Chapter 13
In This Chapter
Understanding the monopolist mindset
Seeing why consumers and society lose out under monopoly
Combating monopolies
You can relax — despite its title, this chapter has nothing to do with the board game Monopoly and so you don’t have to pick whether to be the dog or the car or whatever. You don’t even have to explain why you didn’t choose the iron (no one ever does). You may, however, come away with some better ideas for how to win the game, if you ever find yourself playing it.
The kind of monopoly we’re interested in is the opposite of a competitive market (which contains many firms, none of whom has a significant market share): In a monopoly, one firm supplies the entire market. As you can imagine, when the production of a good is under monopoly control, there are plenty of consequences, most of which make economists quake in their boots.
In this chapter, we show you that a monopolist behaves differently from a firm in a competitive market and consumers lose out as a result. We also have a word or two about some of the other consequences of monopolies and how to deal with them in the real world. Plus, we describe the case of when a natural monopoly arises.
But forgive us for, ahem, monopolizing your attention. We now get right into monopolies.
For a producer, a monopoly is a good thing to have. The absence of competition means you can make long-run profits — which would get competed away in a markets that had competition. If you supply the entire market, you can raise price higher than a competitive firm would without fear of being undercut. You may also get lazy and stop innovating when you’re not under any threat of an innovative competitor making a better product.
When you understand why profits are zero, and consumers get all the surplus in perfect competition (see Chapter 10), you will also see how monopolies do the opposite. Monopolies are better for the producer at the expense of the consumer and society as a whole.
In a competitive market, you use the structure of the supply and demand model in Chapter 9 to investigate the way prices, quantities, and equilibrium change in a given market. When you have perfect competition, you focus on the marginal company — as in Chapter 10 — because it helps to see how prices affect each firm’s decision and then you aggregate up to the industry level. In contrast, a monopoly firm supplies the whole market, and that means you want to look at its decisions in a slightly different way.
The supply curve for a “normal” (that is, not monopolized) market comes from adding up the marginal costs of producing outputs for each of the individual firms in the market at each quantity of output.
We now think about what the monopolist is doing and how this mindset compares to a company in a competitive market. Again, economists are focusing on decisions of the firm — what it will want to produce at what price and how much it will make for doing it. Let’s go through an example now.
To start, we assume that the monopolist, just like all the firms in this book, wants to maximize profits. With that in mind, let’s identify the profit-maximizing equilibrium for the monopoly. Figure 13-1 shows average and marginal cost curves looking more or less the way they do for a competitive firm (we define these curves in Chapter 7).
The monopolist is the only firm supplying this good, so the market demand curve (derived by adding up all the consumer demand curves) is the same as the firm’s demand curve. So, the demand or average revenue curve for the monopolist is downward sloping. How much this firm sells on the market affects market price. That’s of course not true for a perfectly competitive firm whose output choice does not affect market. This demand (or AR) curve can be expressed by the following formula:
where Q is quantity.
Now multiply both sides of the equation by Q to turn it into total revenues (TR):
Now the marginal revenue curve, the contribution made by selling each additional unit, is going to be the change in TR as quantity, Q, changes. In other words, marginal revenue (MR) is the slope of the total revenue (TR) curve.
You can find the slope in a lot of ways. Probably the easiest is to work it out on a diagram, but we’re going to use a little bit of calculus here and find the slope of TR by differentiating it with respect to Q:
Look at the resulting equation. The 10 (the intercept — the place where it crosses the axis) is the same on both the AR and MR equations, telling you that it crosses the vertical axis at the same place.
Remember the profit-maximizing condition: MC = MR. Here, the evil bean monopolies (and the evil bean counters who presumably work out how many beans they should produce) set their output to maximize profits and then read off the demand curve the price (which, remember, equals average revenue) that the beans command in the marketplace. Looking at Figure 13-1, you can see the big difference between the marginal cost price (Pc) that you’d get in a perfectly competitive industry and the monopoly price (Pm) that you see here. So, a profit-maximizing monopoly supplies less output at a higher price.
You may want to call shenanigans on the way we look at this issue; after all, we do everything in terms of quantity and only mention price right at the very end. Well, we do so for a very sensible reason.
Unless a monopolist can force price and quantity at the point of a gun, which in a marketplace they generally can’t, it must choose to work with either price or quantity, not both. In this case, we prefer to model monopolists as quantity setters to make comparisons across different types of market, so that we can use the same type of calculations to compare them.
So, the evil bean monopoly (picture a baked bean with a dismissive smirk on its face) is making the same type of decision but getting a higher price for its beans. Now, we look at its profits.
Again, remember that a firm in perfect competition makes in the long run economic profits of zero, and so the marginal firm is indifferent between being in the market and being out of it.
Remember profit are equal to total revenue less total cost.
And total revenue equals price multiplied by quantity. That means that we can rejig our equation a little by taking the quantity out of it. Total revenue divided by quantity is just price, and total costs divided by quantity are therefore average costs. So, to go through the stages:
Factor the terms on the right by quantity so that you can write Q out of the brackets:
If you take the markup on the right-hand side (price – average cost) and multiply it by quantity, you get the total level of profit, above zero, made by the monopoly.
We want to deal with one final implication of the model of a monopolist’s profit-maximizing choices here.
To see why, consider quickly the relationship between marginal revenue and demand (discussed in the earlier section “Thinking like a monopolist: It’s mine … all mine! Bwa-ha-ha!”). The marginal revenue curve crosses the quantity axis at exactly halfway down the demand curve.
In any particular market, welfare can be measured by the sum of producer and consumer surplus — see Chapter 9 for the definitions and an example of how this works. A monopoly is no exception.
The next section shows you what the deadweight loss is and three ways monopolies can get some of it back.
One of the costs of monopoly is the deadweight loss that results from monopolists producing less output compared to competitive firms.
In Figure 13-3, we make a little comparison between the two cases.
In a competitive market, equilibrium is achieved where demand and supply cross. Because the supply curve is the sum of marginal cost curves, you know that the market price is equal to the marginal cost of output at each firm. Fine!
But look at the evil bean monopoly mentioned earlier and see the difference. The bean monopoly produces an output level where MC = MR, which is less than in a competitive marketplace, which would produce up to the point where the marginal cost curve crosses the demand curve, where P = MC.
For economists, this deadweight loss is a troubling issue. They aim to see more produced for less resources overall, which happens in competitive markets. Economists can accept competition not being perfect, but when the monopoly makes higher profits and everyone loses out as a result, they start to get a little nervous. As a result, pretty much every economist since the days of Adam Smith has tried to find ways of preventing the monopoly situation from arising.
In competitive markets, firms sell at the same price — any attempt to raise price or charge consumers different prices is undermined by arbitrage. This restriction doesn’t hold for a monopolist, though. A monopolist can use three cunning ruses to grab some of the potential surplus in the market.
We start at the top with the case when a monopolist is able to charge every consumer a unique price for its product.
In this case, the evil bean (monopoly) company sells the same product (standard beans) at a different price to each consumer, such that each bean is sold to that consumer who values that bean most.
Figure 13-4 illustrates this scenario using a greatly simplified version of the earlier diagram (Figure 13-3). Here, the monopolist charges any consumer at the maximum price that they’re willing to pay for that good. As a result, the monopolist wants to sell to consumers as long as the price a consumer is willing to pay for that unit is greater than the marginal cost of that unit. The monopolist will produce up to where P = MC and extract every penny of consumer surplus. This means the consumer surplus that was lost when it charges a single price is now regained and goes to the monopolist. This eliminates the deadweight loss; but the real kicker is that all the welfare goes to the monopolist as producer surplus.
First degree price discrimination was considered to be exceptional or very rare indeed, to the extent that it only existed in textbooks, largely because when you think about the practicalities of charging everybody different prices you realize how difficult it would be. You would have to identify “who is who” on the demand curve and prevent arbitrage among consumers who could buy at a low price and resell at a higher price.
These challenges are less daunting with the advent of online transactions, big data, and auction-style markets. Now first degree price discrimination is much simpler. Firms can now track customers and learn a lot about their willingness to pay — and in the case of services like airlines, you can easily prevent resale of the ticket.
In second degree price discrimination, the price per unit paid by a consumer depends upon how much of the good (how many beans) the consumer buys.
Bulk discounts are an example. Here, the general principle is that the largest purchaser pays a lower per unit price because he buys a large quantity, whereas a consumer who buys a small quantity is charged a higher per unit price. The packaging of the goods makes it difficult for arbitrage — that is, difficult for the large purchaser to unbundle the package and resell it in smaller packages at a profit. Under second degree price discrimination, if two different consumers buy the same amount of the good, they pay the same amount. Differential pricing is based on quantity purchased by the consumer.
In contrast to first degree price discrimination, second degree price discrimination is relatively commonplace. Think for a moment about the market for soft drinks, typically sold by the wholesaler in cases of 24 cans. Suppose you operate a corner shop and sell, say, 5 cases a week, and charge a retail price of $1 per can. The wholesaler charges you $12 a case, making the cost to you equal to 50 cents per can. But now suppose the new supermarket around the corner is one branch of a large chain ordering 5,000 cases a week, and as a result the wholesaler is willing to charge only $5 a case. The cost to the supermarket of a can of soda is less than half yours. The supermarket can now undercut you while still making more money per can.
In third degree price discrimination the monopolist segments consumers into different groups, and while consumers in one group pay the same price as each other, the individual groups pay different prices from each other.
To dig a bit deeper, the monopolist charges a higher price to the group with the less elastic demand (who reveal themselves as willing to pay a little bit more). Our example here comes from our experience with students, who often tell us that they don’t have much money. Not having resources makes them a little more willing to shop around for better prices, which leads us to suspect that their demand is more elastic.
A monopolist supplier can therefore offer a lower price to students, who need to show their student ID when making the purchase, and a higher price to its other customers. Movie theaters and entertainment venues routinely do this. Similar cases exist with senior bus passes, or with mobile network services where the business market has a less elastic demand and correspondingly is charged more for services.
The real world has many examples of firms with some degree of market power doing something that isn’t exactly covered by the three cases in the preceding section but is related to them. These firms offer fundamentally the same product in different versions with different features enabled in the higher price version — in one case, a printer manufacturer offered exactly the same product but with a cable cut in the cheaper version, causing the higher value features to be disabled!
Another form of third degree price discrimination is to segment consumers in different geographic markets and sell the same product at different prices in different areas, capturing more of the value from the inelastic market.
A variant of this practice is common in the film and video entertainment industry, where a film is released in different windows. In the first window — or exhibition — the film is delivered to cinemas where those people who are most willing to pay go and see it earlier. Those who don’t want to take the distributor up on the offer have the option of waiting for the DVD window, where they can view the same film at a lower cost per view. At the ultimate end of the chain is exhibition via TV where people can eventually view the same film for nothing. In this case, the distributor passes through each window, selling the product for a slightly lower price each time until the market is fully served.
In a pure monopoly, and compared to a competitive firm, the quantity a monopoly supplies is lower and the price higher (see the preceding section for details). If the monopoly charges only one price, the monopoly results in a deadweight loss, because producer and consumer surplus are lost. But if by charging different prices to each consumer or group of consumers, the monopolist supplies more output, this mitigates against the efficiency loss. However, the surplus typically goes to the monopolist in terms of higher profits. In addition, if barriers to enter the industry are high, monopolies are also likely to be less innovative because they aren’t subject to pressure from competitors.
Economists consider all these features of monopoly to be undesirable. The question is what to do about them.
Tackling monopolies is a little tricky, because the solution depends crucially on how a monopoly comes about.
For instance, Google search gets better the more people use it, because using it gives Google more data about what people search for and how, and this helps Google refine their algorithm. More users beget more users, leading to a situation where Google is the dominant search engine in the market.
Another type of legal monopoly is when intellectual property, such as patents or copyrights, have been granted. In this case, a person or firm is permitted to have a temporary monopoly in order to give people an incentive to do expensive research and development.
The U.S. courts have interpreted antitrust law to mean that monopoly is not unlawful per se, but is unlawful if acquired through prohibited conduct that is seen as anticompetitive. So, a firm simply operating more efficiently than everyone else and therefore getting bigger than all its rivals is fine. But when in a dominant position, the firm can’t engage in behavior that disadvantages other smaller rivals from competing. These behaviors include the following:
Okay, we admit that this heading’s phrasing scans much better with Carole King and Gerry Goffin’s original words, but in this section we describe how a monopoly can come about simply because it is efficient to have only one company serve a market. Water and wastewater networks and sewage treatment plants are natural monopolies and as a result run as public utilities typically owned by local government. Few persuasive arguments can be made that a community would be better off if government broke it up.
When the MES of the firm serving that market is small, firms can operate at their most efficient scale when holding only a small fraction of the market. Therefore you’re likely to see the market as being competitively supplied. If, however, MES is very close to or even greater than the total demand in that market, that market is only ever likely to be supplied by one firm.
The question for economists is what to do about this situation, given that they don’t like monopolies very much. One option for dealing with natural monopoly, where you don’t expect much benefit to result from breaking the firm up, is to set up a system of regulation instead.