Defense
A nation’s defense hinges on information and its analysis. That we live in an Information Age is redundant, but must be restated to truly appreciate the importance of it in terms of national defense. No matter how large an army or how impressive the technology, defense personnel must attain information literacy; the alternative is vulnerability.
Military science’s strategy, objectives and tactics are applicable to all aspects of defense, and are useful for considering the roles and relationships within information literacy. In this chapter I will consider the roles of Strategist (which will include objectives) and Tactician.
Information literacy and the intelligence cycle
Before approaching the above roles, it is worthwhile considering an important concept that drives the defense sector, namely the intelligence cycle. Like information literacy, depending on the department, the intelligence cycle comes with a variety of definitions. The United States’ CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) describes as its primary mission: ‘… collect, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the president and senior US government policymakers in making decisions relating to the national security’.1 However, the same nation’s FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) describes it in terms of the following components: ‘Planning and Direction’; ‘Collection’; ‘Processing and Exploitation’; ‘Analysis and Production’; ‘Dissemination’; and ‘Requirements’.2 Although the words differ, the missions are the same: attain information literacy in relation to defense.
As with information literacy, despite the different definitions, the intelligence cycle basically has four components: Plan, Collect, Process and Disseminate. The similarities between these components and those of information literacy are explicit:
Plan and Identify: strategists Plan missions just as seekers Identify topics.
Collect and Locate: operatives often do both primary and secondary research, and their secondary sources are actually the same types as those for the other sectors (e.g. books, articles, Web pages).
Process and Analyze: sources are evaluated for quality, and information for relevance.
Disseminate and Use: as with Use in information literacy, there are different ways that Disseminate can occur. However, there does seem to be a major difference: whereas the seekers themselves typically Use (i.e. act upon the culmination of the process), Disseminate often amounts to passing information to superiors who will act upon it.
Another similarity is that the intelligence cycle is most often a non-linear process: rarely are there standard start or end points. Although we must first Identify to become information literate, Identify sometimes changes based upon thinking during Locate or Analyze. This also applies with intelligence: Plan will be developed for a mission, but might be adjusted during Collect or Process. Additionally, if one information literacy component or one intelligence cycle is flawed, the whole suffers, leading to information illiteracy or a cycle of unintelligence.
The distinctions this book makes about primary and secondary research and information literacy are similar to those associated with the intelligence cycle’s open and closed sources. Open sources are available to anyone, whereas closed sources are covert. As with primary research in other sectors, defense seekers must pursue information from closed sources first-hand; by contrast, open sources are often the same as those associated with secondary research along with the resources used to Locate or Collect them.
Other than a few differences, the two resemble each other so much it makes one think if one came from the other. An argument that information literacy came from the intelligence cycle is the dates of origin of both: Zurkowski’s and Burchinal’s ideas were communicated in the 1970s, whereas many sources cite the modern-day intelligence cycle as becoming prominent with the beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s. It would definitely not be the first innovation that those within information literacy have borrowed from defense. Arguably, the greatest innovation in information literacy (perhaps the thing that put it in the forefront of librarianship and information studies) also comes from defense: the Internet (it is acknowledged that it was a defense response to perceived Cold War threats).
Strategist as seeker
Commanders in chief primarily decide national defense strategy. However, their decisions are often based upon information provided by high military command or experts in relevant fields. It is these personnel who often design the objectives of that strategy. It is hard to imagine that leaders at the strategic level would have to conduct much secondary research: they should already be aware of the theoretical information related to the mission that such sources provide. In fact, they themselves are probable information providers for them (e.g. authors, interviewees). They will need primary information, however, and most likely receive it from tactical personnel. Strategists Identify information needed from Locate, and use it for strategic development once it is disseminated.
At this point we encounter a dilemma concerning the distinction between primary and secondary sources. According to this book’s description, would not disseminated information of the type described above be secondary? After all, the strategist was not involved in Locate. Let us view this from an operational perspective. For example, field scouts report an enemy’s mortar arsenal. This information is then disseminated to a strategist. The strategist did not scout the encampments, and thus cannot see first-hand whether the number is accurate (unless the information comes from an IMINT branch; more on that below). However, when planning a strategy, as long as the information disseminated was collected from relevant and reliable tacticians, it is considered primary. An information literacy analogy in academics is co-authorship: co-authors work on separate aspects of a paper. Although co-authors may not Locate all the information (e.g. habits noted during an observation), for the purposes of the paper, it is still primary. The other author saw it second-hand, but for the paper as a whole, it is primary. For the strategy as a whole, tactical information disseminated to a strategist is primary.
Strategist as provider
Strategists often provide information within the intelligence cycle (e.g. sharing past experiences or subject knowledge). As already stated, people who decide strategy are, we hope, experts in the area. However, like administrators in other sectors, their main providing role is as facilitator. Analogous to the concept of strategy, and closely related, is government policy; policy dictates to procedures the whats, hows and whys, while strategy shares the same relationship to tactics.
A major part of strategic facilitation is training and logistics. Once strategy is planned, the most important thing strategists can do is enable their tacticians to succeed. This means supporting them with the equipment they need and how to use it. Although utilization of the skills developed is more under the auspices of tactics, it is strategists who determine and ensure training takes place. The effectiveness and relevance of it directly affects how well a mission is executed.
In addition to combat and reconnaissance skills, better awareness of the work in relation to the strategy and intelligence cycles should be given so that tactical personnel better realize their role, and that of the information they collect. By teaching and learning tactics from a cyclical perspective, all personnel will be able to better adapt and decide what information is most valuable to the mission and overall strategy. The same can be said about a seeker and information literacy: once Identify is fully understood, the training on Locate resources will better align with what he or she needs to accomplish.
In addition to training, providing a climate that allows for accurate dissemination is necessary for strategic success. There is a famous quote from the 1992 movie A Few Good Men where the colonel says ‘You can’t handle the truth!’ The quote was an accusation against strategists in general. The colonel justified his immoral actions and the concealment of them based upon his belief that his superiors would want him to do it that way: they wanted results, but no accountability for the methods used to attain them. If true, then the environment in which he operated was convoluted and counter to effective strategy facilitation.
Too often we hear ‘the boss only wants to know what he wants to know’. For the sake of information literacy, those who decide strategy and policy must facilitate an environment conducive to truth. If this is not the case, then not only will the intelligence cycle be a waste of time and resources, it could be immoral and/or a threat to national security.
Interview with an Egyptian Chief Officer: Colonel Osama AH-Esmet Mohamed El-Shenawy (translated by Sherif El-Shenawy)
Colonel El-Shenawy is stationed in Alexandria, Egypt. He is a graduate of the Academy of Police and Law in Cairo, and is currently pursuing a PhD to become a judge. He coordinates correctional facilities in north-east Egypt. Western readers might ask, ‘Why is he included in Defense: why not Justice?’ Due to the country’s regional problems with terrorism, Egyptians are forced to contend with defense issues internally as well as externally. Therefore, the Head of Correctional Facilities in Egypt is very much involved with the intelligence cycle; the Colonel reports directly to the Minister of the Interior, and sometimes provides security for the Egyptian President. He also works closely with the Egyptian military and American FBI: his ideas relating to defense strategy are heard at the executive level.
He was unfamiliar with the phrase ‘information literacy’, but is familiar with the intelligence cycle and considers information to be ‘very important’. He thinks the most valuable comes from undercover operatives. Once information is disseminated to him, he is largely concerned with processing (i.e. Analyze). However, he attributes the largest obstacle to strategic information literacy to be in collection (i.e. Locate). ‘Sometimes the people here are on a different “clock”, or should I say no clock at all. It can be very frustrating at times trying to get together with individuals to discuss very important information in a timely manner.’
Although adherence to the intelligence cycle and the experience and leadership of those in command is important to strategic defense, the Colonel believes that ultimately it depends upon individuals engaged in tactics: ‘I have been promoted several times, and I attribute my success to my loyal, hard-working staff.’ He predicts that more sophisticated communication techniques and equipment will ‘without a doubt’ provide more reliable information for strategic planning in the future. The key to utilization is to prepare tactical personnel: ‘… [we] need the right equipment, and properly trained individuals.’
Tactician as seeker
It is within the tactical divisions where most seeking for the intelligence cycle is done. Depending on the department and amount of money allocated to it, there are a variety of tactical personnel who collect, including librarians. As has been the case throughout this book, however, primary information (i.e. covert) is the major focus, and arguably the most important primary information is sought by soldiers or other types of field operatives. For example, if the strategy is to break an enemy’s internal communication link, then reconnaissance of the enemy is necessary. Information to seek includes: individuals or groups in communication, languages or codes, modes of technology, logistics and allies. Although satellite technology can capture a lot of information, there still needs to be a human element: technology is not sufficiently intuitive to understand the complexities and rituals of communication.
Due to the disseminated nature of the intelligence cycle, by being seekers, tacticians are generally simultaneously providers. The focus here is to collect and process, while the disseminate cycle carries over to strategists’ planning (again, a cycle).
Tactician as provider
Although different departments have different emphases and capabilities, there are five major disciplines that comprise collection within the intelligence cycle, and information literacy is critical to all of them. Not all nations have the technological or human resources to develop or utilize these tactical operations. Additionally, different defense departments put more emphasis on some divisions over others; emphasis will depend upon the tactical priority, agency policy, national strategy and budget. Regardless, information literacy in these divisions is synonymous with national security.
Again, these divisions relate to information seeking; however, due to the disseminated nature of the intelligence cycle, they are categorized as providers to strategists.
Human sources
The information collection department that deals with humans as information sources is commonly known as HUMINT (HUMan INTelligence): the espionage equivalent of interviews and observations. Unlike subject experts in academic research, HUMINT sources can be friendly, neutral or hostile. For hostile sources, counter-intelligence techniques are used to Locate and Analyze because such sources are inclined not to provide useful information. For example, a HUMINT agent might use reverse psychology to confuse a hostile source into providing information he or she does not want to provide. Unless there is some individual incentive offered, unlike in scholarship where the seeker should be as direct and explicit as possible, HUMINT agents must be indirect and subtle.
Although HUMINT seeks largely primary information, the successful agent will probably do some secondary research. For example, an undercover Mossad operative in Al-Qaeda territory had better know all there is to know about Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization, including cultural aspects of the group, much of which is available through open or secondary sources.
Technical sources
In general, there are four divisions that focus on the types of information that can be collected with technology. They have several names and subcategories, and sometimes their boundaries blur, but the following offer a general illustration of them.
IMINT (IMagery INTelligence) uses satellites and other aerial technology to capture images. The purpose is to understand an operating environment to minimize human risk. By taking photographs and infrared images, it is possible to learn about an enemy’s strongholds. GEOINT (GEOspatial INTelligence) is related, its focus being on land and water features.
Although a human should still be involved in processing, satellite technology eliminates the need for humans to collect data. If a plane or balloon is used, then a pilot and photographer are necessary; however, with improved satellite technology, the potential for higher resolution images and greater accuracy seems inevitable, and thus human intervention will probably be reduced.
MASINT (Measurement And Signal INTelligence). Unlike other departments that focus on collecting information, MASINT is largely a processing department. It involves analyzing enemy and friendly equipment performance under a variety of conditions. Two important pieces of MASINT technology are high-powered lenses and radar sensors. A goal is to process enough information to create equipment profiles.
SIGINT (SIGnals INTelligence) is the interception of signals between people, machines or various combinations thereof. Signals between people are handled by a subset called COMINT (COMmunications INTelligence); the subset for machines is ELINT (ELectronic INTelligence). ELINT is ever developing, and grows in importance with the collect cycle. Because so much communication takes place via electronic devices, it is imperative that defense not only identifies the signals, but also analyzes their sources and usage patterns.
OSINT (Open Source INTelligence) involves little of the traditional cloak-and-dagger suspense associated with the other departments. OSINT agents are basically librarians who locate data from openly available sources. Although some primary research technique might be conducted at this level (e.g. interviews, surveys), the emphasis is definitely on secondary information.
Tacticians can give direct information or facilitate information literacy. For example, when a tactician is questioned by an enemy HUMINT operative, that operative wants direct information that either ensures his or her country’s defense or compromises that of the tactician. Therefore, by providing misinformation the tactician actually avoids such compromise, and facilitates their own country’s defense or the other nation’s vulnerability. One would be hard pressed to justify such misinformation as legitimate information literacy-providing behavior in any other sector.
Another example of the dual direct/facilitator role applies to COMINT. Due to the heavy emphasis on communication in defense, COMINT is a major information literacy facilitator. For information to be processed and disseminated, it must be effectively transmitted. In addition to facilitating friendly transmissions and preventing leaks, by intercepting enemy transmissions, COMINT provides direct information.
Interview with an American Army Captain: anonymous
The Captain has combat experience in Iraq, serving a two-year tour from 2006 to 2008. He was injured in the line of duty, and currently is recovering from shrapnel wounds. He expects a full recovery, and will shortly be deployed to Afghanistan. His mission is to ‘kill and disrupt Al Qaeda forces and destroy the will of Al Qaeda sympathizers in the Triangle of Death’. To this end, he has a plethora of infantry training, including: Infantry Officer School Basic Course, Airborne, Ranger and various survivor courses.
Although he had not heard of the phrases ‘information literacy’ or ‘intelligence cycle’ they are definitely crucial to his work. I described to him the concept of HUMINT intelligence; in addition to combat soldier, he sees himself as a HUMINT operative. ‘That’s what we do: what we see on the ground is what MI [military intelligence] uses to paint their strategy.’ Through territorial patrol and interviews with Iraqis, he disseminates to high command a ‘Whiskey 5’ file, i.e. the ‘who, what, where, when and how’ of what transpires on the ground.
The Captain describes information in relation to defense tactics as ‘factual pieces that you need to acquire’. I asked if he can do his job without information literacy. ‘Yes, but you can lose lives and make things 100 times more difficult.’ He noted that in tactical defense ‘misinformation is worse than no information at all’. ‘I am trained to react to a situation without being given prior briefing, but if I’m operating under a false assumption then I or my men can die.’
The Captain associates himself most with the Locate (i.e. collect) component. ‘We are the eyes and ears on the ground.’ Due to the duality of the seeker/provider relationship, the Captain finds Use (i.e. disseminate) the most challenging component to pursue: ‘I have to make decisions, but also follow protocol.’ Whether he disseminates information or is expected to Use, ‘It’s hard because you can’t predict what’s going to happen. There are a lot of conflicting reports, and things change quickly. You have to be a flexible leader.’
The Captain predicts that the future of information literacy in defense lies with technology; but he disagrees with the emphasis. He used IMINT as an example: ‘They put all the money into the technology, but a satellite can’t distinguish attitudes, or age and gender.’ To illustrate, he described a time when on patrol he and his troops encountered about two dozen military-aged men dressed as farmers. Unlike most farmers, however, their family members were not present (e.g. no wives or children). Soon after, the ‘farmers’ fired at them.
‘How is a satellite going to tell you that? A lot of them [strategists] think they know it all thanks to their hightech satellite images. That’s good stuff, but the information it gives you isn’t going to help out a lot when the enemy is using guerrilla tactics … You have to meet them at their own game or you can’t win.’
Although the Captain believes too much emphasis is placed on technology, he does value the information that it provides. ‘They [human and technical source retrieval] need to be married together … but the technical needs to support the human, not the other way around.’
Issues
Torture
HUMINT operatives are probably most tempted to employ torture. A hostile source will not usually voluntarily provide information, yet it must be determined whether or not the source knows something important. Therefore, interrogation is necessary; however, when does interrogation become torture, and is it effective?
Along with describing it, several articles of the United Nations Convention of 1987 explicitly condemn torture as a means of interrogation:
‘For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions’.3
HUMINT is responsible for collecting and processing information, but is it responsible for human rights? Does a defense agency not have a duty to protect its nation by any means necessary? Which is more irresponsible: not abiding by the United Nations’ or Geneva War conventions or not doing what is most effective for national defense?
Every citizen is supposedly equal; therefore, if a HUMINT agent does not torture, then the expectation is that the agent’s fellow citizens will not be tortured. In this regard, by not torturing, agents facilitate national defense by preventing their own citizens’ torture. However, what if one of these enemy citizens possesses information that could save millions of lives, and there are known torture methods effective in making him or her talk? What if the tactician is ordered by higher level personnel to torture? An honorable information seeker will not torture human sources, but an honorable soldier must obey orders. These are the sorts of dilemmas that all defense personnel should be prepared to encounter.
1.Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/ [accessed 28 September 2009].
2.Federal Bureau of Investigation. Directorate of Intelligence. http://www.fbi.gov/intelligence/di_cycle.htm [accessed 28 September 2009].
3.Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm [accessed 29 September 2009].