Internal bank funds pricing or “FTP” is a key element in liquidity risk management. It is also a devil of a topic to teach, because there is no “one size fits all” and different banks set different objectives for it. As befits what should be viewed as a key pillar of the liquidity risk management framework, but is as often as not treated as an internal accounting exercise, there are many nuances and the FTP process can be as frustrating to implement and monitor as it is to set policy for. That said, an inappropriate or artificial internal funds pricing policy may lead to poor business decision‐making, and could generate excessive liquidity and funding risk exposure. It is therefore imperative for banks to operate a robust and disciplined internal funding mechanism, one that is integrated into the overall liquidity risk management framework.
In this chapter we review the rationale behind the internal term liquidity premium (TLP) and present a recommended best‐practice policy template for internal funds pricing.
Bank internal funds pricing mechanism – called variously funds transfer pricing (FTP), firm liquidity pricing (FLP), liquidity transfer pricing (LTP), or term liquidity premium (TLP), although these terms are not actually synonymous – is invariably operated via the Treasury function. This is logical given that all banks operate essentially the same internal funding arrangement, as illustrated in Figure 11.1. Treasury is also responsible for external balance sheet liquidity risk management, as well as interest‐rate risk.
FTP – the price at which an individual business line raises funds from or places deposits at its own Treasury desk – is essential to the risk management process. It is the key parameter in business decision‐making, the driving of sales, asset allocation, and customer product pricing. It is also a key hurdle rate behind the product approval process and in an individual business line's performance measurement. Just as capital allocation decisions affecting front‐office business units need to account for the cost of that capital (in terms of return on regulatory and economic capital), so funding decisions exercised by corporate treasurers carry significant implications for sales and trading teams at the trade level.
The problem arises because banks undertake maturity transformation, funding long‐dated assets with shorter dated liabilities. Moreover, certain assets such as mortgages and corporate loans are frequently illiquid in nature. The combination of a funding gap and illiquid asset base makes it imperative that, each time an asset is originated, business lines correctly price in the term liquidity risk they are generating. Conversely, a business line that raises funds can also be valued at the internal TLP.
Hence, the internal funding rate is important to the discipline driving business decision‐making. For example, a uniform cost of funds (something practised by many banks during the lead‐up to the 2008 financial crisis) will mean that the different liquidity stresses on the balance sheet, created by different types of asset, are not addressed adequately at the aggregate funding level. Different asset types place different liquidity pressures on the Treasury funding desk, thereby demanding a structurally sound internal funding pricing policy that is appropriate to the type of business line being funded.
A formal internal funding policy is necessary in order to make explicit to business lines the need for the bank to cover the cost of its liquidity risk. The objectives of the policy are to:
The policy must also seek to ensure that business lines recognise the impact of asset and liability pricing on the balance sheet of the bank, and allow for these costs accordingly. The policy document should be formalised and approved at the asset–liability committee (ALCO) level, and Treasury should review the document on a semi‐annual basis. The policy should include the treatment for each product asset class in which the bank deals.
It is important, then, that all banks put in place an internal funding structure that correctly charges for the term liquidity risk placed on the balance sheet by each business line. An artificially low funding rate can create as much potentially unmanageable risk exposure as a risk‐seeking loan origination culture.
The principal debate concerns exactly what Treasury is pricing when it sets the FTP. If one accepts that a bank undertakes maturity transformation, then logic dictates that the FTP charge should be a term liquidity premium. For example, the internal rate from Treasury to the corporate banking division looking to price a 5‐year bullet corporate loan would be the 5‐year TLP. The FTP would then equal:
The proxy for the short‐term funding rate is usually 3‐month Libor, but it could equally logically be 1‐month Libor or the central bank base rate. The bank's ALCO should approve the appropriate proxy.
Note that this does not necessarily equate to the bank's 5‐year wholesale cost of funds (COF). The bank's funding rate will incorporate an element of its own credit risk to the market, as well as the term liquidity premium, and it is only the liquidity premium that should be passed on to the business line in the internal FTP.
If we discount the reality of maturity transformation and assume matched funding, then in this example we would have:
While it is always important to ensure that the correct cost of liquidity is allowed for in the internal funding model, it needs to be set in line with commercial and practical reality.
The TLP, when used in the way we have defined it here, is not a straightforward exercise when extracting from market and customer rates. Often one needs to have recourse to proxies, and instead of one specific value being available, one may need to be satisfied with a range and/or average.
The base case scenario would be for a bank to have access to the wholesale markets at Libor across the entire term structure. There is a case here for saying that the FTP can be Libor‐flat; however, this is the current state now, with the future state of the markets being unknown. Thus, a zero FTP spread can be justified only on a match‐funded basis. Given this logic, a bank needs to determine its cost of liquidity. There may be more than one answer, so an element of judgement is called for.
The starting point is the rate at which the bank can raise funds in the market. For a large bank, its primary issuance level will, in a stable market, lie above the secondary market level. If we ignore this difference for the time being, a logical first step would be to take the cost of its funds in the market as the primary input to its internal funding curve. Two things must be considered: (i) this funding rate includes the credit risk of the bank, which needs to be stripped out, and (ii) not every bank has a public funding curve. It is necessary then to consider proxies to establish the cost of liquidity.
While a number of proxy measures can be considered, we recommend the following:
While the above approach assumes a flat credit term structure for the bank (which from observation of the credit derivative market we know not to be accurate), it does still give some idea of the liquidity premium.
The FTP charge can be based on a simple average of the above measures. Alternatively, given an individual bank's structure, it may choose to give higher weight to certain proxies. Since there is no transparent explicit cost of liquidity, a bank will have to exercise some judgement when setting the rate.
A worked example of this calculation will be presented in the next issue of iRisk.
The actual internal funding curve template, be it the TLP or all‐in FTP curve, should be included in the bank's funding policy document and reviewed on a regular basis. While it is common for the FTP rates to be posted as a grid (as shown in Figure 11.2), this is not recommended because of the implied linear interpolation relationship between odd‐date tenors. Instead, the FTP curve should be drawn as a curve such as shown in Figure 11.3. Here we illustrate an example for a bank that operates across the retail, corporate, and wholesale banking space and has also calculated a “weighted average” funding curve (WACF). Many banks choose the grid presentation, however. When a grid is used, assets or liabilities with maturities that are not exact full years, and thus fall in between the tenors on the grid, should be priced on a straight‐line interpolation basis between the shorter and longer date prices.
Tenor | GBP |
<3M | 0 |
6M | 7 |
12M | 14 |
2Y | 25 |
3Y | 32 |
4Y | 40 |
5Y | 42 |
7Y | 68 |
10Y | 99 |
Figure 11.2 Bank FTP grid
The FTP curve will state explicitly the rate paid or received by the business lines for assets and liabilities across the term structure. If the FTP policy assumes matched funding, and applies full marginal cost (FMC) pricing, then this disregards the fact that, in reality, the bank is engaging in maturity transformation. While this is logically tenable, it may not be practical for commercial or economic reasons. This is why the more robust regime is for Treasury FTP to apply the TLP add‐on to the short‐term funding rate, rather than FMC. The final customer pricing would incorporate cost of capital, required margin, and an add‐on for customer credit risk.
Of course, the final choice for the FTP policy is a matter of individual bank judgement, and again should be decided by ALCO.
As previously noted, where behavioural analysis indicates that the term to maturity of an item differs from its contractual term to maturity, the expected maturity is used to set the appropriate FTP rate. For assets and liabilities, the best example is as follows:
For trading book assets, which are generally assumed to be liquid and expected to be sold within 6 months of being bought, the FTP charge would be set according to the expected holding duration and not the legal maturity of the traded asset. Typically, this will be at the 6‐month FTP rate; however, this depends on the type of asset and the level of liquidity. In general, a bank will set different tiers of liquidity, with Tier 1 (such as G7 government bonds) being the most liquid and thus attracting a 1‐week or 1‐month FTP, down to Tier 3 for the least liquid and attracting the 6‐month internal funds rate.
Though there is no “one size fits all” FTP regime, we present here best‐practice guidelines for the FTP approach in retail, corporate, and wholesale market business lines.
The guidelines assume a standard internal funding arrangement, whereby internal funding operations are arranged via a bank account in Treasury. When a loan is made, this internal account is overdrawn and then funded on an overnight basis to the business line. The standard overnight FTP charge is 3‐month Libor, but it could be 1‐month Libor or 6‐month Libor, or the central bank base rate, depending on the opinion of the bank's ALCO. Assets or liabilities are set at the relevant tenor FTP, although another option is to operate a net rather than gross funding basis and either charge or pay the net position long or short in each relevant tenor bucket at the relevant FTP.
A retail bank is stable funded, and in large part funded by zero‐rate or low‐rate liabilities (termed non‐interest‐bearing liabilities or NIBLs). The asset FTP tenor can generally be set safely at less than the contractual tenor, often the expected life (EL) tenor. This preserves competitive position. Liabilities are also priced at behavioural tenor. So here FTP = TLP and not COF. For residential mortgage assets we assume capital and repayment products, with no interest‐only mortgages. The main principles are shown in Figure 11.4.
Note here that tenors quoted are behavioural or, as is common, can be adjusted downwards for competitive reasons. If operating a net charging regime, it is possible to set and net nearly matching tenors, for example, 3‐year deposits against 3‐year assets.
From Figure 11.4, for the floating‐rate asset, FTP is 3M Libor + TLP. The TLP tenor will be the behavioural life of the asset, so we have suggested 7‐year. For the fixed‐rate asset, FTP is the fixed‐rate equivalent to 3M Libor plus TLP where the TLP tenor matches the product life. (For example, a 2‐year fixed‐rate in a mortgage that moves to floating variable or can be refixed at a new rate after 2 years.) This transfers interest‐rate risk from the business line and centralises it in Treasury, which is recommended.
Figure 11.6 shows our recommended template behavioural tenors, but it must be emphasised that each bank should set the level appropriate to its own product analysis.
Retail bank product | <1Y | 1Y | 2Y | 3Y | 4Y | 5Y |
Personal loans | 20% | 40% | 40% | |||
Mortgages | 100% | |||||
Overdrafts | 10% | 10% | 80% | |||
Credit cards | 20% | 70% | 10% | |||
Savings accounts | 20% | 20% | 60% | |||
Current accounts | 20% | 80% |
(Source: Choudhry, 2012)
Figure 11.6 Template retail bank behavioural tenors, percentage of balances
The reality of FTP policy is that it must reflect the two‐way relationship between assets and customers. We summarise, with reference to Figure 11.5, that the practical considerations for FTP should reflect:
The longer dated assumption allows a retail bank to consider itself as “almost match funded”. This is the attraction, from a liquidity risk management point of view, of stable customer deposits (“stable” liabilities as opposed to “non‐stable” in the Basel III terminology).
Compared to retail banking, corporate banking encompasses a wider range of products that attract FTP. As noted above, the treatment of specific product types will be articulated in the detailed funding policy statement.
Per the orthodox approach, business lines originating assets or raising liabilities will have funding and interest‐rate risk transferred to Treasury and made up to an equivalent interest basis. In the process, the model assumes that all assets are funded at the short‐term FTP rate, let us again assume 3M Libor, and all liabilities are rewarded at 3M Libor. The key consideration here, which also applies in retail banking but to a lesser extent, is the hedging side, as a significant amount of corporate bank lending is at a fixed or capped interest rate that must be hedged against interest‐rate risk. Note that variable rate products that are linked to the central bank base rate generally fund internally on a 3M Libor basis, but often are unhedged for interest‐rate risk due to the lack of depth in the base rate swap market.
This raises a key management point. Since internal FTP‐base rate‐Libor basis risk cannot be hedged externally, a bank's origination policy should dictate that fixed‐rate, fixed‐term assets are hedged with cash fixed‐rate liabilities, in order to match repricing tenor and matching interest rates bases. In other words, the bank's IRR hedging policy document should influence product origination strategy to ensure basis risk is minimised at the point of origination.
The recommended corporate bank FTP regime is illustrated in Figure 11.7. Figure 11.8 shows a template tenor convention.
Corporate bank product | <1Y | 1Y | 2Y | 3Y | 4Y | 5Y | Contractual tenor |
Base rate loans | 20% | 20% | 10% | 50% | |||
Libor‐linked loans | 20% | 30% | 50% | ||||
Overdrafts | 25% | 75% | |||||
Interest‐only loans | 25% | 75% | |||||
Repayment loans | 10% | 20% | 20% | 50% | |||
Variable tenor (revolving facility) | 10% | 90% | |||||
Savings accounts | 50% | 50% | |||||
Current accounts | 20% | 30% | 50% | ||||
(Source: Choudhry, 2012) |
Figure 11.8 Corporate banking product tenor behaviour, percentage of balance
Note that there are two alternative approaches here, shown in Figure 11.7: (i) the internal FTP that Treasury charges the business for funds lent out at a fixed‐rate to the customer is also at a fixed‐rate for the (behavioural) life of the loan, or (ii) the internal FTP is at a floating‐rate. Option 2 does not remove the interest‐rate risk for the business line and so Treasury then also has to put in place an internal swap hedge with the business line.
For the business lines, approach (i) is the most transparent, consequently that is the one recommended by the author.
The wholesale banking business model, where one exists in a bank, requires a more prescribed FTP regime. There is little, if any, concept of a “customer deposits” funding business and the asset side is funded with repo (secured funding) and wholesale funding (money markets and capital markets).
This makes the FTP model more straightforward to implement. For example, a summary template might look like this:
Most banks will not have FTP grids for currencies other than their domestic currency and USD and EUR. The base currency grid can be converted to a required currency rate by applying the FX basis swap rate to it – not an exact science but the approach should be sufficient for most purposes.
A bank that operates across all markets will need to consider carefully how to construct its FTP curve and whether there should be one unified curve across the bank or variations by business line.
The concept of internal funds pricing and the term liquidity premium is quite a complicated one, and there is no “one size fits all”. It is important that the mechanism put in place is the one most appropriate to the business model of the bank in question, and set up to reflect the type of business that the bank's shareholders and Board want it to do.
Implementing an internal funds pricing policy that explicitly charges each business line for its cost of liquidity is not always a painless task, due in part to inertia and resistance from the business lines themselves. This is particularly acute when the businesses have historically always paid a Libor‐flat or Libor + fixed spread charge. The bank's FTP policy, whether it is an update or it is being set up for the first time, should always be owned by the Board, delegated to ALCO, and implemented by the Treasury and Finance departments.