloud computing is focused on defining the challenges of performing digital forensic investigations within physical a cloud computing environment (Birk, 2011; Reilly et al. 2011; Ruan et al. 2011). Cloud forensics is a new field of digital forensics that brings new challenges (Reilly et al. 2011), such as evidence identification, legal issues, data acquisition, and the suitability of traditional digital forensic tools to acquire data from the Cloud. These challenges not only exacerbate the problems of digital forensics within a cloud environment but also create a new front for digital forensic investigations. (Barbara 2009) highlights the important issue of data identification in the Cloud, stating that “with the huge amount of potential data flowing in and out of a cloud, how do you identify individual users of individual services provided by a transient host image, particularly when they make expert efforts to cover their tracks?” Hence, it is clear that digital forensic practitioners will need to adapt their processes and tools in order to conduct investigations in cloud environments. According to (Frowen 2009), there is no foolproof, universal method of extracting evidence in an admissible fashion from the Cloud, and in some cases, very little evidence is available to extract. As such, cloud computing represents just one of the fast‐paced technological developments presenting ongoing challenges to legislators, law enforcement officials, and computer forensic analysts. Cloud computing is the most difficult area when it comes to satisfying guidelines mentioned by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) related to searching and seizing evidence, due to the remoteness of cloud data centers (http://www.digital‐detective.net/acpo‐good‐practice‐guide‐for‐digital‐evidence). (Reilly et al. 2011) state that certain aspects of computer forensic processes can be applied to cloud computing, but the main stumbling block is the fact that it may be impractical or legally impossible for digital forensic investigators to seize physical devices likely to contain digital evidence. (Dykstra and Sherman 2012) state that discovery and acquisition of evidence in remote, elastic, provider‐controlled cloud computing platforms differ from traditional digital forensics, and examiners lack the proper tools to conduct these tasks. Criminals that target or use cloud computing will undoubtedly emerge in this landscape, and investigators will continue to rely on their existing expertise and tools like Guidance Software's Encase or Access Data's Forensic Tool Kit unless alternative tools or techniques are developed (Richard and Roussev 2006). Several researchers have pointed out that evidence acquisition is a forefront issue with cloud forensics (Dykstra and Sherman 2012; Taylor et al. 2011). In addition, (Ruan et al. 2011) identified the main peripheral challenges posed by cloud adoption and digital investigations within cloud‐based environments:

  • Data jurisdictional issues
  • Lack of international collaboration and legislative mechanisms
  • Lack of laws and regulations
  • Decreased access to and control over data

(Birk 2011) states that technical challenges for cloud forensics investigations arise due to the various types of cloud computing environments and uncertainty about how to conduct investigations in these environments. (Garfinkel 2010) suggests that “cloud computing in particular may make it impossible to perform basic forensic steps of data preservation and isolation of forensic data/systems of interest.” (Lillard et al. 2010) see cloud computing as a subject that must be approached as a matter of network forensics combined with remote disk forensics. However, there are other considerations for law enforcement officers to contemplate when conducting investigations in the Cloud, such as time‐dependent issues, extracting large volumes of data, lack of access to data due to the absence of passwords or a lack of expertise, and procedures and appropriate tools during the execution of search warrants. These issues have not been considered fully by Burk and others (Dykstra and Sherman 2012; Ruan et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2011). In addition, in cloud computing platforms, law enforcement investigators do not have physical control over the data or the data centers in which it resides. Many users access cloud platforms with data that resides locally and/or is synced (Boucher and Le‐Khac 2018). How does law enforcement seize only that portion of artifacts where the evidence may exist? How will they know if they have gotten everything they will need during the analysis, interpretation, documentation, and presentation of evidence? According to the results of a survey conducted by (Ruan et al. 2011) of 156 forensics experts and practitioners worldwide, more than half of the respondents agreed that the establishment of a new foundation of standards and policies for digital forensics in cloud‐based environments is an opportunity. Indeed, 88.89% agreed or strongly agreed that designing forensic architectures for the Cloud is a valuable research direction for cloud forensics. The need for digital investigations in cloud environments will increase as the adoption of cloud services continues to grow. This will compel law enforcement agencies to adapt their digital forensic procedures when conducting investigations in cloud environments. The extent to which law enforcement agencies have changed from traditional digital forensics processes to meet the challenges posed by cloud forensics could not be established through this research. The challenges in relation to cloud‐based forensics are not only technical; there are many legal challenges associated with data recording, privacy, and access issues (Cushman et al. 2016). In addition, the manner in which access is provided to digital forensic practitioners and the process of acquiring evidential material also pose legal concerns. These concerns are extremely important, especially in relation to cloud environments being ubiquitous, multinational, and widely distributed. However, these issues do not fully address the intricacies law enforcement investigators are faced with when executing search warrants within cloud environments. In another survey conducted by (Ruan et al. 2011), of 72 respondents who were asked what the challenges are in cloud forensics, 90.14% agreed or strongly agreed that jurisdiction issues were a key challenge and 82.94% agreed or strongly agreed that the lack of laws/regulations was also a challenge. This is further complicated if cloud resources are distributed across international boundaries. (Ruan et al. 2011) stated that traditional digital forensic professionals identify multijurisdictional and multitenancy challenges as the top legal concern. Performing forensics in the cloud exacerbates these challenges. To summarize, we can say that cloud forensics is in its infancy, although a number of important papers have been published in this area that give insight into the more theoretical side. The research did identify that cloud adoption is high and, as a result, the number of cloud‐based investigations will rise. These high adoption rates pose a new set of challenges for law enforcement agencies. However, a number of authors have identified critical points regarding cloud forensics and the issues that law enforcement agencies will face. A digital forensic framework model applicable to cloud forensics is required. In addition, many researchers have stated that the current set of digital forensic tools cannot be fully applied to acquisitions in cloud environments. A number of authors agree that the difficulties posed by cloud forensics are complex, given the various forms of cloud computing services that exist. In addition, there are large implications when acquiring data from a cloud environment that may spread over multiple jurisdictions. Researchers have explored the challenges and proposed some solutions to mitigate these challenges. These solutions may be practical during incident response or civil investigations. However, solutions put forward by some researchers could not be utilized by law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations. These issues illustrate the requirement to develop a digital forensic framework for cloud‐based investigations supported by appropriate digital forensic tools. This would assist both law enforcement agencies and non‐law enforcement bodies conducting criminal investigations in the Cloud.

12.4 Toward a New Cloud Forensics Model

Another objective of our research is how to build a new digital forensic process for investigators to identify and extract data from cloud systems, and how to address associated problems. To do so, we launched a study on how the proliferation of cloud computing is affecting investigators, including the depth of knowledge of cloud computing, digital forensic approaches, and views on moving away from the traditional digital forensic approach. We learned the following from our study:

  • Investigating cloud environments is very challenging. In addition, the growth of social media is adding to the challenges faced by investigators when conducting investigations in the Cloud.
  • Using traditional approaches to digital forensics may ultimately lead to the loss of evidential material if employed during the execution of search warrants. The reason is that computer forensic practitioners may only establish that a cloud‐based solution was used by a suspect during the review of the seized evidence. This can lead to the destruction of evidence in the Cloud by a suspect.

Due to the limitations of traditional forensics, an alternative digital forensic model is required, supported by a robust framework to identify and extract data from cloud environments. Our new model was initially presented in (Plunkett et al. 2015). In this chapter, we continue to detail and complete it with a comprehensive study and evaluation. This model is described as a framework that enables an investigator to identify and extract specific data relating to a given case in the most efficient manner. In addition, we also propose a number of digital forensics tools that support the extraction of evidential material from a cloud system. Usually, these tools have been fully accepted by the courts. There are different ways to launch a cloud investigation. However, we conducted research and found that investigators need to be specific about the data volumes they identify and acquire. This applies to organizations or individuals that may be under investigation. It is neither practical for investigators to seize entire virtual machines running on cloud systems nor practical to seize entire physical servers of data centers. Hence, our approach has been developed by being cognizant of the factors mentioned previously while also ensuring that the following considerations are addressed: (i) time on site and (ii) large data extraction. First, when officers investigate a suspect location under a search warrant, the time spent on site is a critical factor. They need to identify, document, and acquire evidential material in a reasonable timeframe that does not impact greatly the suspect organization or individual. Second, during the execution of a search warrant, investigators can be faced with very large volumes of data. Extracting all the potentially useful data during the execution of a search warrant can cause a number of issues.

12.4.1 Model

This is a digital forensic framework model consists of three main components coupled with the use of dedicated software and hardware, outlined as follows: (i) pre‐search preparation; (ii) search; (iii) post‐search investigation. Each of these components has a number of tasks that must be completed prior to the next component being utilized. A diagram illustrating these steps is provided in Figure 12.1.

Schematic of proposed cloud forensic model starting from internal case team intelligence gathering passed to digital forensic practitioner which initiates pre-search stage, to search stage, to post search, leading to digital forensic report.

Figure 12.1 Proposed cloud forensic model.

12.4.2 Pre‐Search

The pre‐search stage has five tasks that must be completed prior to the execution of a search:

  1. Gather all publicly available information regarding suspect individuals or organizations. Particular focus during this stage is on trying to identify the IT environment within the target location. Open source intelligence gathering can identify whether a cloud‐based environment may be encountered during the execution of a search warrant. This task focuses on gathering all relevant intelligence regarding the suspect organization, its target employees, or an individual. The intake and orientation; strategy, search, store; technical capabilities, tactical applications; analysis; refine, recycle, and reporting (ISTAR) method (Doodeman 2017) can be used as a means of intelligence gathering while ensuring that the correct steps are taken during this stage.
  2. Ensure that all digital forensic tools used in the extraction of evidence are forensically sound and function correctly prior to use. This task ensures that during the execution of a search warrant, all digital forensic tools used to acquire digital evidence are used in a forensically sound manner. The tool used to wipe all sectors on the storage devices needs to be rigorously tested and documented to ensure that it is correctly functioning prior to conducting the wiping of storage devices.
  3. Ensure that all storage media used to store evidential material is sterile. It is vital that all storage media used to store evidential material is forensically wiped to ensure that no cross contamination of evidence can occur. Each storage device must be forensically wiped and verified to ensure that no data resides on the device.
  4. Build a picture of the ICT infrastructure of the target location, and identify whether cloud‐based infrastructures exist. This task deals with the development of an on‐site ICT infrastructure questionnaire. The objective of the questionnaire is to develop a picture of the ICT environment during the execution of a search warrant. The questionnaire will assist digital forensic practitioners in ascertaining whether cloud‐based solutions are being utilized. Vital information will be recorded during this phase of the search, including information such as passwords used to access any cloud‐based environments, the type of encryption solutions that may be employed within the organization, the identification and recording of the security controls in place, and establishing how access to data is controlled within the organization.
  5. Ensure that all search team members are aware of the intelligence gathered and the proposed operational plan. This step ensures that all members of the investigation and search team are briefed on all intelligence gathered and the approach to be employed by the digital forensic practitioners. It is important that search team members are briefed prior to the execution of a search warrant because each team member will be responsible for securing the scene and ensuring that no digital evidence can be destroyed during the initial stages of the execution of the search warrant.

12.4.3 Search Stage

The search stage focuses on the execution of the search warrant and the identification and acquisition of digital evidence. The stage comprises four phases: (i) secure the scene; (ii) identify IT personnel and complete the on‐site infrastructural questionnaire; (iii) prioritization of targets and devices; (iv) RAM and internet acquisition, and identified cloud and local acquisition.

  • Phase 1: Secure the scene

    The main objectives of this phase are to secure scene, identify target individuals, and obtain access passwords. In addition, it is important to ensure that no suspect personnel delete any electronic data. Each search team member should have been briefed and trained on how to secure the scene and search site prior to the execution of the search warrant. In addition, each team member will be assigned a high‐priority target identified in pre‐search task 1 (as discussed in the previous section.

    It is also vital that each team member acquire the username and password in order to maintain access to the computing devices associated with individual targets. However, this depends on the legislation of each country or region as discussed in our previous research (Ryder and Le‐Khac 2016). For example, during the execution of a search warrant, Irish law enforcement officers have the right to request all passwords to access any systems they believe may contain evidential material. The Criminal Justice Bill, 2011 and the Competition Act, 2002 have provisions and associated sanctions for non‐cooperation.

  • Phase 2: Identify IT personnel and complete the on‐site infrastructural questionnaire

    The purpose of this phase is to gain an understanding of the ICT infrastructure in order to facilitate the acquisition of specific target data and the prioritization of target individuals who utilize cloud systems. When using our model, it is the responsibility of the lead investigator to identify the individual responsible for the maintenance of the ICT environment during the execution of the search warrant. If the ICT is managed externally, the next step is to request that the external ICT support organization assist the lead investigator in establishing the ICT environment of the suspect organization. If no assistance can be given to the lead investigator, the warrant holder will be informed, because the prioritization of targets and data may change due to the lack of access or knowledge of the ICT infrastructure in question. Once completed, the ICT infrastructure questionnaire should provide the investigator with a detailed view as to how the ICT infrastructure of the target location is constructed.

  • Phase 3: Prioritization of targets and devices

    The infrastructure questionnaire focuses on identifying whether any cloud‐based systems are being utilized by the organization or individual. Once the questionnaire is completed, the investigator will communicate with the warrant holder to establish whether any further targets have been identified. The warrant holder will also communicate any additional passwords identified by the other team members during phase 1. If no additional targets have been identified, the lead investigator will begin the process of prioritizing the target individuals and will acquire specific digital evidence. The acquisition of data will be prioritized based on targets that can access cloud systems.

  • Phase 4: RAM and internet acquisition, and identified cloud and local acquisition

    These steps ensure that the most effective approach is applied to acquiring digital evidence stored either on the Cloud or on a local device. This stage has a number of predefined steps that must be carried out in a certain order:

    1. Acquisition of volatile data is required in order to ensure that any passwords running in random access memory (RAM) can be acquired if not voluntarily disclosed to a search team member.
    2. Acquisition of all internet‐related evidence.
    3. Analyzing of data. This stage focuses on reviewing the two datasets acquired previously to identify whether any cloud‐based applications have been utilized on the suspect machine. If identified, further information may be required from the user of the suspect machine. Once a detailed picture of the suspect device is established, along with how the user operates this device, the process of acquiring the digital evidence can commence. If the acquisition relates to data in cloud‐based environments, then a specific approach will need to be applied, depending on the type of cloud models or cloud services.
    4. Acquisition of the registry. This is an important step in establishing detailed information regarding the suspect device such as application install dates, internet and application most‐recently used lists, and username/password access. This evidence is vital to link the user of a computer to digital evidence found.
    5. Investigation of the user‐access control within the local or network environment. Using tools such as AccessEnum (Russinovich 2006) will assist digital forensic practitioners, post‐search, in constructing a picture of who had access to particular electronic evidence.

12.4.4 Post‐Search Investigation Stage

The post‐search investigation stage focuses on the acquisition of the evidence seized and analysis of this evidence. This stage is composed of three phases.

  • Phase 1: Acquisition

    All evidence seized from the suspect organization or individual will be acquired from the sterile media as discussed in the pre‐search stage. Best practice techniques state that a digital forensic practitioner should never work on original evidence; therefore, all evidence seized will be copied to a digital forensic workstation (http://www.digital‐detective.net/acpo‐good‐practice‐guide‐for‐digital‐evidence). A forensic workstation will be used to conduct analysis of all data acquired during an investigation. The forensic workstation will also utilize sterile disks and will not be connected to any networked environments. This is to ensure the integrity of the evidence being analyzed. Once the data is acquired, it is verified against the original evidence; the original evidence is then given to the case exhibits officer to ensure the continuity of this evidence.

  • Phase 2: Analysis

    Once all the evidential material is acquired to the forensic workstation, the analysis can begin. An important aspect of this analysis is to ensure that all data seized from the target organization or individual is made available to the case team. The pertinent evidence is identified by the case team and communicated to the forensic practitioner. The forensic practitioner will identify the evidence from the original acquisition images and will attempt to establish, through document metadata, the report, and intelligence gathered through the onsite infrastructural questionnaire, who was the creator and editor of the identified evidential files.

  • Phase 3: Reporting

    A forensic report will be created by the forensic practitioner. The on‐site infrastructural questionnaire is a key component for the generation of the forensic report because it forms the initial foundations of how and why evidence was identified and acquired. The onsite infrastructural questionnaire will also detail who had access to cloud‐based systems, how they were used, and what files were acquired from the Cloud. This information, coupled with the registry analysis and the report, will try to link suspect individuals to vital pieces of evidence. The report will consist of an overview of the case and a summary of where the evidence was found, the forensic analysis that was conducted, and the findings based on the evidential material.

12.5 Evaluation and Analysis

To evaluate the proposed approach, we consider the following scenario. In a country, the Authority was established following the enactment of the Competition Act, 1991. The function of the Authority is to promote competition in all sectors of the economy by tackling anticompetitive practices and by increasing awareness of such practices. Where there is evidence of businesses engaging in anti‐competitive practices – whether through price‐fixing or abusing their dominant position – the Authority can intervene through the enforcement of competition law. Under Section 45 of the Competition Act 2002, the Authority has the power to enter any premises to seize and retain any books, documents, and records. The application of the proposed model was utilized by the Authority's digital forensics practitioners in conjunction with traditional forensic techniques during the execution of three search warrants on organizations alleged to be engaged in cartel behavior. Prior to the implementation of our approach, the Authority utilized traditional digital forensic methods. The Authority's Cartels division is responsible for investigating alleged hard‐core criminal Cartels. The information outlined here does not refer directly to the industry in which the investigation took place, the organizations that were under investigation, or the people involved in the alleged behavior. The organization, for referral purposes, will be called Organization A. The Cartels division received intelligence regarding cartel behavior in a particular industry, and, as a result, further evidence was required to progress the investigation. This evidence would be gathered through the execution of two search warrants on the suspected organizations. In this evaluation, we focus on the search stage and post‐search investigation.

12.5.1 Search Stage

12.5.1.1 Secure the Scene/Onsite Infrastructural Questionnaire

The search warrant was executed, and the search scene was secured by the search team members. The lead digital forensic practitioner assigned to the search site requested access to the IT manager to ascertain the IT infrastructure of the organization.

The organization in question did not have an IT manager on site; however, the organization utilized in IT support company. The lead digital forensic practitioner made contact with the IT support company and acquired the administration passwords to access the servers and computers of Organization A.

Further information regarding the IT infrastructure of Organization A was supplied to the lead investigator, enabling them to complete the on‐site infrastructural questionnaire. The infrastructural questionnaire identified that Organization A utilized Gmail as its primary e‐mail application. Two users had sole access to the account. These users had previously been identified as target individuals. No other target individuals were identified within Organization A.

The lead investigator requested the Gmail passwords from the target individuals; these were voluntarily disclosed and documented in the on‐site questionnaire. The lead investigator commenced the acquisition of the two targets identified in accordance with the search stage, phase 4: RAM and internet acquisition, review, identify cloud and local acquisition. The acquisition of RAM of both target devices was conducted, and Internet Evidence Finder was run on both target devices; it revealed that no other cloud‐based systems were being utilized by these target individuals. The lead investigator then employed EnCase Portable and configured an Enscript to search each of the suspect devices for any locally stored e‐mail files and to report on any documentary files that had been deleted from the system within a specific timeframe. No e‐mail files were found; however, a number of suspect files were identified as having been deleted.

12.5.1.2 Acquisition of the Gmail Account

No locally stored e‐mail applications were installed on either target device; therefore, Microsoft Outlook 2010 was required to be installed on one of the target devices. This process was documented by the lead digital forensic practitioner. Once installed, the Post Office Protocol (POP) accounts with the usernames and passwords were configured in Microsoft Outlook 2010, and a local .pst file was generated and acquired to the forensic storage device.

12.5.1.3 Acquisition of Pertinent Network Data

Both targets identified previously accessed a single shared network share that contained evidential material. The network share was located on a server within the target premises. The share name was directly related to the nature of the alleged offense, and all data within this share was deemed to be of high importance. The acquisition of the entire share was made using FTK Imager. The acquired forensic image was generated and written to the forensic storage device. Using AccessEnum, a report was generated on the security and access control of this share. This report was placed on the sterile storage device.

12.5.1.4 Seizure of Devices

During the initial stages of the analysis of both target devices, it was established that a number of suspect files had been deleted from both target machines that might hold evidential material. It was therefore recommended to the warrant holder by the lead investigator that both devices should be seized. The lead investigator powered off both target devices and seized them.

12.5.2 Results/Report

If traditional digital forensic techniques had been used in this investigation, vital information such as the cloud application Gmail and data stored on encrypted drives would not have been identified, and thus vital evidential material might have been overlooked. Using our proposed model enabled the lead investigator and the search team to work together to identify targets and evidential material prior to the execution of a search warrant. The use of the onsite questionnaire and the systematic approach enabled the investigator to identify whether cloud systems were being utilized within the target organization.

Using EnCase Portable to search various network drives for particular keywords enabled the investigator to acquire relevant data, thus reducing the size of the evidential material. All data was acquired using digital forensic tools. These tools also verified the acquisition of any data and provided the investigation team with the best evidence possible. The final stage of our approach has not been applied to this investigation because it is a live case and has not proceeded to this stage as yet.

12.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, the challenges of cloud forensics have been discussed in conjunction with examining current digital forensic tools and frameworks. The utilization of digital forensic tools that have the ability to systematically search digital devices, whether in the Cloud or locally stored, is critical to conducting effective forensic investigations. Current research efforts suggest that cloud forensics is still in its infancy. Numerous challenges have been identified and incorporated into our proposed cloud forensic model. The proposed model successfully identified and extracted data from a cloud computing system. Acquiring evidence from the Cloud is complex but can be simplified and accomplished in an organized and systematic way by utilizing an appropriate digital forensic framework. The proposed approach attempts to improve upon existing digital frameworks through the amalgamation of standard techniques. The proposed model also advocates a systematic approach supported by digital forensic tools, which reduces the risks associated with the acquisition of digital evidence.

The growth of smart mobile devices and their integration with cloud systems is a new area and requires further research. Computing devices such as laptops and PCs will soon be overtaken by smart mobile devices. This opens a new set of challenges for cloud forensics and will require fundamentally different tools and supporting frameworks (Faheem et al. 2015; Faheem et al. 2016). The current generation of digital forensics tools is limited in use when acquiring data from a cloud system. These tools have been overtaken by the advances of cloud‐based solutions and the intense growth of information. Research regarding the next generation of digital forensic tools for law enforcement agencies is required to meet future advancements of cloud technologies.

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