15

Knowing in the Indian Tradition

Girishwar Misra

The intellect acquires critical acumen by familiarity with different traditions. How much does one really understand by merely following one's own reasoning only?

 

—Bhartṛhari (Vākyapadīya 2.484)

The quest for knowledge in social sciences has largely emulated and adopted the natural scientific mode of knowing under the assumption that the crux of scientific understanding lies in the set procedures irrespective of the domain of study. A close scrutiny of the repertoire of the empirical methods and techniques makes it amply clear that such an approach was based on the premises of unity of science, observer-independent reality, static and fixed nature of reality and possibility of valid and value-free method of knowledge generation. The promise was to offer unequivocal evidence and certainty. With this kind of conviction effort was made to develop theories and principles of various phenomena. In fact, the emphasis on manifested empirical world has yielded increasingly greater amount of data regarding variables of various kinds supposed to unravel principles stating invariances. In this kind of knowledge-generation, an object is observed by the scientist with the explicit goal of control and prediction. In this context, empiricism informed the scientific effort towards understanding any phenomenon and constituted a prototypical approach for modern social sciences including psychology. Until recently it unquestioningly enjoyed the status of the most respectable and authoritative means of knowledge. The tradition of modern psychological study of learning/knowing was framed in the context of sensory experiences. The cognitive and computer-based information theoretic models of learning too are ultimately rooted in the empiricist tradition. Now it is clear that both top-down and bottom- up processes are required for explaining the vast range of cognitive processes. Contrary to empiricism, the roots of rationalism lie in reason. It assumes that mind must be integral to the experiencing self. It is not something that follows or processes experience. It is quite clear that the sensory experiences and mental operations cannot be meaningfully separated and appreciated.

However, the success story of the physical sciences has impressed the social scientists, particularly psychologists, in such a way that research modeled after physical sciences standardized the pursuit of knowledge. It was treated as secular, real, trustworthy, universal and rational. However, adoption of the same in the case of human beings has proved not only problematic but also the primacy of the method started dictating the terms and conditions of the whole inquiry. It was a matter of methodological discretion whether a given phenomenon would be admitted for the purposes of study. This assumption was based on the strong belief that the scientific procedure is equipped with in-built mechanisms of generating unambiguous and flawless data, and could provide dependable and generalizable knowledge. The most damaging consequence was that the subject matter was appropriated and a number of tactics were employed to preserve and sustain the scientific spirit at any cost.

The developments in the sociology of science and the philosophy of science, however, tend to suggest that scientific activity is a human social activity. Also, the limitations of positivist-empiricist mode of knowing are becoming apparent and new meta theories of understanding are emerging from diverse areas such as critical theory, hermeneutics, phenomenology and literary criticism, which are opening new ways of looking at the problem of knowledge. The interpretive turn is challenging the foundationist views and favors multiplicity of truth and understanding. Empiricism as only epistemology is being questioned and alternative epistemologies are being sought. Rationalism is one alternative. However, post modernists object to empiricism and rationalism and go for social constructionism and modes of hermeneutic engagement as better options. Both of them situate knowing in the social domain. The social constructionist scholarship has illustrated that understandings of various phenomena do vary across societies, cultures and eras. The conventional understandings in Western psychological scholarship are different from what we find in non-Western cultures. This has been demonstrated in the domains of self, emotions, values, motivation and personality. In the Western world the process of knowing as well as values attached to it have been largely linked with the idea of progress. To a large extent the practice of the discipline of psychology has subscribed to this view and has become ethnocentric. This has resulted in depicting cultural differences as deficits. In recent analyses the applicability of the imported knowledge systems has been found quite constrained and efforts are directed toward exploring alternative perspectives on knowing available in the disparate traditions.

Against this backdrop, this chapter explores the process of knowing in the Indian tradition. In particular it provides a sample of thoughts the content and characteristics of which are worthy of investigation by cognitive, cultural and cross-cultural psychologists.

Indian Perspectives on Knowledge

A close perusal of the Indian philosophical texts reveals that in this tradition, the existence of human beings is usually conceptualized as but a constituent part of a broader field encompassing the whole universe. Unlike in the Western tradition, man is not at the centre of the universe. The manifest diversity of the experienced or phenomenal world is grasped and often conceived in terms of a non-individualistic and a predominantly cosmic world-view. While Western thinking is characterized by dynamics ‘which continually expresses itself in setting problems, and approaches the single object as static entity; India utilizes the fundamental notions of statics in stating the leading questions, but at the same moment conceives the actual object dynamically as passing from its origin to decay, without becoming clearly recognized and distinguished as a static existent, separated from other cosmic phenomena’ (Heimann, 1937, p. 19). Thus Indian thought treats reality as a unified whole as opposed to a collection of discrete objects or events. Within a relational world view everything present in the universe is treated as a part of an interconnected whole. This implies that all the constituents share the essential properties of the whole (yat piṇḍe tad brahmāṇḍe). It implies interdependence and connectivity. Ramanujan (1990) has termed it context sensitivity.

Another related feature of the Indian way of thinking is its emphasis on abstract concepts and universals. Thus, as Nakamura (1964, p. 47) states ‘most of the Indian thinkers are apt to emphasize universal concepts and to subordinate the concrete individual and the particular perception to the universal. The individual soul, for instance, was given the metaphysical status of a permanent substance co-eternal with God.’ This implies that the essence of the individual or the particular is not greater than the universal which becomes a basis for realizing the particular.

While the above characterization holds true for many systems of Indian thought it would be incorrect to argue for complete homogeneity in the Indian perspectives. The Indian tradition is very rich and consists of many schools of thought, which have grown and addressed the issues of reality and methods of knowing in diverse ways. Even a brief introduction to these systems and their nuances is beyond the scope of this presentation. There are twelve major schools of Indian philosophy. They constitute two main groups, that is, the Vedic—those who accept the authority of the Vedas are called āstika (orthodox) and the Non-Vedic—those who deny the authority of the Vedas are called nāstika (heterodox). The six orthodox schools can be arranged in three sets that are akin to each other:

1. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika,
2. Sāṁkhya and Yoga, and
3. Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta.

The six heterodox schools come under the following three heads:

1. Materialism known as Cārvāka or Lokāyata,
2. Jainism,
3. Buddhism, which has four sub-divisions:
   1. Vaibhāṣika (direct realism),
   2. Sautāntrika (indirect realism),
   3. Yogācāra (idealism), and
   4. Madhyamika (nihilism)

(See for details Akhilanand, 1948; Bijalwan, 1977; Coomaraswamy, 1943; Dasgupta, 1922; Dutta, 1960; Goward & Kunjunni Raja, 1990; Hiriyanna, 1932; Larson & Bhattacharya, 1987; Matilal, 1990; Paranjpe, 1984, 1998; Potter, 1977; Radhakrishnan, 1952; Raju, 1985; Safaya, 1975).

The present attempt is limited to providing a selective overview of the major perspectives on knowledge available in the Indian tradition.

The Nature of Knowledge and Knowing

The notion of knowledge has been approached by Indian thinkers in diverse ways. It has been conceptualized as ‘relation’, ‘act’, ‘quality’, and ‘self-subsistence’. However, all these terms are interlinked and do not refer to exclusive categories. In the philosophical literature, jñāna (cognition), upalabdhi (attainment) and buddhi (intellect) are often used independently as well as interchangeably to refer to knowledge. The Sāṁkhya theory proposes that knowledge is a mode of buddhi, which is an evolute of prakṛti (matter). As an activity, knowing is characterized as a process of consciousness. We use a number of measures/means (pramāṇa) as instruments (karaṇa) to obtain valid cognition (pramā). A valid cognition is one which is ‘free from doubt’ (saṃśaya), indefiniteness (anadhyavasāya), and error (bhrama), and which, therefore, reveals things as they are (yathārtha), furnishes the basis of successful activities (samvādi-pravṛttyanukūla) and is not contradicted (abādhita) by any other experience (Dutta, 1967, p. 119).

The process of knowing involves four factors, that is, subject (pramātā), object (prameya), method (pramāṇa) and the resulting knowledge (pramā). True or valid knowledge is not possible in the absence of any one of these. However, the operative cause of knowledge is pramāṇa. It is also subject to various types of errors. However, the validity of knowledge may be determined by focusing on the functional aspects of reality. This empirical world is treated as a field of action (karmamayam jagat). Everything, therefore, is meant for some action and every action has an end. We can test when a given object serves the end for which it is meant (arthakriyākārin). It is believed that novelty is the major feature of knowledge.

According to Gautama, the founder of Nyāya School, the beginnings of any inquiry lie in doubt (saṁśaya) and the desire to know (jijñāsā). At this point the utility for human good is explicitly stated and a careful analysis of the pros and cons of the issue (pakṣa pratipakṣa) is done and an attempt is made to ascertain true knowledge. The terms are accurately defined (lakṣaṇa) and their indications are stated. The seeker of knowledge is advised to observe the following steps of rigorous critical inquiry:

• Use all valid sources of knowledge;
• Use (and avoid conflict with) established theories;
• Use examples acceptable to all;
• Use the five-step method of discovery and proof;
• Use the indirect hypothetical/postulation method to strengthen the argument;
• Avoid material fallacy (hetvābhāsa),
• Avoid quibbles (cala),
• Avoid false analogies (jāti), and
• Avoid self-satisfying steps which may cause defeat in debates.

The inquiry is rooted in multiple sources including direct experience, introspection, knowledge obtained from other valid sources, current linguistic usage and knowledge of previously established theories. The inquiry is disciplined by certain norms. It is stated that the suppositions should be parsimonious (laghavaḥ) and if perception is sufficient nothing unperceived should be supposed. Alternative suppositions have to be eliminated. Defects in the process of reasoning such as self-dependence (ātmāśraya), mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya), circular reasoning (cakraka) and infinite regress (anavastha) have to be checked and eliminated. The validity of knowledge is regarded natural by some (for example, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta) who think that the conditions of validity lie within the very conditions that generate the knowledge. Thus knowledge is known from the knowledge itself (svataḥ-pramāṇa). Contrary to this other thinkers (e.g., Nyāya Vaiśeṣika) hold the position that knowledge is not self-manifest and needs external validity (parataḥ pramāṇa). Buddhists think that validity is nothing but practical efficiency. Knowledge of knowledge has also been explained in diverse ways. Some consider knowledge as self-manifest (svataḥ-prakāśa) (for example, Sāṁkhya, Vedānta, Prabhākara, Jain) while others consider it as based on introspection (Nyāya) or inference (Bhaṭṭa). True knowledge (vidyā) leads to the awareness of the unity incorporating all the manifestations. On the other hand, ignorance (avidyā) denotes an understanding which leads to the view that all things are separate and diverse.

Types of Knowledge and Systems of Studies

The pursuits in the realm of knowledge were classified in two broad categories, that is spiritual knowledge (parā vidyā) and empirical knowledge (aparā vidyā). Spiritual knowledge is concerned with the experience of universal reality and empirical knowledge is bound to specific objects. It deals with the name (nāma) and form (rūpa) of ultimate reality in its diverse manifestations. The knowledge of supreme reality was supposed to lead to liberation (mokṣa). Empirical knowledge is of practical significance and deals with the ordinary world. It is pragmatic. In this context, it may be mentioned that the two types of knowledge are used to support the whole range of existential concerns and, therefore, are complementary. Both have a significant place in realizing the life goals (puruṣārthas). Liberation is accessible by multiple means and does not necessarily imply renunciation of the world. Rather, it involves liberation from the false ego boundaries which make a person self-centered.

It is interesting to note that the term vidyā was used for science as well as philosophy. Vidyās were classified in four major categories, that is, ānvīkṣikī, trayī, vārttā, and daṇḍanīti. They dealt with philosophy, vedic knowledge, and economic and political studies, respectively. Ānvīkṣikī is ‘philosophizing’ rather than ‘philosophy’. Thus the Buddhist, the Jain, the Cārvāka together with (the veda-believing) Sāṁkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika are recognized as divisions of ānvīkṣikī. The development of these vidyās demonstrates a dialectic of two perspectives, the orthodox and the heterodox. As Pandey (1984, p. 220) says,

The development of knowledge systems is conceptualized in the form of śāstras. As Pandey (1984) says,

The treatises on erotics (kāmaśāstra), wealth/economy (arthaśāstra) and ethics (dharmaśāstra) were very systematically developed and exemplify the idea of śāstra.

Attitude Towards Knowledge

Knowing involves relating to the different aspects of our Reality such as persons, events, objects and ideas. The Indian attitude towards knowing is grounded in a set of premises as stated below.

1. Ignorance is the cause of suffering. The pursuit of knowledge in general is oriented towards removal of suffering (sā vidyāyā vimuktaye ṛte jñānān na muktiḥ/vidyayāmṛtam aśnute) experienced in one's life. It is not considered as a pure intellectual exercise.
2. Knowledge of any kind is inseparable from the human goals and values. Human life has been traditionally conceived as the pursuit of four related goals (puruṣārthas), that is, dharma (ethical merit), artha (wealth), kāma (enjoyment) and mokṣa (salvation). The pursuit of these goals has to take place in the context of the four life stages or divisions of life, that is, student (brahmacarya), householder (gṛhastha), forest dweller (vānaprastha) and renouncer (sannyāsa). These stages are preparatory to the life goals. It may be noted that mokṣa (liberation) as a goal has been a later addition to the goal structure and is not a compulsion. Similarly, forest dwelling is also optional. One may decide to remain a householder and continue in the community life and instead of becoming a renouncer may try to pursue dharma as a gṛhastha.
3. The philosophical discourse, although it has intellectual and academic focus on the problems of human existence, is intimately linked to the life of action in society. A motive towards the search for an ideal life and a deeper sense of life is always present. The quest for being itself (ontological being), which encompasses both being and becoming is central to the process of knowing.
4. Knowledge is characterized more in terms of modifications, structuring and reorganization of the knower. It changes the knower or the person engaged in the pursuit of knowledge more than changing or controlling the object or the thing being known. In fact, knowledge was supposed to transform the whole person by introducing changes in mental, linguistic and behavioural functioning of the person.
5. The relationship between dharma and knowledge in the Indian tradition is congenial. As Paranjpe (1984) has rightly indicated, in the Indian context of Adhyātma, there is no conflict between science and religion, which has resulted in an avoidant attitude towards religion in the West. As a result, Indian science developed in close relationship with dharma.
6. The Indian view assumes that the universe is lawful and there is continuity within the entire animate kingdom. Similarly, man's relationship with nature is also construed in different ways. The Western view emphasizes a conflict between man and nature because man is placed over nature. In the Indian tradition, man and nature are interdependent and share coexistence. As V. N. Misra (1984) has remarked, man does not stand on the top of the universe nor is the rest of existence subservient to him. There is an inherent correspondence of macrocosm and microcosm. The man in Indian thought is operating on two planes, one operating along the dimension of time and space, while the other transcends time through its projection in its progeny and transcends space through its identity not only with the nature around, but with all the beings.

Mind: Its Nature, States and Functions

Most of the schools of Indian philosophy consider that mind (manas) cannot be equated with self (ātman) who is the knower. It is considered as a substance and an instrument of knowledge. The materiality of mind has been very strongly emphasized by the Sāṁkhya system. Some schools consider mind as an internal sense organ responsible for the experiences of pleasure, pain, and other internal states (Chennakesavan, 1980).

It is held that knowledge constitutes the nature or quality of self (ātman) acting through mind, reaching out to the objects and making them known to the self. An early reference to the functions of mind in Aitareya Upaniṣad includes the following: samjñāna (awareness), ājñāna (perception), vijñāna (discrimination), prajñāna (intelligence), medhā (wisdom), dṛṣṭi (insight), dhṛti (steadfastness), mati (thought), manīṣā (thoughtfulness), smṛti (memory), saṃkalpa (conception), kratu (purpose), asu (life), kāma (desire for a thing), and vaśa (desire for possession). Chāndogya Upaniṣad also gives a list of mind's functions which incorporates some additional functions such as citta (intelligence and thought), dhyāna (concentrated reflection), and smara (remembrance). Finally, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad considers kāma (desire), vicikitsā (doubt), śraddhā (belief), aśradhā (disbelief), dhṛti and adhṛti (steadiness and unsteadiness), hrī (shame), dhī (meditation) and bhī (fear) as the mind's activity.

The Yoga system delineates five modes or states of mental activity consisting of kṣipta (wandering), mūḍha (forgetful), vikṣipta (distracted), ekāgra (one-pointed) and niruddha (restrained). In terms of discriminating power, mental activities are classified as kliṣṭa (hindered) and akliṣṭa (unhindered). The akliṣṭa has discrimination for the objects and consists of vṛtti pramāṇa (valid knowledge), viparyaya (illusion), vikalpa (predicate relation), nidrā (sleep), and smṛti (memory). Perception depends on mental modification or citta vṛtti and contact between the target object and manas through sense organs. Self (puruṣa) is considered as the real cognizer. The citta vṛttis are illuminated by puruṣa’s reflection in buddhi. Knowledge is illumination of a thing not already presented and is caused by the operation of the self. Illusion (viparyaya) means knowing of the unreal possessing a form not of its own. It is incorrect cognition (mithya jñāna). Such knowledge is contradicted or sublated by a subsequent cognition. The realization of the true self is also blocked by mis-conceptions (kleśa) such as avidyā (ignorance), asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment or passion), dveṣa (aversion) and abhiniveśa (clinging to life). Vikalpa (predicate relation) is considered by Yoga sūtra as a way of knowing. It involves imagination without any corresponding perceptible object. It is the result of verbal expressions of knowledge. Recognition (pratyabhijñā) is considered as a form of perception by the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy. It occurs because of many factors such as attention (praṇidhāna), association (nibandha), practice (abhyāsa), indicative (liṅga), distinguishing features (lakṣaṇa), likeness (sādṛśya), ownership or possession (parigraha), support (sambandha), sequence (anantarya), separation (viyoga), similar employment (ekakārya), enmity (virodha), superiority (atiśaya), acquisition (prāpti), cover (avadhāna), pleasure and pain (sukha and duḥkha), desire and aversion (icchā and dveṣa), fear (bhaya), need (arthitva), profession (kriyā), affection (rāga), and merit and demerit (dharma and adharma). These causes of recognition are not mutually exclusive. They refer to the characteristics of objects and events, their contexts and relationships. In this conceptualization recognition is considered as recollective cognition. Some thinkers emphasize on its perceptual aspects and directness of experience, while others emphasize its memory component.

Memory (smṛti) refers to the activation of residual impressions or traces of the past experiences (saṁskāras). Memory is a function of the contact of these saṁskāras with mind (manas). It has been distinguished from recollection on the basis of presence/absence of objects. Some scholars have considered that being dependent on past experience (anubhava) memory is only a mediate knowledge. Others argue that memory is an indicator of the continuity of life and experiences. Memory is importantly related to ākāra (configuration) while perception involves rūpa (form). The saṁskāras gradually become stronger with their repeated manifestations in actions. This has implications for the practice of Yoga. For instance, bad and painful saṁskāras have to be substituted by good and pleasant saṁskāras. The stored up experiences have tendencies for actualization (vāsanas). The saṁskāras are often present at the unconscious level.

Thus, while knowledge is a quality of the self it is manifested by the mind through its contact with the objects. It should be noted that if the self has to attain knowledge, the mind has to be active and regulate the entire process. Mind is matter but has sattva guṇa (luminosity) and, therefore, has the capacity to reflect. The objects being largely tāmasic (quality of darkness and heaviness) are incapable of luminosity. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there are nine kinds of matter (or rather elements), namely, earth, water, fire, air, space, time, direction, mind, and self.

Consciousness

The meaning of consciousness in the Indian tradition has gradually evolved. The initial realization of the principle of oneness of the universe gradually led to the view that consciousness is transcendental and entirely unlike any known object of the empirical world. The absolute consciousness is empirically non-characterisable. It is yet not unknown, and its nature is ‘jñā’ or pure intelligence. Its nature is of the constant, unchanging and basic consciousness. This provides a background and support for the empirically experienced consciousness. In fact the coalition of the changing and unchanging consciousness forms the basis of experience within which the distinctions of subject and object are made. Once we attain perfect harmony between our vital, mental and psychical beings and sādhanā has purified our being, we get the intuition of the transcendental. In the western tradition the psychological complex (for example, sensation, thoughts, feelings) is held to be mental. Contrary to this, Indian thinkers have considered the mental world also as part of matter. The difference between the two is only of subtlety (sūkṣmata) and fineness retained in the process of modification.

Causality

The problem of causality has been analyzed in different ways in the various philosophical systems. In the Vedic thought, causation is looked at from the cosmic point of view and the question considered is about the ‘making’ or ‘creating’ of the whole cosmos. According to one view the creator is Brahman or Ātman (Self) who creates the entire world out of itself and remains present in it. Another theory holds that the world evolved out of a primordial chaos or non-being. As Heimann (1937) says, Upaniṣadic cosmology teaches that the world originated by sṛṣṭi or sarga— seminal emission from the supreme body.

However, the idea of universal causality was questioned by subsequent thinkers. For instance Dignag argued that ‘events alone are perceived substances and relations are constructed in judgment (vikalpa). The world that is directly perceived is only a flux of instantaneous events, but the world that is constructed by rational knowledge is an ordered whole of substances and relations. The constructed world is superimposed on the perceptual world as its relevant description in verbal conceptual terms and this “systematic” or “transcendental” illusion is the basis of all thought and action’ (Pandey, 1984, p. 228). Thus in this tradition causality is related to the nature of the mind and justified on the ground of its indispensability.

Buddhists have argued that the joint use of observation and inference and non-observation under certain conditions should be employed to ascertain causal relationships. The logicians (naiyayikas) view ‘cause’ in terms of ‘activity of making’. In this sense causation stands for the whole process comprising of ‘some agency producing some entity by acting on something else as its material’. Thus we have three causes, that is, the agent as efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa), the material (samavāyi kāraṇa) and the joining/contributing factors (asamavāyi kāraṇa). In this framework, a cause is different from the emerging effect. The causes are considered as regular antecedents for the effects. In contrast, the Sāṁkhya theorists advanced the view that the effect pre-exists in the creation in some latent fashion. In other words, causation is really a manifestation of continuous evolution.

Reality

Reality is dealt within a general sense by reference to the notion of padārtha or tattva, the ultimate category. Different systems of thought identify different numbers of such categories. The ultimate principles are often put forward as distinct intuitable essences. They are conceptualized in terms of distinctive features (lakṣaṇas). Let us briefly examine the conceptualization of reality in the historical perspective.

In the early Ṛg Veda we find Varuṇa, a deity of universal character who was thought of as pervading nature, and influencing everything including sun, stars, water, the human mind and animal life. Varuṇa is referred to as the representation of ṛta—the cosmic order, or inner balance of the cosmic manifestations. It is a remarkable fact that the majority of texts emphasize cosmic plurality and cosmic interchangeability, involving alternation of even divine forms. As Heimann (1964, p. 39) says, ‘to the Indian mind…beasts are just as worthy an expression of divine Nature as is man. In India, then, not singleness, but plurality and manifoldness of form and type have been emphasized during every period…From the very beginning…matter is on an equal footing with spirit or mind…there is equal valuation of matter and spirit.’

It is very important to note that matter and spirit—eternal primeval essences share similar status. Also, the cosmic and specific faculties are derived from matter including intellect. The spiritual principle is often viewed as ‘inactive’. Heimann (1937) has referred to three metaphors to illustrate the status of Spirit in the Indian tradition:

• Spirit riding as a mere passenger in the chariot of the cosmic urge.
• Spirit as the owner of a bedstead without active participation in supplying the material. He is only the customer for whom the bed has been manufactured so that he may sleep in it.
• Spirit as the magnet attracting matter, thus causing it to move and influencing its direction while himself remaining static.

The principles of reincarnation and karma are universal. They, however, are not pre-existent to the cosmic happenings, but come into existence together with these. There is no pre-eminent ultimate, unique principle. It has often been argued that the doctrine of Māyā is illusory and Nirvāṇa indicates annihilation of existence. As Heimann (1937) observes that māyā refers to measurable empirical things. They are smaller than the unmanifest (avyaktam) and being constructions are subject to destruction. The empirical reality is definite. The objects of empirical world do not share the transcendental reality of the ‘indefinite’. Thus Indian thought recognizes an eternity of ‘transcendental statics’, and the ‘continuity of an empirical dynamics’. Similarly, Nirvāṇa does not mean nullity. It refers to ‘not thing’, that is the indefinite thing.

The Indian ontology postulates two major planes (satta) of reality—transcendental (pāramārthika) and empirical (vyavahārika). The transcendental reality is considered to be non-changing and universal. It can be experienced under certain conditions like samādhi. In addition a category of apparent reality (pratibhāsika) has also been proposed (for example, the silver seen in the glittering conch-shell). It exists only for the duration of the cognition itself. It is not the matter alone but matter and spirit combined which forms the basis for activity. Also, there is the fundamental notion of an after-life for every existing entity. This world (saṁsāra) is supposed to be a continuous stream of active lives. The same cannot be interpreted as ‘cycle of rebirths’ since the individual in its rebirth never returns to the same point, but always to a more developed stage of incarnation, in accord with the growth of its own inherent tendency.

Thus, objects do not have only static existence. Rather, they are subject to continuous changes both in themselves as well as in their relationship with other existing objects. Heimann (1937, pp. 61-62) designates it as transcendental materialism which ‘postulates the transformation of one empirical form into another, and finally all these into a static shapelessness which is beyond all empirical experience…It has an outlook tending towards ultimate oneness—the real universe—that is towards the primal and final sat, static being, which can nevertheless be grasped only in its derived forms of transient “becoming” in the empirical Bhavas.’ In this framework human beings are not considered to be endowed with some great power because they have the capacity to reason, as Descartes postulated. Instead, as Heimann (1937, p. 97) says, ‘India's conclusion is: In spite of my reasoning I exist just as do all other accidental manifestations of the primeval unity.’

The Means of Knowledge

Apprehending reality (tattvajñāna) and becoming aware of it requires some measure (pramāṇa) or means. In the Western philosophy perception and inference are two sources of knowledge. The various schools of thought have proposed diverse sources of knowledge and have various orders of preference. The major means of knowledge include the following: pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison), śabda (verbal testimony), arthāpatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition) are accepted as auxiliary sources of knowledge. In addition, pratibhā (intuitive knowledge), aitihya (unbroken tradition) and sambhava (possible inclusion) have been considered by some schools as sources of knowledge.

Perception (Pratyakṣa)

Perceptual knowledge is viewed as direct knowledge of objects, dealing with both external as well as internal (bodily) objects and states. It is an achievement of coordination among sense organs, self (ātman) and mind (antaḥkaraṇa/manas). In this process knowledge occurs in the form of ‘consciousness’ or awareness when mind and self come into contact. Thus it may be considered as an objective action based on the contact between sense-organ and dynamically active sense object. The internal objects (for example, feelings, states, etc.) are known through mind (antaḥkaraṇa) coming directly into contact with self. We perceive attributes of things or substances and experience their identities. It is assumed that individual characteristics as well as generic attributes are both perceived. It is held that knowledge requires modification of mind corresponding to the object. In this sense knowledge becomes a manifestation of consciousness through an appropriate mental mode. For instance Vedānta considers four states or functions (vṛtti) of mind, that is, deliberation (manas), determination (buddhi), egoism (ahaṁkāra) and recollection (citta).

A distinction has been made between indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) perception. Indeterminate perception is perception of the mere being. In determinate perception the identity is also included. The sensory experience is considered to be definite and assuring because the objects are directly presented to the knowing self by the activity of the sense-organs and the mind. Thus united with the sense-organs, mind contacts the objects. Mind plays an active role in this process. Perceptual knowledge, therefore, is a broader concept than what is usually understood by sensory experience. It subsumes the whole range of common sensory perception, introspection, as well as intellectual and mystical intuition.

Inference (Anumāna)

Inference is treated as knowledge of the invariable concomitant relation between what is perceived and what is deduced. The Sanskrit term anumāna means ‘knowing after’ or knowledge derived from some other knowledge. It also refers to ‘measure along’ using other measures. Thus, it involves deductive inference which follows from the already existing knowledge. In this framework, the significance of inference depends on what is available from direct perception. The syllogistic reasoning which illustrates the inference as conceived in the Indian tradition consists of five steps as follows:

• Proposition to be proved (pratijñā): The hill has fire.
• Reason for this (hetu or liṅga): Because it has smoke.
• Universal proposition supported by an instance (udāharaṇa or nidarśana): Whatever has smoke has fire, such as a kitchen.
• Application of the universal proposition (upanaya or anusandhāna): Hill has smoke, such as is always accompanied by fire.
• Conclusion proved (nigamana): Therefore hill has fire.

It is evident that this kind of reasoning combines deductive as well as inductive processes. It involves formal validity with material truth through inductive generalization and deductive particularization. The use of example supplies a basis for enumeration and empirical induction enabling verification for sensible prediction. It shows that the major premise is really based upon an actual instance. This whole process is termed as comprehension (parāmarśa) which establishes a link in the entire process of inference.

Thus inference relies on the understanding of invariable concomitance deduced from observation of agreement in presence, absence, and non-observation of the contrary. Some scholars have talked about three types of inference based on a priori (pūrvavat) (inferring effect from cause), a posteriory (śeṣavat) (inferring cause from effect), and analogical (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa) (inference from something perceived as similar). A distinction between inference for self (svārthānumāna) and inference for other (parārthānumāna) has also been made. The major difference between the two is that in the latter all the premises have to be stated while the same is not necessary in the case of the former.

On the whole, the Indian syllogism exemplifies a novel way to approach the problem of inference. As Heimann (1937, p. 87) has observed, it ‘is not…an affair of pure deduction, but a sequence of inductions, and it is characteristic of India's practical outlook and its practical conception of proof’. It presents a ‘paradigm of the union of diverse epistemic principles’. Pandey (1984, p. 221) states that in this paradigm ‘reason examines a principle given in tradition in terms of its logical ground, empirical evidence and analogy. If reasons were unguided by tradition it would lead to endlessly changing conclusions. Although it is admitted that doubt requires reasoning and reasoning proceeds till one reaches a contradiction, it was realized that merely hypothetical reasoning or tarka can only have a subordinate role within the broader sweep of syllogistic reasoning or anumān.’ He further notes that, ‘by its working within the framework of tradition this conception of reason tends to be scholastic and conservative but by its working within a context of practical inquiry and experience, it has a pragmatic or vyavahārika character’.

Comparison (Upamāna)

Comparison is a spontaneous cognitive process to be called by the observance of similarity or analogy. This may be viewed as a way of knowing A's similarity to B from the perception of B's similarity to A which has been perceived elsewhere. Thus, it involves an empirical association of two similar observations. For instance, the relationship between Brahman and Ātman is viewed as all pervading and unrelated like ākāśa (space, sky). This source of knowledge is based on sensory facts but inference transcends the senses and helps in exploring the unseen. It is mediate and general in nature and shows that when perception is not sufficient the immediate cognition is used. It is important to note that the role of memory in this process is secondary. The cognition of similarity leads to recollection and not vice versa. The observed similarity leads to the past experience. It seems that mind is considered to possess some special process leading to the observance of similarity. Unlike western thinkers Indians do not consider comparison as a form of inference.

Postulation (Arthāpatti)

This source of knowledge involves supposition or presumption of some fact. When in our experience some unit of cognition is incomplete, we posit something to make it a structured whole. In such a situation we often engage in assuming some unknown fact in order to account for a known fact that is otherwise inexplicable. A famous example often referred to in the Indian treatises goes like this: Suppose we found ‘a stout person A who does not eat in the day.’ Now, ‘stoutness’ is not possible without eating. The person, therefore, ‘must be eating’ and if he is not eating in the day then he must be eating in the night. Thus, in order to explain ‘stoutness’ we posit the fact of ‘eating in the night’. Postulation is distinguished from inference on the basis of the absence of a major premise. It is also different from induction. A distinction has been made between postulation to explain something seen and postulation of a meaning for making words intelligible.

Verbal Testimony (Śabda)

Most of the facts in everyday life are made known to us by means of words. In addition, under certain circumstances words can even serve as a means of immediate knowledge. They often supplement perception and inference. Not only this, in the Indian tradition they are viewed as the only vehicle of supra sensuous knowledge. Words are assumed to precede intuitive perception. This kind of knowledge is based on the comprehension of the meanings of the pertinent words and their interrelations. The words of trustworthy people who have attained knowledge (āpta) are important sources of knowledge. Veda or Śruti (scriptural authority) has been consistently considered as the only source of knowing Brahman—the absolute reality. Vedas are viewed as divine revelation representing indisputable truth. They are known as nigama. Āgama is actually a divine text different from nigama or Veda. The various tantric texts are āgama or ‘the word that has become’, the Brahman itself in the word-form. This is to be contrasted with ‘the word that has come’, a report on what God has said. The meaning of words (śabda bodha) works as a source of knowledge. It involves constructive combination of ideas. In this process the cognition of words is the instrument, recollection of meaning is the operation, and verbal comprehension is the outcome. However, scriptural authority is not the ultimate source of knowledge of Brahman. It is, rather, anubhava (intuitive experience), which leads to realization of Brahman. Śruti only clears the ignorance.

The words signify objects, actions, and attributes which have universal (for example ‘cow’ to refer to all cows) and particular (for example, ‘cow’ to refer to one particular individual cow) aspects. Usually the implied meaning is secondary but it is sought when primary meaning does not work. The primary meaning is related to saying (abhidhāna) and secondary meaning involves pointing or indicating (lakṣaṇa). Thus, metaphors employ secondary meaning and point to something and have a suggestive power (lakṣyārtha). It is generally accepted that words have meaning only when they exist in the sentence. A sentence has four important features; that is, word order (ākāṅkṣa)—each word expects something from other words, coordination of meaning of a word with another (yogyatā), continuity in time and space (sannidhi) and intention (tātparya). The denotative meaning can be of four types, namely derivative (yaugika), conventional (rūḍha), derivatively conventional (yogarūḍha), and derivative and conventional (yaugika-rūḍha).

In the determination of meaning the context under reference plays a crucial role. The context involves several types of relationships (for example, association, dissociation, mutual association, hostility, opposition, purpose, context, situation, indicator sign, proximity, capacity, propriety, place, time, gender and accent). According to Patañjali, a great exponent of grammar, the meaning is learned from the behaviour of people. The convention (samaya) is viewed as the primary determinant of the meaning because the speaker and hearer are both members of a linguistic community. According to Prabhākara, words have no meaning apart from the action they lead to and the meaning of a word is the action to which they lead.

The importance of language as an activity, as languaging (śabdana vyāpāra) was clearly recognized by the Sanskrit grammarians. Language makes the human transactions possible. It is held that linguistic expressions have evolved out of one principle—word essence (śabda tattva)—eternal verbum. It refers to the ever extending consciousness of the sentient. Word as Brahman and alphabets as akṣara (undestroyable) convey an important sense. Matilal (1990) finds a significant link: ‘our perceived world is also an interpreted world’. The act of interpretation is nothing but languaging. Language is inseparably related to awareness. All cognitive awareness appears in the form of interpretations through language.

It is interesting to note that Indian grammar (vyākaraṇa) which dealt with the systematic study of language also developed as a philosophical system. Being aware of the significant contributions of language to human experience and consciousness, not only the phenomenal aspects of language were taken into account but also contemplation about its metaphysical foundations was done. It was realized that knowledge is grounded in language. In the Indian tradition, the normative aspect of language focused on the oral or spoken form of language because the written form of language was considered inadequate to comprehensively encompass all aspects of linguistic reality. Words were treated as constituents of consciousness in the act of speaking.

Bhartṛhari, one of the most important grammarians, postulated that there is no cognition without the operation of words; all cognition is shot through and through by the word. All knowledge is illumined through the word (sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate). It is through the meaning conveyed by words that all knowledge is experienced. This is true because we understand and communicate our thoughts only through the expressed words. Here, the word is not identified with sound only. The understanding regarding objects (sampratyaya) is also included in it. The relationship between word and meaning is eternal and impersonal. Bhartṛhari observes that language operates at two levels. At first an idea comes as an inner flash (sphoṭa). This is the first level which is termed as paśyantī vāc. This is reflected in the intuitive flash of idea, sentence, or poem as a whole. Its manifested or uttered form is vaikharī vāc. Between these two levels there is a middle level known as madhyamā vāc in which the intuitive holistic idea is separated in sequence. This scheme covers the entire-range of linguistic operations.

Non-Cognition (Anupalabdhi)

This is a means to the knowledge of non-existence (abhava). The underlying assumption is that if a thing is known by a particular sense-organ, its opposite will also be known by the same sense-organ. It is argued that non-existence of a thing is apprehended by its non-perception. The remarkable fact is that here the emphasis is on ‘non-apprehension of presence’ rather than non-perception of non-existence. Thus both existence and non-existence are facts of cognition. We say that ‘there is no pen on the table’. Here the sense contact is with the locus of non-existence and not with the non-existence. Thus, only appropriate non-apprehension can cause valid cognition of non-existence. Indian logicians have identified several types of non-existence, such as those caused by destruction, absolute non-cognition and mutual non-cognition.

Knowing Pleasure and Pain

Manas (mind) as an internal sense-organ has been considered responsible for emotional experiences. The different schools of thought have explained these experiences in different ways. According to the Nyāya system, pleasure and pain (sukha and duḥkha), desire and aversion (icchā and dveṣa), cognition (jñāna) and volition (prayatna) are the qualities of the self (ātman). But they are known to self only when manas comes into contact with the self as possessed of these qualities. Pain occurs when the pressure from a want becomes extreme. When the want is satisfied, the person feels pleasure. Obstruction is the characteristic of pain (bādhanalakṣaṇam duḥkham). On the other hand, agreeableness (anukūla) is pleasure.

According to Vaiśeṣika sūtras, pleasure and pain are different as they have diverse causes and effects. Pleasure leads to a feeling of pleasantness (anugraha), attraction (abhiṣvaṅga) and brightness of the eyes and face, etc. (nayanādi prasāda). In contrast, pain's effects include anger, ideas of harm doing and depression. Both, pleasure and pain can be with reference to past and future. In these cases, they are based on recollection and reflection, respectively. Also, they are immediate perceptions, unlike cognition (jñāna) which involves doubt and assurance (saṁśaya and nirṇaya). Pleasure and pain cause desire and aversion (icchā and dveṣa). Desire is the source of effort, remembrance, virtue and vice. Some major types of desires are: lust, hunger, affection, aspiration, compassion, disinclination, disposition (to impose or deceive others) and inclination (unexpressed desire). Aversion leads to anger (krodha), ill-will (droha), resentment (manyu), jealousy (akṣamā), and indignation (amarṣa). The knowledge of pleasurable things leads one to put incessant effort to obtain it. All other emotional experiences emerge out of pleasure and pain.

Realization of Supreme Knowledge

The learning processes for higher order knowledge (parā vidyā) require a Guru. It involves sādhanā (spiritual praxis) in the supervision of a ṛṣi or draṣṭā (seer). As Pandey (1984, p. 1) argues,

Ultimate authority in India is in practice held to belong not to ancient books, nor their learned expositions, but to those who are believed to have personal experience of spiritual truth. It is a living vision which transforms the inner life, faculties and powers of the person who attains it. The process of seeking and attaining spiritual vision and inner transformation has been variously called, the commonest expressions being sadhana, or yoga.

In its broadest sense sādhanā involves perfection in work for every person in his or her respective pursuit and performance of duties. Sādhanā also denotes ‘making’, and thus implicates transformation of self. It involves detached truth seeking (jijñāsā), sensitiveness (ākṣiptakalpatā), earnestness (saṃvega), maturity and wisdom (viveka), and realization of the constraints and limitations emanating from egoism and acquisitiveness.

In general, three ways (mārga) of spiritual realization have been practiced. They consist of knowledge, action and devotion (jñāna, karma and bhakti). The yogic system of Patañjali prescribes the practice of yoga consisting of eight limbs: restraints (yama), observances (niyama), postures (āsana), breathing exercises (prāṇāyāma), withdrawal of senses from its objects (pratyāhāra), concentration (dhāraṇā), contemplation (dhyāna), and samādhi (a trance like state). The samādhi state also has several hierarchically arranged levels or stages as listed below:

• Savitarka: In this stage words and their denotative and connotative meanings remain mixed together.
• Nirvitarka: This stage involves consciousness devoid of meanings and association originating from social conventions.
• Savicāra: This is characterized by a focus on space, time, and causal context of the object of cognition.
• Nirvicāra: This is a state uncharacterized by past, present, or future characteristics of object.
• Sānanda: This is focused on means of cognition.
• Sāsmitā: This is focused on the sense of self.
• Asamprajñāta: This state is the highest state devoid of all objects of cognition. The yogī attains final liberation, which is complete aloofness or isolation of puruṣa from prakṛti. The experiencing subject is completely withdrawn into himself so that he is no longer conscious of anything. This condition emerges when all varieties of the processes of consciousness are completely restrained. It is usually achieved for short periods of time. Its practitioner experiences a superior form of direct perception, an essence-envisioning perspective on objects, a truth-bearing insight, and an experience of bliss (Paranjpe, 1984). Also, its effects/consequences do not impel a person to seek various objects of desire. This trans-cognitive state is a qualitatively different type of experience.

Vedānta also suggests that nirvikalpaka samādhi leads to the attainment of a superior state of being. This requires (a) correct discrimination between the everlasting and the impermanent, (b) maintaining mind (sama), withholding the senses from the objects of their pleasure (dama), preventing the mind from modifying itself (uparati), enduring hardships and pain (titikṣā), (c) adopting a conviction about faith in scripture and teacher (śraddhā) and resting mind (samādhāna), and (d) intense desire for liberation from the bonds created by egoism and ignorance. In addition, three broad strategies have been suggested, that is, learning/listening (śravana), intellectual training (manana) and ethical training (nididhyāsana).

Devotion (bhakti) is the second mode of spiritual realization. Devotion requires recognition of a personal God, who is omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent, and who confers his grace on the devotee when he surrenders himself unreservedly to God. The Bhagavad Gītā states that meditation of God and offerings with devotion and dedication make people free from the fruits which constitute the bondage of action. God is even-minded to everybody. However, those who worship him with devotion, they abide in God and God also in them. In the Bhagavad Gītā, Krishna says to Arjuna, ‘On Me fix your mind, become My devotee, My worshipper; render homage unto Me. Thus having attached yourself to Me, with Me as your goal, you shall come to Me.’ Giving up all action to God, full devotion, lodging all the understanding in God, removal of egoism (I-ness and my-ness), friendship and pity for all beings, tranquil, equality to pleasure and pain, patient, and forgiving have been enumerated as important characteristics of a bhakta (devotee).

Yoga of action (karma) is the third way to approach the supreme being and the transcendental reality. It is said that doing the assigned work without attachment leads to the highest goals. Work is also necessary for the solidarity of the society (loka saṃgraha). Thus in order to fulfill one's social obligations, one has inevitably to perform the assigned work. Thus one should engage in work and remain uninvolved in its consequences. The Bhagavad Gītā says that actions of all sorts are actually performed by the dispositions of matter (Prakṛti). However, due to egoism, a person thinks that ‘I am the doer’. A person who knows that self, matter and action are different does not become attached to the results of actions. On the other hand, those who are attached to the dispositions and actions are attached to the outcomes. Actions do not cling to the person if there is no yearning for their fruit. Such an action is non-action. A person steadfast in yoga engages in action and abandons attachment. He becomes even-minded in success and failure. These approaches have been developed in detail by the different schools of thought and its sub-systems have emerged. However, the existence of a reality which transcends the phenomenal world and has no beginning or end has been accepted by almost all the orthodox systems of Indian thought. This reality is treated in popular Hinduism as God.

Concluding Comments

The preceding account of knowing in the Indian context reveals a very rich and complex metatheoretical framework which has the potential to offer insights into the intricate processes of human understanding. The diversity in Indian thought is remarkable; it shows considerable similarity with the Western mode of intellectual inquiry up to a point. It is more rigorous and inclusive than western empirical approach as currently practiced in psychological science. Also, it goes beyond the Western approach in many ways. Belief in multiple but interdependent worlds, use of discursive practices, significance of language, perception, reason and sādhanā to obtain empirical truth on the one hand and a realization of transcendental reality on the other, are very important for a holistic understanding.

In terms of knowing, a comprehensive methodology has to respect the first person perspective also. Psychology as an inner discipline seeks to locate and find oneself in its true and unconditioned form. The empirical manifestations of the inner do not constitute the essence. The observations at the surface level are but expressions. The experiencing person has exclusive accessibility to and ownership of a state of awareness. Knowing, which incorporates both—understanding and realization of truth in one's being, is the goal. In this formulation the identity of subject and object opens up a new possibility of experience beyond the confines of the observation of surface manifestations. Realizing truth or experiencing reality in an unmediated mode through participation or conscious experience makes truth a part of being. The processes of śravana, manana and nididhyāsana relate to learning, understanding and realization, respectively. They emphasize sense mediated learning, reasoning and meditative knowing. Movement across these three levels involves third, second and first orders of knowledge in which externally observable, interpersonal or inter-subjectively shared and personally experienced self-transformation take place. It may have intrinsic authenticity. In this case validity is reflexive. It involves direct experience and a state of consciousness. It differs from the third person accounts prevailing in psychology which are framed within the context where subject-object duality is maintained and where interpersonal consensual validation is achieved. Ego remains at the centre. Contrary to this the Indian pursuit of knowledge moves in the direction of ego annihilation as it is an illusion. The egoless experiencing person is a mere witness—a sākṣī. Reducing the first person experience to third person observation is problematic. The existing approach in psychology is limited in its scope as it hardly touches consciousness as such—a reality in its own right. The Indian perspective takes a qualitative and spiritual position and warrants inner development that may enable direct experience. It calls for a consciousness based paradigm with the scope of direct and experiential knowledge. Such a move is a matter of contemporary relevance and practical utility. It generates new, different and a more comprehensive theoretical perspective, and concepts in which emancipatory values are central and pursuit for knowledge is more engaging.

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