CDO MARKET AND THE HEALTH OF BANKING

CDOs and their impact on the global financial system have been an intensively debated topic of late. U.K. regulator Howard Davies is credited with a statement wherein he equated CDOs with the toxic waste of investment banking. Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank during his term in office reiterated on several occasions his unwavering acclaim for CDOs as responsible for maintaining the health of the global banking system. In a speech to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 41st Annual Conference on Bank Structure, Chicago, Illinois on May 5, 2005, he stated:
 
As is generally acknowledged, the development of credit derivatives has contributed to the stability of the banking system by allowing banks, especially the largest, systemically important banks, to measure and manage their credit risks more effectively. In particular, the largest banks have found single-name credit default swaps a highly attractive mechanism for reducing exposure concentrations in their loan books while allowing them to meet the needs of their largest corporate customers. But some observers argue that what is good for the banking system may not be good for the financial system as a whole. They are concerned that banks’ efforts to lay off risk using credit derivatives may be creating concentrations of risk outside the banking system that could prove a threat to financial stability. A particular concern has been that, as credit spreads widen appreciably at some point from the extraordinarily low levels that have prevailed in recent years, losses to nonbank risk-takers could force them to liquidate their positions in credit markets and thereby magnify and accelerate the widening of credit spreads.52
During the aftermath of the subprime crisis, lots of people spat venom on CDOs and structured products. There was an extent of over-enthused activity in the CDO space, and in a benign market, it is argued by some that it is quite possible that rating agencies went easy, buoyed by their models that looked at historical defaults. CDO structurers went to heights of optimism, ignoring the correlation risk that might exacerbate in a credit downturn. In principle, however, a CDO as a collective structured investment vehicle is based on a sound footing.

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