Section 3

Pathways to Knowledge

Introduction

Since antiquity the urge to know the world from within and without has been a major concern for humans and has led to the formulation of various traditions of human inquiry. In general, all such inquiries are tested against the criterion of whether they constitute a systematic, unbiased, and dependable understanding of reality. In this context, a distinction is often made between faith about, and knowledge of some part of reality (the object of knowledge), which is supposed to exist independently. The appreciation of this reality is not reality, but is certainly expected to be a valid (re)presentation of that reality, and it is this, that allows us to work or play with it and create something new.

The knower–known (subject–object) relationship, which appears quite simple, is actually quite complex. It requires us to assume that reality exists independent of us, that it can be known through certain means, and that the resulting knowledge can be represented and communicated in an authentic manner. It is the assumption of having access to reality which implies the possibility of an independent reality. Our life-world is organized and sustained within and through our appreciations of reality, and therefore, reality-claims are warranted and have to be established if we want to function well. The evidence and proof of reality becomes then critical to this exercise. This inspired the knowledge seekers to evolve an approach which is public, objective, and observation–based, and which supplies undisputable accounts of reality. It is the studies in the physical sciences and physiology that paved the way for elaborating the ground rules of the empirical and positivist framework, for playing the game of science. In the course of time their scientific procedures were systematized, standardized, and adopted by various other disciplines.

It may be noted that the dogmas of religion in the Western world led to a strong opposition between the institutions of the church, and those of science. Within the context of the enlightenment, science and (scientific) methodology emerged as a powerful practice for rendering reliable knowledge. The industrial revolution and resultant material progress were taken as a substantiation of the genuineness and irrefutability of the scientific endeavour. Against this backdrop, ‘science’ acquired status, authority and power in the pursuit of knowledge in disparate fields such as the human, social, mathematical, physical, natural and the life sciences. It was assumed that one day we would have complete knowledge of the world via science. This came to be known as the modernity project.

The apparent success of science furnishes perceived legitimacy to the institution of science in the process of knowledge production. Courses on scientific method constitute the core of most of the social/behavioural teaching programmes. Until recently such efforts have been confined primarily to quantitative, third-person approaches. However, ample arguments and demonstrations have been put forward about the limitations of such approaches. The challenges have come from many directions, in particular from the study of the history of science, deliberations in the philosophy of science, and social studies of science. They suggest that the much publicized rational, value-free, and objective image of science is subject to certain limitations, and empiricism has been overburdened by the over-enthusiastic followers of science. The problem becomes crucial especially once we move from the physical sciences to the human sciences.

Impressed by the success story of physical sciences, psychologists appropriated their methodology. In the process, they moved from the study of psyche and consciousness to behaviour, and from there back to the study of mental processes. However, the assumptions about the existence of such an ‘objective’ reality, and approaching that reality and making judgments about it that are complex, have generated rich and sophisticated philosophical discourses. The possibility of undisputed knowledge and its foundations has been construed and discredited in many ways. Those thinkers who question the possibility of observer-independent reality, argue in favour of a constructivist account of knowledge. They endorse the tenability of multiple perspectives on reality, contingent on the intellectual resources available during a given socio-historical epoch. This goes against the certitude that was much sought after in most of the earlier accounts of knowledge, and brings in an element of insecurity as a natural condition in which one has to live. The developments in post-modernist thought clearly imply this position, thus leading to hermeneutic and interpretive modes of knowledge generation, in which there are interpretations but no ultimate reality.

The academic agenda of psychology and its concerns were designed to suit the demands of the scientific method. The mainstream remained preoccupied with questions, methods (for example, observation, experimentation, psychological testing), and applications (for example, deficits, pathology, mind-control), all within a positivist framework. A close scrutiny of the developments in the history of psychology tends to suggest that the metaphors used for describing and explaining psychological processes were cultural products, and their emergence was largely a politico-economic matter. They charted the psychological territory within a specific socio-cultural milieu, and the findings were not cumulative. The investigations and theories in a given domain led to always new issues, instead of pursuing the prior issues in a consistent manner. The proliferation of concepts and theories in a given area of study (for example, intelligence, personality, motivation) exemplifies the difficulties in consolidation of the field. Also, methodological rigour in terms of representativeness, replication, stability within and between persons, and validity of observations, all rest on precarious grounds.

The conceptual foundations of psychology reflect considerable divergence which is deep-rooted in terms of ontology as well as epistemology (for example, psychodynamic, neural, cognitive, social, and cultural), and which hardly allows for effective inter-systemic communication. The scene is now changing, and pluralism in theory and methodology is becoming increasingly accepted. In recent years qualitative methods involving interpretive strategies have been invoked, and themes like spirituality, religion and virtue are being addressed. The recognition of culture as a resource in cross-cultural and cultural psychological works has facilitated confluence of many divergent streams of work.

Knowledge (vidyā) in the Indian tradition stands for knowing, being, perceiving and thinking. It is not only concerned with the external reality, but also relates to the inner world; as well as a world which is inclusive of both. The Bhagavad Gītā describes yoga, tapas, and svādhyāya as major ways of pursuing knowledge. The Vedāntic tradition talks about śravaṇa, manana and nidhidyāsana, while Yoga talks about the eight ladders (aṣṭāṅga yoga). In all these traditions, empiricism is not treated as the ultimate foundation of knowledge, and other methods are entertained in which unmediated knowledge of reality is attempted.

Reality is understood in terms of two broad categories, referred to as transcendent and manifest (para and apara), which differ in their epistemology, ontology and methodology. While the former deals with spiritual knowledge and self-realization, the latter relates to the social and scientific domains of the empirical world. The Indian worldview attempts to transcend the gap between these two aspects of reality, or bridges the two by adopting a comprehensive and holistic third position. This section of the present volume addresses the problems and possibilities in different modes of psychological knowledge, as represented in various traditions of Indian thought.

In the first chapter, entitled ‘Indian psychology and the scientific method’, Peter Sedlmeier explores how the two can go together, and elucidates how the Indian tradition can be used as a source for specific psychological hypotheses that can be tested within the formal parameters of mainstream science. Sedlmeier first outlines the standards of the scientific method and then introduces his own conception of what genuine Indian psychology is all about, including a ‘metatheory’ of Indian psychology. From this metatheory (and to a certain extent also from theories that are included in the metatheory), he derives several classes of testable hypotheses and exemplifies these with the help of some specific hypotheses or questions. Subsequently, Sedlmeier comes back to the topic of methods with an emphasis on the special methods needed to examine some of the hypotheses that deal with different aspects of consciousness. The chapter ends with an exploration of possible ‘interfaces’ between Indian and Western academic psychology.

In the second chapter, William Braud makes an attempt at ‘Integrating yoga epistemology and ontology into an expanded integral approach to research’, on the basis of his work on ‘Integral Inquiry’ at the Institute of Transpersonal Psychology. Braud is of the view that Indian psychology and yogic epistemology and ontology can contribute much to enrich research aimed at bridging the gap between science and the spiritual/wisdom traditions. He describes ways in which yogic principles, and processes closely related to these, already have been usefully introduced into research praxis, and suggests additional ways in which aspects of yoga might be integrated into research in the future and how this might enliven and transform the research enterprise.

In ‘Knowing in the Indian tradition’, Girishwar Misra gives an account of Indian theories of cognition. Indian theories of cognition emphasize universal concepts, and view reality as a unified whole. The process of knowing begins with doubt, and the desire to know. In general, Misra points out, two domains of knowledge are differentiated in the Indian view—the transcendental (pāramārthika) and the empirical (vyāvahārika). Transcendental reality is considered as non-changing and universal. The major issues that have been discussed are mind, consciousness, and reality. Misra notes that there is a certain degree of similarity between the Indian and the Western mode of intellectual inquiry. In the Indian view, mind is conceptualized as an internal sense organ. Misra concludes that the Indian perspective on knowing holds contemporary relevance and has practical utility.

Matthijs Cornelissen makes in ‘What is knowledge? A reflection based on the work of Sri Aurobindo’ a case for the existence of essentially different modes of knowing. Cornelissen notes that Aurobindo identified four forms of knowing—knowledge by identity, knowledge by intimate direct contact, knowledge by separative direct contact and wholly separative knowledge by indirect contact. Cornelissen goes on to elaborate these four types of knowledge as follows: (1) knowledge by indirect separative contact includes scientific knowledge of the outer reality; (2) knowledge by direct separative contact is the semi-objective introspection of inner processes; (3) knowledge by direct intimate contact is the experiential knowledge of inner processes; and (4) knowledge by identity is the Vedic knowledge, in which knower, knowledge and known are one. In Aurobindo's view, direct, intuitive knowledge by identity forms the essential core of all our knowledge. The author offers some arguments why such unconstructed, intuitive knowledge might actually exist, and then outlines some of the ways by which the Indian tradition has tried to make self-observation and intuition more accurate and reliable.

S. R. Bhatt gives a study of early Buddhist cognitive theories in ‘The Noetic process (citta vīthi): A Therāvāda Buddhist view’. This chapter analyses psychologically the cognitive process as it is presented in the Therāvāda Abhidhamma tradition which is the earliest tradition of Buddhism and which provides the foundation to all later Buddhist schools. Bhatt clarifies at the very onset that the Buddhist theory of knowledge is a subsidary of the Buddhist theory of reality, which aims at the attainment of nirvāṇa (eternal bliss). The chapter first summarizes the Buddhist conception of knowledge, and then goes on to provide an analysis of the process of cognition.