Chapter 4
Explaining Change in Institutionalized Practices
A Review and Road Map for Research

Thomas D'Aunno

Learning Objectives

  1. Define institutional change.
  2. Understand why institutional change occurs by examining three causal models of institutional change: the exogenous shocks perspective, the endogenous contradictions view, and the intraorganizational dynamics explanation for institutional change.
  3. Understand how institutional change occurs by examining three process models of institutional change: the field-level dynamics model, institutional entrepreneurship models, and change processes within organizations.
  4. Apply institutional change models to recent health reform efforts, including the promotion of integrated services and the expansion of insurance coverage.
  5. Identify priorities for future research on the processes of institutional change.

Since its reemergence in the late 1970s (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977), institutional theory has become a dominant, if not the predominant, approach to the study of organizations and their environments (Haveman and David, 2008). The theory's distinctive contribution lies in its analysis of relationships between widely held beliefs and values in the social and cultural environment of organizations and their behavior (Suddaby, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2008). More specifically, institutional theory argues that organizations receive societal support and legitimacy to the extent that they conform to common views about how they should behave. Taken together, these beliefs, values, and rules form the institutional environment in which organizations operate. Furthermore, many of the practices that institutional environments prescribe, and organizations adopt, become so widely accepted that they are taken for granted, and thus they are highly resistant to change. In other words, institutional theory has focused heavily on understanding conditions that promote convergence and homogeneity of structures and practices among organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

If this were the theory's only ambition, one could conclude that it has been successful. Results from a relatively large body of empirical research show substantial support for institutional explanations of such convergence (Dacin,

Goodstein, and Scott, 2002; Scott, 2001; Greenwood et al., 2008; Heugens and Lander, 2009).

Beginning in the late 1980s, however, institutional theorists (Powell, 1991; DiMaggio, 1988; Zucker, 1988) began to question whether the perspective was limited to explaining changes leading to convergence and similarity among organizations and their practices or, in contrast, if, and how, the theory could account for changes in organizational forms and practices after they had been institutionalized. In response, much conceptual and empirical work has addressed questions about why and how such change occurs, focusing on what Oliver (1992) and Scott (2001, p. 182) term deinstitutionalization, “the processes by which institutions weaken and disappear” and are replaced in part, or wholly, by alternative institutions (see also Kraatz and Moore, 2002). Indeed, the Academy of Management Journal published a special issue on what is now commonly termed institutional change (Dacin et al., 2002); several book chapters review research in this area (see Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009) as well, and one book focuses heavily on these issues (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca, 2009).

Nonetheless, as it currently stands, institutional theory is more coherent and compelling when it comes to explaining the conditions under which organizational practices and forms become institutionalized than in explaining institutional change—why, and especially how, organizations or practices diverge from institutionalized templates. Previous work proposes a variety of explanations to account for institutional change and has examined a variety of aspects of such change. Some explanations, for example, focus on the importance of competition for scarce resources as an impetus for change in institutionalized practices (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Leblebici et al., 1991), whereas other explanations emphasize the role of the state and professions in promoting institutional change (Fligstein, 1990, 1991).

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to develop an agenda for research that can provide a more comprehensive and integrated account for how institutional change occurs than exists in current work. My goal is to promote research on the processes of institutional change by analyzing key aspects of the explanations that have been proposed to account for how such change occurs and suggesting priorities for future research.

I begin by reviewing previous explanations for why and how institutional change occurs. Next, I discuss some strengths and limitations of current models of institutional change for analyzing two particular efforts in health care reform: health insurance exchanges and accountable care organizations. I conclude with suggestions for steps to advance research on institutional change.

Conceptual Background

To begin, I discuss variation in the nature of changes that earlier work defines as institutional change. There is considerable variation in these definitions and empirical measures of institutional change, as well as some controversy about what an appropriate definition should be. I then summarize these explanations to account for why and how institutional change occurs.

The Nature of Institutional Change

Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) note that part of the difficulty in understanding institutions is their diversity and pervasiveness. Prior work on institutional change certainly supports their view. This work varies substantially in that it focuses on explaining changes in a wide range of institutions (Jepperson, 1991). These include templates or blueprints for organizing (Powell, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; D'Aunno, Succi, and Alexander, 2000; Johnson, Smith, and Codling, 2000); organizational form (Fligstein, 1990, 1991; Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994); organizational fields (Hoffman, 1999; Leblebici et al., 1991; Alexander and D'Aunno, 1990); institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, 2008; Thornton, 2002; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna, 2000; Lounsbury, 2002); organizational programs (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Kraatz and Moore, 2002); and management or organizational practices (Townley, 2002; Zilber, 2002; Sherer and Lee, 2002; Smets, Morris, and Greenwood, 2012; Lawrence et al., 2009).

Previous work varies not only in its substantive focus on different institutions, but also in its focus on institutions at varying levels of analysis, ranging from individual-level phenomena to field-level ones. For example, some papers examine change at the field level of analysis (Hoffman, 1999), while others are concerned with radical changes within organizations (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Explanations for institutional change also vary by level of analysis; in other words, analysis levels differ for both independent and dependent variables.

Some observers critique earlier work on two related grounds (Haveman and David, 2008; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). First, and more generally, critics argue that key concepts in institutional theory, including the concept of institution itself, often are not clearly defined or measured. Similarly, they claim that studies of institutional change may be examining changes in practices that are not institutionalized: not all change in organizational fields, organizations, or practices is institutional change (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). The importance of these critiques is obvious, but they merit highlighting. Without an accepted definition and measure of a focal institution, it is not possible to examine institutional change, let alone make comparisons and draw conclusions across studies of such change. I am sympathetic with these critiques and aim to be clear and consistent in distinguishing institutional change in health care from less fundamental changes that are occurring in the field.

Explanations for Institutional Change

Smets et al. (2012) provide a useful summary of explanations for institutional change. They argue that earlier work can be categorized into three approaches, each with its view of the origins, mechanisms, and processes involved in change: exogenous shocks, endogenous field-level contradictions, and intraorganizational dynamics.

The exogenous shocks view argues that institutional change occurs when current arrangements collide with new social values and technologies, demographic shifts, or different political or economic models and conditions that originate either outside an organizational field (Oliver, 1992; Clemens and Cook, 1999; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003) or from its periphery (Battilana, 2011; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, 2004). To the extent that actors encounter jolts from external sources, they are forced to rethink fundamental assumptions about practices that they had taken for granted as the right way to do things. In this view, new ideas and ways of doing things typically originate from outside a field or from actors who are marginal to the field because they are neither socialized in widely accepted views and practices nor as likely to see their value. Thornton (2004), for example, showed how actors from outside the field of publishing in higher education carried new ideas about business strategy and operations into the world of publishing and resulted in substantial changes in the field.

Furthermore, once shocks occur, even well-entrenched actors can see the need for change and can become so-called institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988; Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Battilana et al., 2009; Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis, 2011). These are actors, either organizations or individuals (or combinations of these), who leverage resources, including social and organizational networks, to create new institutions or transform existing ones. In the past few years, researchers have given much attention to the role of such entrepreneurs in institutional change. Battilana and colleagues (2009) recently reviewed sixty published papers and chapters on this topic, and they propose a model of the process of institutional entrepreneurship (reviewed below).

At the same time, controversy remains about assumptions underlying the study of institutional entrepreneurs. Holm (1995) stated the problem quite well: “How can actors change institutions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institutions they wish to change?” (p. 401). Some analysts argue that the idea of institutional entrepreneurs is not consistent with the basic tenets of institutional theory, which hold that social and cultural environments, with their taken-for-granted norms and rules, shape organizational and individual behavior. In this view, studies of “hypermuscular heroes” who somehow have the power to change society (e.g., Steve Jobs or Bill Gates) are outside the bounds of institutional theory (Delmestri, 2006; Meyer, 2006). In contrast, other analysts argue that institutional theory has an oversocialized view of human behavior, rendering actors as passive “cultural dopes” whose social environments imprison them. In this view, institutional theory needs to develop a more compelling account for agency in human activity.

Battilana and I (2009) propose a middle ground and argue that enabling conditions at the field, organizational, and individual levels can promote or inhibit human agency. For example, institutional entrepreneurs are more likely to emerge in organizational fields that are less mature and hold more heterogeneous norms and values (D'Aunno et al., 2000; Dorado, 2005; Kraatz and Block, 2008). In these conditions, people have more freedom to challenge the status quo in organizational arrangements and practices.

Furthermore, following Emirbayer and Mische (1998), Battilana and I (2009) argue for a more complex and nuanced view of human agency. In this view, individuals have a range of levels of self-consciousness as well as a wide range of temporal orientations. At one extreme, self-consciousness is limited, and individuals are oriented mainly to the present or past; they reproduce habits and practices without much question. At the other extreme, self-consciousness is heightened and people project themselves into the future. In doing so, they can imagine alternative ways of behaving and thus have the ability to make choices that challenge the status quo.

Our approach poses research questions about the conditions under which different dimensions of agency and temporal orientations predominate and predispose individuals to behave more or less as cultural dopes than as muscular heroes. Debate about the concept of institutional entrepreneurs and their role in institutional change clearly is not settled, and thus I argue that research should focus on the conditions that promote or inhibit agency.

Two final points are important to consider about the exogenous shocks view. One is that this view emphasizes conflict and power struggles as actors challenge an institutionalized practice or organizational form and incumbents defend the status quo (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006; Van de Ven and Hargrave, 2004). For example, Rao, Morrill, and Zald (2000) draw on social movement theory to discuss “power plays” among actors involved in such struggles, and Hoffman (1999) uses the term institutional war to refer to open conflict among actors. Second, as illustrated in works by Fligstein and McAdam (2012) and Davis and colleagues (2005), the exogenous shocks perspective, as well as the endogenous contradictions view discussed below, often includes at least some analyses at the field and societal levels to account for changes in institutions.

A second approach to explain institutional change emphasizes endogenous contradictions at the field level of analysis. In this view, the potential for change increases to the extent that tensions exist within fields, which hold logics that are inconsistent or contradict each other (Friedland and Alford, 1991; D'Aunno, Sutton, and Price, 1991; D'Aunno et al., 2000; Seo and Creed, 2002). Organizations and individuals facing inconsistent or conflicting demands often must choose among them, thus creating the possibility for choice, which opens the door for these actors to create changes in their practices or models of organizing (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010; Kraatz and Block, 2008). Furthermore, this view holds that tensions among inconsistent logics are likely to increase as organizational fields mature, making it less likely that actors can buffer themselves from conflicting or inconsistent demands (Oliver, 1991).

Smets and colleagues (2012) note that research that focuses on institutional contradictions within fields has emphasized the role that rhetoric and political struggles play in resolving conflicts. Studies show how discourse (Maguire and Hardy, 2009) and political skills are used to mobilize allies (Lounsbury, 2007; Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008). Similarly, studies show tactics that actors use to promote collective movements and the ways in which these movements help actors gain advantage in conflicts (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006).

Kellogg (2009) provides an excellent example of this approach in her careful ethnographic study of the implementation of a mandate from the American Council of Graduate Medical Education that limited residents to an eighty-hour workweek. She examined responses to the mandate over two and one-half years in three similar teaching hospitals. Based on extensive data from participant observation and interviews, Kellogg argues that although field-level forces, such as mandates from credentialing or regulatory bodies, often may be necessary to prompt change in institutionalized practices, it is microlevel processes that make such changes happen within organizations. She terms these microlevel processes collective combat, in which defenders of the status quo and reformers engaged in a relatively protracted struggle to promote their causes. Actors tried to advance their goals by building coalitions, and they used a variety of tactics to mobilize resources, including labeling and denigrating opponents and interfering with their daily activities. Kellogg quickly discovered that changing daily work practices proved difficult—and indeed was unsuccessful in two of the three hospitals—because it required challenging long-standing beliefs, roles, and authority relations. She concludes that to understand institutional change, we need to analyze power and politics within organizations.

In short, in the endogenous contradictions view, institutional change often originates in fields that hold heterogeneous, conflicting, or contradictory beliefs, values, and logics that give actors within such fields opportunities, and indeed license, to challenge the status quo. Change then unfolds in conflict-laden processes that are similar to those reported by researchers who have examined how exogenous shocks prompt institutional change.

A third set of explanations for institutional change focuses on intraorganizational dynamics (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). In this view, organizations, similar to fields, can hold inconsistent, uncoordinated, and sometimes conflicting and contradictory logics (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In turn, actors within such organizations hold values and interests that are similarly fragmented, and this situation creates tensions that prompt challenges to established ways of doing things and potentially result in organizational change. How senior managers (Edelman, 1990) and powerful occupational groups (Dobbin, 2009) respond to these internal organizational conflicts may amplify or resolve them. Meyer and Rowan (1977) observe that loose coupling among actors and practices within organizations is an antidote to such conflicts, but there are limits to loose coupling, especially to the extent that organizations face external pressures for efficiency.

In sum, previous accounts for institutional change vary in some important ways, especially by focusing on either the processes in change or the causes of change, the mechanisms proposed to explain change, the role of agency, and levels of analysis for causal mechanisms. More recent work focuses on the processes in institutional change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), as compared to earlier work that focused on understanding the antecedents of such change. Earlier work asked, “Why, or under what conditions, do institutions change?” as opposed to asking, “How does institutional change occur?” (Scott, 1994, p. 81; Scott, 2001). Accompanying the shift to an increased focus on the processes involved in institutional change has been a shift in research methods, moving from quantitative approaches that test hypotheses about why change occurs to qualitative methods that examine processes involved in change (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). This movement is producing a rich set of explanations for how change occurs that I discuss in more detail in the following sections.

Process Models of Institutional Change

In this section I review models that aim to account for the processes in institutional change. For parsimony, this review is selective, and I group the models into three types that focus on field-level dynamics, institutional entrepreneurship, and change processes within organizations.

A Field-Level Model

Hinings et al. (2004) and Greenwood et al. (2002) propose a process model for understanding institutional change at the field level of analysis. The proposed model consists of five stages that unfold in a sequence.

In stage 1, a range of powerful forces creates pressure for change. These forces include changes in political (changes in elected officials), technical (invention of new technologies), social (changes in demography), and market (entry of new competitors) conditions, and, importantly, the poor performance of established institutions (Oliver, 1992). For example, actors both internal (the Institute of Medicine) and external (employers) to the field of US health care have called for change in its institutional arrangements (how providers are paid) due to widely held views that our system is underperforming.

In stage 2, institutional entrepreneurs introduce new practices to replace old ones. Dorado (1999) argues that these entrepreneurs may be of different types: innovators who operate within a field and see opportunities for improvements in established practices; engineers who are gatekeepers within fields, controlling access to key resources needed to promote change; and catalysts who are outsiders to a field (such as business leaders who want improvements in health care). If these entrepreneurs are successful, their efforts lead to the next stage.

In stage 3, processes unfold, primarily at the field level of analysis, to legitimate new practices and delegitimate old ones. One key process is that of theorization, in which conceptual rationales are elaborated that both specify why old approaches fail to address current problems and justify why a new approach will solve these problems (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). These ideas and arguments to support new practices develop as they are tested by trial and error in local settings (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Strang and Meyer, 1993).

Furthermore, once new practices have been theorized and begin to receive some legitimacy, they can be disseminated across a field. Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell (1997) provide a useful example of how such dissemination occurs in their study of the adoption of total quality management (TQM) among US hospitals. They showed that early adopters customized practices to improve their performance, while later adopters were more likely to use TQM practices as a standard set, even if these practices did not improve their performance. Later adopters seem to be more interested in gaining the legitimacy of using practices that are widely accepted than in actually improving their performance.

In stage 4, as new practices are disseminated across a field, dynamics of change occur within organizations that may (or may not) adopt the new practices, as actors work to promote or oppose them (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Kellogg's (2009) study of hospital responses to changes in residency training hours, summarized above, nicely illustrates the dynamics of values, interests, power, and conflict that Hinings and colleagues (2004) discuss in their model.

Finally, in stage 5, powerful field-level actors promote institutionalization of the new practices. Hinings and colleagues (2004) emphasize that even at this stage, there is no guarantee that new practices will gain enough support to dominate a field. Rather, it is often the case that newly institutionalized practices and the logics that support them (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012) sit side by side in fields with other practices that may be uncoordinated or even conflicting (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Heterogeneity of practices and logics at the field level is often common (Kraatz and Block, 2008).

The proposed model is relatively comprehensive, addressing the fundamental causes of institutional change (the pressures identified in stage 1) as well as the origins of new practices (institutional entrepreneurs of different types) and how they replace established practices at the organizational and field levels. Indeed, one could argue that the model of field-level institutional change by Hinings and colleagues (2004) incorporates all of the key elements and arguments from the models reviewed above. Yet the virtues of the proposed model also entail a limitation: it operates at a level of generality that suggests the need for more precise models of the processes involved in institutional change. I now turn to discuss three such models.

Process Models of Institutional Entrepreneurship

Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) and Battilana and colleagues (2009) have proposed overarching models of processes involved in institutional entrepreneurship. Greenwood and Suddaby's (2006) model has several key components that are linked in a causal stream. To begin, a fundamental cause for institutional change is field stratification, that is, the existence of hierarchies of status and power within and between communities of organizations. By definition, stratification means that some organizations are more elite and central to a field than others. This distinction matters because elite organizations have access to more information than lower-status organizations do and thus elite organizations, more than others, are aware of contradictions that may exist at the field level.

Organizations also vary in the extent to which their forms and practices are aligned with the regulatory and market rules of their field; misalignment exposes organizations to contradictory criteria for their performance (D'Aunno et al., 2000). Furthermore, organizations whose work involves spanning the boundaries of their fields learn about logics that differ from their own. In turn, misalignment and boundary spanning prompt organizational awareness, motivation, and openness to alternative logics. Finally, institutional entrepreneurship is more likely to occur under these conditions.

In brief, stratification and network positions expose organizations differentially to field-level contradictions in expectations for their behavior and performance. Once exposed to such contradictions, organizations may experience negative feedback on their performance (e.g., they cannot meet conflicting expectations and thus disappoint some actors). Furthermore, exposure to contradictions makes organizations aware of alternative models and logics. In turn, negative feedback and awareness of alternatives make organizations open to change and enable institutional entrepreneurs to launch change efforts, which are likely to be successful to the extent that powerful, centrally located organizations are involved in them.

The model by Battilana and colleagues (2009) has some important similarities with that of Greenwood and Suddaby (2006). These include an emphasis on field characteristics and actors' positions within them as factors that enable change, as well as similar observations about the power and politics of change once entrepreneurs initiate their efforts. Yet some different points of emphasis in the two approaches make them more complementary than redundant.

First, Battilana and colleagues (2009) emphasize that institutional change and entrepreneurship are more likely to occur in fields that are newer and less settled (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). In contrast, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) are explicitly concerned with why and how change occurs in mature organizational fields. Second, Battilana and colleagues (2009) argue that actors on the periphery of organizational fields (those with lower status) are more likely to challenge the status quo because they are less invested in it (see Leblebici et al., 1991). In contrast, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) argue that actors who are more elite in a field have more possibilities to learn about alternative logics and adequate power to change arrangements in their fields. Greenwood and Suddaby also argue that even organizations with central positions in a field can become institutional entrepreneurs when they are exposed to field-level contradictions as a result of either boundary-spanning roles or misalignment that they experience. In short, these models differ in their views about the roles that central versus peripheral positions in organizational fields play in motivating and enabling institutional change.

As was the case for the field-level model of institutional change (Hinings et al., 2004) discussed above, both models of institutional entrepreneurship operate at a level of abstraction that leaves open the possibility for complementary accounts. Tracey and colleagues (2011) recently provided such an account. They examined processes involved in the creation of a new organizational form in England: a social enterprise to help homeless people in which they would operate a household catalogue business. Profits from this business not only pay employees a living wage, but also are used to hire staff members whose responsibility is to link employees to needed social services and other job opportunities. To launch this new organization, two entrepreneurs, Paul Harrod and Mark Richardson, engaged in six types of institutional work that clustered around three levels of analysis: individual, organizational, and societal.

At the individual level, creating a new organizational form required Harrod and Richardson to frame the problem in a novel way and engage in counterfactual thinking to imagine alternative approaches to homelessness (e.g., homeless people need jobs and careers rather than homes). Harrod and Richardson also needed to build a new organizational template for their work and did so by borrowing ideas from multiple sources about how to organize and operate a profitable business. Finally, to institutionalize their approach, these entrepreneurs changed societal discourse about the homeless and raised awareness of their new model by using the media and aligning their approach to highly legitimate actors, including, for example, the British royal family.

The approach to institutional entrepreneurship by Tracey and colleagues (2011) combines elements of models by Battilana and colleagues (2009) and Greenwood and Suddaby (2006). In particular, much of what Tracey and colleagues (2011) discuss concerns processes involved in what Battilana and colleagues (2009) term “implementing divergent change.” Tracey and colleagues (2011) nicely theorize the processes in building, launching, and institutionalizing the new organizational model and illustrate what Lawrence et al. (2009) term institutional work. At the same time, Tracey and colleagues (2011) illustrate the importance of Greenwood and Suddaby's (2006) concept of network position, especially the role that boundary spanners such as Harrod and Richardson can play in importing new organizational models, or parts of new models, into a focal field (in this case, homelessness) from other fields (business).

In sum, in the past few years, researchers have made much progress in developing models of key processes involved in institutional entrepreneurship and in articulating its role in institutional change. I turn next to a final set of three models that, unlike those discussed above, focus on changes in institutionalized practices within organizations.

Change Processes within Organizations

Reay, Golden-Biddle, and Germann (2006) examined institutional change within primary care settings by focusing on the introduction of a new role, nurse practitioners, into traditional teams of health care providers. They propose a model of change processes within organizations that highlights the role of individual activities. The model argues that individuals who are highly embedded in work settings can take advantage of an intimate understanding of their organizations to create change in three steps. First, highly embedded persons can recognize or create opportunities to advance new practices; next, these individuals find ways to fit new practices into established structures and systems; and, finally, people who act as change leaders produce evidence to show the value of new practices, thus legitimating them, especially to actors who may oppose them.

The proposed model challenges previous work by showing how individuals who are well socialized in established practices can still have the agency required to promote institutional change (Battilana and D'Aunno, 2009); external jolts are not necessarily required to prompt institutional change. Moreover, the proposed model focuses on small gains rather than dramatic, large-scale events and forces.

Plowman et al. (2007) examined processes of institutional change within an urban church that experienced what the authors term “continuous radical change” as it moved from a traditional mission to one that focused on serving thousands of homeless individuals. The study results show that radical changes in the church were not intended and emerged slowly (the change began when some church members launched a free breakfast on Sunday mornings). Once small changes began to occur, tensions in the organizational context helped to amplify them into radical changes that then become continuous, following one after another.

More generally, Plowman and colleagues (2007) propose that institutional changes are more likely to occur when an organization faces stress and ongoing tension (in this case, the church experienced a long-term decline in members), resources are available that enable larger changes, individuals use language and symbols to support and amplify change, and there is ongoing interaction of these factors that enables continuous radical change.

The work of Plowman and colleagues (2007) has some important similarities to the models I have discussed. First, they emphasize, similar to Hinings and colleagues (2004) and others (Oliver, 1992), that institutional change is more likely to occur to the extent that organizations face challenging conditions or shifts in their context. Second, they emphasize the role of discourse and symbols in promoting change, a theme that Maguire and Hardy (2009), Tracey and colleagues (2011), and other theorists who focus on the role of theorization also emphasize. Third, there is clearly alignment with theorists who argue that institutional change does not depend heavily on individual agency: for example, changes in the church mission were not intentional and do not seem to have occurred as a result of planning.

At the same time, Plowman and colleagues' observations (2007) clearly differ from Reay and colleagues (2006), who emphasize intentional activities and tactics that highly aware individuals use to create small wins that add up to create institutional change. In short, we see two relatively different models of the processes of institutional change in their careful qualitative work.

The final model of change processes within organizations that I review below (Smets et al., 2012) is more similar to Reay and colleagues (2006) than to Plowman and colleagues (2007), but adds a crucial element that both are lacking. Based on their study of law firms in the English and German banking sectors, Smets and colleagues (2012) propose a model that focuses on changes in practices within organizations (what they term improvisations) and, importantly, how these changes not only emerge from everyday work but also become justified and diffused within organizations and the field. In other words, the proposed model is multilevel, crosses levels of analysis, and begins not by top-down changes from the field level but by changes in everyday practices that originate from the bottom up.

Smets and colleagues (2012) begin with the observation that fields hold logics that may collide with each other. In this case, English and German legal practices in the banking sector were not consistent with each other. At the local level, these inconsistencies produced not only complexities for practitioners, but also a sense of urgency to deal with inconsistencies: resolving differences seemed consequential to the practitioners. Next, local improvisation in work practices and reworking of networks of organizations and relationships enable work to proceed in ways that reconcile differences in logics. In a final phase, new practices are unobtrusively embedded at the field level until these practices become widely used and then are formally endorsed.

Several points about the proposed model are important to consider. First, it extends the work of Reay and colleagues (2006), Plowman and colleagues (2007), and others (Hallett, 2010; Kellogg, 2009; Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) who focus attention on changes in institutionalized practices within organizations. More important, the proposed model links changes in local practices to field-level logics and, following the endogenous contradictions view, builds on the idea that institutional change has origins in heterogeneity in logics at the field level.

At the same time, the proposed model contrasts with views about the importance of institutional entrepreneurs (there are no “heroes” in the story) and the role of overt conflict and politics in institutional change, as the exogenous shocks view often emphasizes. Rather, change unfolds in a quiet way. Formal endorsement of new hybrid practices follows from their widespread use rather than the reverse. In early efforts to promote changes in practices, the inability of regulatory bodies to police local organizations (e.g., due to geographic distance between them) enabled the new practices to gain momentum. Finally, though the model by Smets and colleagues (2012) has important strengths, it clearly is not entirely consistent with previous work and models, raising questions about next steps in theory development and research in this field.

Application: Institutional Change in the Health Care Field

On June 28, 2012, the US Supreme Court delivered a historic decision upholding the constitutionality of the mandate for individuals to purchase health insurance (or pay a penalty) included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). In conjunction with President Obama's reelection, it appears that efforts to implement the PPACA will continue and are likely to accelerate. Several states already have taken steps toward PPACA implementation, including establishing health insurance exchanges (HIEs), planning for major expansion of their Medicaid programs, and providing technical assistance to health care providers in implementing electronic medical records systems. Yet all is not going smoothly: other states are not yet participating in these reforms for a variety of reasons, including those that are simply engaged in watchful waiting to see what they can learn from early adopters of PPACA innovations. In addition, the initial implementation of the PPACA's health insurance exchanges was fraught with major problems that limited enrollment opportunities, caused widespread confusion, and provided the act's opponents with renewed incentives to rescind it. (See also the discussion of the PPACA in chapter 1.)

Given this context and the purposes of this chapter, I briefly summarize two major aspects of health reform that may have great significance for access to health care and its quality: incentives for integration of services and expansion in insurance coverage. I use these two issues to illustrate the strengths and limitations of current work to account for how institutional change occurs. Of course, one also could argue that the difficulty that reform efforts have been facing illustrates a key argument in institutional theory: once organizational forms and practices are institutionalized, they are difficult to change, and most changes that occur are relatively superficial.

The legislation created new financial incentives to promote integration of services. The PPACA includes a new state plan option under Medicaid to establish patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) to serve enrollees with complex health care needs. States that take this option will receive an enhanced matching rate for services provided by PCMHs for up to two years. The PPACA also established a new program under Medicare to enable hospitals, specialists, and primary care providers as accountable care organizations (ACOs) to form collectives of providers who care for a defined group of patients. ACOs will be paid bonuses based on their ability to meet quality goals. ACOs and PCMHs have formed across the nation in response to these incentives.

The PPACA also aims to dramatically expand insurance coverage to an estimated 30 million Americans. The legislation abolishes categorical restrictions on eligibility for Medicaid that have traditionally limited enrollment to children and parents, older adults, and individuals with qualifying disabilities, resulting in a possible expansion of approximately 16 million individuals. The PPACA also encourages states to establish HIEs, organizations that will primarily serve individuals buying insurance on their own and small businesses with up to one hundred employees, providing a choice of different health plan options.

In sum, on the one hand, the PPACA created a major new organizational form, HIEs, to increase the demand for health care services by financing access to them for individuals and employers who previously could not afford health insurance. On the other hand, it creates another major new organizational form, ACOs, to improve the “supply side,” or delivery, of health care services by promoting service integration. Both HIEs and ACOs are not only new organizational forms; their founding also entails substantial changes in the way well-established organizations currently work across the field of health care in the United States.

Models of Institutional Change and Health Care Reform

It is useful to raise questions about the extent to which reforms in the health care field in progress qualify as institutional change: To what extent are the practices targeted for change institutionalized, and do proposed new practices diverge significantly from established ones? For the most part, I argue in the affirmative to these questions. For example, the practices that produce uncoordinated care are well established, widely used, and, in many cases, taken for granted, at least among actors embedded in the field. These practices include specialization among the professions, physician dominance in clinical decision making, individual versus teamwork in care provision, and payment systems that reward work volume rather than efficiency or quality of care, thus providing little or no incentive for coordination. Taken together, these practices and the beliefs that support them constitute a well-developed logic of care (Thornton et al., 2012; Battilana, 2011; Scott et al., 2000).

Perhaps most important, the mandate to purchase health care insurance is a strong example of institutional change because it challenges a deeply held cultural view about individual autonomy and rights in American society. As a result, this is the single change that prompted the US Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of reform efforts.

Of course, many of the proposed changes themselves, including ACOs and PCMHs, are not entirely new to the field. The practices and models that reformers seek to put in place have precedents in the field. For example, health care providers such as Intermountain Healthcare, Geisinger, Group Health of Puget Sound, and Kaiser Permanente, have been using the “new” practices and models to pay for and coordinate care, in some cases for decades. Yet though the proposed changes are not new to the field, they diverge sharply from widely used, long-standing, and accepted practices, thus meeting most criteria for institutional change.

A second observation is that the fundamental causes for change in the health care field seem to fit explanations that the exogenous shocks and endogenous contradictions views propose. In particular, several exogenous changes combined to prompt reform efforts. These included changes in the political environment (with the two-term election of President Obama and Democratic Party control in the Senate), the technical environment (widespread availability of information technology), and the economy (the recession of 2009 produced high levels of unemployment and an increase in uninsured individuals and uncertainty about access to health care).

At the same time, I argue that fundamental contradictions in logics that underpin the field (such as balancing the logic of access to care with the logic of efficiency and cost control) also prompted reform efforts. As a result, consistent with the endogenous view of change, calls for reform came from actors within the field, including individual leaders, such as Donald Berwick (founder of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement), and prominent organizations, such as the Institute of Medicine. Finally, common to both views is that the US health care system has not performed well, thus motivating actors both external and internal to the system to seek fundamental changes in its organization and practices.

In contrast, there is little evidence to support the view that the institutional changes in progress stem primarily from changes within local-level organizations that will eventually result in field-level change (change from the bottom up) or that this change is occurring quietly or unobtrusively, as Smets and colleagues (2012) propose.

A third observation is that, consistent with Hinings and colleagues (2004) and Smets and colleagues (2012), the process of change is occurring across multiple levels of analysis. Current reform efforts involve an interplay of processes among local organizations (e.g., ACOs), state-level organizations (such as the Massachusetts HIE), and national actors, including the US Supreme Court and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which is charged with implementing the reforms.

Fourth, I argue that processes in play provide support for some key elements of Greenwood and Suddaby's (2006) model of institutional entrepreneurship. Specifically, this model focuses on change in mature fields, and health care qualifies as one. Greenwood and Suddaby also focus on field stratification and the position that actors occupy in networks of power and status. In particular, they argue that entrepreneurs in mature fields are likely to be high-status actors whose position not only enables them to see field-level contradictions but also affords them legitimacy to take action to address them. The Institute of Medicine, CMS, the American Hospital Association, and the American Nurses Association all are excellent examples of such entrepreneurs.

Fifth, the process models discussed previously focus on the importance of theorizing new practices to legitimate them, the use of rhetoric to support new practices and delegitimate established ones, and the power struggles in contests between proponents of established practices and new ones. One can observe all of these elements in current reform efforts. For example, advocates for reform thus far have used theorizing and rhetoric primarily to undermine established practices (such as practices of insurance companies to limit coverage) rather than promote understanding, acceptance, and the legitimacy of new practices. There are some exceptions, but these are mainly limited to publications in academic journals (Singer and Shortell, 2011). Indeed, critics argue that President Obama has not made a strong enough case (theorized adequately) for the benefits of many reforms and precisely how they will benefit Americans. In short, to the extent that current process models of institutional change are valid, they suggest the need for more theorizing and effective rhetoric to win support in political contests for change, for example, in states that are now debating if they should implement an HIE.

Finally, current process models identify endorsements from formal authorities as a key step to promote dissemination and institutionalization of new practices. To date, crucial endorsements for reforms in US health care have come from several authorities, including the US Supreme Court, the president, many members of Congress, and leading professional organizations within the field. Nonetheless, more formal, and continuing, support will likely be needed to make substantial and longstanding institutional changes. As noted, more states will need to give formal support for HIEs and Medicaid expansion.

Conclusion

The work reviewed in this chapter provides a strong foundation for understanding the origins of institutional change and, more recently, how such change occurs. As noted, studies in the 1990s and early 2000s tested alternative explanations for the causes of institutional change and relied heavily on quantitative analyses of large-scale data sets (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Davis et al., 1994). Since 2002, researchers have addressed questions about how institutional change occurs and have relied heavily on qualitative methods, especially case studies. This approach was entirely appropriate considering that the research goal was, first, to identify key change processes and, second, to propose conceptual models for how institutional change unfolds. Indeed, researchers have had considerable success in attaining this goal, producing several plausible and coherent process models of institutional change. Furthermore, these models vary in some key elements. The time has come for study designs that enable us to test among the available alternative explanations to account for how institutional change occurs, and I propose five major topics for study.

First, we need studies to examine the conditions under which change processes are more likely to originate, and to be driven, from the bottom up versus top down (Scott, 2001). Smets and colleagues (2012) propose a mainly bottom-up approach in which change in institutionalized practices originates in local organizations and then evolves to attain support from formal bodies at the field level. Some key elements of this approach also find support from Reay and colleagues (2006), who showed how individuals who are highly embedded in organizations could promote change in well-established roles.

In contrast, most other models argue for the importance of change processes that originate at the field level of analysis (Hinings et al., 2004; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006; Battilana et al., 2009). Of course, it may be the case that both types of processes are important, yet we have little empirical evidence about the conditions that might make one approach more likely to occur than the other or how the approaches might combine. To address these issues, we need comparative studies that explicitly examine multiple levels of analysis.

Second, many models argue for the importance of institutional entrepreneurs in promoting change, but it is not clear if these people or organizations are more likely to come from the periphery of a field or are located external to it (Leblebici et al., 1991; Battilana et al., 2009). In contrast, are these actors more likely to be centrally located (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006)? Current explanations seem plausible, but with the exception of Battilana (2011), few, if any, empirical studies contrast these explanations to develop understanding of when and how the location of actors promotes or hinders their ability to become entrepreneurs and their success in doing so.

Third, notwithstanding the emphasis of several models of change on the efforts of entrepreneurs who undertake bold initiatives, we need studies to advance understanding of conditions that foster or limit individual agency (Battilana and D'Aunno, 2009; Lawrence et al., 2009). Plowman and colleagues (2007) argue, for example, that members of the church they examined had no intentions of promoting radical change in the church's mission, but such change occurred nonetheless. This observation is consistent with the views of theorists (Meyer, 2006) who argue that institutional theory does not need to rely on explanations involving hypermuscular heroes. Yet accounts in some studies (Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis, 2011) clearly show the importance of such individuals. The conditions that promote or hinder what Lawrence and his colleagues (2009) term “institutional work” by individuals and organizations certainly need more attention in empirical studies.

Fourth, under what conditions do the processes involved in institutional change consist of conflict-laden power struggles (Kellogg, 2009) versus unobtrusive, “under-the-radar” activities (Smets et al., 2012; Reay et al., 2006)? Here again, current work shows a sharp contrast in accounts for how change occurs. We need studies that not only examine the occurrence and use of overt conflict versus unobtrusive activities to promote change, but also to identify the conditions under which each approach or combinations of approaches are successful.

Finally, several models focus on the role of rhetoric and language in theorizing, and thus promoting, institutional change (Tracey et al., 2011; Kellogg, 2009; Plowman et al., 2007). Yet there is much more we need to understand about the role of rhetoric in change processes (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), including what types of rhetorical approaches are effective under varying conditions. In what situations do various types of rhetoric fail and succeed? Indeed, the Academy of Management Review recently put out a call for papers on a special issue that will address these issues.

Health care reform efforts, in particular HIEs and models to reform care provision such as ACOs, provide a useful context for the studies I have suggested. This is true, for example, because of the federalist form of US government that involves multiple levels of analysis—local, state, and federal. Furthermore, the health care field has an abundance of data in public records. In fact, many of the studies reviewed in this chapter were conducted in health care settings.

In sum, as it currently stands, institutional theory is more coherent and compelling when it comes to explaining the conditions under which organizational practices become institutionalized than in explaining institutional change: why, and especially how, organizations or practices diverge from institutionalized templates. Yet in the past decade, much work has focused on the processes in institutional change. This work has produced a rich set of explanations for how change occurs. Such work holds the promise of supporting efforts to promote effective change in the health care field and advancing institutional and organization theory more generally.

Key Terms

  1. Accountable care organizations
  2. Deinstitutionalization
  3. Endogenous contradictions
  4. Exogenous shocks
  5. Field-level change
  6. Health insurance exchanges
  7. Institutional change
  8. Institutional entrepreneurship
  9. Institutional theory
  10. Institutionalization
  11. Intraorganizational dynamics
  12. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
  13. Patient-centered medical homes
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